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Abstract	  This	  thesis	  adopts	  a	  supply-­‐side	  approach	  to	  understanding	  poor	  law	  expenditure.	  It	  investigates	  the	  reasons	  for	  variations	  in	  relief	  spending	  by	  poor	  law	  unions,	  the	  local	  government	  organisations	  responsible	  for	  poor	  relief	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  from	  -./0	  to	  -2/3,	  and	  makes	  important	  new	  contributions	  to	  the	  historiography	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  in	  three	  key	  ways:	  First,	  it	  emphasises	  the	  signi/icance	  of	  different	  types	  of	  places.	  As	  indoor	  relief	  grew,	  particularly	  in	  urban	  settings,	  the	  poor	  law	  was	  increasingly	  important	  in	  local	  economies	  as	  a	  buyer	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  Second,	  it	  shows	  that	  these	  transactions	  were	  socially	  embedded,	  based	  as	  they	  were	  on	  relationships	  between	  administrators	  and	  suppliers.	  Third,	  it	  demonstrates	  that	  these	  social	  transactions	  could	  affect	  the	  local	  costs	  of	  buying	  goods,	  and	  thereby	  the	  relief	  policies	  and	  practices	  which	  shaped	  paupers’	  experiences.	  Using	  geographical	  information	  systems	  techniques,	  it	  develops	  a	  spatial	  understanding	  of	  relief	  and	  suggests	  new	  ways	  of	  measuring	  the	  costs	  and	  types	  of	  poor	  law	  practices.	  It	  queries	  the	  conception	  of	  a	  north-­‐south	  divide	  in	  generosity	  of	  relief	  and	  suggests	  that	  paupers	  saw	  greater	  differences	  between	  rural	  and	  urban	  unions.	  Moreover,	  it	  argues	  that	  variations	  in	  relief	  practices	  need	  to	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  local	  'inancial	  management.	  It	  analyses	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  unions	  contracted	  for	  provisions,	  and	  relates	  relief	  expenditure	  to	  local	  costs	  of	  goods.	  By	  investigating	  the	  supply	  of	  goods	  to	  unions	  across	  England	  and	  Wales	  it	  demonstrates	  the	  social	  signi3icance	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  for	  local	  economies,	  not	  just	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  impact	  on	  poverty,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  consumer	  of	  goods	  and	  a	  source	  of	  revenue	  for	  businesses.	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! Introduction	  	  
1.1 New	  geographies	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  In	  $%&'	  the	  destitute	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  had	  a	  new	  environment	  of	  rights,	  responsibilities	  and	  hazards	  to	  navigate,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Amendment	  Act.1	  Since	  the	  end	  of	  Elizabeth’s	  reign,	  some	  78,898	  parishes	  had	  been	  responsible	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  relief.2	  Each	  had	  its	  own	  practices	  and	  policies,	  and	  reformers	  pointed	  to	  the	  social	  and	  economic	  ills	  which	  resulted	  from	  this	  patchwork	  of	  administration.	  The	  new	  poor	  law,	  the	  framework	  for	  poor	  relief	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  which	  persisted	  until	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  brought	  this	  local	  administration	  of	  relief	  under	  unprecedented	  central	  government	  scrutiny.	  Parishes	  were	  now	  encouraged	  to	  come	  together	  as	  poor	  law	  unions	  run	  by	  elected	  guardians,	  with	  the	  object	  of	  easing	  the	  tax	  burden	  for	  ratepayers	  by	  reducing	  the	  number	  of	  paupers	  and	  by	  cutting	  costs.	  	  The	  old	  law,	  argued	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  1234	  report	  of	  the	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  Poor	  Laws,	  was	  characterised	  by	  overly	  generous	  hand-­‐outs	  and	  comfortable	  workhouse	  provision	  which	  did	  nothing	  to	  discourage	  idleness.3	  In	  those	  rural	  areas	  where	  seasonal	  employment	  was	  especially	  important,	  local	  landowners	  were	  accused	  of	  supporting	  a	  welfare	  system	  in	  which	  ratepayers	  subsidised	  farm	  labour	  off-­‐season	  by	  indiscriminately	  topping	  up	  the	  wages	  of	  able-­‐bodied	  workers.4	  Within	  a	  few	  months	  of	  the	  report’s	  publication,	  Parliament	  under	  Earl	  Grey’s	  Whig	  government	  passed	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Amendment	  Act,	  bringing	  reform	  to	  the	  system	  broadly	  along	  the	  lines	  proposed	  by	  the	  Commission.	  	  Parishes	  would	  be	  grouped	  into	  unions,	  so	  they	  could	  enjoy	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  more	  ef1icient	  administration.	  The	  use	  of	  payments	  in	  cash	  or	  in	  kind	  (‘outdoor’	  relief),	  for	  able-­‐bodied	  males	  at	  least,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  !	  &	  $	  Will.	  IV,	  c.	  -..	  An	  Act	  for	  the	  Amendment	  and	  Better	  Administration	  of	  the	  Laws	  relating	  to	  the	  Poor	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  (*+,-).	  2	  !"	  Eliz.,	  c.	  +.	  An	  Acte	  for	  the	  Reliefe	  of	  the	  Poore	  (7897).	  3	  Parliamentary	  Papers	  (PP)	  !"#$	  XXVII	  !	  -­‐	  XXXIX	  #:	  Report	  from	  His	  Majesty’s	  Commissioners	  for	  inquiring	  into	  the	  Administration	  and	  Practical	  Operation	  of	  the	  Poor	  Laws.	  4	  S.G.	  Checkland	  and	  E.O.A.	  Checkland	  (eds.),	  The	  Poor	  Law	  Report	  of	  $%&'	  (Harmondsworth:	  Penguin,	  )*+,),	  p.	  01.	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was	  to	  be	  discouraged	  in	  favour	  of	  relief	  inside	  the	  workhouse	  (‘indoor’	  relief).	  To	  encourage	  this	  class	  of	  person	  to	  2ind	  employment,	  rather	  than	  apply	  for	  relief,	  indoor	  relief	  was	  to	  be	  governed	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  ‘less	  eligibility’:	  that	  conditions	  in	  the	  workhouse	  should	  be	  no	  better	  than	  those	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  lowest-­‐paid	  independent	  labourer.	  This,	  reformers	  believed,	  would	  reduce	  applications	  for	  relief	  and	  therefore	  overall	  expenditure.	  Little	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  was	  entirely	  new,	  however,	  and	  some	  localities	  had	  adopted	  one	  or	  other	  of	  the	  policies	  embodied	  in	  the	  legislation	  well	  before	  4567.5	  Poor	  relief	  was	  to	  continue	  to	  be	  funded	  by	  a	  parish-­‐based	  rate,	  and	  in	  the	  -irst	  three	  decades	  of	  its	  operation	  parishes	  still	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  cost	  of	  relieving	  their	  respective	  paupers.6	  	  The	  most	  visible	  change	  in	  central	  government	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Amendment	  Act	  was	  the	  institution	  of	  a	  new	  authority	  –	  initially	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commission	  (PLC)	  –	  charged	  with	  imposing	  a	  degree	  of	  uniformity	  on	  unions	  by	  suppressing	  unlawful	  practices	  and	  encouraging	  the	  use	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  less	  eligibility.	  The	  PLC	  was	  replaced	  in	  789:	  by	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  (PLB),	  which	  was	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board	  (LGB)	  in	  7897.	  The	  new	  poor	  law	  guardians,	  elected	  by	  ratepayers,	  had	  much	  less	  discretion	  over	  relief	  practices	  under	  the	  new	  law	  than	  the	  local	  of2icials	  who	  had	  formerly	  administered	  relief.	  However,	  it	  was	  not	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  central	  authority	  to	  ensure	  every	  aspect	  of	  relief	  was	  identical	  across	  the	  country.	  Expenditure	  and	  types	  of	  relief	  varied	  widely	  between	  unions	  throughout	  the	  life	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law.	  	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  variation	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  thesis.	  Historians	  have	  so	  far	  explained	  differences	  primarily	  by	  local	  divergence	  in	  policy	  and	  by	  the	  uneven	  demand	  for	  poor	  relief.	  This	  thesis	  examines	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  administrative	  units	  could	  be	  unions	  of	  parishes	  under	  the	  new	  poor	  law,	  unions	  under	  Gilbert’s	  Act	  1234	  (!!	  Geo.	  III,	  c.	  *+.	  An	  Act	  for	  the	  better	  Relief	  and	  Employment	  of	  the	  Poor),	  incorporations	  under	  local	  acts,	  or	  single	  parishes	  either	  under	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  or	  $%	  Eliz	  c.	  ,,	  depending	  on	  how	  and	  when	  they	  were	  formed.	  The	  term	  ‘union’	  is	  used	  in	  this	  thesis	  to	  encompass	  all	  these	  types	  of	  unit,	  unless	  indicated	  otherwise.	  6	  Until	  the	  Union	  Chargeability	  Act:	  34	  &	  !"	  Vict.,	  c.	  *".	  An	  Act	  to	  Provide	  for	  the	  Better	  Distribution	  of	  the	  Charge	  for	  the	  Relief	  of	  the	  Poor	  in	  Unions	  (6789).	  See	  M.	  Caplan,	  ‘The	  new	  poor	  law	  and	  the	  struggle	  for	  union	  chargeability’,	  International	  Review	  of	  Social	  History	  !":!	  ("#$%),	  pp.	  +,$-­‐!"".	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explanations	  are	  adequate,	  and	  seeks	  to	  add	  to	  our	  understanding	  by	  investigating	  how	  far	  variations	  in	  local	  relief	  expenditure	  and	  policy	  were	  linked	  to	  the	  local	  costs	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  Boards	  of	  guardians	  made	  decisions	  about	  relieving	  paupers	  using	  a	  complex	  matrix	  of	  considerations	  including	  ideas	  about	  moral	  hazard,	  individual	  worth,	  local	  independence	  and	  expense.	  Yet	  expense	  has	  been	  understood	  primarily	  as	  a	  function	  of	  pauper	  numbers,	  and	  not	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  unions	  to	  fund	  expenditure	  nor	  to	  the	  differing	  local	  prices	  suppliers	  charged	  them.	  In	  examining	  these	  costs,	  this	  study	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  business	  practices	  and	  networks	  that	  developed	  to	  supply	  the	  local	  poor	  law.	  	  The	  approaches	  taken	  in	  this	  study	  work	  towards	  a	  redrawing	  of	  the	  geographies	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law.	  In	  particular,	  this	  thesis	  adopts	  a	  relational	  conception	  of	  the	  scales	  at	  which	  the	  poor	  law	  operated:	  Using	  statistical	  analysis	  and	  geographical	  information	  systems	  (GIS)	  techniques,	  it	  considers	  data	  for	  all	  unions	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  permitting	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  national	  picture	  over	  time	  yet	  with	  an	  unprecedented	  level	  of	  local	  detail.	  It	  promotes	  a	  more	  nuanced	  appreciation	  of	  the	  regionality	  of	  relief,	  highlighting	  the	  ,lows	  between	  the	  national,	  regional	  and	  local.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  considering	  the	  practices	  of	  a	  number	  of	  case	  studies	  within	  their	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  contexts,	  and	  suggests	  that	  poor	  law	  unions	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  integral	  parts	  of	  their	  local	  and	  wider	  communities	  through	  their	  interactions	  with	  business,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  paupers.	  The	  poor	  law	  must	  therefore	  be	  conceptualised	  as	  a	  dynamic	  network	  of	  relationships	  and	  0lows,	  with	  different	  features	  emergent	  at	  different	  scales,	  and	  not	  simply	  as	  a	  static	  framework	  within	  which	  policy	  was	  created,	  implemented	  or	  resisted.	  	  
1.2 Historiographical	  approaches	  to	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  This	  conceptualisation	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  approaches	  taken	  by	  many	  scholars	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law,	  which	  broadly	  can	  be	  said	  to	  fall	  into	  two	  classes.	  One,	  the	  ‘institutional’	  approach,	  emphasises	  the	  government	  and	  administration	  of	  poor	  relief.	  The	  other,	  with	  a	  ‘demand-­‐side’	  slant,	  seeks	  to	  understand	  who	  paupers	  were	  and	  the	  forms	  their	  relief	  took.	  Such	  categories	  are	  not	  mutually	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exclusive,	  and	  within	  them	  can	  be	  found	  very	  different	  methodologies	  and	  !indings.	  In	  focusing	  on	  the	  ways	  that	  the	  administration	  of	  poor	  relief	  was	  embedded	  in	  local	  economies	  through	  business	  relationships,	  this	  thesis	  takes	  a	  ‘supply-­‐side’	  approach,	  spanning	  the	  two.	  	  
1.2.1 Institutional	  histories	  The	  traditional	  institutional	  narrative	  can	  be	  summarised	  thus:	  Before	  &'()	  the	  central	  authority	  tried	  to	  abolish	  outdoor	  relief	  entirely	  but	  failed	  because	  of	  real	  economic	  conditions,	  especially	  cyclical	  unemployment	  in	  industrial	  areas	  and	  seasonal	  unemployment	  in	  agricultural	  areas.	  This	  disposed	  boards	  of	  guardians,	  composed	  of	  farmers,	  shopkeepers,	  gentry	  and	  other	  interested	  parties,	  to	  offer	  doles	  to	  the	  underemployed,	  in	  contravention	  of	  the	  ‘principles	  of	  -./0’	  promoted	  by	  the	  central	  authority.7	  After	  '()*,	  a	  policy	  drive	  by	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board,	  backed	  by	  social	  movements	  calling	  for	  greater	  individual	  responsibility	  on	  the	  part	  of	  paupers,	  resulted	  in	  a	  new	  emphasis	  on	  indoor	  relief.	  However,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  workhouses	  built	  to	  deter	  the	  able-­‐bodied	  had	  become	  unsuited	  to	  their	  increasingly	  elderly	  and	  in-irm	  populations.	  The	  institutional	  approach	  is	  exempli'ied	  by	  the	  work	  of	  Beatrice	  and	  Sidney	  Webb,	  in	  whose	  long	  shadows	  so	  much	  of	  poor	  law	  history	  has	  been	  written.	  Attempts	  by	  the	  centre	  to	  end	  outdoor	  relief	  were	  core	  to	  their	  narrative,	  both	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  contemporary	  policy	  and	  as	  an	  historical	  account.	  For	  the	  Webbs,	  the	  persistence	  of	  outdoor	  relief	  was	  attributable	  to	  the	  piecemeal	  way	  in	  which	  the	  central	  authority	  imposed	  its	  will	  on	  unions.8	  In	  other	  words,	  local	  practices	  were	  a	  function	  of	  national	  political	  will.	  For	  many	  historians	  since	  the	  Webbs,	  the	  key	  question	  has	  been	  the	  strength	  of	  local	  resistance	  to	  central	  policy.9	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  K.	  Williams,	  From	  Pauperism	  to	  Poverty	  (London:	  Routledge	  &	  Kegan	  Paul,	  3453),	  pp.	  9:-­‐!,	  $%.	  8	  S.	  Webb	  and	  B.	  Webb,	  English	  Poor	  Law	  Policy	  (London:	  Longmans,	  Green	  &	  Co,	  2324),	  p.	  34.	  9	  Crowther,	  for	  instance,	  describes	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  as	  ’a	  striking	  example	  of	  central	  policy	  contending	  against	  local	  independence’	  characterised	  by	  ’great	  differences	  of	  practice	  in	  the	  localities’:	  M.A.	  Crowther,	  The	  Workhouse	  System	  /012-­‐!"#":	  The	  History	  of	  an	  English	  Social	  
Institution	  (London:	  Batsford	  Academic	  &	  Educational,	  %&'%),	  p.	  +.	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Other	  investigations	  into	  the	  poor	  law	  have	  argued	  that	  this	  was	  a	  multilateral	  process	  and	  that	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  how	  central	  government	  policy	  was	  implemented	  locally	  was	  the	  relationship	  between	  unions	  and	  central	  authority.	  It	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  know	  that	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commissioners	  issued	  an	  order	  prohibiting	  outdoor	  relief,	  argues	  Dunkley,	  for	  instance;	  equally	  important	  were	  whether	  the	  guardians	  resisted	  it,	  and	  whether	  the	  local	  assistant	  commissioner	  pressed	  for	  strict	  adherence	  to	  the	  regulations.10	  There	  were	  local	  political	  issues	  in	  adopting	  central	  government’s	  agenda.	  For	  example,	  internal	  considerations	  regarding	  the	  ‘crusade’	  against	  outdoor	  relief	  in	  the	  '()*s	  had	  a	  signi/icant	  effect	  on	  relief	  expenditure,	  as	  Hurren	  shows.11	  Local	  government	  was	  used	  to	  continuing	  independence	  from	  central	  government,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  guardians	  were	  willing	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  was	  an	  expression	  of	  this.12	  For	  Driver,	  a	  map	  of	  workhouse	  building	  expenditure	  serves	  as	  a	  map	  of	  the	  varying	  results	  of	  local-­‐national	  power	  relations.13	  Alternative	  approaches	  emphasise	  that	  the	  poor	  law	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  essentially	  an	  expression	  of	  local	  politics,	  with	  the	  central	  authority	  being	  of	  secondary	  importance.14	  	  Local	  resistance	  to	  central	  power	  is	  a	  somewhat	  simplistic	  characterisation	  of	  the	  relationships	  in	  question,	  though.	  First,	  the	  reasons	  behind	  guardians’	  objections	  to	  central	  policy	  had	  much	  to	  do	  with	  the	  locally	  prevailing	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions.	  As	  Boyer	  shows,	  for	  instance,	  industrial	  cities	  in	  the	  north-­‐west	  of	  England	  persisted	  in	  granting	  outdoor	  relief	  to	  the	  able-­‐bodied	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  P.	  Dunkley,	  ‘The	  ‘Hungry	  Forties’	  and	  the	  New	  Poor	  Law:	  A	  Case	  Study’,	  Historical	  Journal	  !":$	  ("#$%),	  pp.	  +,#-­‐!"#.	  11	  E.T.	  Hurren,	  Protesting	  about	  Pauperism:	  Poverty,	  Politics	  and	  Poor	  Relief	  in	  Late-­‐Victorian	  
England,	  )*+,-­‐!"##	  (Woodbridge:	  Royal	  Historical	  Society/Boydell	  Press,	  9::;).	  12	  See	  also	  J.	  Prest,	  Liberty	  and	  Locality:	  Parliament,	  Permissive	  Legislation,	  and	  Ratepayers’	  
Democracies	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  2334),	  pp.	  224-­‐!!.	  13	  F.	  Driver,	  Power	  and	  Pauperism:	  The	  Workhouse	  System,	  89:;-­‐!""#	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  -../),	  p.	  -34.	  14	  D.	  Fraser,	  Urban	  Politics	  in	  Victorian	  England:	  The	  Structure	  of	  Politics	  in	  Victorian	  Cities	  (Leicester:	  Leicester	  University	  Press,	  1234),	  p.	  88;	  A.L.	  Brundage,	  ‘The	  landed	  interest	  and	  the	  New	  Poor	  Law:	  A	  reappraisal	  of	  the	  revolution	  in	  government.’,	  English	  Historical	  Review	  !":$%&	  ("#$%),	  pp.	  %+-­‐!";	  P.	  Dunkley,	  ‘The	  landed	  interest	  and	  the	  new	  Poor	  Law	  :	  a	  critical	  note.’,	  
English	  Historical	  Review	  !!:#$%	  (#%()),	  pp.	  !).-­‐!".	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into	  the	  ()*!s,	  in	  de)iance	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  3456	  act.15	  Even	  where	  the	  theories	  behind	  poor	  law	  amendment	  were	  considered	  sound,	  theory	  was	  put	  aside	  in	  times	  of	  economic	  distress	  when	  guardians	  were	  forced	  to	  cope	  with	  unemployed	  able-­‐bodied	  men	  facing	  starvation.	  The	  persistence	  of	  allowances	  into	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	  was	  therefore	  a	  result	  of	  expedience.16	  In	  rural	  unions	  whose	  boards	  were	  dominated	  by	  farmers,	  for	  instance,	  allowances	  as	  part	  of	  outdoor	  relief	  were	  used	  to	  manage	  the	  labour	  supply.17	  	  A	  second	  criticism	  of	  the	  model	  of	  central-­‐local	  antagonism	  is	  that	  dislike	  of	  the	  new	  regime,	  if	  and	  where	  it	  occurred,	  could	  co-­‐exist	  with	  the	  adoption	  of	  its	  standards.	  The	  central	  authority	  did	  not	  attempt	  to	  impose	  its	  policies	  unilaterally	  on	  unions,	  and	  was	  fairly	  receptive	  to	  suggestions	  for	  change	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  as	  Ogborn	  points	  out.18	  Moreover,	  the	  exercise	  of	  local	  autonomy	  was	  not	  always	  a	  reactionary	  force	  and	  policy	  was	  the	  product	  of	  continual	  negotiation.19	  Personal	  dealings	  were	  often	  key,	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  importance	  of	  relationships	  between	  assistant	  commissioners	  and	  guardians	  in	  putting	  key	  union	  of-icers	  in	  post.20	  	  A	  third	  factor	  complicating	  the	  central-­‐local	  model	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  either	  central	  or	  local	  government	  had	  full	  capacity	  to	  respond	  effectively	  to	  circumstances.	  London	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  Local	  particularism	  helped	  de3ine	  London’s	  relief	  practices	  before	  and	  after	  2345,	  with	  parishes	  often	  having	  their	  own	  individual	  constitutions	  created	  ad	  hoc	  by	  local	  acts	  concerning	  relief,	  rates	  and	  assessment.	  Popular	  radicalism,	  the	  defence	  of	  parochial	  rights	  and	  the	  signi,icant	  advantages	  of	  patronage	  also	  found	  expression	  in	  London’s	  vestries,	  making	  it	  dif3icult	  for	  the	  central	  authority	  to	  impose	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  G.R.	  Boyer,	  An	  Economic	  History	  of	  the	  English	  Poor	  Law,	  2345-­‐!"#$	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  -../),	  pp.	  345-­‐!.	  16	  D.	  Eastwood,	  Governing	  rural	  England:	  Tradition	  and	  transformation	  in	  local	  government,	  
!"#$-­‐!"#$	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  2334),	  p.	  289.	  17	  A.	  Digby,	  ‘The	  rural	  poor	  law’,	  in	  D.	  Fraser	  (ed),	  The	  New	  Poor	  Law	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century	  (London:	  Macmillan,	  /012),	  pp.	  /61-­‐!.	  18	  M.	  Ogborn,	  ‘Local	  power	  and	  state	  regulation	  in	  nineteenth	  century	  Britain’,	  Transactions	  of	  
the	  Institute	  of	  British	  Geographers	  !":"	  (%&&"),	  pp.	  "%+-­‐!!".	  19	  Williams,	  From	  Pauperism	  to	  Poverty,	  p.	  %&.	  20	  P.	  Harling,	  ‘The	  Power	  of	  Persuasion:	  Central	  Authority,	  Local	  Bureaucracy	  and	  the	  New	  Poor	  Law’,	  English	  Historical	  Review	  !"#:%&&	  (!))&),	  pp.	  ."-­‐!".	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will.	  Nonetheless,	  conditions	  in	  London	  lent	  themselves	  to	  the	  proliferation	  of	  institutional	  relief.	  The	  capital’s	  growth	  rate	  made	  outdoor	  relief	  dif+icult	  to	  administer	  and	  it	  had	  a	  greater	  proportion	  of	  casual	  poor	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.21	  Its	  poor	  law	  authorities	  also	  found	  it	  almost	  impossible	  to	  enforce	  the	  settlement	  laws	  which	  dictated	  which	  parish	  was	  responsible	  for	  relieving	  a	  pauper	  (which	  could	  entail	  the	  person’s	  removal	  to	  another	  part	  of	  the	  country),	  a	  problem	  that	  most	  unions	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  did	  not	  have.	  Unions	  in	  the	  East	  End	  gained	  a	  reputation	  for	  running	  the	  harshest	  workhouse	  regimes	  as	  they	  fought	  to	  provide	  as	  little	  relief	  as	  possible	  given	  their	  small	  rate	  base,	  and	  expenditure	  fell	  in	  the	  West	  End	  and	  City	  as	  their	  populations	  declined.22	  
1.2.2 Demand	  for	  relief	  The	  example	  of	  London	  shows	  that	  the	  numbers	  and	  types	  of	  people	  applying	  for	  relief	  were	  just	  as	  signi0icant	  as	  the	  institutional	  networks	  that	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  demand.	  Different	  types	  of	  paupers	  required	  different	  institutional	  responses.	  Relief	  practices	  in	  urban	  places	  with	  high	  numbers	  of	  vagrants	  would	  therefore	  not	  be	  the	  same	  as	  those	  whose	  dealing	  largely	  with	  the	  elderly	  and	  in#irm.23	  Immigrant	  paupers	  also	  cost	  more,	  judging	  from	  areas	  with	  relatively	  high	  populations	  of	  incomers,	  such	  as	  the	  Irish	  in	  Liverpool,	  Manchester,	  Bradford	  and	  East	  London.24	  	  Some	  studies	  have	  emphasised	  more	  fundamental	  aspects	  of	  demographic	  structure	  as	  the	  drivers	  for	  local	  relief	  practices.	  Before	  )*+,,	  for	  example,	  settlement	  and	  rating	  laws	  were	  based	  on	  the	  parish	  unit.25	  Unions	  composed	  of	  predominantly	  rural	  parishes	  which	  also	  included	  a	  single	  parish	  with	  a	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  D.R.	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  Pauper	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  the	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  Feldman,	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  The	  Solidarities	  of	  
Strangers:	  The	  English	  Poor	  Laws	  and	  the	  People,	  7899-­‐!"#$	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  '(()),	  p.	  --..	  25	  Union	  Chargeability	  Act	  (3456).	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high-­‐density	  population	  –	  for	  example,	  a	  market	  town	  with	  an	  agricultural	  hinterland	  –	  had	  a	  different	  tax-­‐base	  and	  expenditure	  pro/ile	  to	  those	  which	  were	  predominantly	  urban.26	  Agrarian	  migration	  also	  had	  a	  role,	  and	  there	  was	  possibly	  a	  relationship	  between	  enclosure	  and	  higher	  poor	  law	  expenditure.27	  	  The	  modern	  consensus	  is	  that	  socio-­‐economic	  causes	  of	  poverty	  were	  behind	  much	  of	  the	  local	  variation	  in	  demand	  for	  relief.	  Central	  government	  believed	  that	  the	  number	  of	  indoor	  poor	  was	  connected	  to	  economic	  conditions,	  and	  that	  improvements	  in	  workhouse	  conditions	  only	  had	  a	  marginal	  effect	  on	  indoor	  pauperism,	  whereas	  the	  amount	  of	  outdoor	  relief	  was	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  result	  of	  local	  policy.28	  The	  Webbs,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  believed	  that	  economic	  conditions	  had	  ‘little	  or	  no	  effect	  on	  numbers	  relieved,	  either	  in	  or	  out	  of	  the	  workhouse’	  but	  that	  the	  type	  of	  relief	  was	  important:	  denying	  outdoor	  relief	  deterred	  pauperism.29	  It	  is	  plausible	  that	  economic	  factors	  combined	  with	  political:	  Mackinnon	  suggests	  that	  changes	  in	  the	  trade	  cycle	  were	  responsible	  for	  short-­‐term	  variations	  in	  indoor	  pauperism,	  but	  policy	  could	  have	  a	  ‘considerable’	  effect	  on	  pauperism	  in	  the	  long	  term.30	  Pauperism	  itself	  was	  socially	  constructed,	  and	  not	  simply	  an	  economic	  fact	  independent	  of	  cultural	  meaning.	  There	  was,	  moreover,	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  variation	  in	  conceptualisations	  of	  paupers.31	  Pauperism	  was	  not	  a	  measure	  of	  poverty	  but	  rather	  of	  local	  decisions	  about	  welfare	  entitlement	  connected	  to	  of#icials’	  understandings	  of	  gender,	  age	  and	  ethnicity.32	  This	  had	  a	  geographical	  dimension,	  with	  industrial	  urbanised	  areas	  showing	  far	  lower	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  Caplan,	  ‘Union	  chargeability’.	  27	  K.D.M.	  Snell,	  Annals	  of	  the	  Labouring	  Poor:	  Social	  Change	  and	  Agrarian	  England	  9::;-­‐!"##	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  56!"),	  pp.	  ()*-­‐!"#.	  28	  M.	  MacKinnon,	  ‘Poor	  Law	  Policy,	  Unemployment	  and	  Pauperism’,	  Explorations	  in	  Economic	  
History	  !":"	  (&'()),	  p.	  "&..	  29	  S.	  Webb	  and	  B.	  Webb,	  English	  Local	  Government,	  vol.	  5:	  English	  Poor	  Law	  History	  Part	  II:	  The	  
last	  hundred	  years	  (London:	  Longmans,	  Green	  &	  Co,	  %&'&),	  p.	  %+,-.	  30	  MacKinnon,	  ‘Poor	  Law	  Policy,	  Unemployment	  and	  Pauperism,’	  p.	  ;<=.	  31	  Lees,	  Solidarities	  of	  Strangers,	  p.	  %.	  32	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&';	  P.	  Thane,	  ‘Women	  and	  the	  Poor	  Law	  in	  Victorian	  and	  Edwardian	  England’,	  
History	  Workshop	  !	  ($%&'),	  pp.	  ,%-­‐!".	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levels	  of	  pauperism	  than	  the	  rural	  areas	  of	  the	  west,	  south,	  and	  east.33	  Highly	  urbanised	  counties	  had	  the	  lowest	  proportion	  of	  adult	  female	  pauperism,	  whereas	  agricultural	  areas	  saw	  the	  highest	  rates,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  correlation	  between	  high	  male	  wage	  levels	  and	  low	  female	  pauperism	  rates.34	  Poverty	  and	  pauperism	  were	  not	  only	  gendered	  but	  also	  related	  to	  life-­‐cycle,	  with	  young	  mothers,	  widows	  and	  widowers	  with	  young	  children,	  and	  elderly	  women	  particularly	  at	  risk.35	  Poverty	  was	  also	  very	  often	  seasonal,	  with	  women	  increasingly	  unlikely	  to	  keep	  their	  employment	  during	  the	  harvest	  in	  the	  early	  to	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century.36	  Demand	  for	  relief	  in	  any	  locality	  must	  therefore	  be	  seen	  not	  only	  as	  a	  result	  of	  local	  economic	  conditions	  but	  also	  of	  local	  cultural	  expectations	  –	  on	  the	  part	  of	  both	  applicants	  and	  administrators.	  	  Attempts	  to	  integrate	  analysis	  of	  relief	  practices	  with	  the	  broader	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  contexts	  of	  poverty	  have	  yielded	  important	  results,	  especially	  at	  the	  regional	  scale.	  Some	  regional	  variation	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  levels	  of	  industrialisation,	  some	  by	  guardians’	  sentiment	  and	  some	  by	  differences	  in	  understandings	  of	  entitlement.37	  In	  many	  areas,	  poor	  law	  amendment	  in	  )*+,	  made	  little	  difference	  to	  the	  ‘enduring	  regional	  patterns	  in	  welfare	  culture	  that	  we	  can	  see	  developing	  from	  at	  least	  5677	  onwards,’	  King	  suggests.38	  It	  is	  worth	  considering	  how	  long	  into	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  such	  regionalism	  persisted.	  	  
1.2.3 The	  supply	  side	  Structural	  explanations	  for	  poor	  law	  outcomes	  account	  for	  a	  great	  deal	  at	  the	  regional	  level,	  but	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  union-­‐level	  variation	  within	  these	  regions	  requires	  a	  ,inely	  grained	  approach.	  Historians	  have	  not	  found	  it	  easy	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  Lees,	  Solidarities	  of	  Strangers,	  p.	  %&'.	  34	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  %&'-­‐!!.	  35	  S.	  Williams,	  Poverty,	  gender	  and	  life-­‐cycle	  under	  the	  English	  poor	  law,	  5678-­‐!"#$	  (Woodbridge:	  Royal	  Historical	  Society/The	  Boydell	  Press,	  6788),	  pp.	  #$#	  ff.	  36	  Snell,	  Annals	  of	  the	  Labouring	  Poor,	  p.	  %%.	  37	  S.	  King,	  Poverty	  and	  Welfare	  in	  England,	  ./00-­‐!"#$:	  A	  Regional	  Perspective	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1222),	  pp.	  167-­‐!".	  38	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&'.	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to	  generalise	  the	  results	  of	  local	  studies	  to	  the	  regional	  or	  national	  scale.39	  This	  thesis	  suggests	  that	  poor	  law	  policy	  and	  practice	  was	  an	  emergent	  property	  of	  the	  interconnections	  between	  the	  economic,	  social,	  cultural	  and	  political	  at	  all	  scales.	  Local	  economies,	  representing	  one	  element	  of	  this,	  have	  been	  considered	  structurally	  as	  partial	  determinants	  of	  the	  demand	  for	  relief,	  but	  not	  as	  having	  any	  bearing	  on	  the	  supply	  of	  relief.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  omission.	  Prices	  of	  goods,	  for	  instance,	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  standards	  of	  living.40	  It	  is	  therefore	  reasonable	  to	  ask	  whether	  these	  prices	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  buying	  power	  of	  poor	  law	  unions,	  and	  on	  the	  decisions	  guardians	  made	  about	  the	  extent	  and	  types	  of	  relief	  they	  made	  available.	  This	  thesis	  argues	  that	  there	  were	  complex	  links	  between	  relief	  provision	  and	  the	  local	  supply	  of	  goods.	  High	  commodity	  prices	  could	  force	  many	  people	  to	  seek	  relief,	  or	  at	  least	  could	  arise	  from	  the	  same	  economic	  circumstances	  that	  caused	  destitution.	  In	  some	  unions,	  high	  prices	  for	  certain	  goods	  and	  services	  could	  increase	  relief	  costs	  signi+icantly.	  However,	  relief	  expenditure	  and	  prices	  did	  not	  have	  a	  straightforward	  linear	  relationship	  across	  all	  unions,	  and	  this	  thesis	  does	  not	  argue	  that	  unions’	  spending	  or	  rate-­‐raising	  can	  be	  explained	  entirely	  by	  commodity	  prices.	  Rather,	  commodity	  prices	  could	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  relief	  policies,	  with	  high	  prices	  in	  some	  circumstances	  leading	  to	  stricter	  entitlement	  regimes.	  More	  important,	  however,	  were	  the	  relationships	  between	  unions	  and	  their	  suppliers.	  An	  institution	  like	  a	  workhouse	  could	  have	  had	  a	  signi+icant	  impact	  on	  a	  local	  economy	  by	  creating	  demand	  that	  would	  otherwise	  not	  have	  existed.	  Suppliers	  might	  in	  some	  cases	  have	  owed	  their	  existence	  to	  the	  local	  workhouse	  consuming	  their	  goods.	  Furthermore,	  individual	  unions	  were	  dependent	  on	  markets	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  competition,	  +lexibility,	  organisation	  and	  size.	  It	  is	  therefore	  critical	  to	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  Notable	  exceptions	  focusing	  on	  the	  old	  poor	  law	  are	  King,	  Poverty	  and	  Welfare	  and	  Williams,	  
Poverty,	  gender	  and	  life-­‐cycle.	  40	  N.F.R.	  Crafts,	  ‘Regional	  Price	  Variations	  in	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  Living	  in	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  after	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understand	  the	  business	  practices	  surrounding	  contracting	  by	  unions	  and	  the	  relationships	  between	  them	  and	  their	  suppliers.	  	  Studies	  of	  contracting	  by	  poor	  law	  unions	  have	  so	  far	  been	  limited	  to	  investigating	  some	  important	  sectors,	  but	  not	  contracting	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  the	  contracts	  themselves	  tend	  to	  have	  been	  treated	  tangentially.	  There	  is	  some	  discussion	  of	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  desirability	  of	  market	  forces	  and	  private	  provision	  in	  public	  services.41	  Medical	  arrangements	  made	  by	  unions	  have	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  research,	  mostly	  concentrating	  on	  public	  health,	  the	  services	  available	  to	  paupers,	  vaccination	  and	  medical	  practitioners.42	  Lunacy	  provision	  has	  received	  some	  attention	  too,	  focusing	  on	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  paupers	  concerned.43	  These	  works	  focus	  on	  contracts	  for	  service	  provision	  with	  individuals	  or	  institutions	  in	  direct	  contact	  with	  paupers,	  however,	  and	  not	  on	  the	  basic	  provisioning	  of	  the	  institutions	  concerned.	  The	  types	  of	  suppliers	  of	  goods	  to	  workhouses	  and	  other	  poor	  law	  institutions	  covered	  a	  wide	  spectrum,	  from	  national	  companies	  providing	  coal,	  to	  local	  smallholders	  selling	  farm	  produce.	  The	  historiography	  of	  business,	  however,	  has	  tended	  towards	  industrial	  activity	  at	  the	  larger	  end	  of	  the	  scale.	  Some	  limited	  attention	  has	  also	  been	  paid	  to	  retail,	  much	  of	  which	  has	  focused	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Such	  as	  M.R.	  Somers	  and	  F.	  Block,	  ‘From	  poverty	  to	  perversity:	  Ideas,	  markets,	  and	  institutions	  over	  +,,	  years	  of	  welfare	  debate’,	  American	  Sociological	  Review	  !":$	  ($""'),	  pp.	  !"#-­‐!"#.	  42	  These	  include	  D.	  Brunton,	  Vaccination:	  Practice	  and	  Policy	  in	  England,	  Wales,	  Ireland,	  and	  
Scotland	  *+,,-­‐!"#$	  (Woodbridge:	  Boydell	  and	  Brewer,	  3445);	  A.	  Digby,	  Making	  a	  Medical	  Living:	  
Doctors	  and	  Patients	  in	  the	  English	  Market	  for	  Medicine,	  4567-­‐!"!!	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  -../);	  M.W.	  Flinn,	  ‘Medical	  services	  under	  the	  New	  Poor	  Law’,	  in	  D.	  Fraser	  (ed),	  The	  New	  Poor	  Law	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century	  (London:	  Macmillan,	  /012),	  pp.	  67-­‐!!;	  D.R.	  Green,	  ‘Medical	  Relief	  and	  the	  New	  Poor	  Law	  in	  London’,	  in	  O.P.	  Grell,	  A.	  Cunningham	  and	  R.	  Jütte	  (ed),	  Health	  Care	  and	  Poor	  Relief	  in	  12th	  and	  13th	  Century	  Northern	  Europe	  (Aldershot:	  Ashgate,	  *++*),	  pp.	  **+-­‐!"#;	  R.	  Hodgkinson,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  National	  Health	  Service:	  The	  
Medical	  Services	  of	  the	  New	  Poor	  Law,	  6789-­‐!"#!	  (London:	  The	  Wellcome	  Historical	  Medical	  Library,	  )*+,);	  S.J.	  Novak,	  ‘Professionalism	  and	  Bureaucracy:	  English	  Doctors	  and	  the	  Victorian	  Public	  Health	  Administration’,	  Journal	  of	  Social	  History	  !:#	  (&'()),	  pp.	  ##.-­‐!"#;	  I.	  Waddington,	  
The	  Medical	  Profession	  in	  the	  Industrial	  Revolution	  (Dublin:	  Gill	  and	  Macmillan,	  1234).	  43	  P.	  Bartlett,	  ‘The	  asylum,	  the	  workhouse,	  and	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  insane	  poor	  in	  <=th-­‐century	  England’,	  International	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Psychiatry	  !":$	  ("''(),	  pp.	  $!"-­‐!"#;	  B.	  Forsythe,	  J.	  Melling	  and	  R.	  Adair,	  ‘The	  New	  Poor	  Law	  and	  the	  County	  Pauper	  Lunatic	  Asylum:	  The	  Devon	  Experience	  *+,--­‐!""#’,	  Social	  History	  of	  Medicine	  !:#	  (&!!'),	  pp.	  ##,-­‐!"".	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on	  the	  bigger	  high-­‐street	  shops.44	  A	  study	  of	  the	  full	  range	  of	  suppliers	  to	  unions	  therefore	  adds	  to	  this	  discourse.	  	  There	  is	  a	  clear	  opportunity	  for	  this	  thesis	  to	  add	  to	  the	  historiography	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  by	  investigating	  the	  supply-­‐side	  costs	  incurred	  by	  poor	  law	  unions	  and	  the	  business	  practices	  that	  surrounded	  them.	  Chapter	  )	  shows	  that	  a	  more	  complex	  understanding	  of	  the	  national	  geographies	  of	  expenditure	  is	  required	  before	  attempting	  explanations	  of	  local	  variation.	  It	  argues	  for	  a	  recasting	  of	  classi.ications	  of	  poor	  law	  unions	  by	  their	  expenditures,	  moving	  away	  from	  dualities	  of	  ‘generosity’	  and	  ‘parsimony’	  on	  the	  part	  of	  boards	  of	  guardians.	  It	  shows	  that	  there	  was	  a	  north-­‐south	  divide	  in	  poor	  law	  practice	  when	  expenditure	  is	  measured	  in	  proportion	  to	  entire	  populations,	  but	  not	  when	  considered	  in	  relation	  to	  pauper	  numbers.	  It	  also	  demonstrates	  a	  relationship	  between	  distance	  from	  London	  and	  the	  use	  of	  outdoor	  relief.	  	  Boards	  of	  guardians	  took	  decisions	  based	  on	  their	  local	  circumstances	  and	  these	  national	  and	  regional	  contexts.	  Guardians	  had	  little	  power	  in	  the	  face	  of	  economic	  cycles,	  regional	  trade	  depressions,	  local	  outbreaks	  of	  infectious	  diseases	  and	  the	  like.	  However,	  as	  Chapter	  5	  shows,	  they	  could	  exercise	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  discretion	  when	  it	  came	  to	  contracting	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  to	  the	  union.	  Regulations	  issued	  by	  the	  central	  authority	  could	  circumscribe	  guardians’	  activities,	  but	  they	  could	  not	  bind	  the	  independent	  traders	  who	  sold	  goods	  to	  the	  unions.	  Rather,	  these	  interactions	  were	  subject	  to	  existing	  contract	  law.	  This	  gave	  boards	  of	  guardians	  !lexibility	  in	  their	  (inancial	  management	  and	  thereby	  their	  local	  relationships,	  putting	  social	  structures	  and	  processes	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  poor	  law	  economies.	  These	  relationships	  formed	  a	  signi2icant	  part	  of	  poor	  law	  guardians’	  strategies	  for	  controlling	  costs,	  and	  Chapter	  -	  shows	  how	  the	  prices	  paid	  by	  unions	  for	  a	  selection	  of	  goods	  contributed	  to	  their	  overall	  expenditure.	  Increases	  in	  prices	  for	  some	  goods	  could,	  in	  certain	  cases,	  raise	  relief	  spend	  noticeably.	  Demand	  from	  unions	  was	  considerable	  as	  workhouses	  consumed	  very	  great	  quantities	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  The	  predominant	  interests	  of	  retail	  historians	  are	  discussed	  in	  N.	  Alexander	  and	  G.	  Akehurst,	  ‘Introduction:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Modern	  Retailing,	  <=>?-­‐!"#$’,	  Business	  History	  !":!	  (&''(),	  pp.	  &-­‐!".	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of	  food,	  fuel	  and	  clothing.	  Nonetheless,	  in	  many	  respects	  it	  was	  the	  large	  suppliers	  who	  had	  the	  advantage	  in	  dictating	  prices,	  and	  guardians’	  procurement	  practices	  were	  not	  always	  ef2icient.	  Workhouse	  inmates	  suffered	  the	  consequences	  of	  unions’	  efforts	  to	  save	  costs,	  with	  suppliers	  delivering	  poor	  quality	  and	  sometimes	  adulterated	  food.	  The	  business	  of	  institutional	  supply	  was	  lucrative	  over	  long	  periods	  for	  a	  small	  number	  of	  large	  -irms,	  as	  Chapter	  (	  shows	  by	  contrasting	  the	  supplier	  networks	  of	  unions	  in	  London,	  Wales,	  the	  Midlands	  and	  the	  north-­‐east	  of	  England.	  Guardians	  had	  the	  dual	  priorities	  of	  keeping	  costs	  down,	  while	  wanting	  to	  spend	  the	  rates	  within	  their	  unions.	  They	  were	  also	  constrained	  by	  the	  number	  of	  potential	  suppliers.	  For	  reasons	  of	  availability	  and	  cost,	  therefore,	  relatively	  remote	  unions	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  cheap	  suppliers	  from	  major	  towns	  outside	  their	  unions.	  Yet	  there	  was	  also	  space	  in	  the	  market	  for	  more	  minor	  traders	  to	  gain	  business	  from	  poor	  law	  supply,	  and	  unions	  gave	  some	  trade	  to	  local	  businesses	  on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis.	  London	  was	  something	  of	  a	  special	  case,	  however,	  as	  the	  size	  and	  infrastructure	  of	  the	  capital	  enabled	  more	  suppliers	  to	  compete	  for	  poor	  law	  business,	  compared	  with	  elsewhere	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  Chapter	  )	  demonstrates	  the	  spatial	  reach	  of	  some	  of	  the	  businesses	  that	  supplied	  dozens	  of	  workhouses	  in	  London	  plus	  other	  institutions	  such	  as	  hospitals,	  schools	  and	  insane	  asylums.	  Chapter	  )	  concludes	  the	  thesis	  by	  emphasising	  the	  opportunities	  for	  business	  which	  the	  poor	  law	  offered	  local	  /irms	  and	  entrepreneurs.	  These	  opportunities	  were	  dependent	  not	  only	  on	  location,	  but	  on	  the	  sorts	  of	  places	  in	  which	  they	  occurred	  too.	  Business	  relationships	  must	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  light	  of	  unions’	  different	  relief	  practices	  and	  spending	  priorities,	  which	  were	  themselves	  dependent	  on	  place-­‐types	  and	  location.	  The	  variations	  in	  pauper	  experiences	  of	  relief	  across	  England	  and	  Wales	  and	  through	  time	  were	  therefore	  rooted	  in	  poor	  law	  unions’	  interconnections	  with	  their	  wider	  local	  and	  national	  socio-­‐economic	  contexts.	  	  	  In	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  this	  thesis,	  a	  number	  of	  analytical	  approaches	  were	  taken	  which	  did	  not	  ultimately	  advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  poor	  law	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economies.	  In	  some	  cases,	  such	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  create	  more	  complete	  time	  series	  for	  contract	  prices,	  data	  were	  unavailable.	  In	  others,	  some	  statistical	  analysis	  did	  not	  yield	  useful	  results.	  For	  example,	  the	  spatial	  variation	  in	  indoor	  relief	  expenditure	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  good	  candidate	  for	  modelling	  through	  geographically	  weighted	  regression,	  taking	  into	  account	  variables	  including	  union	  rateable	  value	  and	  contract	  prices	  of	  certain	  goods.45	  No	  models	  which	  were	  tested	  proved	  convincing,	  however.	  Other	  GIS	  techniques,	  such	  as	  hotspot	  analysis	  for	  expenditure,	  pauper	  numbers	  and	  rateable	  value,	  simply	  provided	  statistics	  (in	  this	  case,	  the	  Getis-­‐Ord	  Gi*	  statistic,	  z-­‐scores	  and	  associated	  p-­‐values)	  which,	  when	  mapped,	  only	  duplicated	  the	  effects	  visible	  in	  the	  straightforward	  maps	  of	  original	  values	  which	  are	  included	  in	  this	  research.	  As	  the	  hotspot	  analysis	  would	  not	  have	  added	  meaningfully	  to	  the	  thesis,	  it	  too	  has	  been	  excluded.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  M.	  Charlton,	  S.	  Fotheringham	  and	  C.	  Brunsdon,	  ‘Geographically	  Weighted	  Regression’,	  White	  paper	  (National	  Centre	  for	  Geocomputation,	  National	  University	  of	  Ireland	  Maynooth:	  =>>?).	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! National	  geographies	  of	  poor	  law	  expenditure	  	  	  
2.1 Introduction	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  much	  poor	  law	  scholarship	  lies	  the	  question	  of	  why	  relief	  practices	  varied	  over	  time	  and	  place.	  But	  before	  that	  question	  can	  be	  approached,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  understand	  how	  relief	  varied.	  This	  chapter	  addresses	  this	  seemingly	  straightforward	  issue,	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  particularly	  urban	  context	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  indoor	  relief	  over	  the	  period	  requires	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  the	  ways	  poor	  law	  administrators	  organised	  their	  work	  within	  their	  local	  economies.	  In	  doing	  so,	  it	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  usual	  methods	  of	  measuring	  poor	  law	  expenditure	  tell	  an	  incomplete	  story.	  Two	  key	  reasons	  for	  the	  gaps	  in	  our	  understanding	  are,	  -irst,	  the	  choice	  of	  variables	  for	  measuring	  expenditure;	  and,	  second,	  the	  geographical	  scale	  at	  which	  analysis	  is	  performed.	  This	  chapter	  suggests	  some	  alternative	  measurements	  which,	  when	  investigated	  at	  an	  appropriate	  scale,	  point	  to	  important	  distinctions	  in	  the	  ways	  urban	  and	  rural	  unions	  in	  different	  regions	  and	  at	  different	  times	  relieved	  their	  poor.	  	  Scale	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  elements	  in	  this	  analysis.	  Historians	  have	  tended	  to	  aggregate	  poor	  law	  data	  by	  county	  or	  region,	  partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  making	  the	  data	  manageable.	  The	  assumption	  underlying	  this	  aggregation	  is	  that	  counties	  or	  regions	  contained	  little	  enough	  variation	  between	  their	  constituent	  poor	  law	  unions	  for	  that	  variation	  to	  be	  irrelevant.	  This	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  case.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  historians	  have	  lamented	  that	  the	  sheer	  volume	  of	  material	  on	  the	  poor	  law	  makes	  it	  necessary	  to	  illustrate	  chie,ly	  by	  example,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  know	  how	  representative	  any	  such	  example	  might	  be.1	  Little	  effort	  has	  been	  made	  to	  address	  Southall’s	  ‘tentative’	  suggestion,	  made	  in	  5665,	  that	  ‘the	  general	  neglect	  of	  the	  spatially	  disaggregated	  national	  statistics	  in	  existing	  studies	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  M.A.	  Crowther,	  The	  Workhouse	  System	  /012-­‐!"#":	  The	  History	  of	  an	  English	  Social	  Institution	  (London:	  Batsford	  Academic	  &	  Educational,	  89:8),	  p.	  >;	  S.	  King,	  Poverty	  and	  Welfare	  in	  England,	  
!"##-­‐!"#$:	  A	  Regional	  Perspective	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  3444),	  p.	  8.	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the	  Poor	  Law	  is	  not	  altogether	  justi2ied’.2	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  variations	  in	  relief	  practices	  should	  be	  considered	  with	  more	  granularity.	  This	  chapter	  therefore	  uses	  disaggregated	  data	  from	  all	  individual	  poor	  law	  unions	  for	  selected	  time	  periods.	  In	  so	  doing,	  it	  shows	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  understand	  individual	  unions	  in	  the	  contexts	  of	  their	  wider	  regions	  and	  to	  assess	  unions	  or	  types	  of	  union	  over	  time.	  Such	  types	  need	  not	  be	  restricted	  by	  location:	  Unions	  can	  be	  grouped	  by	  size,	  population	  density,	  relief	  policies,	  expenditure	  levels	  and	  so	  on.	  Furthermore,	  union-­‐level	  data	  enable	  a	  more	  thorough	  set	  of	  geographical	  information	  systems	  (GIS)	  techniques	  to	  be	  adopted	  than	  would	  be	  the	  case	  using	  county-­‐level	  data.	  This	  chapter	  takes	  a	  new	  and	  overdue	  approach	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  poor	  law	  practices,	  therefore,	  by	  mapping	  several	  attributes	  of	  every	  individual	  union	  across	  England	  and	  Wales	  to	  determine	  the	  national	  picture	  of	  change	  over	  both	  time	  and	  space.	  	  	  There	  are	  more	  good	  reasons	  to	  consider	  poor	  relief	  at	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  unions.	  One	  is	  that	  the	  data	  are	  available	  and	  accessible	  (though	  not	  for	  every	  year	  for	  some	  useful	  variables).	  The	  annual	  poor	  rate	  returns	  published	  by	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commission	  (PLC)	  and	  its	  successors	  in	  their	  annual	  reports	  contain	  information	  on	  amounts	  spent	  on	  different	  types	  of	  relief	  and	  the	  incidental	  administrative	  running	  costs	  of	  poor	  law	  unions.	  Other	  union	  returns	  giving	  numbers	  of	  paupers	  are	  also	  available	  in	  the	  ‘Poor	  rates	  and	  pauperism’	  series	  of	  central	  authority	  publications	  ordered	  annually	  by	  Parliament	  from	  5678	  onwards.	  Rateable	  value,	  the	  tax	  base	  on	  which	  poor	  rates	  were	  levied,	  was	  published	  nationally	  only	  infrequently	  before	  the	  Local	  Taxation	  Returns	  Act	  !"#!,	  when	  it	  began	  to	  be	  issued	  annually,	  though	  it	  is	  available	  for	  certain	  years	  before	  then.3	  	  A	  further	  reason	  to	  look	  to	  individual	  unions	  is	  that	  the	  poor	  law	  was	  a	  local	  institution	  and	  was	  treated	  as	  such	  by	  paupers,	  guardians,	  local	  of6icials,	  ratepayers,	  central	  government	  and	  policymakers.	  This	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  wide	  variation	  in	  poor	  law	  practice	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  H.R.	  Southall,	  ‘Poor	  law	  statistics	  and	  the	  geography	  of	  economic	  distress’,	  in	  J.	  Foreman-­‐Peck	  (ed),	  New	  perspectives	  on	  the	  late	  Victorian	  economy	  ("##"),	  p.	  )").	  3	  !"	  &	  !%	  Vict.	  c.	  +,.	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Local	  relief	  did	  operate	  within	  a	  national	  and	  regional	  context,	  but	  the	  relevance	  of	  these	  contexts	  cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  given	  for	  all	  these	  members	  of	  the	  poor-­‐law	  domain.	  For	  example,	  central	  government	  grouped	  unions	  into	  regions	  or	  districts	  which	  were	  overseen	  by	  assistant	  commissioners	  or,	  after	  !"#$,	  inspectors.	  The	  importance	  of	  these	  groupings	  is	  assessed	  below	  (Section	  !.#),	  and	  in	  some	  ways	  they	  were	  indeed	  important	  to	  the	  administration	  of	  relief.	  However,	  they	  were	  an	  irrelevance	  to	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  paupers	  in	  their	  daily	  interactions	  with	  the	  poor	  law.	  It	  will	  be	  shown	  that	  paupers	  were	  concerned	  with	  the	  local,	  not	  the	  regional,	  in	  this	  respect.	  This	  chapter	  explores	  spatial	  and	  temporal	  variation	  in	  poor	  law	  practices	  by	  using	  data	  for	  all	  unions	  for	  two	  particular	  periods,	  the	  early	  5678s	  and	  early	  !"#$s.	  By	  !"*$,	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  (PLB)	  had	  been	  in	  place	  for	  three	  years	  and	  was	  operating	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  a	  ‘mature’	  system	  of	  relief.	  Administrative	  processes	  such	  as	  statistical	  collection	  had	  been	  standardised,	  even	  if	  many	  unions	  resisted	  implementing	  the	  PLB’s	  policies	  (such	  as	  the	  !"#$	  Outdoor	  Relief	  Prohibitory	  Order).4	  The	  early	  )*+,s	  were	  also	  an	  important	  demographic	  turning-­‐point.	  The	  +,-+	  census	  revealed	  for	  the	  7irst	  time	  that	  more	  people	  in	  England	  lived	  in	  urban	  areas	  than	  in	  rural,	  as	  a	  result	  both	  of	  direct	  migration	  to	  towns	  and	  of	  those	  new	  urban	  dwellers	  increasing	  local	  birth	  rates.5	  Furthermore,	  the	  irremovability	  of	  non-­‐settled	  parish	  residents	  after	  a	  certain	  period	  was	  beginning	  to	  take	  effect:	  Legislation	  of	  !"#$	  granted	  irremovability	  after	  5ive	  years’	  continuous	  residence	  and	  there	  were	  subsequent	  reductions	  to	  this	  period.6	  The	  early	  )*+,s	  are	  therefore	  a	  vital	  period	  for	  understanding	  how	  urbanisation	  shaped	  relief	  practices.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  second	  period	  of	  analysis,	  two	  decades	  later,	  the	  PLB	  was	  subsumed	  into	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board	  and	  the	  central	  authority	  began	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  D.	  Ashforth,	  ‘The	  urban	  Poor	  Law’,	  in	  D.	  Fraser	  (ed),	  The	  New	  Poor	  Law	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  
Century	  (London:	  Macmillan,	  /012),	  pp.	  /62-­‐!.	  5	  J.G.	  Williamson,	  ‘Migrant	  Selectivity,	  Urbanization,	  and	  Industrial	  Revolutions’,	  Population	  and	  
Development	  Review	  !":$	  (!'((),	  pp.	  $%&	  ff.	  6	  !	  &	  $%	  Vict.,	  c.	  ,,	  and	  subsequent	  legislation.	  See	  K.D.M.	  Snell,	  Parish	  and	  belonging:	  
Community,	  identity	  and	  welfare	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  ,-..-­‐!"#$	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  -../),	  p.	  33/.	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renew	  its	  efforts	  to	  promote	  the	  ‘principles	  of	  1234’	  with	  what	  became	  known	  as	  a	  ‘crusade’	  against	  outdoor	  relief.7	  The	  implementation	  of	  this	  policy	  was	  facilitated	  by	  social	  and	  economic	  conditions	  that	  were	  already	  in	  place	  by	  the	  !"#$s,	  though,	  and	  this	  will	  be	  seen	  by	  exploring	  changes	  in	  the	  years	  before	  that	  date.	  The	  )*+,s	  are	  also	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  turning-­‐point	  in	  economic	  performance,	  social	  structure,	  and	  the	  political	  environment	  by	  many	  poor	  law	  historians	  and	  others.8	  These	  two	  periods	  also	  have	  the	  advantage	  of	  data	  availability.	  6789	  is	  the	  earliest	  year	  for	  which	  a	  daily	  pauper	  count	  (held	  on	  4	  January)	  was	  published	  nationally	  for	  all	  unions.9	  Earlier	  pauper	  counts	  had	  unsuccessfully	  attempted	  to	  construct	  measures	  of	  pauperism	  by	  counting	  numbers	  relieved	  over	  six-­‐month	  periods,	  a	  method	  eventually	  rejected	  by	  the	  PLB’s	  statistical	  department	  (see	  Section	  !.".#).10	  Population	  censuses	  were	  held	  in	  2342	  and	  !"#!,	  permitting	  reasonably	  good	  demographic	  analysis;	  and	  rateable	  value	  was	  recorded	  for	  both	  periods.	  This	  double-­‐snapshot	  approach	  is	  supplemented	  by	  further	  data	  for	  particular	  unions	  and	  the	  country	  as	  a	  whole	  where	  appropriate,	  and	  yields	  important	  and	  useful	  results	  that	  demonstrate	  the	  urban	  growth	  of	  indoor	  relief	  and	  associated	  costs	  at	  a	  new	  level	  of	  detail.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  E.T.	  Hurren,	  Protesting	  about	  Pauperism:	  Poverty,	  Politics	  and	  Poor	  Relief	  in	  Late-­‐Victorian	  
England,	  )*+,-­‐!"##	  (Woodbridge:	  Royal	  Historical	  Society/Boydell	  Press,	  9::;).	  8	  Some	  of	  the	  many	  studies	  taking	  c.4567	  as	  a	  start	  or	  end	  point	  are:	  C.	  Bellamy,	  Administering	  
central-­‐local	  relations,	  -./--­‐!"!":	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board	  in	  its	  6iscal	  and	  cultural	  context	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  3455);	  G.	  Crossick	  (ed.),	  The	  lower	  middle	  classes	  in	  
Britain	  ()*+-­‐!"!#	  (London:	  Croom	  Helm,	  ./00);	  D.R.	  Green,	  From	  Artisans	  to	  Paupers:	  Economic	  
Change	  and	  Poverty	  in	  London,	  2345-­‐!"#$	  (Aldershot:	  Scolar	  Press,	  2334);	  J.	  Harris,	  ‘Political	  thought	  and	  the	  welfare	  state	  0123-­‐!"#$:	  an	  intellectual	  framework	  for	  British	  social	  policy’,	  
Past	  &	  Present	  !"#:!	  (!''(),	  pp.	  !!--­‐!"!;	  Hurren,	  Protesting	  about	  Pauperism;	  P.	  Johnson,	  ‘Social	  risk	  and	  social	  welfare	  in	  Britain,	  2345-­‐!"#"’,	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  Working	  Paper	  !/#$	  ("##$);	  E.A.	  Wrigley	  and	  R.S.	  Scho:ield,	  The	  Population	  History	  of	  England,	  1231-­‐!"#!	  (London:	  Edward	  Arnold,	  ,-.,).	  9	  PP	  #$%&	  LXIII	  #:	  Paupers.	  Return	  for	  the	  years	  #$9:,	  #$&:,	  #$%:,	  and	  #$%=,	  of	  the	  number	  of	  paupers	  in	  receipt	  of	  relief	  in	  each	  union	  in	  England	  on	  3	  January	  of	  each	  year	  respectively,	  together	  with	  the	  cost	  of	  total	  relief	  to	  the	  poor;	  also,	  a	  general	  summary	  of	  the	  same	  particulars	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  England	  in	  each	  of	  the	  speci4ied	  years.	  10	  PP	  #$%&	  XXVII	  Second	  Annual	  Report	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board.	  /012.	  In	  Pursuance	  of	  the	  Statute	  '(	  &	  ''	  Vict.	  c.	  '(.	  s.	  '0,	  pp.	  3-­‐!.	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2.2 Poor	  law	  data	  The	  analysis	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  based	  primarily	  on	  material	  in	  Parliamentary	  papers	  published	  by	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commission,	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  or	  Local	  Government	  Board	  (Table	  !.!).	  The	  central	  authority	  in	  all	  its	  forms	  was	  characterised	  by	  a	  focus	  on	  enumerating	  poor	  relief	  expenditure	  and	  on	  quantifying	  pauperism.	  The	  operation	  of	  the	  poor	  laws	  had	  been	  a	  subject	  of	  statistical	  inquiry	  well	  before	  their	  amendment	  in	  5678,	  but	  a	  central	  government	  department	  with	  speci2ic	  responsibility	  for	  poor	  relief	  administration	  had	  an	  unprecedented	  ability	  to	  gather,	  publish	  and	  analyse	  information	  on	  national	  and	  local	  practice.11	  In	  part,	  this	  activity	  was	  aimed	  at	  holding	  poor	  law	  unions	  to	  account.	  It	  also	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  increasing	  interest	  in	  methodologically	  rigorous	  approaches	  to	  data	  collection,	  evident	  in	  the	  close	  connections	  between	  poor	  law	  personnel	  and	  the	  Statistical	  Society	  of	  London.	  Edwin	  Chadwick,	  for	  instance,	  was	  appointed	  auditor	  to	  the	  society	  in	  /012,	  within	  months	  of	  its	  establishment,	  and	  fellows	  included	  Frederick	  Purdy,	  who	  became	  head	  of	  the	  PLB’s	  statistical	  department,	  and	  William	  Golden	  Lumley,	  the	  PLC’s	  assistant	  secretary.12	  The	  !irst	  article	  published	  in	  the	  society’s	  journal	  proper	  was	  by	  assistant	  commissioner	  James	  Phillips	  Kay.13	  The	  sheer	  bulk	  of	  information	  collected	  by	  the	  poor	  law	  authorities	  presented	  analytical	  dif3iculties,	  and	  indeed	  the	  5678	  
Report	  began	  with	  a	  description	  of	  the	  problems	  the	  commissioners	  had	  encountered:	  The	  replies	  to	  their	  circulated	  queries	  were	  ‘so	  numerous,	  that	  it	  became	  a	  question	  how	  they	  should	  be	  disposed	  of’.14	  Modern	  scholarship	  has	  also	  found	  the	  volume	  of	  data	  to	  be	  a	  barrier	  to	  research.15	  However,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  For	  discussion	  of	  quantitative	  information	  gathered	  under	  the	  old	  system,	  see	  S.	  King,	  ‘‘In	  these	  you	  may	  trust’:	  Numerical	  information,	  accounting	  practices	  and	  the	  Poor	  Law,	  c.<=>?	  to	  !"#$’,	  in	  T.	  Crook	  and	  G.	  O’Hara	  (eds),	  Statistics	  and	  the	  public	  sphere	  (London:	  Routledge,	  '())),	  pp.	  $%-­‐!!.	  12	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Statistical	  Society	  of	  London	  !:#	  (!&	  January	  !-./),	  pp.	  &-­‐!!.	  13	  J.	  Phillips	  Kay,	  ‘On	  the	  establishment	  of	  county	  or	  district	  schools,	  for	  the	  training	  of	  the	  pauper	  children	  maintained	  in	  union	  workhouses’,	  Journal	  of	  the	  Statistical	  Society	  of	  London	  !:!	  (May	  !()(),	  pp.	  !.-­‐!".	  14	  PP	  #$%&	  XXVII	  #	  -­‐	  XXXIX	  Report	  from	  His	  Majesty’s	  commissioners	  for	  inquiring	  into	  the	  administration	  and	  practical	  operation	  of	  the	  Poor	  Laws,	  p.	  6.	  15	  Southall,	  ‘Poor	  law	  statistics,’	  p.	  456.	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quantity	  and	  detail	  of	  available	  information	  should	  be	  treated	  as	  an	  opportunity,	  rather	  than	  an	  obstacle.	  	  
Data type Source 
Population, 1851 and 1871. PP 1876 LXIII 1. Paupers. 
Indoor and outdoor paupers, 1 Jan 1850 and 1 Jan 1870. 
Area in acres, 1854. PP 1854 LVI 1. Poor rates, &c. 
Rateable value of property assessed to the poor rate, 1852. 
Relief expenditure, year to 25 Mar 1850. PP 1851 XXVI 1. Third annual report 
of the Poor Law Board. 1850. 
Relief expenditure, year to 25 Mar 1870. PP 1871 XXVII 1. Twenty-third 
annual report of the Poor Law 
Board. 1870. 
Rateable value of property assessed to the poor rate, 1870. PP 1895 LXXXIV 507. Rateable 
Value of Lands, &c. 
Area in acres, 1868. PP 1868-69 LIII 5. Poor Law. 
Table 2.1: Poor law union data sources. 
2.2.1 Counting	  paupers	  The	  central	  authority	  collected	  information	  on	  the	  numbers	  of	  paupers	  in	  different	  ways	  over	  time.	  In	  2345	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commission	  decided	  that	  the	  way	  it	  had	  counted	  paupers	  until	  then	  –	  in	  six-­‐month	  periods	  to	  Lady-­‐day	  and	  Michaelmas	  –	  was	  unwieldy.	  The	  possibility	  existed	  that	  different	  unions	  would	  count	  their	  paupers	  by	  different	  methods.	  Furthermore,	  the	  8igures	  for	  indoor	  and	  outdoor	  paupers	  might	  not	  be	  comparable	  as,	  for	  example,	  an	  individual	  entering	  the	  workhouse	  three	  times	  in	  six	  months	  could	  be	  counted	  three	  times,	  whereas	  an	  individual	  receiving	  outdoor	  relief	  every	  fortnight	  for	  the	  same	  six	  months	  could	  be	  counted	  once.16	  The	  PLB	  from	  ,-.-	  therefore	  asked	  unions	  to	  report	  their	  respective	  pauper	  numbers	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  workhouse	  on	  +	  January	  and	  '	  July.17	  The	  relationship	  between	  these	  day-­‐counts	  and	  total	  numbers	  of	  paupers	  relieved	  in	  the	  whole	  year	  is	  a	  dif6icult	  one	  to	  ascertain,	  given	  the	  /laws	  in	  the	  six-­‐month	  counts,	  though	  some	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  C.	  Booth,	  ‘Enumeration	  and	  classi6ication	  of	  paupers,	  and	  state	  pensions	  for	  the	  aged’,	  
Journal	  of	  the	  Royal	  Statistical	  Society	  !":"	  (&'(&),	  pp.	  -..-­‐!"#;	  Idem,	  Pauperism:	  A	  Picture;	  and	  
the	  Endowment	  of	  Old	  Age:	  An	  Argument	  (London:	  Macmillan,	  /012),	  chapter	  ).	  17	  PP	  #$%&	  XXVII	  !,	  pp.	  %-­‐!.	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historians	  have	  attempted	  to	  ‘correct’	  the	  day-­‐counts	  by	  multiplying	  their	  averages	  by	  certain	  constants.18	  	  In	  this	  study,	  unless	  otherwise	  speci0ied,	  only	  the	  (	  January	  count	  is	  used	  without	  any	  attempt	  at	  ‘correction’.	  3	  January	  is	  an	  arbitrary	  date	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  the	  +igures	  –	  chosen	  for	  its	  administrative	  convenience	  by	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  –	  and	  the	  numbers	  of	  paupers	  on	  that	  date	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  same	  proportion	  of	  paupers	  relieved	  for	  the	  whole	  year	  for	  every	  union.	  Figures	  for	  ‘expenditure	  per	  pauper’,	  for	  example,	  therefore	  should	  be	  read	  as	  expenditure	  for	  the	  full	  year	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  paupers	  on	  $	  January	  of	  
that	  year.	  This	  ensures	  that	  all	  the	  .igures	  are	  comparable.	  Figures	  for	  expenditure	  per	  pauper	  should	  therefore	  be	  treated	  as	  indicative	  only,	  as	  they	  do	  not	  represent	  actual	  sums	  spent	  per	  individual	  pauper.	  They	  are	  not	  too	  far	  off,	  however:	  Dividing	  the	  full-­‐year	  cost	  by	  the	  ,	  January	  pauper	  count	  gives	  a	  !igure	  which	  is	  on	  average	  01.0	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  mean	  annual	  costs	  of	  food	  and	  clothing	  per	  inmate	  per	  year	  for	  seventy	  unions,	  according	  to	  a	  Parliamentary	  return	  of	  )*+*	  (Figure	  !.!).19	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  See,	  for	  example,	  L.H.	  Lees,	  The	  Solidarities	  of	  Strangers:	  The	  English	  Poor	  Laws	  and	  the	  
People,	  ()**-­‐!"#$	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  5667),	  pp.	  57;-­‐!"!;	  K.	  Williams,	  
From	  Pauperism	  to	  Poverty	  (London:	  Routledge	  &	  Kegan	  Paul,	  3453),	  pp.	  	  395-­‐!"#;	  S.	  Webb	  and	  B.	  Webb,	  English	  Local	  Government,	  Vol.	  6:	  English	  Poor	  Law	  History	  Part	  II:	  The	  Last	  Hundred	  
Years	  (London:	  Longmans,	  Green	  and	  Co,	  1232),	  p.	  %&'%.	  19	  Calculated	  from	  PP	  %&'(-­‐!"	  XLIX	  part	  +	  ,-.:	  Workhouses.	  Return	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  building	  of	  workhouses	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  erected	  since	  4567;	  stating	  number	  of	  inmates	  intended	  for	  originally,	  and	  average	  annual	  expense	  of	  food	  and	  clothing,	  for	  the	  years	  6789	  to	  6787,	  of	  the	  said	  workhouses;	  PP	  /012	  Session	  5	  XXXII	  pt.	  I	  Supplement	  =>:	  Poor	  rates	  and	  pauperism.	  Return	  (B.)	  Paupers	  relieved	  on	  5st	  January	  5898.	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A	  further	  complicating	  factor	  is	  that	  not	  all	  local	  poor	  law	  bodies	  returned	  !igures	  on	  paupers	  to	  the	  central	  authority.	  Unions	  and	  parishes	  incorporated	  under	  the	  )*+,	  act	  were	  obliged	  to,	  but	  other	  entities	  such	  as	  Gilbert’s	  unions	  and	  individual	  parishes	  under	  other	  legislation	  were	  not.	  Hence	  for	  !"#$-­‐!",	  !""	  bodies	  returned	  data	  for	  population,	  area	  and	  rateable	  value;	  !5!	  gave	  numbers	  for	  expenditure;	  and	  only	  010	  provided	  pauper	  numbers.	  From	  these	  data,	  therefore,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  determine	  differences	  and	  similarities	  between	  the	  various	  types	  of	  poor	  law	  authority.	  	  
2.2.2 Rateable	  value	  Rateable	  value	  (RV)	  was	  the	  tax	  base	  of	  each	  union	  and	  is	  used	  here,	  as	  it	  was	  at	  the	  time,	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  a	  union’s	  relative	  wealth.	  Individual	  properties	  were	  assessed	  by	  district	  valuers	  and	  assigned	  values	  upon	  which	  the	  owners’	  or	  occupiers’	  liability	  for	  the	  poor	  rate	  and	  ability	  to	  elect	  guardians	  were	  determined.	  RV	  was	  calculated	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  rent	  a	  property	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  bring	  in,	  were	  it	  to	  be	  rented,	  not	  including	  rates,	  taxes,	  tithes	  and	  so	  on,	  and	  deducting	  the	  probable	  annual	  cost	  of	  repairs,	  insurance	  and	  other	  measures	  required	  to	  keep	  it	  to	  the	  current	  standard.	  From	  this	  value,	  a	  rate	  of	  a	  certain	  amount	  in	  the	  pound	  was	  levied.	  	  The	  assessment	  of	  rates	  was	  notoriously	  erratic	  and	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  gauge	  how	  rigorous	  any	  given	  area’s	  assessment	  might	  have	  been.	  Frederick	  Purdy	  noted	  in	  ()*+:	  ‘From	  the	  capricious	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  rateable	  value	  is	  arrived	  at	  in	  different	  parishes,	  it	  is	  known	  to	  be	  worthless	  as	  a	  means	  of	  estimating	  the	  pressure	  of	  rates	  in	  one	  district	  as	  compared	  with	  another.’20	  However,	  it	  formed	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  poor	  rate	  even	  if	  it	  was	  not	  a	  true	  re#lection	  of	  the	  annual	  value	  of	  the	  assessed	  property.	  As	  the	  #igures	  were	  used	  contemporaneously	  to	  inform	  decisions	  about	  local	  spending,	  they	  can	  reasonably	  be	  used	  now	  to	  analyse	  this	  spending.	  It	  is	  assumed	  here	  that	  assessment	  remained	  consistently	  patchy	  enough	  across	  the	  country	  to	  give	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  F.	  Purdy,	  ‘The	  Pressure	  of	  Taxation	  on	  Real	  Property’,	  Journal	  of	  the	  Statistical	  Society	  of	  
London	  !":!	  (&'()),	  pp.	  ")&-­‐!"!.	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usable	  (igures	  for	  comparing	  unions.21	  By	  measuring,	  for	  example,	  expenditure	  relative	  to	  rateable	  value,	  the	  use	  a	  union	  made	  of	  its	  resources	  can	  be	  judged.	  
2.2.3 Expenditure	  on	  the	  poor	  Figures	  for	  relief	  expenditure	  are	  primarily	  taken	  from	  the	  poor	  rate	  return	  sections	  of	  the	  PLB’s	  annual	  reports.	  It	  is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  examine	  what	  the	  return	  was	  in	  fact	  counting.	  The	  poor	  rate	  return	  tables	  for	  5678,	  for	  example,	  show	  that	  the	  PLB	  classi&ied	  expenditure	  under	  certain	  headings	  (Table	  !.!).	  ‘Amount	  expended	  for	  the	  Relief	  of	  the	  Poor’	  contains	  three	  categories:	  ‘In-­‐Maintenance’,	  ‘Out-­‐Relief’	  and	  ‘Other	  Expenses	  of,	  or	  Immediately	  connected	  with	  Relief’.	  There	  are	  ten	  further	  categories	  for	  other	  forms	  of	  expenditure	  such	  as	  legal	  costs,	  vaccination	  fees,	  parish	  repair	  bills	  and	  local	  rates.	  These	  last	  included	  the	  police,	  county,	  hundred	  and	  borough	  rates	  which	  were	  not	  raised	  by	  the	  poor	  law	  union	  as	  such	  but	  were	  ‘assimilated	  to’,	  i.e.	  collected	  through,	  the	  poor	  rate.22	  The	  ‘Total	  Expenditure’	  column	  therefore	  includes	  all	  expenditure	  from	  funds	  collected	  through	  the	  poor	  rates	  and	  connected	  sources,	  but	  this	  expenditure	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  poor	  relief	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  union.	  The	  poor	  rate	  return	  is	  thus	  best	  seen	  as	  the	  means	  for	  a	  ratepayer	  to	  discover	  how	  and	  where	  his	  rates	  were	  spent,	  not	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  what	  was	  spent	  speci+ically	  on	  the	  poor.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  For	  more	  on	  the	  assessment	  of	  rateable	  value,	  see	  2	  &	  4	  Will.	  IV,	  c.	  ;2.	  An	  Act	  to	  Regulate	  Parochial	  Assessments	  (1234);	  W.G.	  Lumley,	  The	  Law	  of	  Parochial	  Assessments,	  explained	  in	  a	  
Practical	  Commentary	  on	  the	  Statute	  2	  &	  4	  Will.	  7,	  Cap.	  :2,	  !rd	  ed.	  (London:	  Shaw	  and	  Sons,	  !"#$);	  M.	  Lopes,	  ‘Report	  of	  the	  Local	  Taxation	  Committee	  on	  the	  Proposals	  of	  the	  Government	  with	  Reference	  to	  Local	  Taxation.	  With	  an	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Rating	  and	  Valuation	  Bills’,	  Chamber	  
of	  Agriculture	  Journal	  and	  Farmers’	  Chronicle	  (Reprint)	  (May	  &'());	  T.F.	  Hedley,	  Local	  Taxation:	  
Rating	  Railways,	  Mines,	  Machinery,	  Mansion-­‐Houses,	  Woodlands,	  Government	  Property,	  and	  
Hospitals.	  Observations	  on	  the	  Right	  Honourable	  G.J.	  Goschen’s	  Bill	  on	  Parochial	  Assessments	  (London:	  Shaw	  &	  Sons,	  /010);	  C.A.	  Webb,	  The	  Law	  and	  Practice	  of	  Rating	  and	  Assessment:	  A	  
Handbook	  for	  Overseers,	  Members	  of	  Assessment	  Committees,	  Surveyors,	  and	  Others	  Interested	  in	  
Rating	  and	  Valuation	  (London:	  Crosby	  Lockwood	  &	  Son,	  3435);	  E.	  Cannan,	  The	  History	  of	  Local	  
Rates	  in	  England	  in	  Relation	  to	  the	  Proper	  Distribution	  of	  the	  Burden	  of	  Taxation,	  !nd	  ed.	  (London:	  P.	  S.	  King	  &	  Son,	  &'&().	  22	  G.C.	  Broderick,	  ‘Local	  Government	  in	  England’,	  in	  J.W.	  Probyn	  (ed),	  Local	  Government	  and	  
Taxation,	  Cobden	  Club	  Essays	  (London:	  Cassell	  Petter	  &	  Galpin,	  9:;<),	  p.	  ?:;	  J.R.	  McCulloch,	  A	  
Treatise	  on	  the	  Principles	  and	  Practical	  In2luence	  of	  Taxation	  and	  the	  Funding	  System,	  #rd	  ed.,	  (Edinburgh:	  Adam	  and	  Charles	  Black,	  /012),	  pp.	  678-­‐!"#.	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Item Expenditure £ Expenditure % 
In-maintenance 914,264 12.4 
Out-relief 3,155,096 42.9 
Other expenses - relief 
Total expended for relief of the poor 
1,325,660  18.0 
5,393,031 73.3 
Legal costs 77,581 1.1 
Constables/Justices 65,120 0.9 
Vaccination fees 23,641 0.3 
Registration Act costs 58,636 0.8 
Parochial Assessments Act costs 14,197 0.2 
Local rates 1,321,034 17.9 
Parliamentary expenses 28,773 0.4 
Repairs 9,475 0.1 
Nuisances removal costs 80,700 1.1 
Other 286,037 3.9 
Total 7,360,220 100.0 
Table 2.2: Expenditure by poor law unions in England and Wales, 1850.  
Source: PP 1851 XXVI 1: Third annual report of the Poor Law Board, p. 78. 
The	  part	  of	  the	  poor	  rate	  return	  giving	  0igures	  for	  relief	  of	  the	  poor	  (shown	  in	  the	  top	  section	  of	  Table	  !.!)	  does	  not	  specify	  what	  is	  counted	  as	  indoor	  relief,	  outdoor	  relief	  or	  ‘other’	  relief,	  an	  indeterminate	  class	  which	  is	  notably	  greater	  than	  indoor	  relief.	  This	  can	  instead	  be	  gleaned	  from	  the	  instructions	  on	  preparing	  the	  return	  issued	  by	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  to	  union	  clerks.23	  These	  instructions	  show	  that	  in-­‐maintenance	  was	  the	  amount	  spent	  on	  paupers	  in	  the	  workhouse	  including	  irremovable	  poor	  and	  vagrants.	  Outdoor	  relief	  was	  the	  cost	  of	  relief	  in	  money	  or	  in	  kind,	  including	  relief	  to	  non-­‐resident	  poor,	  irremovable	  poor	  and	  vagrants,	  and	  of	  loans	  to	  paupers.	  It	  also	  appears	  to	  have	  included	  funeral	  expenses.	  Other	  relief	  expenses	  were	  the	  maintenance	  of	  lunatics	  in	  asylums	  or	  licensed	  houses;	  extra	  medical	  fees	  or	  payments	  charged	  to	  parishes;	  emigration	  expenses;	  emigration	  loans	  and	  interest	  repaid;	  workhouse	  loans	  and	  interest	  repaid;	  salaries	  of	  of3icers;	  and	  other	  relief	  costs	  where	  applicable.	  A	  more	  detailed	  subdivision	  of	  the	  ‘other’	  relief	  category	  can	  be	  made	  by	  examining	  the	  expenditure	  of	  individuals	  unions	  or	  incorporations.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  MH#$/#&,	  Circular	  #0/0$,	  #0	  March	  #20$:	  Example	  Form	  #;;	  Circular	  =2/0$,	  =$	  June	  #20$:	  An	  Example	  of	  the	  mode	  of	  preparing	  the	  Annual	  Poor	  Rate	  Return,	  by	  reference	  to	  certain	  Columns	  of	  the	  Yearly	  Abstract	  –	  Form	  !",	  and	  of	  the	  two	  Half-­‐Yearly	  Financial	  Statements	  –	  Form	  &',	  whence	  the	  necessary	  particulars	  may	  be	  obtained.	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Southampton	  Incorporation	  was	  unusual	  in	  publishing	  annual	  statements	  (though	  irregularly	  produced).	  Its	  expenditure	  may	  not	  necessarily	  be	  a	  guide	  to	  that	  of	  other	  unions,	  but	  can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  example	  (Table	  !.!).	  This	  shows	  the	  relative	  importance	  to	  Southampton	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  maintenance	  of	  lunatics,	  staf%ing	  costs,	  servicing	  loans	  and	  of%ice	  costs.	  Further	  costs,	  given	  in	  the	  ‘Other	  charges’	  row	  of	  Table	  !.!,	  include	  ‘Visiting	  Lunatics,	  Conveying	  Paupers,	  Subscriptions	  to	  Hospitals,	  Rent	  of	  Airing	  Ground,	  Water	  Rates,	  Furniture,	  Insurance,	  Carpenters’,	  Bricklayers’,	  and	  Masons’	  Charges	  for	  Repairs,	  Gas	  Fittings,	  Ironmongery,	  Tinman,	  and	  Smiths’	  Work,	  Painter,	  Plumber,	  And	  Cooper,	  Brushmaker,	  and	  other	  sums,	  chargeable	  to	  the	  Establishment.’	  
Item Expenditure £ Expenditure % 
In-maintenance 775 11.3 
Out-relief 4,279 62.6 
Maintenance of lunatics 349 5.1 
Officers' salaries  496 7.3 
Maintenance of officers in the workhouse  100 1.5 
Total spent on officers 596  8.7 
New buildings and schoolhouse loan and interest 133 1.9 
Rate books, printing, stationery, and advertising 219 3.2 
Other charges 485 7.1 
Total 6,836 100.0 
Table 2.3: Expenditure on the poor by Southampton Incorporation, half-year to Michaelmas 
1850.  
Source: TNA MH12/11000/19, folio 43, 4 April 1853: Expenditure of the Town.  
The	  cost	  to	  a	  union	  of	  in-­‐maintenance	  as	  enumerated	  in	  the	  poor	  rate	  return	  therefore	  would	  have	  included	  provisions	  (food,	  clothing,	  coal	  etc.)	  for	  paupers	  but	  excluded	  staf/ing	  costs,	  workhouse	  building	  and	  repair	  costs	  and	  other	  incidental	  expenditure.	  All	  this,	  however,	  was	  included	  in	  the	  ‘Total	  expended	  for	  the	  relief	  of	  the	  poor’.	  	  
2.3 Poor	  relief	  expenditure:	  The	  national	  context	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  expenditure	  on	  poor	  relief	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  !luctuated	  cyclically	  along	  with	  the	  wider	  economy.	  The	  +ive	  years	  following	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  saw	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  pre-­‐!"#$	  reduction	  in	  the	  amount	  spent	  per	  head	  of	  
	   !"	  
population,	  but	  the	  decline	  was	  short-­‐lived.	  ()*+	  was	  the	  low-­‐water-­‐mark	  for	  relief	  spending	  under	  the	  new	  system	  in	  real	  terms	  (Figure	  !.!).	  As	  in(lation	  rose	  and	  fell,	  so	  too	  did	  the	  annual	  change	  in	  spend	  on	  the	  poor	  (Figure	  !.!).24	  During	  the	  +,-.s,	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  of	  poor-­‐relief	  was	  much	  lower	  than	  the	  consumer	  price	  in,lation	  rate,	  re,lecting	  the	  push	  to	  reduce	  relief	  costs.	  Relief	  spend	  increased	  at	  a	  higher	  rate	  than	  in-lation	  during	  what	  later	  became	  known	  as	  the	  ‘hungry’	  1234s,	  but	  thereafter,	  the	  correlation	  between	  in;lation	  and	  expenditure	  on	  the	  poor	  is	  very	  clear.25	  Some	  periods	  of	  divergence	  are	  notable,	  however:	  The	  drop	  in	  poor	  relief	  in	  the	  early	  ,-./s	  during	  a	  time	  of	  relatively	  high	  in-lation	  might	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  ‘crusade’	  against	  outdoor	  relief,	  and	  it	  was	  followed	  in	  the	  later	  part	  of	  the	  decade	  by	  an	  above-­‐in#lation	  increase	  in	  relief.	  Relief	  also	  increased	  above	  in!lation	  in	  the	  +,-.s	  –	  possibly	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  property	  quali3ication	  for	  guardians	  of	  the	  poor	  bringing	  working-­‐class	  guardians	  into	  union	  boardrooms.26	  
	  
Figure 2.2: Spend on poor per head of population, 1834-1899.  
Source: PLC/PLB/LGB annual reports and population interpolated from decennial censuses. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  J.	  O’Donoghue,	  L.	  Goulding	  and	  G.	  Allen,	  ‘Consumer	  price	  in<lation	  since	  >?@A’,	  Economic	  
Trends	  !"#	  (&""#),	  pp.	  +,-­‐!".	  25	  P.	  Dunkley,	  ‘The	  ‘Hungry	  Forties’	  and	  the	  New	  Poor	  Law:	  A	  Case	  Study’,	  Historical	  Journal	  !":$	  ("#$%),	  pp.	  +,#-­‐!"#.	  26	  A.	  Brundage,	  ‘Reform	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  electoral	  system,	  :;<=-­‐!"’,	  Albion:	  A	  Quarterly	  Journal	  
Concerned	  with	  British	  Studies	  !:#	  (&'!(),	  p.	  -&..	  
	   !"	  
	  
Figure 2.3: Annual percentage change in spend on poor and consumer price inflation rate, 
1834-1898.  
Source: PLC/PLB/LGB annual reports and O’Donoghue et al., ‘Inflation’. 
A	  second	  important	  long-­‐term	  trend	  was	  the	  increase	  in	  indoor	  relief	  and	  decline	  in	  outdoor	  relief	  from	  )*+),	  attributed	  by	  Snell	  to	  an	  expansion	  of	  institutional	  provision	  in	  urban	  settings	  combined	  with	  the	  ‘crusade’	  of	  the	  !"#$s.27	  Williams,	  too,	  points	  to	  the	  changing	  con1igurations	  of	  specialised	  institutions	  of	  the	  post-­‐!"#$	  period.28	  Outdoor	  relief	  was	  regarded	  by	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  +,-.	  Report	  and	  by	  the	  Charity	  Organisation	  Society	  in	  the	  !"#$s	  onwards	  as	  wasteful	  and	  immoral,	  tending	  to	  increase	  the	  dependence	  of	  the	  poor	  on	  ratepayers,	  especially	  when	  given	  in	  aid	  of	  wages.29	  Opponents	  of	  the	  new	  system,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  characterised	  it	  as	  a	  pittance	  (Figure	  !.!).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Snell,	  Parish	  and	  Belonging,	  p.	  %&'.	  28	  Williams,	  From	  Pauperism	  to	  Poverty,	  pp.	  %&'-­‐!"#.	  29	  This	  is	  a	  central	  theme	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Report:	  S.G.	  Checkland	  and	  E.O.A.	  Checkland	  (eds.),	  
The	  Poor	  Law	  Report	  of	  /012	  (Harmondsworth:	  Penguin,	  5678).	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Figure 2.4: ‘Phiz’ (H.K. Browne), ‘Out-door Relief’, in J. Grant, Sketches in London (London:  
T. Tegg, 1840), p. 244. Wellcome Library, London. 
The	  numbers	  of	  outdoor	  relief	  recipients	  3luctuated	  widely	  in	  the	  third	  quarter	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  the	  ‘crusade’	  period	  did	  see	  a	  signi4icant	  reduction	  in	  absolute	  numbers	  of	  outdoor	  paupers,	  but	  an	  increase	  in	  indoor	  relief	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  all	  relief	  can	  be	  identi0ied	  from	  the	  early	  4567s	  (Figure	  !.!).	  $%.&	  per	  cent	  of	  paupers	  were	  relieved	  in	  the	  workhouse	  in	  $9:;	  compared	  to	  +,.,	  per	  cent	  in	  +012,	  a	  rise	  in	  proportion	  of	  nearly	  a	  quarter	  in	  the	  six	  years	  before	  the	  ‘Goschen	  minute’	  and	  the	  concomitant	  drive	  from	  central	  government	  to	  cut	  outdoor	  relief.30	  The	  %&'(s	  saw	  an	  average	  annual	  increase	  in	  indoor	  pauperism	  of	  /.1	  per	  cent;	  over	  the	  two	  decades	  before	  !"#$	  the	  average	  increase	  was	  !.3	  per	  cent	  and	  over	  the	  two	  decades	  from	  !""#	  it	  was	  !.#	  per	  cent.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  G.J.	  Goschen,	  Letter	  of	  the	  Rt.	  Hon.	  G.J.	  Goschen,	  President	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board,	  on	  the	  Relief	  
to	  the	  Poor	  in	  the	  Metropolis,	  dated	  12th	  November,	  789:	  (London:	  Shaw	  &	  Sons,	  /012).	  #$%&	  was	  a	  low	  point	  in	  indoor	  relief	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  all	  relief	  because	  of	  the	  large	  increase	  in	  outdoor	  relief	  granted	  extraordinarily	  during	  the	  cotton	  famine.	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Figure 2.5: Pauper numbers by relief type, 1849-1899.  
Source: Annual reports of PLC and successors. 
One	  reason	  for	  the	  persistent	  reluctance	  of	  many	  unions	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  ‘principles	  of	  -./0’	  is	  suggested	  by	  the	  comparative	  costs	  of	  indoor	  and	  outdoor	  relief.	  Maintaining	  paupers	  in	  institutions	  was	  signi3icantly	  more	  expensive	  than	  giving	  doles	  of	  outdoor	  relief,	  as	  measured	  per	  episode	  of	  pauperism	  (Figure	  !.!).	  Moreover,	  the	  in.lation-­‐adjusted	  index	  cost	  of	  relief	  per	  outdoor	  pauper	  rose	  gradually	  and	  with	  relative	  stability	  by	  34	  per	  cent	  over	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  This	  was	  not	  an	  insigni"icant	  rise	  by	  any	  means,	  but	  was	  well	  behind	  the	  ,-	  per	  cent	  increase	  in	  costs	  per	  indoor	  pauper.31	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure 2.6: Average expenditure per indoor and outdoor pauper in England and Wales, 1849-
1899, at 1850 values.  
Source: Annual reports of PLC and successors; O’Donoghue et al., ‘Inflation’. See note 31 on 
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Historians	  have	  tended	  to	  neglect	  the	  cost	  to	  unions	  of	  relief	  per	  pauper.	  In	  part	  this	  may	  be	  because	  of	  the	  dif2iculties	  in	  determining	  total	  numbers	  of	  paupers,	  and	  in	  disaggregating	  types	  of	  paupers.	  It	  may	  also	  re5lect	  a	  persistent	  historiographical	  interest	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  as	  a	  local	  and	  national	  political	  institution	  –	  whether	  seen	  in	  contrast	  to,	  or	  as	  context	  for,	  the	  more	  recent	  emphasis	  on	  pauper	  experiences.	  The	  measurements	  of	  expense	  more	  commonly	  found	  in	  analysis	  of	  poor	  relief	  are	  the	  cost	  per	  head	  of	  population,	  and	  expenditure	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  rateable	  value,	  though	  the	  latter	  was	  not	  published	  systematically	  for	  individual	  unions	  with	  any	  regularity.32	  Both	  these	  measures	  represent	  the	  cost	  to	  a	  community	  of	  maintaining	  its	  paupers.	  They	  were	  also	  the	  most	  important	  criteria	  used	  by	  central	  government	  and	  poor	  law	  unions	  themselves.	  The	  poor	  law	  report	  of	  !"#$,	  for	  instance,	  noted	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  spent	  on	  the	  poor	  between	  '('(	  and	  '(+,	  was	  at	  a	  greater	  rate	  than	  the	  increase	  in	  population.33	  The	  annual	  reports	  of	  the	  central	  authority,	  starting	  with	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commission’s	  .irst,	  included	  .igures	  on	  expenditure	  per	  head.	  Unions	  would	  have	  compared	  their	  performance	  relative	  to	  their	  neighbours	  according	  to	  this	  calculation,	  as	  would	  politicians.34	  Unions	  which	  published	  annual	  accounts	  of	  their	  expenditure	  over	  the	  year	  tended	  to	  include	  population	  *igures	  for	  comparison.35	  Despite	  this	  focus	  on	  expenditure	  per	  head	  of	  population	  and	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  rateable	  value,	  unions	  also	  on	  occasion	  published	  !igures	  for	  the	  cost	  per	  pauper.	  In	  its	  annual	  accounts	  Ashton-­‐under-­‐Lyne,	  for	  instance,	  calculated	  the	  average	  cost	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  per	  week	  alongside	  a	  reckoning	  of	  the	  collective	  number	  of	  days	  for	  all	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Expenditure	  per	  pound	  of	  rateable	  value	  was	  not	  a	  standard	  component	  of	  the	  poor	  rate	  return,	  which	  gave	  expenditure,	  population	  and	  rateable	  value	  but	  not	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other.	  Occasional	  Parliamentary	  returns	  gave	  nationally	  aggregated	  6igures,	  e.g.	  PP	  89:;	  LIX	  8:	  Poor	  rates,	  &c.	  Return	  relating	  to	  local	  taxation,	  &c.	  33	  Poor	  Law	  Report,	  p.	  %&'.	  34	  PP	  #$%&	  XLIX	  *+*:	  Poor	  relief.	  Return	  showing	  the	  total	  amount	  expended	  for	  the	  relief	  of	  the	  poor	  during	  the	  years	  ended	  at	  Lady-­‐Day	  %&'(	  and	  %&''	  respectively;	  together	  with	  the	  cost	  per	  head	  on	  the	  population	  in	  -ifty	  unions	  and	  parishes,	  having	  the	  largest	  population,	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  35	  For	  example	  TNA	  MH#$/#&$',	  *&*+/A/#-.&,	  Truro	  Union:	  An	  Abstract	  of	  the	  Union	  Expenditure	  for	  the	  year	  ending	  Lady-­‐day,	  &'((.	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indoor	  paupers	  per	  half-­‐year.36	  But	  for	  the	  (irst	  !ifty	  years	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law,	  central	  government	  was	  only	  intermittently	  interested	  in	  costs	  per	  pauper.	  In	  !"#!	  the	  PLB	  asked	  unions	  for	  the	  average	  weekly	  cost	  per	  head	  of	  indoor	  paupers	  during	  the	  half-­‐year	  ended	  Lady-­‐day	  %&'(.37	  However,	  the	  results	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  incorporated	  into	  the	  returns	  of	  some	  poor	  law	  inspectors	  on	  their	  districts,	  but	  not	  published	  in	  full	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  H.B.	  Farnall’s	  report	  on	  the	  Eastern	  district.38	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  annual	  report	  contains	  the	  customary	  lengthy	  tables	  giving	  amounts	  spent	  and	  numbers	  of	  pauper	  in	  each	  class,	  but	  nowhere,	  it	  seems,	  has	  the	  one	  been	  divided	  by	  the	  other.	  	  The	  systematic	  reporting	  of	  costs	  per	  pauper	  by	  central	  government	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  begin	  until	  '((),	  with	  the	  eleventh	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  LGB.39	  From	  this	  point,	  average	  costs	  per	  pauper	  were	  published	  annually	  but	  only	  on	  a	  national	  scale,	  and	  the	  /igures	  for	  individual	  unions	  were	  not	  speci&ied.	  The	  LGB	  drew	  some	  interesting,	  but	  not	  entirely	  accurate,	  conclusions	  from	  its	  analysis	  of	  this	  expenditure.	  It	  noted	  that	  the	  mean	  cost	  per	  pauper	  (of	  all	  types)	  was,	  ‘as	  a	  general	  rule,	  in	  inverse	  proportion’	  to	  the	  number	  of	  paupers,	  and	  blamed	  what	  it	  called	  ‘indirect	  relief,’	  i.e.	  the	  administrative	  (ixed	  costs	  such	  as	  staf)ing	  and	  servicing	  loans.	  ‘These	  are	  charges	  of	  a	  comparatively	  permanent	  character,	  but	  little	  in0luenced	  by	  the	  mere	  numbers	  on	  the	  relief	  lists,’	  it	  reported.40	  The	  LGB	  was	  certainly	  right	  that	  expenditure	  in	  the	  ‘other	  relief	  costs’	  column	  of	  the	  poor	  rate	  return	  (i.e.	  not	  indoor	  or	  outdoor	  relief)	  was	  on	  the	  increase	  (Figure	  !.!).	  It	  continued	  to	  rise	  throughout	  the	  century	  –	  accounting	  for	  more	  than	  half	  the	  total	  relief	  costs	  from	  0123	  onwards	  (Figure	  !.!).	  However,	  the	  LGB	  was	  wrong	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  inverse	  relationship	  between	  expenditure	  per	  pauper	  and	  pauper	  numbers.	  This	  trend	  existed,	  but	  only	  because	  it	  was	  true	  speci1ically	  for	  outdoor	  relief,	  which	  predominated,	  and	  it	  held	  true	  even	  when	  the	  .ixed	  costs	  were	  stripped	  out	  (Figure	  !.!,	  b	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  A	  Statement	  of	  the	  Accounts	  of	  the	  Ashton-­‐under-­‐Lyne	  Union,	  for	  the	  Half-­‐Year	  ended	  March	  
!"th,	  '(()	  (Ashton-­‐under-­‐Lyne:	  Ashton-­‐under-­‐Lyne	  Poor	  Law	  Union,	  .//0).	  37	  PP	  #$%#	  XXVII	  Twenty-­‐third	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board,	  Appendix	  A,	  	  no.	  7,	  p.	  8.	  38	  Ibid.,	  Appendix	  B,	  p.	  ,-..	  39	  PP	  #$$%	  XXX	  Eleventh	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board.	  #$$#-­‐!",	  pp.	  xix	  ff.	  40	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  xix-­‐xx.	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c).	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  not	  true	  for	  indoor	  pauperism	  even	  when	  these	  6ixed	  costs	  were	  removed	  (Figure	  !.!,	  a).	  An	  alternative	  explanation	  is	  needed,	  therefore.	  It	  might	  be	  that	  over	  time,	  and	  as	  more	  paupers	  received	  indoor	  relief,	  more	  of	  those	  paupers	  required	  the	  more	  expensive	  forms	  of	  institutional	  care,	  for	  instance	  in	  in/irmaries,	  asylums	  and	  schools.	  Meanwhile,	  those	  who	  were	  deemed	  eligible	  for	  outdoor	  relief	  in	  the	  last	  quarter	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  were	  similar	  sorts	  of	  people:	  those	  requiring	  larger	  doles	  or	  pensions.	  The	  only	  difference	  was	  their	  location.	  	  	  
	  
Figure 2.7: Costs (adjusted for inflation) of indoor and outdoor relief and other relief 
expenditure.  
Source: Annual reports of PLC and successors. 
	  
Figure 2.8: Proportions of total relief costs of indoor, outdoor and other expenditure.  
Source: Annual reports of PLC and successors. 
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2.4 Administrative	  geographies	  Spatial	  variation	  in	  poor	  law	  practices	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  contemporaries.	  Helen	  Bosanquet	  noted	  in	  ()*):	  	  This	  want	  of	  uniformity…	  may	  depend	  largely	  upon	  peculiarities	  of	  local	  administration	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  relief	  given	  will	  be	  by	  way	  of	  maintenance	  in	  an	  institution,	  or	  by	  way	  of	  an	  allowance	  in	  the	  home	  of	  the	  recipient.	  In	  some	  Unions	  it	  is	  almost	  entirely	  the	  former,	  in	  others	  almost	  entirely	  the	  latter.’41	  	  
Yet	  one	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  had	  been	  to	  engender	  a	  degree	  of	  uniformity	  in	  relief	  across	  the	  country.	  It	  was	  not	  intended	  that	  every	  union	  should	  do	  exactly	  the	  same,	  but	  the	  central	  authority	  felt	  that	  the	  local	  adoption	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  0123	  would	  naturally	  lead	  to	  a	  reduction	  in	  relief	  spending	  overall.	  	  The	  central	  authority’s	  key	  mechanisms	  for	  promoting	  ‘correct’	  behaviour	  by	  unions	  were	  circular	  letters	  distributing	  policy	  edicts,	  and	  the	  persuasiveness	  of	  its	  regional	  administrators,	  the	  Assistant	  Commissioners,	  renamed	  as	  Inspectors	  in	  ,-./.	  In	  ,-.1	  there	  were	  twelve,	  each	  with	  a	  district	  of	  around	  !ifty	  unions.	  It	  was	  their	  role,	  in	  part,	  to	  see	  that	  there	  was	  as	  little	  variation	  between	  similar	  unions	  within	  their	  districts	  as	  possible.	  The	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  attempted	  to	  ensure	  that	  each	  inspector	  promoted	  the	  same	  set	  of	  policies,	  by	  demanding	  regular	  returns	  of	  numbers	  of	  paupers	  and	  expenditure	  by	  the	  unions	  overseen	  by	  the	  inspectors.42	  Between	  '()*	  and	  '(-*	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  in	  two	  key	  measurements	  the	  districts’	  performance	  improved	  by	  the	  PLB’s	  standards	  (Figure	  !.!").	  First,	  the	  districts	  displayed	  much	  less	  variation	  in	  expenditure	  per	  outdoor	  pauper	  in	  -./0	  than	  they	  had	  in	  -.30.	  Second,	  the	  percentage	  of	  paupers	  relieved	  in	  the	  workhouse	  rose,	  with	  all	  but	  one	  of	  the	  twelve	  districts	  maintaining	  above	  eleven	  per	  cent	  of	  their	  paupers	  indoors	  in	  !"#$.	  London	  and	  the	  south-­‐east	  of	  England	  (districts	  1	  and	  2)	  were	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  H.	  Bosanquet,	  The	  Poor	  Law	  Report	  of	  /010:	  A	  summary	  explaining	  the	  defects	  of	  the	  present	  
system	  and	  the	  principal	  recommendations	  of	  the	  Commission,	  so	  far	  as	  relates	  to	  England	  and	  
Wales	  (London:	  Macmillan,	  '()(),	  p.	  -..	  42	  TNA	  MH'(,	  correspondence	  of	  Poor	  Law	  Commission	  with	  Assistant	  Commissioners	  and	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  with	  Poor	  Law	  Inspectors.	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greatest	  users	  of	  the	  workhouse,	  and	  south	  Wales	  (district	  6)	  the	  least	  enthusiastic	  (Figure	  !.!!).	  Meanwhile	  expenditure	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  remained	  much	  more	  variable.	  Outdoor	  relief	  doles	  could	  be	  monitored	  and	  limited	  much	  more	  readily	  than	  indoor	  relief	  could	  be,	  as	  workhouse	  costs	  were	  more	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  local	  prices	  of	  goods.	  This	  division	  into	  districts	  therefore	  suggests	  a	  persistence	  in	  regional	  policy	  and	  behaviour	  by	  poor	  law	  unions	  well	  into	  the	  /012s,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  districts.	  
	  
Figure 2.10: Mean spend per pauper by type of relief in poor law inspector districts, 1850 and 
1870 (at 1850 values).  
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Figure 2.11: Poor law inspector districts, 1849.  
Source: PP 1849 XXV 1, Appendix, Table 16 p. 82. 
This	  regional	  or	  district	  framework	  was	  useful	  for	  governance,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  the	  scale	  at	  which	  individual	  paupers	  interacted	  with	  poor	  law	  authorities.	  Labour	  was	  increasingly	  mobile	  in	  this	  period,	  and	  therefore	  so	  was	  poverty.43	  The	  %&'%	  census	  revealed	  for	  the	  4irst	  time	  that	  more	  people	  in	  England	  lived	  in	  urban	  areas	  than	  in	  rural,	  as	  a	  result	  both	  of	  direct	  migration	  to	  towns	  and	  of	  those	  new	  urban	  dwellers	  increasing	  local	  birth	  rates.44	  Furthermore,	  the	  irremovability	  of	  non-­‐settled	  parish	  residents	  after	  a	  certain	  period	  was	  beginning	  to	  take	  effect:	  Legislation	  of	  1234	  granted	  irremovability	  after	  :ive	  years’	  continuous	  residence	  and	  there	  were	  subsequent	  reductions	  to	  this	  period.45	  The	  reductions	  in	  part	  stemmed	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  period	  of	  actual	  residence	  was	  very	  dif1icult	  for	  poor	  law	  administrators	  to	  determine.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  G.R.	  Boyer,	  An	  Economic	  History	  of	  the	  English	  Poor	  Law,	  5678-­‐!"#$	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  -../),	  p.	  343.	  44	  Williamson,	  ‘Migrant	  Selectivity,’	  pp.	  $%&	  ff.	  45	  !	  &	  $%	  Vict.,	  c.	  ,!	  and	  subsequent	  legislation.	  See	  Snell,	  Parish	  and	  Belonging,	  p.	  %%&.	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There	  were	  few	  checks	  that	  unions	  could	  make,	  and	  in	  many	  instances	  they	  simply	  had	  to	  take	  paupers	  at	  their	  word.46	  Irremovability	  also	  prompted	  rural	  landlords	  to	  ‘clear	  their	  estates’	  by	  destroying	  or	  refusing	  to	  repair	  cottages,	  and	  towns	  had	  little	  option	  but	  to	  accommodate	  these	  forced	  migrants.47	  Unions	  immediately	  bore	  the	  cost	  of	  irremovability:	  In	  6789	  unions	  relieved	  '(),+++	  irremovable	  paupers	  at	  a	  total	  expense	  of	  8'+9,+++,	  over	  &&	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  -..0	  million	  spent	  on	  all	  paupers	  that	  year.48	  From	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  therefore,	  labourers	  in	  the	  makeshift	  economy	  were	  increasingly	  thinking	  about	  where	  they	  should	  seek	  work	  on	  the	  basis	  not	  only	  of	  where	  work	  was	  available,	  but	  also	  of	  where	  they	  might	  !ind	  relief	  most	  readily.	  	  This	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  geography	  of	  poor	  relief.	  That	  there	  were	  strong	  patterns	  visible	  in	  relief	  practices	  at	  a	  regional	  scale	  is	  not	  disputed.	  However,	  paupers	  were	  concerned	  with	  the	  local,	  rather	  than	  with	  the	  regional.	  Ravenstein’s	  analysis	  shows	  that	  migrants	  at	  this	  period	  usually	  travelled	  only	  short	  distances	  from	  their	  places	  of	  birth,	  largely	  moving	  to	  urban	  centres	  from	  rural	  parts	  of	  the	  same	  or	  bordering	  counties,	  and	  tended	  only	  to	  travel	  longer	  distances	  to	  the	  ‘great	  centres	  of	  commerce	  or	  industry’.49	  As	  Goose	  points	  out,	  unions	  within	  the	  same	  county	  could	  display	  ‘signi$icant	  contrasts’	  in	  relief	  practices,	  either	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  ideology	  or	  as	  a	  re'lection	  of	  local	  economic	  structures.50	  Looking	  at	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  union	  is	  therefore	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  understanding	  the	  choices	  available	  to	  migrants	  who	  might	  have	  needed	  poor	  relief.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  PP	  #$%&	  XVII	  !.	  Report	  from	  the	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Irremovable	  Poor;	  together	  with	  the	  proceedings	  of	  the	  committee,	  minutes	  of	  evidence,	  appendix,	  and	  index,	  evidence	  of	  John	  Lambert,	  q.	  ,-.	  47	  A.	  Redford,	  Labour	  migration	  in	  England,	  1233-­‐!"#$	  !nd	  ed.,	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  -./0),	  p.	  -45.	  48	  PP	  #$%#	  XXVI	  !.	  Third	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board.	  5678.	  In	  pursuance	  of	  the	  statute	  !"	  &	  !!	  Vict.	  c.	  !"*	  s.	  !",	  p.	  !.	  49	  E.G.	  Ravenstein,	  ‘The	  laws	  of	  migration’,	  Journal	  of	  the	  Statistical	  Society	  of	  London	  !":$	  ("##$),	  pp.	  "*#-­‐!"".	  50	  N.	  Goose,	  ‘Workhouse	  populations	  in	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century:	  The	  case	  of	  Hertfordshire’,	  
Local	  Population	  Studies	  !"	  (%&&&),	  p.	  !!.	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2.5 Poor	  law	  expenditure	  at	  the	  local	  scale	  National	  averages	  and	  aggregated	  /igures	  are	  important	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  poor	  relief	  policy	  and	  practice,	  but	  they	  hide	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  local	  variation,	  especially	  because	  of	  the	  wide	  disparities	  in	  demography	  between	  authorities.	  In	  $%&$,	  for	  instance,	  the	  least	  populated	  union	  –	  with	  &'(	  inhabitants	  –	  was	  Brinton,	  Norfolk,	  which	  also	  had	  the	  lowest	  expenditure	  on	  its	  poor	  in	  $%&',	  at	  !"#$.	  It	  is	  probable	  that	  it	  had	  fewer	  paupers	  than	  the	  88	  reported	  by	  Welwyn,	  Hertfordshire	  –	  which	  also	  had	  the	  fewest	  outdoor	  poor	  –	  but	  as	  Brinton	  was	  a	  Gilbert’s	  union	  it	  was	  not	  required	  to	  return	  pauper	  numbers	  to	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board.	  The	  biggest	  single	  authority	  in	  terms	  of	  inhabitants	  was	  Liverpool	  ("#$,"&!).	  The	  largest	  by	  acreage	  was	  Bellingham,	  Northumberland,	  while	  the	  smallest	  union	  was	  West	  London,	  Middlesex.	  Nineteen	  unions	  had	  no	  workhouses,	  and	  hence	  no	  indoor	  paupers	  to	  report,	  in	  2345.	  These	  were	  mostly	  in	  Wales	  and	  the	  Midlands	  and	  south-­‐west	  of	  England.	  The	  smallest	  reported	  workhouse	  populations,	  at	  ten	  each,	  were	  at	  Bala	  in	  Merioneth	  and	  Tetbury	  in	  Gloucestershire,	  and	  the	  greatest	  in	  Manchester,	  Lancashire,	  at	  !,#$%.	  Liverpool’s	  might	  have	  been	  bigger,	  but	  as	  a	  local	  incorporation	  it	  did	  not	  return	  the	  (igures.	  After	  the	  repeal	  of	  Gilbert’s	  Act	  in	  789:,	  in	  comparison,	  there	  was	  somewhat	  less	  variation	  in	  population	  sizes.	  In	  4564	  the	  smallest	  union	  was	  Welwyn,	  Hertfordshire,	  with	  4,454	  inhabitants.	  Liverpool	  was	  by	  then	  the	  second-­‐largest	  by	  population,	  having	  been	  overtaken	  by	  West	  Derby	  ("#$,&'().	  Seven	  unions	  had	  no	  workhouse	  as	  late	  as	  <=$&:	  six	  were	  in	  Wales	  and	  one,	  Todmorden,	  was	  in	  Lancashire.	  Given	  these	  variations	  in	  absolute	  numbers,	  it	  is	  more	  helpful	  to	  compare	  expenditure	  by	  unions	  in	  proportion	  to	  their	  populations.	  A	  clear	  division	  between	  northern	  and	  southern	  unions	  is	  apparent	  in	  both	  0123	  and	  0143	  (Figure	  !.!"):	  Unions	  in	  the	  south	  of	  England	  and	  central	  Wales	  consistently	  spent	  more	  on	  poor	  relief	  per	  head	  of	  population	  than	  those	  in	  the	  north	  of	  England.	  Within	  these	  broad	  delineations,	  some	  regional	  differences	  are	  also	  clear:	  The	  north-­‐east	  spent	  a	  little	  more	  per	  head	  than	  the	  north-­‐west,	  for	  instance,	  and	  Devon’s	  and	  Cornwall’s	  unions	  spent	  a	  little	  less	  per	  head	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  south.	  Furthermore,	  these	  patterns	  are	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strikingly	  tenacious	  over	  the	  two	  decades.	  When	  ranked	  by	  expenditure	  per	  head	  of	  population	  for	  '()*	  and	  '(-*,	  unions	  showed	  a	  very	  strong	  tendency	  to	  remain	  in	  a	  similar	  position	  relative	  to	  others.51	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Spearman’s	  ρ,	  the	  correlation	  coef.icient	  of	  their	  ranks,	  is	  1.33.	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The	  idea	  of	  the	  north-­‐south	  divide	  was	  a	  familiar	  theme	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  Howell	  pointing	  to	  the	  persistent	  ‘role	  of	  geographical	  differentiation	  in	  British	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  development	  as	  a	  force	  in	  its	  own	  right’.52	  The	  north	  was	  understood	  as	  industrialised,	  modern	  and	  prosperous,	  the	  south	  as	  bucolic	  but	  impoverished.	  Overlaid	  on	  this	  is	  the	  historiographical	  conception	  of	  attitudes	  to	  poor	  relief.	  King,	  for	  instance,	  identi4ies	  a	  ‘gulf	  in	  poor	  law	  practice	  and	  generosity	  between	  northern	  and	  southern	  areas’	  under	  the	  old	  poor	  law,	  based	  on	  spend	  per	  head	  of	  population.53	  He	  stresses	  that	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  did	  not	  alter	  the	  ‘enduring	  regional	  patterns	  in	  welfare	  culture	  that	  we	  can	  see	  developing	  from	  at	  least	  4566	  onwards.’54	  	  Whether	  the	  south’s	  policies	  can	  be	  described	  as	  ‘generous’	  and	  the	  north’s	  as	  ‘parsimonious’	  is	  open	  to	  question,	  however.	  	  Fundamentally,	  the	  south	  had	  more	  paupers	  per	  capita,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  unsurprising	  that	  it	  spent	  more	  per	  capita.	  The	  south	  of	  England	  and	  north	  of	  Wales	  contained	  almost	  all	  the	  unions	  with	  the	  greatest	  numbers	  of	  paupers	  in	  their	  populations	  in	  both	  !"#$	  and	  %&'(	  (Figure	  !.!").	  Pauperism	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  direct	  proxy	  for	  poverty,	  as	  paupers	  were	  people	  the	  guardians	  and	  their	  of1icers	  chose	  to	  relieve,	  even	  though	  pauperism	  rates	  cannot	  be	  divorced	  from	  local	  poverty	  entirely.	  Low	  numbers	  of	  paupers,	  therefore,	  might	  not	  always	  indicate	  low	  levels	  of	  poverty	  in	  a	  given	  union,	  as	  the	  guardians	  might	  have	  been	  very	  keen	  to	  keep	  the	  poor	  rates	  down	  and	  thus	  declined	  many	  applications.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  north’s	  pauperism	  rate	  was	  relatively	  low	  for	  this	  reason.	  However,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  had	  applications	  for	  relief	  been	  uniform	  in	  the	  north	  and	  south,	  the	  pressure	  of	  these	  applications	  could	  have	  been	  responded	  to	  with	  generosity	  in	  the	  south	  and	  parsimony	  in	  the	  north	  on	  such	  a	  great	  scale	  by	  so	  many	  unions	  and	  with	  such	  geographical	  consistency.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  P.	  Howell,	  ‘Industry	  and	  identity:	  the	  north-­‐south	  divide	  and	  the	  geography	  of	  belonging,	  !"#$-­‐!"!#’,	  in	  A.R.H.	  Baker	  and	  M.	  Billinge	  (eds),	  Geographies	  of	  England:	  The	  North-­‐South	  
Divide,	  Material	  and	  Imagined	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  5667),	  p.	  ;<.	  53	  S.	  King,	  ‘Poor	  Relief	  and	  English	  Economic	  Development	  Reappraised’,	  Economic	  History	  
Review	  !":$	  ('(()),	  p.	  ./'.	  54	  King,	  Poverty	  and	  Welfare,	  pp.	  %%&-­‐!!".	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The	  relative	  generosity	  of	  poor	  law	  unions	  was,	  therefore,	  understood	  by	  contemporaries	  to	  be	  a	  function	  of	  expenditure	  in	  proportion	  to	  resources,	  i.e.	  per	  head	  or	  per	  pound	  of	  rateable	  value.	  (The	  geographic	  distribution	  of	  spend	  as	  a	  ratio	  of	  rateable	  value	  was	  almost	  identical	  to	  that	  of	  spend	  per	  head,	  and	  rateable	  value	  and	  expenditure	  were	  very	  highly	  correlated.55)	  There	  were	  good	  reasons	  why	  this	  understanding	  prevailed,	  in	  particular	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ratepayers	  were	  considered	  to	  have	  the	  principal	  stake	  in	  the	  poor	  law	  system.	  Yet	  generosity	  can	  only	  fully	  be	  assessed	  by	  an	  exploration	  of	  how	  it	  was	  understood	  by	  paupers.	  Two	  factors	  are	  central	  to	  this:	  the	  mode	  of	  relief,	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  relief	  likely	  to	  be	  given.	  	  The	  amount	  of	  relief	  is	  the	  more	  straightforward	  factor.	  A	  crude	  measurement	  of	  mean	  relief	  expenditure	  per	  outdoor	  pauper	  gives	  a	  good	  idea	  of	  the	  unions	  where	  paupers	  might	  have	  judged	  guardians	  as	  parsimonious	  or	  generous	  compared	  to	  those	  in	  neighbouring	  unions	  (Figure	  !.!").	  This	  measurement	  takes	  no	  account	  of	  the	  breadth	  of	  ‘entitlement’	  to	  poor	  relief,	  however,	  and	  poor	  individuals	  and	  families	  denied	  any	  form	  of	  relief,	  even	  in	  a	  locality	  where	  pensions	  were	  relatively	  substantial,	  would	  no	  doubt	  have	  disputed	  the	  characterisation	  of	  the	  union	  as	  ‘generous’.	  Nonetheless,	  some	  striking	  spatial	  features	  emerge	  in	  mapping	  indicative	  expenditure	  per	  outdoor	  pauper.	  In	  !"#$,	  the	  largest	  concentrations	  of	  low	  spending	  were	  in	  Lancashire,	  West	  Yorkshire	  and	  North	  Wales,	  where	  outdoor	  paupers	  on	  average	  received	  relatively	  small	  allowances.	  In	  contrast,	  a	  signi0icant	  band	  of	  region-­‐wide	  high	  spending	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Cumberland,	  Northumberland,	  Lincolnshire	  and	  the	  East	  Midlands.	  County	  Durham	  and	  North	  Yorkshire	  stand	  out	  as	  exceptions	  to	  this	  eastern	  band	  of	  larger	  allowances.	  There	  was	  also	  perhaps	  a	  degree	  of	  similarity	  in	  the	  mid-­‐to-­‐high	  spending	  unions	  of	  the	  central	  south	  and	  south	  Midlands.	  Aside	  from	  these	  groupings,	  though,	  it	  is	  not	  apparent	  that	  there	  was	  much	  regional	  uniformity	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  There	  was	  certainly	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  intra-­‐regional	  variation	  in	  the	  south-­‐west,	  south-­‐east,	  East	  Anglia	  and	  most	  of	  the	  Midlands.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  For	  spend	  *+,-	  v.	  RV	  *+,2,	  Pearson’s	  r	  =	  #.%&	  and	  for	  -.%#	  r	  =	  #.%%.	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These	  &indings	  build	  on	  King’s	  ‘impressionistic’	  map	  of	  the	  welfare	  landscape	  in	  the	  early	  part	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  the	  amounts	  of	  outrelief	  given	  and	  the	  openness	  of	  entitlements	  under	  the	  old	  poor	  law.56	  The	  characterisation	  of	  relatively	  generous	  allowances	  in	  the	  north-­‐east	  and	  a	  more	  restrictive	  north-­‐west	  appears	  to	  have	  held	  true	  into	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century.	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country,	  either	  the	  patterns	  tentatively	  delineated	  by	  King	  did	  not	  persist	  to	  /012,	  or	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  intra-­‐regional	  variation	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  suitability	  of	  regional	  demarcations	  along	  the	  lines	  suggested.	  It	  is	  certainly	  possible	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  regional	  patterns	  changed	  signi%icantly	  over	  the	  %irst	  few	  decades	  of	  the	  century,	  given	  the	  conspicuous	  changes	  between	  ,-./	  and	  ,-1/	  in	  some	  parts.	  North	  Wales,	  in	  particular,	  increased	  its	  outdoor	  allowances	  en	  bloc,	  as	  rateable	  value	  per	  head	  increased	  and	  pauper	  numbers	  declined.	  Some	  unions	  in	  Lancashire	  also	  increased	  their	  spend	  per	  outdoor	  pauper	  by	  ./01,	  while	  the	  central	  and	  east	  Midlands	  and	  north-­‐east	  continued	  to	  give	  above-­‐average	  payments.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  remained	  something	  of	  a	  patchwork	  in	  outdoor	  relief,	  though.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  mapping	  outdoor	  relief	  spend,	  the	  measurement	  of	  relief	  expenditure	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  does	  not	  give	  an	  adequate	  indication	  of	  relative	  generosity.	  Workhouses	  were	  more	  or	  less	  expensive	  to	  run	  depending	  on	  a	  number	  of	  variables	  unconnected	  to	  the	  comfort	  guardians	  wished	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  inmates,	  such	  as	  the	  prices	  of	  goods	  consumed	  by	  the	  institutions	  which	  are	  considered	  in	  subsequent	  chapters.	  Mapping	  expenditure	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  therefore	  only	  gives	  an	  idea	  of	  how	  costly	  workhouses	  were	  (Figure	  !.!").	  London	  was	  consistently	  the	  most	  expensive	  place	  to	  run	  a	  workhouse,	  with	  some	  clusters	  of	  costly	  indoor	  relief	  in	  the	  east	  Midlands	  and	  south	  Wales.	  Meanwhile	  East	  Anglia,	  north	  Wales	  and	  the	  West	  Country	  spent	  the	  least	  on	  their	  indoor	  paupers.	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  King,	  Poverty	  and	  Welfare,	  p.	  %&%.	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Given	  a	  choice	  between	  indoor	  and	  outdoor	  relief,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  paupers	  seem	  to	  have	  preferred	  outdoor.	  This	  was	  the	  presumption	  underpinning	  the	  principle	  of	  less	  eligibility	  –	  the	  very	  purpose	  of	  the	  workhouse	  was	  to	  be	  a	  deterrent	  –	  and	  its	  effectiveness	  can	  be	  inferred	  from	  the	  strength	  of	  opposition	  to	  the	  workhouse	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  the	  new	  system.57	  A	  measurement	  of	  a	  harsh	  regime	  as	  it	  was	  perceived	  by	  paupers	  might	  therefore	  be	  the	  proportion	  of	  paupers	  relieved	  in	  the	  workhouse	  (Figure	  !.!").	  The	  south-­‐east	  had	  the	  greatest	  proportions	  of	  indoor	  poor	  in	  /012,	  with	  the	  south	  and	  Midlands	  containing	  unions	  displaying	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  workhouse	  use.	  Wales	  and	  the	  north	  of	  England,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  Cumbria,	  tended	  not	  to	  use	  indoor	  relief	  as	  much	  in	  comparison.	  As	  shown	  above,	  by	  89:;	  indoor	  relief	  was	  much	  more	  common	  across	  England.	  Figure	  !.!"	  shows	  this	  consolidation	  of	  workhouse	  use	  being	  particular	  signi4icant	  in	  the	  Midlands	  and	  north	  of	  England,	  though	  Wales	  and	  the	  south-­‐west	  of	  England	  continued	  to	  maintain	  fewer	  indoor	  paupers	  as	  a	  proportion	  than	  did	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  N.C.	  Edsall,	  The	  anti-­‐Poor	  Law	  movement,	  ./01-­‐!!	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  !"#!);	  J.	  Knott,	  Popular	  opposition	  to	  the	  /012	  Poor	  Law	  (London:	  Croom	  Helm,	  '()*).	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The	  important	  spatial	  factor	  in	  the	  rate	  of	  indoor	  pauperism	  appears	  to	  be	  not	  a	  regional	  delineation,	  but	  instead	  distance	  from	  London.	  The	  further	  from	  London	  a	  union	  was,	  the	  less	  likely	  it	  was	  to	  relieve	  its	  poor	  in	  the	  workhouse.	  This	  was	  especially	  the	  case	  in	  /012	  and	  persisted	  over	  at	  least	  the	  next	  two	  decades	  (Figure	  !.!").	  By	  &'(),	  the	  average	  percentage	  relieved	  indoors	  had	  risen	  almost	  everywhere	  but	  Wales.	  The	  south-­‐east	  continued	  to	  have	  the	  highest	  indoor	  rates,	  but	  had	  been	  matched	  by	  several	  northern	  urban	  unions	  which	  embraced	  the	  use	  of	  the	  workhouse	  far	  more	  than	  they	  had	  in	  the	  !"#$s.	  These	  are	  represented	  in	  the	  peak	  of	  indoor	  relief	  in	  the	  /01-­‐!""	  kilometre	  band	  (Figure	  !.!"	  and	  Table	  !.!).	  An	  urban	  union	  is	  de/ined,	  for	  these	  purposes,	  as	  having	  a	  population	  density	  of	  one	  or	  more	  person	  per	  acre.58	  
	  
Figure 2.17: Percentage of paupers relieved in workhouse vs. distance in km from City of 
London (centroids), 1 January 1850 and 1 January 1870.  
Source: See Table 2.1. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  This	  arbitrary	  de-inition	  is	  discussed	  in	  C.M.	  Law,	  ‘The	  Growth	  of	  Urban	  Population	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  ,-.,-­‐!"!!’,	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  British	  Geographers	  !"	  ("%&'),	  	  pp.	  $%&-­‐!"#.	  




of  unions 
Mean indoor % 
1850 1870 
< 50 km 84 16.4 18.4 
51-100 km 102 15.7 15.5 
101-150 km 99 13.6 13.6 
151-200 km 102 12.5 12.3 
201-250 km 73 10.3 13.7 
251-300 km 85 6.3 11.8 
> 300 km 98 8.1 10.9 
Total 643 11.9 13.7 
Table 2.4: Mean percentage of indoor pauperism on 1 Jan 1850 and 1870 by distance bands.  
Source: See Table 2.1. 
2.6 Indoor	  and	  outdoor	  relief	  in	  urban	  and	  rural	  unions	  Two	  questions	  must	  therefore	  be	  considered:	  First,	  why	  did	  so	  many	  unions	  in	  Wales	  and	  the	  rural	  north	  resist	  using	  the	  workhouse;	  and	  second,	  why	  did	  northern	  towns	  stop	  resisting?	  Wales,	  Lancashire	  and	  Yorkshire,	  which	  had	  the	  lowest	  indoor	  pauperism	  rates,	  were	  areas	  typi*ied	  by	  resistance	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law.	  The	  experiences	  of	  William	  Day,	  an	  assistant	  poor	  law	  commissioner	  from	  /012	  to	  /041,	  suggest	  some	  characteristics	  of	  the	  unions	  in	  Wales	  under	  his	  superintendence	  which	  contributed	  to	  their	  low	  indoor	  pauperism	  rate.	  From	  his	  perspective,	  the	  area	  was	  rife	  with	  abuses	  and	  intractable	  opposition	  to	  investing	  in	  workhouses,	  stemming	  from	  a	  combination	  of	  misconceptions	  about	  the	  new	  system	  and	  the	  vested	  interests	  of	  landowners.	  The	  ratepayers	  and	  guardians	  of	  the	  poor	  in	  many	  unions	  were	  stubbornly	  opposed	  to	  adopting	  the	  policies	  advocated	  by	  Day	  and	  the	  PLC,	  such	  as	  replacing	  their	  old	  and	  (in	  Day’s	  view)	  inadequate	  workhouses	  with	  expensive	  modern	  institutions.	  In	  1234	  he	  told	  the	  PLC:	  ‘I	  cannot	  but	  feel	  that	  the	  question	  henceforth	  whether	  you	  or	  the	  Guardians	  are	  to	  be	  masters	  in	  Wales	  is	  now	  in	  peril.	  I	  have	  been	  repeatedly	  told	  by	  the	  Guardians	  that	  you	  dare	  not	  enforce	  your	  orders,	  &	  in	  the	  con1idence	  of	  this	  it	  is	  that	  they	  dare	  to	  disobey	  them.’59	  He	  wrote	  to	  fellow	  assistant	  commissioner	  Sir	  John	  Walsham	  in	  $%&':	  ‘You	  cannot	  know	  the	  miseries	  of	  thirty	  or	  forty	  Welsh	  Guardians	  who	  won’t	  build	  a	  Workhouse,	  and	  consequently	  meet	  in	  the	  parlour	  of	  a	  pot	  house	  twelve	  feet	  by	  fourteen	  and	  keep	  all	  the	  windows	  shut	  and	  spit	  tobacco	  on	  your	  shoes	  –	  to	  say	  nothing	  of	  knowing	  not	  a	  word	  of	  what	  they	  are	  talking	  of	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  TNA	  MH'(/*+,	  Day	  to	  PLC,	  *5	  August	  *9':.	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in	  an	  unknown	  tongue.’60	  Day’s	  confrontational	  style	  might	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  guardians’	  resistance,	  and	  after	  his	  forced	  resignation	  in	  2345	  the	  PLC	  suggested	  he	  ‘was	  wanting	  not	  in	  activity	  but	  in	  discretion’.61	  Here	  was	  entrenched	  resistance	  to	  expensive	  central	  government	  policies	  seen	  to	  be	  designed	  for	  the	  south	  of	  England,	  reinforced	  by	  a	  personality	  clash.	  Encouraging	  guardians	  to	  comply	  with	  central	  government	  policy	  was	  also	  a	  battle	  in	  the	  northern	  district	  overseen	  by	  assistant	  commissioner	  William	  H.T.	  Hawley.	  He	  described	  the	  management	  of	  ten	  of	  his	  7ifty-­‐!ive	  unions	  as	  ‘ineffective’	  or	  ‘unsatisfactory’	  in	  the	  quarter	  ended	  45	  December	  59:;;	  unions	  infringed	  PLC	  orders	  and	  workhouses	  in	  several	  unions	  awaited	  structural	  improvement.62	  In	  a	  report	  on	  land	  ownership	  in	  the	  North	  Riding	  of	  Yorkshire	  in	  +,-+	  Hawley	  complained	  of	  the	  ‘evil’	  of	  close	  parishes,	  i.e.	  those	  with	  a	  small	  number	  of	  landowners	  exercising	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  control	  over	  their	  tenants.63	  Rates	  levied	  in	  neighbouring	  open	  parishes	  exceeded	  by	  nearly	  a	  half	  those	  in	  the	  close	  parishes,	  and	  Hawley	  lamented	  the	  ‘dissipation	  of	  the	  Parochial	  funds	  in	  expensive	  and	  useless	  litigation’	  between	  parishes	  arguing	  over	  paupers’	  rights	  to	  relief	  under	  the	  laws	  of	  settlement.64	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  earlier	  years	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law,	  by	  3453	  boards	  of	  guardians	  seemed	  keen	  to	  administer	  the	  new	  system	  effectively.	  Hawley	  reported	  to	  the	  PLB:	  	   At	  all	  the	  Boards	  I	  perceive	  a	  cordial	  desire	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Guardians	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  law	  with	  justice	  towards	  the	  ratepayers,	  and	  humanity	  towards	  the	  poor:	  the	  orders	  of	  your	  Board	  are	  generally	  very	  cheerfully	  obeyed,	  and	  my	  own	  suggestions	  attended	  to.	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  growing	  appreciation	  of	  the	  value	  and	  ef2icacy	  of	  the	  workhouse	  test	  as	  applied	  to	  destitution.65	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  National	  Library	  of	  Wales,	  Day	  MSS	  5678	  F,	  Day	  to	  Sir	  John	  Walsham,	  =	  August	  6A7B,	  cited	  in	  R.A.	  Lewis,	  ‘William	  Day	  and	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commissioners’,	  University	  of	  Birmingham	  
Historical	  Journal	  !:#	  (#!&'),	  p.	  #,-.	  61	  TNA	  HO'(/*+**,	  PLC	  to	  Sir	  William	  Somerville,	  (	  October	  *='+.	  62	  TNA	  MH'(/*+,	  +*(A/*-,	  W.H.T.	  Hawley	  to	  PLC,	  *	  January	  +>!".	  63	  TNA	  MH'(/*+,	  '-*.//+,	  Hawley	  to	  PLB,	  :	  January	  +./+.	  64	  Ibid.	  65	  TNA	  MH'(/*+,	  -*.'/.+,	  Hawley	  to	  PLB,	  (.	  January	  +=.+.	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These	  unions	  might	  have	  appeared	  to	  Hawley	  to	  be	  increasingly	  compliant,	  but	  they	  were	  largely	  not	  subject	  to	  orders	  restricting	  or	  prohibiting	  their	  outdoor	  relief	  expenditure.66	  Without	  such	  regulation,	  their	  relief	  costs	  were	  kept	  down	  by	  maintaining	  only	  small	  numbers	  of	  paupers	  in	  their	  workhouses.	  Such	  regional	  explanations	  can	  only	  go	  so	  far,	  though,	  as	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  show	  mixtures	  of	  indoor	  pauperism	  rates	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  uniformity	  of	  the	  rural	  Wales-­‐Lancashire-­‐Yorkshire	  band.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  further	  from	  London	  the	  central	  authority’s	  representatives	  travelled,	  the	  more	  they	  encountered	  the	  attitude	  Day	  described:	  that	  ‘that	  may	  do	  very	  well	  for	  England,	  but	  it	  won’t	  do	  for	  Wales’.67	  For	  the	  majority	  of	  unions,	  however,	  individual	  circumstance	  had	  much	  to	  do	  with	  actual	  relief	  policy,	  and	  in	  few	  regions	  was	  there	  uniformity	  of	  circumstance.	  By	  $%&'	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  division	  between	  rural	  and	  urban	  approaches	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  indoor	  relief	  (Figure	  !.!").	  Unions	  in	  Wales,	  none	  of	  which	  had	  population	  densities	  greater	  than	  one	  per	  acre,	  did	  not	  increase	  their	  indoor	  relief	  rates	  on	  average	  from	  /012,	  though	  there	  were	  a	  few	  individual	  unions	  which	  did	  (or	  which	  built	  workhouses).	  Southern	  urban	  unions	  including	  London	  did	  not	  change	  their	  proportions	  of	  indoor	  pauperism	  greatly	  either,	  but	  they	  had	  started	  from	  higher	  rates	  in	  the	  2irst	  place.	  In	  the	  north,	  as	  shown	  above,	  urban	  unions	  began	  to	  adopt	  the	  workhouse	  to	  a	  far	  greater	  extent	  than	  they	  had	  done.	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  F.	  Driver,	  ‘The	  historical	  geography	  of	  the	  workhouse	  system	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  0123-­‐!""#’,	  Journal	  of	  Historical	  Geography	  !":$	  (!'('),	  pp.	  -./-­‐!"#.	  67National	  Library	  of	  Wales,	  Day	  MSS	  ()*+	  F,	  Day	  to	  Walsham,	  4	  August	  )8*9,	  cited	  in	  Lewis,	  ‘William	  Day,’	  p.	  ./0.	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Figure 2.18: Percentage change in indoor relief rates, 1850-70, by union location-type.  
Source: See Table 2.1. 
The	  locations	  of	  increases	  and	  decreases	  in	  indoor	  pauperism	  compared	  to	  !"#$	  had	  clear	  regional	  and	  demographic	  features,	  therefore	  (Figure	  !.!").	  Those	  unions	  in	  the	  lowest	  third	  for	  indoor	  rates	  in	  both	  0123	  and	  0143	  were	  mostly	  in	  Wales	  and	  the	  north	  of	  England.	  Those	  in	  the	  top	  third	  for	  both	  years	  were	  mostly	  in	  the	  south-­‐east	  and	  west	  Midlands.	  But	  those	  in	  the	  lowest	  third	  in	  $%&'	  which	  increased	  their	  ranking	  by	  $%5'	  were	  predominantly	  in	  the	  north-­‐west,	  along	  with	  some	  towns	  across	  the	  south.	  Some	  of	  the	  unions	  classi&ied	  as	  ‘northern	  rural’	  but	  which	  displayed	  a	  signi&icant	  increase	  in	  indoor	  relief	  were	  sites	  of	  rapid	  urbanisation,	  such	  as	  Skipton,	  Leyburn	  and	  Stockton,	  or	  were	  already	  towns	  with	  large	  agricultural	  hinterlands,	  like	  York.	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Figure 2.19: Locations of indoor relief rate changes, 1850-70.  
Source: See Table 2.1. 
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parts	  of	  England	  and	  Wales,	  rural	  unions	  spent	  fairly	  similar	  amounts	  per	  outdoor	  pauper.	  Meanwhile	  expenditure	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  was	  fairly	  close	  for	  all	  kinds	  of	  union	  by	  this	  typology,	  with	  the	  very	  clear	  exception	  of	  London,	  where	  workhouse	  costs	  were	  by	  far	  the	  highest.	  London	  also	  gave	  indoor	  relief	  to	  many	  more	  of	  its	  paupers	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country,	  though	  other	  urban	  unions	  in	  the	  south	  also	  had	  high	  indoor	  relief	  rates	  in	  ,-./.	  By	  ,-3/,	  real	  spend	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  had	  risen	  for	  all	  types	  of	  union,	  but	  spend	  per	  outdoor	  pauper	  was	  static.	  	  
	  
Figure 2.20: Mean spend per pauper by method of relief and location-type of union, 1850 and 
1870 (at 1850 values).  
Source: PP 1851 XXVI 1; PP 1876 LXIII 1. 
From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  a	  pauper	  seeking	  outdoor	  relief,	  therefore,	  whether	  the	  union	  was	  in	  the	  north	  or	  south	  made	  little	  difference	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  
relief:	  The	  important	  factor	  was	  whether	  it	  was	  rural	  or	  urban.	  The	  likelihood	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not	  far	  behind.	  Unions	  in	  Wales	  continued	  to	  shun	  the	  workhouse,	  with	  only	  six	  per	  cent	  of	  their	  paupers	  given	  indoor	  relief	  in	  ./01	  (Table	  !.!).	  	  




















London 8.92 9.75 +9 2.94 2.85 -3 23 26 +13 
Northern rural 6.10 7.50 +23 3.97 3.95 -1 12 13 +14 
Northern urban 6.12 7.60 +24 3.12 3.16 +1 11 17 +59 
Southern rural 5.65 6.97 +23 3.90 3.76 -4 16 14 -8 
Southern urban 6.36 8.20 +29 3.44 3.29 -4 19 19 +1 
Wales 5.80 7.31 +26 3.65 4.08 +12 5 6 +15 
Table 2.5: Mean spend per pauper type by relief and location-type of union, 1850 and 1870 
(at 1850 values). Source: PP 1851 XXVI 1; PP 1876 LXIII 1. 
The	  preference	  for	  outdoor	  relief	  among	  northern	  industrial	  towns	  in	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	  has	  been	  well	  documented.	  Boyer	  notes	  that	  it	  was	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  manufacturers	  to	  promote	  outdoor	  relief	  as	  they	  could	  thereby	  use	  the	  poor	  law	  as	  a	  form	  of	  unemployment	  insurance.69	  In	  Lancashire	  and	  the	  West	  Riding,	  downturns	  in	  the	  textiles	  trade,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  early	  6789s,	  were	  accompanied	  by	  big	  increases	  in	  the	  numbers	  of	  adult	  able-­‐bodied	  men	  relieved	  on	  account	  of	  want	  of	  work	  or	  insuf2iciency	  of	  earnings.	  This	  was	  ‘almost	  uniformly’	  outdoor	  relief.70	  It	  was	  cheaper	  than	  indoor	  relief	  not	  only	  because	  the	  value	  of	  relief	  per	  pauper	  was	  less,	  but	  also	  because	  it	  did	  not	  leave	  workhouses	  empty	  when	  trade	  was	  good.	  Attempts	  by	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  to	  prohibit	  or	  regulate	  the	  giving	  of	  outrelief	  to	  able-­‐bodied	  factory	  workers	  and	  casual	  labourers	  were	  regularly	  obstructed	  by	  boards	  of	  guardians	  in	  the	  north	  of	  England.71	  	  The	  considerable	  rise	  in	  workhouse	  use	  by	  unions	  in	  northern	  towns	  by	  ./01	  is	  signi%icant,	  given	  the	  deep-­‐seated	  resistance	  to	  ending	  outdoor	  relief	  in	  many	  of	  these	  places.	  On	  -	  January	  -234	  some	  &'	  per	  cent	  of	  paupers	  in	  northern	  urban	  unions	  were	  relieved	  indoors,	  compared	  to	  22	  per	  cent	  on	  2	  January	  ()*+.	  This	  was	  an	  increase	  of	  nearly	  7+	  per	  cent,	  and	  brought	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Boyer,	  English	  Poor	  Law,	  p.	  %&'.	  70	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  %&'-­‐!"#.	  71	  M.E.	  Rose,	  ‘The	  allowance	  system	  under	  the	  New	  Poor	  Law’,	  Economic	  History	  Review,	  #nd	  ser.	  !":$	  (!"''),	  pp.	  '!!-­‐!"#.	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northern	  urban	  unions	  into	  line	  with	  their	  southern	  counterparts	  whose	  indoor	  relief	  rates	  remained	  static	  at	  ,-	  per	  cent	  on	  average	  over	  the	  period	  (Table	  !.!).	  This	  change	  in	  relief	  policy	  certainly	  set	  northern	  towns	  apart	  from	  northern	  rural	  areas,	  which	  decreased	  their	  use	  of	  the	  workhouse	  by	  6	  per	  cent	  over	  the	  period.	  This	  adds	  to	  Driver’s	  identi0ication	  of	  the	  north	  of	  England	  as	  the	  centre	  of	  workhouse	  building	  from	  the	  mid-­‐!"#$s	  onwards;	  it	  was,	  in	  fact,	  speci-ically	  the	  unions	  with	  the	  highest	  population	  densities	  which	  increased	  their	  indoor	  pauperism	  rates	  the	  most.72	  In	  Lancashire	  alone,	  Chorlton,	  Liverpool,	  Prestwich,	  West	  Derby,	  Chorley,	  Burnley,	  Preston	  and	  Toxteth	  all	  had	  debt	  of	  over	  -./,111	  for	  workhouse	  building	  authorised	  by	  the	  PLB	  between	  *+,-	  and	  *+0*.73	  Of	  these,	  only	  Chorley	  had	  a	  population	  density	  of	  under	  one	  person	  per	  acre.	  In	  part,	  the	  increase	  in	  indoor	  relief	  by	  northern	  towns	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  changes	  in	  the	  rating	  system	  which	  funded	  poor	  relief.	  The	  Union	  Relief	  Aid	  Act	  %&'(	  was	  designed	  with	  the	  Lancashire	  cotton	  belt	  in	  mind,	  to	  enable	  poorer	  parishes	  to	  receive	  rates-­‐in-­‐aid	  from	  other	  parishes	  within	  their	  unions;	  and	  the	  Union	  Chargeability	  Act	  %&'(	  made	  entire	  unions	  the	  basis	  for	  rating,	  instead	  of	  their	  constituent	  parishes.74	  As	  MacKinnon	  describes,	  such	  changes	  increased	  the	  amounts	  available	  to	  unions,	  which	  were	  then	  able	  to	  expand	  workhouse	  provision,	  to	  begin	  to	  comply	  with	  central	  government	  policy	  and	  make	  possible	  the	  ‘crusade’	  against	  outrelief.75	  The	  greatest	  bene$iciaries	  of	  this	  rating	  change	  were	  indeed	  the	  northern	  urban	  unions,	  whose	  rateable	  value	  per	  head	  of	  population	  increased	  by	  56	  per	  cent	  on	  average	  between	  +,-.	  and	  +,!",	  well	  above	  the	  national	  average	  rise	  of	  45	  per	  cent.	  The	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  was,	  by	  $%&',	  in	  a	  position	  to	  complain	  that	  ‘as	  regards	  expenditure,	  it	  appears	  certain	  that	  considerably	  more	  liberality	  is	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  F.	  Driver,	  Power	  and	  Pauperism:	  The	  Workhouse	  System,	  89:;-­‐!""#	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  -../),	  pp.	  3--­‐!.	  73	  P.	  Wood,	  ‘Finance	  and	  the	  urban	  poor	  law:	  Sunderland	  Union,	  4567-­‐!"!#’,	  in	  M.E.	  Rose	  (ed),	  
The	  Poor	  and	  the	  City:	  The	  English	  Poor	  Law	  in	  its	  Urban	  Context,	  :;<=-­‐!"!#	  (Leicester:	  Leicester	  University	  Press,	  -./0),	  p.	  4..	  74	  !"	  &	  !%	  Vict.,	  c.	  ,,-	  and	  !1	  &	  !2	  Vict.,	  c.	  32.	  See	  Ashforth,	  ‘The	  urban	  Poor	  Law,’	  p.	  89:.	  75	  M.	  MacKinnon,	  ‘English	  Poor	  Law	  Policy	  and	  the	  Crusade	  Against	  Outrelief ’,	  Journal	  of	  
Economic	  History	  !":$	  ('()"),	  pp.	  ./$-­‐!"#.	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now	  displayed	  than	  formerly’.76	  One	  Lancashire	  union	  was	  ‘lately	  found	  to	  be	  erecting	  a	  green-­‐house	  to	  supply	  the	  in-irmary	  with	  -lowers’	  and	  others	  were	  criticised	  for	  proposals	  to	  build	  premises	  with	  elaborate	  decorations,	  Portland	  stone	  and	  ‘terracotta	  enrichments	  to	  the	  front	  elevation’.77	  The	  economic	  hardship	  which	  hit	  urban	  unions	  in	  the	  cotton	  district	  in	  the	  early	  3456s	  could	  not	  have	  been	  alleviated	  by	  greater	  use	  of	  the	  workhouse,	  given	  the	  scale	  of	  distress,	  but	  the	  changes	  in	  rating	  which	  followed	  the	  cotton	  famine	  enabled	  these	  unions	  to	  invest	  in	  workhouse	  building	  to	  a	  greater	  degree.78	  Some	  of	  London’s	  unions	  also	  borrowed	  large	  sums	  for	  institutional	  projects,	  but	  their	  indoor	  relief	  rates	  had	  been	  high	  for	  some	  decades,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  since	  before	  '()*.79	  	  
2.7 Conclusion	  The	  use	  of	  disaggregated	  national	  data	  enables	  a	  new	  geography	  of	  poor	  law	  practice	  to	  be	  drawn.	  Some	  regions	  displayed	  clusters	  of	  similar	  behaviour,	  for	  example	  in	  the	  persistence	  of	  outdoor	  relief	  in	  Wales,	  the	  north	  of	  England,	  and	  central	  and	  East	  Midlands.	  However,	  most	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  showed	  a	  high	  level	  of	  variation,	  especially	  among	  the	  unions	  of	  the	  south-­‐west,	  south-­‐east,	  East	  Anglia	  and	  the	  West	  Midlands.	  Indoor	  relief	  tended	  to	  decrease	  with	  distance	  from	  London,	  and	  by	  differentiating	  rural	  and	  urban	  unions	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  the	  rise	  in	  the	  use	  of	  the	  workhouse	  by	  !"#$	  was	  most	  concentrated	  among	  urban	  unions	  in	  the	  industrial	  north	  of	  England.	  These	  were	  best	  placed	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  changes	  in	  rating	  in	  the	  %&'(s	  which	  permitted	  an	  increase	  in	  capital	  expenditure.	  The	  workhouse,	  school	  and	  asylum	  capacity	  created	  by	  this	  infrastructure	  investment	  enabled	  these	  northern	  towns	  to	  respond	  to	  poverty	  among	  their	  rapidly	  growing	  populations	  with	  increasing	  emphasis	  on	  indoor	  relief.	  This	  form	  of	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  For	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  the	  cotton	  famine	  see	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expenditure	  was	  re.lected	  not	  only	  in	  the	  .igures	  for	  workhouse	  relief,	  but	  also	  in	  those	  for	  of+icers’	  salaries,	  loan	  servicing	  and	  specialised	  institutional	  relief.	  This	  chapter	  has	  argued	  that	  relief	  practices	  cannot	  be	  fully	  understood	  by	  exploration	  at	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  region,	  and	  that	  local	  conditions	  such	  as	  population	  density,	  pauper	  numbers	  and	  rating	  must	  be	  overlaid	  on	  regional	  analysis.	  That	  being	  so,	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  consider	  how	  guardians	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  union	  worked	  within	  the	  contexts	  of	  national	  policy	  and	  local	  conditions.	  	  The	  rise	  of	  indoor	  relief	  in	  general,	  and	  in	  urban	  contexts	  in	  particular,	  requires	  that	  attention	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  ways	  unions	  managed	  not	  only	  the	  demand	  for	  relief	  but	  also	  its	  supply.	  Food	  prices	  on	  the	  whole	  declined	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  but	  poor	  law	  unions	  saw	  their	  costs	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  increase.	  This	  could	  perhaps	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  higher	  running	  costs	  of	  urban	  workhouses	  and	  the	  different	  types	  of	  care	  that	  prevailed	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century:	  The	  elderly	  and	  in+irm	  might	  have	  consumed	  more	  expensive	  food,	  and	  longer	  average	  stays	  in	  poor	  law	  institutions	  would	  also	  have	  contributed	  to	  higher	  indicative	  costs	  per	  pauper.	  The	  costs	  of	  indoor	  relief	  therefore	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  more	  detail.	  When	  (and	  where)	  outdoor	  relief	  predominated,	  the	  principal	  considerations	  for	  guardians	  related	  to	  the	  amounts	  of	  relief	  to	  give	  and	  to	  whom,	  and	  whether	  to	  distribute	  cash	  or	  bread.	  Only	  occasionally	  did	  outdoor	  relief	  consist	  of	  other	  goods	  such	  as	  clothes,	  and	  these	  were	  rarely	  bulk	  purchases	  by	  unions.	  However,	  the	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  indoor	  relief	  shifted	  the	  business	  of	  boards	  of	  guardians	  towards	  contractual	  arrangements	  and	  institutional	  management.	  The	  following	  chapter	  suggests	  that	  it	  was	  in	  their	  relationships	  with	  their	  local	  economies,	  and	  especially	  with	  the	  3irms	  and	  individuals	  that	  supplied	  goods	  to	  the	  workhouse,	  that	  guardians	  could	  fully	  exercise	  their	  patronage	  and	  powers	  of	  discretion.	  This	  sphere	  of	  local	  activity	  formed	  the	  operating	  framework	  within	  which	  guardians	  could	  make	  decisions	  about	  numbers	  of	  paupers	  and	  modes	  of	  relief.	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! Managing	  local	  poor	  law	  -inance	  	  	  	  
3.1 Introduction	  The	  wide	  range	  of	  relief	  practices	  and	  expenditure	  by	  poor	  law	  unions	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  /	  can	  usefully	  be	  understood	  as	  being	  a	  question	  of	  local	  !inancial	  management.	  Central	  government	  provided	  a	  set	  of	  parameters	  within	  which	  local	  guardians	  had	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  frugality	  and	  administrative	  competence.	  These	  parameters	  affected	  their	  behaviour	  through	  legal	  constraints	  and	  surveillance,	  but	  unions	  were	  also	  limited	  by	  local	  circumstances.	  Guardians	  could	  control	  different	  elements	  of	  their	  expenditure	  to	  different	  extents	  in	  different	  places.	  Thus	  neighbouring	  unions	  did	  not	  necessarily	  have	  the	  same	  control	  over	  the	  numbers	  of	  people	  they	  relieved,	  the	  salaries	  of	  their	  of/icers,	  capital	  expenditure	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  the	  goods	  and	  services	  required	  to	  relieve	  paupers,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  Within	  this	  context	  of	  variable	  control,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  unions	  bought	  goods	  and	  services	  were	  key.	  This	  chapter	  therefore	  examines	  how	  far	  guardians	  could	  control	  their	  buying	  practices	  and	  the	  limits	  to	  their	  discretionary	  powers.	  Unions	  operated	  within	  a	  variety	  of	  legal	  constraints	  including	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐!"#$	  statute,	  case	  law	  and	  orders	  issued	  by	  the	  central	  authority.	  Nonetheless	  they	  had	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  discretion,	  either	  explicitly	  allowed	  to	  them	  in	  law,	  or	  which	  they	  exercised	  by	  ignoring	  rarely	  enforced	  regulations,	  following	  unorthodox	  contracting	  practices,	  or	  exploiting	  legal	  loopholes.	  Central	  government	  had	  remarkable	  surveillance	  capabilities	  through	  district	  auditors,	  poor	  law	  inspectors	  and	  direct	  correspondence,	  but	  had	  limited	  powers	  to	  force	  a	  union	  to	  obey	  its	  will	  unless	  the	  union	  acted	  unlawfully.	  This	  has	  a	  bearing	  on	  several	  aspects	  of	  the	  historiography.	  First,	  there	  have	  been	  some	  tentative	  efforts	  to	  describe	  the	  relative	  abilities	  and	  limitations	  of	  poor	  law	  guardians	  within	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  1iscal	  administration.	  MacKinnon	  outlined	  .ive	  ‘equations’	  to	  describe	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  
	   !!	  
–	  admittedly	  a	  ‘simpli-ication’	  –	  based	  on	  ‘indoor	  expenditure	  per	  pauper,	  salaries	  per	  pauper,	  outdoor	  expenditure	  per	  pauper,	  workhouse	  capacity,	  tax	  base,	  economic	  conditions,	  [and]	  guardians’	  attitudes’.1	  Guardians’	  attitudes	  are	  unquanti*iable	  and	  defy	  attempts	  at	  the	  sort	  of	  statistical	  analysis	  which	  would	  make	  these	  ‘equations’	  solvable.	  This	  chapter	  adds	  another	  layer	  of	  complexity,	  suggesting	  that	  historians	  must	  take	  account	  not	  just	  of	  guardians’	  attitudes	  but	  also	  of	  their	  abilities.	  To	  an	  extent,	  ‘abilities’	  here	  means	  their	  capacity	  to	  work	  effectively	  within	  legal	  constraints	  of	  various	  sorts.	  It	  also,	  however,	  means	  their	  skills	  and	  talents.	  As	  Hennock	  points	  out,	  there	  were	  three	  principal	  ways	  for	  elected	  bodies	  to	  avoid	  ratepayer	  revolts:	  5irst,	  by	  ‘careful	  *inancial	  administration’;	  second,	  by	  	  ‘political	  skill	  and	  imagination’;	  and	  third,	  by	  ‘the	  possession	  of	  a	  substantial	  revenue	  independent	  of	  the	  rates’.2	  The	  majority	  of	  boards	  of	  guardians	  could	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  second	  and	  third	  of	  these,	  and	  for	  many	  even	  the	  1irst	  would	  have	  been	  beyond	  them.	  This	  chapter	  shows	  that	  contracting	  was	  one	  arena	  in	  which	  guardians	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  0inancial	  competence	  or	  lack	  thereof.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  most	  boards	  of	  guardians	  went	  about	  buying	  provisions	  for	  their	  workhouses	  in	  an	  orderly	  and	  unexceptional	  way.	  Nonetheless	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  few	  contemporary	  accounts	  of	  union	  contracting	  did	  draw	  attention	  to	  a	  number	  of	  shortcomings.	  	  Second,	  relations	  between	  the	  central	  authorities	  and	  local	  government	  have	  been	  a	  popular	  area	  of	  contention	  among	  historians.	  An	  important	  battle-­‐ground	  has	  been	  the	  place	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  in	  what	  some	  have	  seen	  as	  a	  nineteenth-­‐century	  ‘revolution	  in	  government’.3	  Midwinter,	  for	  instance,	  describes	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  central	  authority	  as	  the	  new	  poor	  law’s	  ‘most	  important	  contribution…	  to	  British	  administrative	  history,’	  despite	  its	  ‘lack	  of	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power’.4	  Brundage,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  argues	  that	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  was	  emphatically	  not	  centralised.5	  One	  strand	  of	  debate	  has	  focused	  on	  the	  Benthamite	  centralising	  tendency	  criticised	  by	  contemporary	  opponents	  of	  the	  %&'(	  and	  !"#$	  reforms.6	  In	  this	  debate,	  historians	  have	  argued	  over	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commission	  presided	  over	  a	  retrenchment	  of	  local	  power.7	  This	  &its	  into	  a	  wider	  historiography	  of	  central-­‐local	  relations	  in	  which	  the	  ‘coalition	  of	  the	  frugal,’	  as	  Harling	  puts	  it	  –	  i.e.	  the	  ratepayers	  in	  charge	  of	  local	  government	  –	  were,	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent,	  in	  a	  constant	  tension	  with	  central	  government’s	  increasing	  assumption	  of	  broader	  powers,	  especially	  in	  the	  arena	  of	  public	  health	  and	  municipal	  government.8	  Studies	  of	  the	  friction	  between	  the	  centre	  and	  poor	  law	  unions	  have	  tended	  to	  have	  an	  administrative	  focus,	  for	  example	  Bellamy’s	  study	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board	  which	  explores	  partnership	  and	  agency	  in	  the	  context	  of	  late-­‐nineteenth-­‐century	  central-­‐local	  relations.9	  Bellamy	  argues:	  A	  political-­‐diplomatic	  approach	  to	  central-­‐local	  relations	  [was]	  adopted	  by	  the	  of)icers	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board…	  I	  refer	  to	  a	  strategy	  directed	  by	  general	  guidelines	  which	  are	  not	  so	  much	  task	  objectives	  as	  parameters	  for	  the	  long	  term	  exploitation	  of	  in0luence	  and	  for	  the	  conduct	  of	  negotiations.	  Within	  those	  guidelines,	  agents	  seek	  movement	  rather	  than	  the	  technically	  correct	  solution.	  Their	  aim	  is	  to	  minimise	  error	  and	  avoid	  the	  breakdown	  of	  relations,	  rather	  than	  to	  maximise	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  E.C.	  Midwinter,	  ‘State	  Intervention	  at	  the	  Local	  Level:	  The	  New	  Poor	  Law	  in	  Lancashire’,	  
Historical	  Journal	  !!:#	  (#&'(),	  p.	  ##!.	  5	  A.L.	  Brundage,	  ‘The	  landed	  interest	  and	  the	  New	  Poor	  Law:	  A	  reappraisal	  of	  the	  revolution	  in	  government.’,	  English	  Historical	  Review	  !":$%&	  ()*"&),	  p.	  &".	  6	  For	  contemporary	  opposition	  on	  this	  ground	  see,	  for	  example,	  J.	  Toulmin	  Smith,	  Local	  self-­‐
government	  and	  centralization:	  The	  characteristics	  of	  each,	  and	  its	  practical	  tendencies,	  as	  
affecting	  social,	  moral,	  and	  political	  welfare	  and	  progress.	  Including	  comprehensive	  outlines	  of	  
the	  English	  constitution	  (London:	  John	  Chapman,	  /01/).	  7	  P.	  Harling,	  ‘The	  Power	  of	  Persuasion:	  Central	  Authority,	  Local	  Bureaucracy	  and	  the	  New	  Poor	  Law’,	  English	  Historical	  Review	  !"#:%&&	  (!))&),	  pp.	  ."-­‐!";	  P.	  Mandler,	  ‘The	  Making	  of	  the	  New	  Poor	  Law	  Redivivus’,	  Past	  &	  Present	  !!"	  (!%&"),	  pp.	  !+!-­‐!"#,	  and	  Brundage,	  Eastwood	  and	  Mandler,	  Past	  &	  Present,	  #$%:#	  (#(()),	  pp.	  #-.-­‐!"#.	  8	  P.	  Harling,	  ‘The	  centrality	  of	  locality:	  the	  local	  state,	  local	  democracy,	  and	  local	  consciousness	  in	  late-­‐Victorian	  and	  Edwardian	  Britain’,	  Journal	  of	  Victorian	  Culture	  !:#	  (#&&'),	  p.	  #,-.	  See	  also	  M.J.	  Daunton,	  Trusting	  Leviathan:	  The	  politics	  of	  taxation	  in	  Britain,	  89::-­‐!"!#	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  3445);	  D.	  Fraser,	  Power	  and	  authority	  in	  the	  Victorian	  city	  (Oxford:	  Basil	  Blackwell,	  ,-.-);	  Hennock,	  ‘Finance	  and	  politics’;	  J.	  Prest,	  Liberty	  and	  Locality:	  
Parliament,	  Permissive	  Legislation,	  and	  Ratepayers’	  Democracies	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  2334).	  9	  C.	  Bellamy,	  Administering	  central-­‐local	  relations,	  -./--­‐!"!":	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board	  in	  its	  
!iscal	  and	  cultural	  context	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  3455).	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performance.	  A	  political-­‐diplomatic	  approach	  is,	  therefore,	  characterised	  by	  -lexibility,	  discretion	  and	  in-luence.10	  
Ogborn	  develops	  this	  argument	  with	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  features	  of	  ‘strategic	  negotiation’	  used	  by	  the	  Poor	  Law	  central	  authorities.11	  He	  warns	  against	  conceiving	  central-­‐local	  relations	  as	  characterised	  by	  mutual	  antagonism,	  suggesting	  that	  not	  only	  are	  such	  models	  undermined	  by	  spatial	  differences,	  they	  also	  do	  not	  take	  account	  of	  the	  multiplicities	  of	  strategic	  government	  action.	  Instead,	  every	  instance	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  power	  has	  its	  own	  ‘7ield	  of	  possibilities	  channelling	  negotiation	  and	  con0lict’.12	  	  This	  chapter	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  to	  assess	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  central	  authorities	  and	  poor	  law	  unions	  in	  this	  light.	  It	  does	  this	  'irst	  by	  examining	  the	  extent	  of	  guardians’	  capabilities	  and	  discretion	  in	  controlling	  amounts	  of	  relief	  and	  numbers	  of	  paupers.	  It	  then	  analyses	  workhouse	  contracting	  practices	  speci&ically.	  Workhouse	  contracting	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  discussed	  by	  historians	  in	  any	  detail,	  despite	  being	  a	  key	  area	  of	  activity	  in	  which	  guardians	  and	  central	  authorities	  interacted.	  This	  chapter	  suggests	  that	  both	  sets	  of	  agents	  employed	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  strategies	  to	  promote	  their	  perceived	  interests.	  Some	  individual	  relationships	  may	  have	  been	  characterised	  by	  mutual	  antagonism,	  but	  for	  the	  most	  part	  centre	  and	  locality	  shared	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  smooth	  operation	  of	  the	  poor	  laws.	  	  
3.2 What	  could	  guardians	  control?	  Thomas	  Mackay	  declared	  that	  ‘within	  the	  discretion,	  allowed	  by	  the	  law	  and	  by	  the	  orders	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board,	  there	  is	  room	  for	  such	  diversity	  of	  action	  that	  whole	  districts	  can	  be	  made	  or	  marred,	  in	  respect	  of	  dispauperisation,	  by	  the	  caprice	  of	  a	  local	  Board	  of	  Guardians.’13	  This	  section	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %%&.	  11	  M.	  Ogborn,	  ‘Local	  power	  and	  state	  regulation	  in	  nineteenth	  century	  Britain’,	  Transactions	  of	  
the	  Institute	  of	  British	  Geographers	  !":$	  (!''$),	  pp.	  $!,-­‐!!".	  12	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %%&.	  13	  T.	  Mackay,	  Public	  relief	  of	  the	  Poor:	  Six	  lectures	  (London:	  John	  Murray,	  0120),	  pp.	  060-­‐!"#.	  The	  context	  was	  an	  appeal	  for	  guardians	  to	  be	  trained	  in	  the	  principles	  advocated	  by	  the	  Charity	  Organisation	  Society,	  of	  which	  Mackay	  was	  a	  senior	  member.	  
	   !"	  
examines	  how	  much	  discretion	  guardians	  really	  had.	  It	  argues	  that	  poor	  law	  unions	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  number	  of	  systemic	  and	  structural	  factors	  over	  which	  they	  could	  not	  expect	  to	  have	  complete	  control.	  These	  factors	  included	  underlying	  economic	  conditions;	  local	  circumstances	  creating	  demand	  for	  poor	  law	  services;	  sickness	  in	  local	  populations;	  indirect	  relief	  expenditure;	  capital	  expenditure;	  and	  the	  costs	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  	  Individual	  boards	  of	  guardians	  could	  not	  expect	  to	  have	  any	  control	  over	  national	  economic	  conditions,	  but	  these	  conditions	  were	  strongly	  related	  to	  unions’	  total	  expenditure	  on	  poor	  relief.	  Those	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  a	  subsistence	  wage	  keenly	  felt	  the	  weakened	  purchasing	  power	  of	  the	  pound.	  Using	  a	  composite	  consumer	  price	  index,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  when	  in#lation	  was	  high,	  so	  too	  was	  poor	  relief	  (Figure	  !.!).	  (This	  shows	  in	  the	  following	  year,	  as	  in#lation	  has	  been	  calculated	  by	  calendar	  year	  whereas	  poor	  law	  unions’	  !inancial	  year	  began	  and	  ended	  at	  Lady-­‐day.)	  
	  
Figure 3.1: Annual consumer price inflation rate and change in spend on poor, England and 
Wales, 1839-1868.  
Source: J. O’Donoghue, L. Goulding and G. Allen, ‘Consumer Price Inflation Since 1750’, 
Economic Trends 604 (2004), pp. 38-46; PP 1870 XXXV 1. Twenty-second Annual Report of 
the Poor Law Board. 1869-70, p. xvii.	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rates	  well	  after	  *+,-.14	  However,	  the	  sorts	  of	  major	  local	  shocks	  that	  could	  create	  large-­‐scale	  poverty	  in	  a	  short	  period	  tended	  to	  be	  outside	  local	  control.	  Examples	  of	  such	  shocks	  include	  the	  Lancashire	  cotton	  famine	  from	  6786	  to	  !"#$,	  during	  which	  the	  poor	  rates	  were	  inadequate	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  destitution	  resulting	  from	  the	  interruption	  of	  cotton	  imports	  by	  the	  American	  civil	  war.15	  In	  May	  '()*,	  for	  instance,	  nearly	  a	  quarter	  of	  Ashton-­‐under-­‐Lyne	  union’s	  population	  received	  poor	  relief.16	  The	  guardians	  had	  no	  mechanism	  for	  reducing	  this	  level	  of	  demand	  for	  poor	  law	  services.	  During	  the	  crisis	  the	  guardians	  declined	  to	  insist	  on	  labour	  tests	  and	  attempted	  to	  supplement	  relief	  with	  charity	  and	  public	  works	  projects.17	  Guardians	  therefore	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  fundamental	  level	  of	  destitution	  caused	  by	  economic	  circumstances	  outside	  their	  control.	  However,	  they	  could	  usually	  choose,	  to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  whom	  they	  relieved.	  This	  could	  be	  achieved	  through	  denying	  relief	  altogether	  where	  they	  believed	  the	  applicant	  was	  not	  destitute,	  or	  by	  a	  rigorous	  application	  of	  the	  workhouse	  test.	  This	  did	  not	  necessarily	  have	  a	  major	  effect	  on	  the	  overall	  costs	  of	  relief,	  however.	  Reducing	  pauper	  numbers	  had	  some	  impact	  on	  in-­‐maintenance	  and	  out-­‐relief	  costs,	  but	  large	  numbers	  of	  poor	  had	  to	  be	  denied	  relief	  before	  ratepayers	  would	  see	  much	  difference,	  especially	  to	  the	  outdoor	  relief	  bill.18	  Labour	  tests	  might	  have	  reduced	  the	  numbers	  of	  able-­‐bodied	  applicants	  during	  hard	  times	  but	  they	  had	  a	  negligible	  effect	  on	  total	  relief	  expenditure.	  For	  instance,	  in	  !"##	  St	  Olave	  union	  instituted	  a	  labour	  test	  to	  administer	  relief	  to	  unexpectedly	  unemployed	  labourers,	  relieving	  345	  men	  during	  a	  crisis	  lasting	  a	  fortnight;	  but	  the	  crisis	  cost	  the	  union	  no	  more	  than	  around	  345,	  accounting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  A.	  Digby,	  ‘The	  labour	  market	  and	  the	  continuity	  of	  social	  policy	  after	  <=>?:	  the	  case	  of	  the	  eastern	  counties’,	  Economic	  History	  Review,	  2nd	  ser.	  !":$	  ($'()),	  pp.	  .'-­‐!".	  15	  W.O.	  Henderson,	  The	  Lancashire	  cotton	  famine,	  1231-­‐!"#$	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  -./.),	  chapter	  5.	  16	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %%.	  17	  L.H.	  Lees,	  The	  Solidarities	  of	  Strangers:	  The	  English	  Poor	  Laws	  and	  the	  People,	  89::-­‐!"#$	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  5667),	  pp.	  ;<=-­‐!".	  18	  M.	  MacKinnon,	  ‘English	  Poor	  Law	  Policy	  and	  the	  Crusade	  Against	  Outrelief ’,	  Journal	  of	  
Economic	  History	  !":$	  ('()"),	  pp.	  ./$-­‐!"#.	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for	  little	  over	  one	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  %&,()*	  in	  total	  outdoor	  relief	  costs	  that	  year.19	  Guardians	  also	  had	  a	  limited	  ability	  to	  reduce	  dietaries	  for	  indoor	  paupers,	  which	  were	  already	  minimal	  by	  national	  policy.	  The	  composition	  of	  meals	  varied	  to	  a	  degree	  between	  unions,	  but	  they	  were	  uniformly	  unappealing	  and	  cheap.20	  Nonetheless,	  guardians	  might	  have	  had	  opportunities	  to	  make	  better	  use	  of	  the	  supplies	  they	  bought.	  The	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  recommended	  to	  Great	  Yarmouth	  union	  in	  ,-./	  that	  it	  should	  cook	  its	  food	  more	  ef7iciently,	  for	  instance,	  by	  substituting	  meat	  dumplings	  for	  cooked	  meat	  and	  reusing	  the	  broth	  to	  make	  soup,	  and	  the	  district	  auditor	  believed	  these	  measures	  might	  save	  the	  union	  between	  ./00	  and	  ./20	  per	  annum.21	  The	  auditor	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  union	  employed	  at	  least	  forty	  paupers	  as	  assistant	  cooks,	  washerwomen	  or	  nurses	  which	  entitled	  them	  to	  an	  extra	  daily	  allowance	  of	  six	  ounces	  of	  meat.	  The	  subtext	  of	  his	  note	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  the	  union	  sought	  ways	  to	  treat	  paupers	  as	  well	  as	  possible.	  The	  costs	  of	  relief	  therefore	  could	  be	  fairly	  loosely	  connected	  to	  the	  demand	  for	  relief:	  the	  ways	  relief	  was	  administered	  were	  also	  important.	  Guardians	  had	  very	  little	  control	  over	  the	  levels	  of	  sickness	  within	  the	  populations	  of	  their	  unions.	  Medical	  expenditure	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  long-­‐term	  reductions	  in	  the	  numbers	  of	  sick	  poor	  but	  instead	  dealt	  mostly	  with	  the	  elderly	  in)irm	  and	  women	  in	  con+inement.22	  Meanwhile	  spending	  on	  sanitation	  may	  well	  have	  reduced	  the	  numbers	  and	  severity	  of,	  for	  instance,	  cholera	  epidemics,	  but	  it	  would	  have	  been	  a	  tiny	  saving	  for	  poor	  law	  unions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  TNA	  MH'(/'(*+(,	  -'**/**,	  G.	  Corner,	  clerk	  to	  St	  Olave	  guardians,	  to	  Poor	  Law	  Board,	  *+	  March	  '()).	  20	  PP	  #$%%	  XXXV	  Dietaries	  for	  the	  inmates	  of	  workhouses.	  Report	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  of	  Dr	  Edward	  Smith,	  FRS,	  medical	  of7icer	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board,	  and	  Poor	  Law	  Inspector,	  p.	  -..	  21	  TNA	  MH'(/*+,,	  -.''//-/,	  Robert	  Aising,	  district	  auditor,	  to	  PLB,	  '/	  December	  '*-/.	  	  22	  M.A.	  Crowther,	  ‘Paupers	  or	  patients?	  Obstacles	  to	  professionalization	  in	  the	  Poor	  Law	  medical	  service	  before	  /0/1’,	  Journal	  of	  the	  History	  of	  Medicine	  and	  Allied	  Sciences	  !":$	  ($"'(),	  pp.	  $$-­‐!";	  L.	  Marks,	  ‘Medical	  Care	  for	  Pauper	  Mothers	  and	  Their	  Infants:	  Poor	  Law	  Provision	  and	  Local	  Demand	  in	  East	  London,	  1234-­‐!"#"’,	  Economic	  History	  Review	  !":$	  ('(($),	  pp.	  -'.-­‐!"#;	  A.	  Negrine,	  ‘Medicine	  and	  Poverty:	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Medical	  Services	  of	  the	  Leicester	  Union,	  '()*-­‐!"!#’	  (Unpublished	  PhD	  thesis:	  University	  of	  Leicester,	  >??@).	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Sanitation	  and	  other	  infrastructure	  expenditure	  was,	  however,	  a	  burden	  on	  the	  poor	  rates	  and	  therefore	  might	  be	  resisted	  by	  guardians	  where	  possible.	  The	  most	  expensive	  items	  were	  the	  hardest	  to	  cut,	  for	  instance	  rent,	  rates	  and	  capital	  expenditure.	  These	  tended	  to	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  unions	  in	  the	  ‘other’	  column	  of	  relief	  costs,	  i.e.	  those	  costs	  that	  were	  not	  in-­‐maintenance	  or	  out-­‐relief.	  The	  items	  recorded	  as	  ‘other’	  expenditure	  by	  St	  Olave	  union,	  London,	  demonstrate	  the	  range	  of	  costs	  which	  unions	  had	  to	  bear	  (Table	  !.!).	  Some	  items,	  such	  as	  visiting	  the	  union’s	  lunatics	  in	  external	  asylums,	  were	  not	  overly	  burdensome.	  Only	  a	  minority	  of	  unions	  were	  members	  of	  school	  districts,	  like	  St	  Olave,	  but	  those	  that	  were	  could	  see	  around	  a	  half	  of	  their	  ‘other’	  costs	  relieving	  the	  children	  who	  were	  sent	  to	  the	  schools.	  District	  school	  expenses	  may	  well	  explain	  the	  concentration	  of	  high	  ‘other’	  relief	  costs	  in	  urban	  centres,	  the	  south-­‐east	  and	  north-­‐west	  in	  ()*+	  and	  ().!	  (Figure	  !.!).	  
Item Expenditure £ % of total 
% not incl.  
district school 
Contributions to district school 1,518 51.9 -- 
Rent, rates & gas 635 21.7 45.1 
House* 327 11.2 23.2 
Burial charges 139 4.8 9.9 
Salaries: medical & school 133 4.5 9.4 
Drugs 99 3.4 7.0 
Removing Irish 34 1.2 2.4 
Sundries 24 0.8 1.7 
Election of guardians 12 0.4 0.8 
Visiting lunatics 7 0.2 0.5 
Total 2,926 100.0 100.0 
*House includes costs of bedsteads, oilwares, brushes, baskets, iron and 
tinwork, printing and stationery, bricklayer, plumber and linendraper. 
Table 3.1: Expenditure on 'other' relief by St Olave union, 1858.  
Source: TNA MH12/12532, 50522/58, St Olave clerk to PLB, 27 December 1858.  	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Urban	  and	  rural	  unions	  showed	  a	  marked	  difference	  in	  the	  costs	  which	  fell	  into	  their	  ‘other’	  category.	  One	  contributory	  factor	  is	  that	  higher	  property	  values	  increased	  both	  rent	  and	  rates,	  so	  urban	  unions	  paid	  more	  on	  average.	  Rateable	  value	  per	  acre	  is	  convincingly	  correlated	  with	  the	  percentage	  of	  expenditure	  on	  ‘other’	  costs.23	  Rural	  and	  urban	  unions	  had	  fairly	  similar	  proportions	  of	  ‘other’	  relief	  spend	  in	  0123	  but	  diverged	  by	  0190,	  when	  urban	  unions	  were	  spending	  much	  more	  in	  this	  category	  (Figure	  !.!).	  This	  could	  be	  connected	  to	  a	  rise	  in	  property	  values	  in	  urban	  areas,	  but	  the	  membership	  of	  school	  districts	  by	  these	  unions	  is	  a	  more	  likely	  explanation	  given	  that	  about	  half	  a	  union’s	  ‘other’	  costs	  could	  be	  district	  school	  costs,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  St	  Olave.	  
	  
Figure 3.3: Expenditure on 'other' relief by rural and urban unions, 1850 and 1871.  
Source: PP 1851 XXVI 1; PP 1871 XXVII 1.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  !"#$:	  Spearman’s	  ρ	  =	  #.%&;	  #$%#:	  '.)!.	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The	  median	  value	  for	  ‘other’	  spend,	  which	  was	  89	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  total	  relief	  in	  !"#$,	  rose	  to	  ,!	  per	  cent	  in	  !"1!.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  proportion	  of	  these	  relatively	  *ixed	  costs	  rose	  signi*icantly	  over	  the	  period.	  This	  was	  a	  real	  increase	  in	  these	  costs,	  not	  a	  reduction	  in	  indoor	  and	  outdoor	  relief:	  The	  median	  amount	  spent	  on	  ‘other’	  relief	  costs	  in	  4567	  was	  9:,7:4	  and	  in	  45<4	  (at	  !"#$	  prices)	  was	  /0,#23.	  The	  highest	  proportion	  of	  relief	  costs	  falling	  into	  the	  ‘other’	  class	  was	  ./	  per	  cent	  in	  &'()	  and	  ,-	  per	  cent	  in	  &',&.	  	  Across	  England	  and	  Wales,	  ‘other’	  spend	  increased	  as	  outdoor	  relief	  declined	  and	  institutional	  relief	  –	  whether	  in	  workhouse,	  asylum	  or	  school	  –	  increased.	  Between	  '()*	  and	  '(-.,	  as	  outdoor	  relief	  dropped	  from	  .9..	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  costs	  to	  &'.)	  per	  cent,	  workhouse	  loan	  servicing	  more	  than	  doubled	  from	  <.<	  per	  cent	  to	  ).+	  per	  cent;	  salaries	  grew	  from	  ++.5	  per	  cent	  to	  +6.7	  per	  cent;	  and	  asylum	  contributions	  rose	  from	  1.1	  per	  cent	  to	  45.6	  per	  cent	  (Figure	  !.!).	  The	  costs	  borne	  by	  unions	  that	  reduced	  their	  outdoor	  relief	  lists	  were	  therefore	  to	  be	  found	  not	  only	  in	  their	  indoor	  relief	  bills	  but	  also	  in	  their	  other	  expenses.	  
	  
Figure 3.4: Components of relief costs, 1860-1895. The 'other' column of the poor rate return 
included lunatic asylum costs, workhouse loans, officers’ salaries and rations and other costs. 
From 1875, school district costs moved from the ‘other’ column to ‘indoor’.  
Source: PP 1900 XXXIII 1. Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the Local Government Board, 1899-
1900, Appendix F, table 93, p. 436.  
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Mean spend  
per office  
per union £ 
Clerk 590 59,431 100.7 1.0 100.6 
Chaplain 415 19,140 46.1 0.7 32.4 
Medical officer 2,680 124,532 46.5 4.5 210.7 
Relieving officer 1,257 103,881 82.6 2.1 175.8 
Master/matron 1,238 44,369 35.8 2.1 75.1 
Schoolmaster 284 7,423 26.1 0.5 12.6 
Schoolmistress 423 7,009 16.6 0.7 11.9 
Porter 347 6,340 18.3 0.6 10.7 
Nurse 171 2,161 12.6 0.3 3.7 
Taskmaster 20 936 46.8 <0.1 1.6 
Collector/Asst. overseer 499 23,026 46.1 0.8 39.0 
Treasurer 52 973 18.7 0.1 1.6 
Other 264 7,747 29.3 0.4 13.1 
District auditor 50 12,933 258.7 0.1 21.9 
Total 8,290 419,901 50.7 14.0 710.5 
Table 3.2: Union officers and their salaries, 1844-45.  
Source: PP 1849 XLVII 83.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  PP	  #$%&	  XLVII	  $+:	  Poor	  Law.	  Return	  of	  the	  number	  of	  of;icers	  employed	  in	  +,-	  unions,	  with	  the	  amount	  of	  salaries,	  for	  the	  year	  1233-­‐!;	  and	  expense	  of	  Poor	  Law	  Commission	  for	  the	  year	  ended	  %&	  March	  &,-.,	  &c.	  25	  Crowther,	  ‘Paupers	  or	  patients,’	  pp.	  12-­‐!".	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At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  was	  capital	  expenditure.	  Guardians	  were	  often	  very	  reluctant	  to	  build	  new	  workhouses,	  in6irmaries	  and	  district	  schools	  or	  to	  renovate	  existing	  premises.	  The	  costs	  were	  great:	  in	  5678,	  for	  example,	  Greenwich’s	  new	  workhouse	  for	  0,2!!	  paupers	  cost	  ,--,/!!.26	  Ratepayers	  might	  be	  divided	  over	  the	  necessity	  for	  new	  premises,	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  case	  of	  St	  Pancras	  parish	  in	  the	  late	  1234s.	  Following	  criticisms	  of	  their	  overcrowded	  workhouse	  in/irmary	  in	  the	  Lancet	  in	  $%&',	  the	  guardians	  bought	  a	  plot	  of	  land	  on	  which	  to	  build	  a	  new	  facility	  in	  3454.27	  It	  was	  not	  yet	  open	  by	  the	  time	  these	  guardians	  were	  largely	  replaced	  that	  year	  by	  a	  new	  cohort	  who	  stood	  on	  an	  anti-­‐expense	  platform.28	  Work	  stopped,	  and	  despite	  public	  scandal	  over	  deaths	  in	  the	  old	  in*irmary	  and	  the	  personal	  intervention	  of	  LGB	  president	  George	  Goschen,	  the	  new	  premises	  were	  not	  ready	  for	  patients	  until	  +,-.,	  after	  some	  of	  the	  former	  guardians	  had	  been	  re-­‐elected	  to	  the	  board.29	  In	  the	  meantime,	  Fun	  magazine	  lampooned	  the	  ‘charming	  parochial	  den/	  with	  its	  inquests	  and	  murderous	  medical	  men’	  and	  published	  provocative	  images	  comparing	  conditions	  in	  the	  in1irmary	  to	  those	  in	  the	  Black	  Hole	  of	  Calcutta	  (Figure	  !.!).30	  Guardians	  could,	  therefore,	  refrain	  from	  expensive	  projects	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  reduce	  the	  burden	  on	  the	  rates,	  but	  this	  would	  work	  only	  in	  the	  short	  term:	  eventually	  the	  need	  for	  renovation	  or	  new	  facilities	  would	  be	  unavoidable.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  D.R.	  Green,	  ‘Icons	  of	  the	  New	  System:	  Workhouse	  Construction	  and	  Relief	  Practices	  in	  London	  under	  the	  Old	  and	  New	  Poor	  Law’,	  London	  Journal	  !":!	  (&''(),	  p.	  &!".	  27	  ‘The	  Lancet	  Sanitary	  Commission	  for	  Investigating	  the	  State	  of	  the	  In7irmaries	  of	  the	  Workhouses	  in	  London’,	  Lancet	  !	  ($%&'),	  pp.	  $,.	  28	  TNA	  MH'(/*+,+	  -(*.,/+/,	  reports	  of	  William	  Markham	  to	  PLB.	  29	  The	  St.	  Pancras	  Workhouse	  In+irmary	  Again’,	  Daily	  News	  ("	  November	  +,-"),	  p.	  2;	  ‘Disgraceful	  Proceedings	  at	  the	  St	  Pancras	  Board’,	  Daily	  News	  ("#	  December	  "+,-),	  p.	  !.	  30	  ‘The	  Saint	  Pancras	  Pauper	  to	  his	  Love’,	  Fun	  ("#	  December	  "#+,),	  p.	  !"!.	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Figure 3.5: F. Barnard, 'Poor-house or Pest-house: or, the Modern Black Hole (Dedicated to the 
St. Pancras Board of Guardians.)’, Fun, 27 November 1869, pp. 118-9. The image is similar to 
a well-known contemporary depiction of the ‘Black Hole’ of Calcutta by Louis Figuier.	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3.3 How	  did	  unions	  contract	  for	  goods	  and	  services?	  
3.3.1 Context	  The	  remaining	  area	  of	  expenditure	  over	  which	  guardians	  tried	  to	  exercise	  some	  control	  was	  the	  purchase	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  for	  the	  workhouse,	  in	  particular	  food	  and	  clothing	  for	  indoor	  paupers	  and	  bread	  for	  outdoor	  paupers.	  Taken	  together,	  poor	  law	  procurement	  represented	  one	  of	  the	  largest	  elements	  of	  state	  expenditure	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  behind	  only	  the	  army	  and	  navy	  (Table	  !.!).	  	  
Department     Spend £ 
Army 3,601,000 
Navy 2,008,000 
Workhouses: Food, fuel, clothing and bedding (England) 1,524,700 
India 1,400,000 
Prisons 625,000 
Workhouses: Food, fuel, clothing and bedding (Ireland and Scotland) 475,300 
Police 435,000 
Stationery, printing and binding 376,000 
Trinity House (lighthouses) 150,000 
Post Office 117,000 
Inland Revenue 77,000 
Total 10,789,000 
Table 3.3: Estimated spending on stores and supplies by selected parts of government, 1872-
73. Wales’s unspecified workhouse expenditure was probably included in the figure for 
England. 
Source: F.W. Rowsell, ‘The Public Stores: Their Purchase and Administration’, Macmillan’s 
Magazine 26 (May - October 1872), pp. 478-485. 	  
However,	  there	  was	  little	  consistency	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  workhouses	  went	  about	  buying	  supplies.	  In	  other	  areas	  of	  government	  spending,	  individual	  departments	  differed	  from	  each	  other	  but	  increasingly	  tended	  to	  have	  internally	  coherent	  procurement	  strategies	  or	  systems:	  Until	  the	  4irst	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  military	  institutions	  found	  their	  supplies	  locally	  but	  in	  !"##	  the	  War	  Of'ice	  introduced	  centralising	  reforms,	  and	  the	  Admiralty	  eventually	  followed	  suit	  in	  0123.31	  In	  contrast,	  poor	  law	  unions	  demonstrated	  an	  unusual	  degree	  of	  variation	  of	  practice	  throughout	  their	  existence.	  This	  was	  a	  result	  of	  several	  factors,	  which	  this	  section	  addresses:	  First,	  organisations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  F.W.	  Rowsell,	  ‘The	  Public	  Stores:	  their	  purchase	  and	  administration’,	  Macmillan’s	  Magazine	  !"	  (May-­‐October	  )*+,),	  p.	  1+2.	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like	  the	  Army	  and	  Navy	  were	  now	  part	  of	  central	  government,	  whereas	  poor	  law	  unions	  were	  local	  government	  and	  responsible	  to	  local	  ratepayers	  (section	  !.!.#).	  Second,	  the	  legal	  framework	  in	  which	  boards	  of	  guardians	  operated	  allowed	  them	  to	  exercise	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  discretion	  (section	  !.!.!).	  Third,	  irregularities	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  guardians	  could	  in	  some	  circumstances	  be	  allowed	  by	  the	  central	  authority	  in	  retrospect,	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  equity	  or	  because	  it	  was	  too	  late	  to	  do	  anything	  about	  an	  infraction	  (section	  !.!.#).	  Fourth,	  guardians	  could	  on	  occasion	  behave	  unlawfully	  –	  ranging	  from	  acting	  
ultra	  vires	  to	  committing	  fraud	  –	  but	  might	  avoid	  discovery	  altogether	  (section	  !.!.#).	  Despite	  these	  freedoms,	  1lexibilities	  and	  discretionary	  powers,	  though,	  the	  ability	  of	  guardians	  to	  promote	  value	  for	  money	  or	  obtain	  a	  high	  standard	  of	  goods	  remains	  questionable	  (section	  !.!.#).	  	  
3.3.2 Central-­‐local	  relations	  As	  discussed	  in	  section	  !.#,	  historians	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  local	  implementation	  of	  central	  government	  policy,	  especially	  in	  the	  long-­‐standing	  debates	  over	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  unions	  could	  exercise	  local	  discretion.	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  boards	  of	  guardians	  bought	  goods	  and	  services	  have,	  however,	  not	  received	  attention.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  omission,	  as	  items	  like	  workhouse	  supplies	  and	  bread	  for	  outdoor	  paupers	  made	  up	  a	  signi2icant	  proportion	  of	  union	  expenditure:	  In	  metropolitan	  unions	  in	  /012,	  provisions	  accounted	  for	  !"."	  per	  cent	  of	  maintenance	  costs	  per	  indoor	  pauper.	  Clothing	  took	  up	  +.-	  per	  cent	  and	  other	  ‘necessaries’	  the	  remaining	  12.4	  per	  cent.32	  Food	  allowances	  per	  pauper	  were	  not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  in	  2345	  as	  they	  had	  been	  in	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century,	  but	  the	  proportions	  are	  unlikely	  to	  have	  been	  more	  than	  a	  few	  percentage	  points	  different.	  Furthermore,	  the	  central	  authorities	  were	  renowned	  for	  the	  level	  of	  detail	  they	  controlled	  in	  so	  many	  other	  areas	  of	  activity.	  As	  a	  German	  observer	  commented	  in	  *+,-:	  ‘By	  a	  multitude	  of	  rules	  that	  defy	  review,	  outdoor	  and	  indoor	  relief,	  schools	  and	  hospitals,	  and	  asylums	  for	  the	  poor,	  have	  been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  PP	  #$#%	  LIII	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  Poor	  Laws	  and	  Relief	  of	  Distress.	  Appendix	  vol.	  XXV.	  Statistics	  relating	  to	  England	  and	  Wales,	  p.	  $%&	  ff.	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regulated	  in	  such	  precise	  detail	  that	  the	  Poor	  Laws	  themselves	  sink	  into	  comparative	  insigni/icance	  before	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Orders,	  so	  far	  as	  the	  actual	  work	  of	  administration	  is	  concerned.’33	  However,	  there	  were	  hardly	  any	  prescriptions	  from	  the	  PLC,	  PLB	  or	  LGB	  concerning	  contracts,	  tenders	  and	  the	  like:	  one	  short	  section	  of	  the	  general	  orders	  of	  2345,	  one	  minor	  amendment	  to	  the	  form	  of	  cheques	  in	  /012	  and	  one	  slightly	  more	  substantial	  amendment	  to	  the	  form	  of	  contract	  in	  -./..	  This	  may	  be	  contrasted	  with	  rest	  of	  the	  -,899	  or	  so	  pages	  of	  poor	  law	  orders	  on	  other	  subjects	  which	  were	  in	  force	  by	  6787.34	  It	  is	  worth	  asking	  why	  so	  little	  of	  the	  central	  authorities’	  activities	  were	  concerned	  with	  such	  a	  large	  part	  of	  the	  unions’	  activities,	  once	  the	  regulations	  for	  contracting	  had	  been	  laid	  down	  in	  1234.	  It	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  centre	  was	  not	  at	  all	  interested,	  however.	  Rather,	  guardians	  were	  subject	  to	  those	  regulations	  and	  could	  appeal	  against	  rulings	  of	  unlawful	  expenditure	  made	  by	  district	  auditors.	  The	  centre	  therefore	  did	  engage	  in	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  correspondence	  regarding	  these	  rulings.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  though,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  central	  authority	  saw	  little	  reason	  to	  interfere	  with	  the	  overarching	  regulations	  for	  contracting.	  	  The	  centre	  had	  set	  up	  a	  structure	  from	  the	  decentralised	  origins	  of	  poor	  relief	  administration,	  allowing	  guardians	  to	  work	  with	  local	  circumstances.	  The	  PLB	  reviewed	  this	  laissez	  faire	  approach	  in	  *!"#	  when	  it	  noticed	  that	  London	  unions	  were	  paying	  different	  amounts	  for	  the	  same	  goods.35	  (See	  chapter	  ).)	  The	  PLB	  commissioned	  the	  Admiralty’s	  superintendent	  of	  contracts,	  Francis	  Rowsell,	  to	  inquire	  into	  whether	  unions	  were	  getting	  value	  for	  money	  and	  a	  suitable	  standard	  of	  goods	  under	  their	  existing	  arrangements.36	  Rowsell	  unsurprisingly	  drew	  attention	  to	  shortcomings	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  J.	  Redlich	  and	  F.W.	  Hirst,	  Local	  Government	  in	  England	  Vol.	  &	  (London:	  Macmillan	  &	  Co,	  4567),	  p.	  $%$.	  34	  Glen,	  Poor	  Law	  Orders,	  ##th	  edition	  (London,	  #-.-),	  in	  Redlich	  and	  Hirst,	  Local	  Government,	  	  p.	  $%$.	  35	  PP	  #$%&	  LVIII	  *+,:	  Metropolitan	  Boards	  of	  Guardians	  (contracts).	  Return	  of	  the	  contracts	  made	  by	  the	  Metropolitan	  Boards	  of	  Guardians	  for	  the	  supply	  of	  certain	  articles	  for	  the	  six	  months	  ending	  Michaelmas	  0123.	  36	  PP	  #$%&	  LI	  )**:	  Workhouses,	  Metropolis	  (supply	  of	  provisions).	  Copy	  of	  report	  of	  Francis	  W.	  Rowsell,	  Esquire,	  superintendent	  of	  contracts,	  Admiralty,	  to	  the	  Right	  Honourable	  James	  Stansfeld,	  M.P.,	  President	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board,	  dated	  the	  67th	  day	  of	  July	  ;<=;,	  relative	  to	  the	  system	  of	  supply	  of	  provisions	  and	  stores	  for	  the	  workhouses	  of	  the	  Metropolis.	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these	  arrangements	  and	  recommended	  in	  their	  place	  the	  sorts	  of	  processes	  the	  Admiralty	  had	  adopted,	  though	  he	  did	  not	  suggest	  fully	  centralising	  procurement	  for	  workhouses.	  Neither	  the	  PLB	  nor	  its	  successor	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board	  took	  any	  strong	  action	  to	  encourage	  unions	  to	  sharpen	  their	  tendering	  procedures,	  beyond	  distributing	  Rowsell’s	  6indings	  among	  the	  London	  boards	  of	  guardians.37	  Rowsell’s	  report	  was	  the	  most	  wide-­‐ranging	  and	  detailed	  survey	  of	  contracting	  practices	  commissioned	  by	  the	  central	  authority,	  which	  seemingly	  made	  no	  other	  formal	  examination	  of	  the	  topic	  until	  '()(.	  For	  some	  thirty	  years,	  therefore,	  unions	  saw	  no	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  rules	  for	  workhouse	  supplies.	  This	  lends	  weight	  to	  Bellamy’s	  description	  of	  the	  central	  authorities’	  aim	  as	  being	  to	  ‘minimise	  error…	  rather	  than	  to	  maximise	  performance.’38	  The	  opportunity	  cost	  of	  centralising	  procurement	  among	  poor	  law	  unions	  would	  have	  been	  very	  high,	  even	  on	  a	  regional	  basis.	  Unions,	  after	  all,	  already	  represented	  centralised	  procurement	  among	  groups	  of	  parishes.	  The	  gains	  would	  have	  been	  uncertain;	  guardians	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  best	  sources	  of	  knowledge	  about	  local	  markets;	  and	  it	  was	  up	  to	  the	  ratepayers	  to	  decide	  whether	  they	  were	  happy	  with	  what	  guardians	  bought	  with	  their	  rates.	  It	  was	  for	  the	  guardians	  themselves	  to	  choose	  to	  adopt	  Rowsell’s	  recommendations	  or	  to	  discard	  them.	  Guardians	  therefore	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  discretion	  allowed	  by	  the	  fairly	  broad	  regulations	  on	  contracting	  and	  supplies.	  
3.3.3 Rules	  and	  regulations	  Boards	  of	  guardians	  operated	  within	  a	  legal	  framework	  of	  case	  law,	  statute	  law	  and	  orders	  from	  the	  central	  authority.	  The	  centre	  also	  had	  the	  role	  of	  sanctioning	  unusual	  expenditure	  and	  remitting	  unlawful	  expenditure	  where	  it	  was	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  fairness.	  Statute	  law,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  Elizabethan	  poor	  laws,	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Amendment	  Act	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  local	  acts,	  gave	  boards	  of	  guardians	  the	  right	  to	  spend	  the	  rates	  on	  maintaining	  the	  poor,	  and	  gave	  the	  PLC	  and	  its	  successors	  the	  right	  to	  make	  orders	  and	  regulations	  on	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  TNA	  MH%&/%,	  LGB	  to	  London	  unions,	  3	  January	  %89:.	  38	  Bellamy,	  Central-­‐local	  relations,	  p.	  %%&.	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guardians’	  behaviour.	  Case	  law	  provided	  explication	  by	  the	  courts	  on	  points	  of	  contention	  and,	  where	  necessary,	  the	  courts	  looked	  to	  pre-­‐!"#$	  cases	  for	  precedents	  concerning	  the	  expenditure	  of	  the	  poor	  rates.	  Poor	  law	  unions	  and	  the	  central	  authority	  were	  therefore	  governed	  by	  legislation	  and	  precedents	  speci&ically	  concerned	  with	  poor	  relief,	  and	  they	  were,	  of	  course,	  also	  constrained	  by	  the	  laws	  which	  applied	  to	  other	  areas	  of	  life,	  in	  particular	  those	  relating	  to	  contracts.	  But	  unions	  bought	  goods	  and	  services	  from	  suppliers	  who	  were	  not	  themselves	  subject	  to	  the	  poor	  laws	  (except	  as	  ratepayers).	  A	  supplier	  did	  not	  become	  obliged	  to	  conform	  to	  the	  orders	  of	  the	  central	  authority	  simply	  by	  selling	  to	  a	  union.	  This	  gave	  rise,	  therefore,	  to	  an	  area	  of	  limited	  or	  tempered	  control	  for	  the	  central	  authority:	  it	  could	  not	  exercise	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  management	  over	  workhouse	  supplies	  that	  it	  could	  over	  dietaries,	  for	  example,	  even	  though	  they	  were	  closely	  related	  parts	  of	  a	  union’s	  business.	  In	  the	  'irst	  year	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law,	  the	  PLC	  explicitly	  allowed	  guardians	  to	  purchase	  bread,	  -lour,	  meat	  and	  other	  workhouse	  supplies	  as	  they	  saw	  !it,	  ‘in	  such	  manner	  as	  may	  appear	  to	  such	  guardians	  best	  calculated	  to	  prevent	  imposition,	  and	  to	  promote	  economical	  management’.	  39	  The	  only	  stipulation	  was	  that	  purchases	  should	  ‘be	  made	  upon	  tenders	  after	  public	  advertisement	  in	  one	  county	  newspaper	  at	  least.’	  The	  PLC	  was	  keen	  to	  stress	  in	  its	  4irst	  annual	  report	  the	  price	  advantages	  of	  contracting	  for	  unions	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  high	  costs	  faced	  by	  individual	  parishes.	  (This	  was	  just	  one	  of	  many	  claimed	  bene$its	  of	  joining	  a	  union.)	  Uck$ield	  union,	  the	  PLC	  reported,	  now	  paid	  ..s	  for	  a	  hundredweight	  of	  cheese,	  whereas	  its	  constituent	  parishes	  had	  paid	  34s	  !d.	  Tenders	  for	  *lour	  had	  fallen	  by	  a	  couple	  of	  shillings	  per	  four-­‐bushel	  bag	  to	  between	  '(s	  !d	  and	  %&s	  !d.	  Local	  tradesmen	  did	  not	  need	  to	  be	  concerned	  about	  losing	  business,	  though,	  as	  ‘the	  purchases	  of	  the	  independent	  labourers	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  #$%&	  XXXV	  #)*:	  First	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commissioners	  for	  England	  and	  Wales.	  p.	  )*,	  Appendix	  1:	  Orders	  and	  regulations,	  article	  *1:	  Purchase	  of	  Provisions	  and	  other	  Articles.	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have,	  to	  a	  considerable	  extent,	  made	  up	  for	  the	  diminished	  consumption	  of	  goods	  by	  the	  parish.’	  40	  Objections	  to	  the	  new	  system	  from	  traders	  were	  dismissed	  by	  the	  PLC.	  A	  group	  of	  Bermondsey	  master	  bakers	  presented	  a	  memorial	  in	  2345	  asking	  the	  Commissioners	  to	  approve	  a	  ticket	  system	  of	  outdoor	  relief	  in	  the	  parish.	  Among	  the	  many	  evils	  of	  such	  a	  system,	  Chadwick	  wrote	  in	  reply,	  was:	  [T]he	  interest	  which	  it	  is	  found	  to	  create	  on	  the	  part	  of	  many	  persons	  to	  obtain	  the	  management	  and	  control	  of	  the	  parochial	  rates,	  not	  for	  the	  public	  advantage,	  but	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  patronage	  and	  in6luence	  acquired	  by	  the	  distribution	  of	  such	  supplies;	  which	  in6luence	  affords	  strong	  motives	  to	  the	  undue	  retention	  or	  extension	  of	  out-­‐door	  relief,	  to	  the	  serious	  injury	  of	  the	  condition	  and	  morals	  of	  the	  labouring	  classes,	  amongst	  whom	  inducements	  to	  indolence,	  2ilth,	  and	  imposture,	  are	  thus	  maintained	  and	  diffused	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  rate-­‐payers.41	  
The	  bakers	  were	  labouring	  under	  the	  ‘common	  error’	  that	  the	  new	  system	  would	  operate	  to	  their	  detriment;	  and	  the	  Commissioners	  knew	  better	  as	  they	  had	  ‘extensive	  experience	  beyond	  that	  of	  any	  single	  parish’.	  The	  PLC,	  therefore,	  responded	  to	  this	  memorial	  by	  traders	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  it	  dealt	  with	  many	  other	  objections	  to	  the	  new	  system:	  Opposition,	  they	  argued,	  resulted	  either	  from	  ignorance	  or	  from	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  the	  old	  system.	  To	  reduce	  the	  chances	  of	  such	  interests	  controlling	  workhouse	  supply,	  the	  PLC	  set	  out	  more	  detailed	  rules	  for	  tendering	  and	  entering	  contracts	  in	  a	  general	  order	  in	  ()*+,	  and	  these	  were	  reissued	  in	  similar	  form	  in	  the	  ()*6	  Consolidated	  General	  Order	  (CGO).42	  They	  provided	  that	  any	  contract	  worth	  !"#	  or	  more	  was	  to	  be	  put	  out	  to	  tender	  and	  advertised	  in	  a	  local	  newspaper	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  PP	  #$%&	  XXXI	  #)&,	  !"#:	  Third	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commissioners	  for	  England	  and	  Wales;	  together	  with	  appendices	  (A.)	  (B.)	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  (C.),	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  Appendix	  A:	  R.	  Reynolds,	  A.	  Baxter,	  J.	  Green,	  W.T.	  Gordon	  to	  PLC,	  12	  October	  6789;	  reply	  1>	  November	  6789.	  42	  PP	  #$%&	  XIX	  #:	  Eighth	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commissioners,	  with	  appendices.,	  p.	  78,	  appendix	  A,	  no.	  -:	  General	  order	  on	  Proceedings	  of	  Boards	  of	  Guardians,	  articles	  :;-­‐!";	  J.F.	  Archbold,	  The	  Consolidated	  and	  Other	  Orders	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commissioners,	  and	  of	  the	  Poor	  
Law	  Board,	  with	  Introduction,	  Explanatory	  Notes,	  and	  Index	  (London:	  Shaw	  and	  Sons,	  ./01)	  (’CGO	  '()*’),	  pp.	  /*-­‐!"#.	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by	  the	  guardians.43	  Potential	  suppliers	  were	  to	  submit	  sealed	  bids	  to	  be	  opened	  on	  a	  given	  day	  at	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  guardians,	  who	  would	  choose	  the	  most	  appropriate,	  though	  they	  were	  not	  bound	  to	  accept	  the	  cheapest.	  The	  guardians	  could	  –	  but	  did	  not	  have	  to	  –	  ask	  suppliers	  to	  provide	  sureties	  for	  the	  due	  performance	  of	  their	  contracts.	  The	  central	  authority	  would	  therefore	  contemplate	  procedural	  solutions	  to	  clear	  problems.	  A	  further	  example	  is	  that	  of	  fraud:	  For	  instance,	  payments	  to	  suppliers	  were	  to	  be	  made	  by	  orders	  –	  i.e.	  cheques	  –	  drawn	  upon	  the	  union	  treasurer.44	  In	  April	  )*+,	  the	  PLB	  amended	  the	  regulations	  to	  ensure	  these	  cheques	  were	  payable	  to	  named	  individuals	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  bearer.45	  In	  a	  circular	  accompanying	  the	  new	  regulation,	  the	  PLB	  ‘observed	  with	  much	  regret	  the	  frauds’	  which	  union	  of9icers	  had	  committed	  and	  expressed	  their	  belief	  that	  the	  old	  style	  of	  cheque	  offered	  ‘undue	  facility	  for	  the	  commission	  of	  such	  frauds’.46	  They	  also	  reminded	  guardians	  of	  the	  regulation	  in	  the	  CGO	  requiring	  unions	  to	  pay	  suppliers	  within	  twenty-­‐one	  days	  of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  quarter.	  If	  this	  article	  were	  ‘duly	  and	  punctually	  observed’	  in	  all	  cases,	  they	  wrote,	  there	  would	  be	  greater	  security	  for	  guardians’	  creditors	  and	  less	  risk	  of	  ‘improper	  dealing’.47	  The	  PLB	  was	  acting	  in	  response	  to	  two	  cases	  which	  took	  place	  in	  early	  1234:	  In	  one,	  John	  Paul,	  assistant	  clerk	  to	  the	  City	  of	  London	  union,	  embezzled	  over	  :;<<	  due	  to	  !lour	  suppliers	  Kingsford	  &	  Co	  and	  to	  one	  of	  the	  union’s	  overseers.48	  In	  the	  other	  case,	  Thomas	  Robinson,	  assistant	  clerk	  to	  the	  North	  Bierley	  union,	  was	  found	  guilty	  of	  altering	  a	  series	  of	  cheques,	  for	  instance	  making	  one	  for	  67	  appear	  to	  be	  for	  *+,,	  and	  appropriating	  the	  money.49	  The	  regulations	  therefore	  still	  allowed	  guardians	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  discretion	  in	  their	  choices	  of	  supplier	  and	  their	  methods	  of	  receiving	  supplies,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  followed	  the	  correct	  procedures	  for	  holding	  board	  meetings.	  It	  was	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Archbold,	  CGO	  %&'(,	  arts.	  ((-­‐!".	  44	  Ibid.,	  art.	  '(.	  45	  Ibid.,	  ’Payments	  to	  Guardians’,	  p.	  456.	  46	  Ibid.,	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  %&'.	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  Ibid.	  48	  ‘The	  frauds	  on	  the	  City	  of	  London	  union’,	  Daily	  News,	  #$	  December	  +,-.,	  p.	  $;	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  Union	  frauds’,	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  #	  February	  +#,-,	  p.	  -.	  49	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  Bradford	  Observer,	  #	  February	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  p.	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for	  the	  central	  authority	  to	  ensure	  that	  unions	  received	  good	  value	  or	  resisted	  cartels	  and	  ‘combinations’	  of	  traders,	  but	  it	  did	  show	  some	  concern	  for	  the	  good	  order	  of	  poor	  law	  supply.	  The	  centre	  acted	  to	  ensure	  contracts	  were	  enforceable,	  for	  example	  by	  insisting	  on	  proper	  advertising,	  tendering	  and	  contracting	  procedures	  such	  as	  contracting	  under	  seal.	  Any	  deviation	  from	  these	  rules	  might	  render	  a	  contract	  unenforceable.	  For	  example,	  where	  a	  contract	  was	  entered	  into	  by	  a	  union	  with	  a	  supplier	  but	  it	  was	  not	  under	  seal,	  if	  the	  supplier	  defaulted	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  term	  of	  the	  contract	  then	  the	  liability	  would	  only	  be	  for	  goods	  already	  supplied,	  rather	  than	  for	  the	  goods	  which	  would	  have	  been	  supplied	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  term.	  If	  a	  contract	  was	  made	  in	  conformity	  with	  general	  contractual	  law	  but	  not	  with	  the	  regulations	  of	  the	  PLB	  it	  was	  not	  void	  unless	  the	  PLB	  declared	  it	  void.	  The	  Braintree	  guardians,	  for	  instance,	  asked	  the	  PLB	  for	  its	  opinion	  on	  taking	  legal	  proceedings	  against	  a	  baker	  whose	  contract	  stipulated	  that	  bread	  should	  be	  delivered	  the	  day	  after	  it	  had	  been	  baked.	  He	  persisted	  in	  delivering	  it	  ‘hot	  from	  the	  oven	  and	  consequently	  weighing	  much	  more	  than	  it	  would	  have	  done	  after	  the	  lapse	  of	  twelve	  or	  twenty	  four	  hours’.50	  Frequent	  complaints	  had	  not	  had	  the	  desired	  effect.	  The	  PLB,	  however,	  told	  the	  guardians	  that	  they	  must	  seek	  independent	  advice,	  noting	  that	  the	  contract	  was	  not	  termed	  according	  to	  of#icial	  recommendations.	  Unions	  could,	  therefore,	  gain	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  central	  authority	  by	  adopting	  its	  protocols.	  Unions	  could	  lawfully	  ignore	  these	  protocols,	  but	  would	  be	  left	  unprotected	  if	  they	  did.	  Many	  unions	  experienced	  the	  perils	  associated	  with	  such	  self-­‐reliance.	  The	  guardians	  of	  St	  Olave,	  for	  example,	  discovered	  in	  789:	  that	  the	  acceptance	  by	  the	  union	  of	  a	  tender	  did	  not	  itself	  count	  as	  a	  binding	  contract.	  William	  Snelling,	  a	  baker,	  tendered	  to	  supply	  bread	  at	  45s	  !!d	  per	  cwt	  and	  +lour	  at	  /0s	  per	  cwt	  in	  September	  that	  year,	  but	  declined	  to	  sign	  the	  contract	  or	  bond.	  However,	  he	  did	  supply	  the	  goods	  until	  Friday	  23	  October,	  when	  he	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  union	  clerk	  saying	  he	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  make	  any	  more	  deliveries	  after	  the	  following	  day.	  ‘If	  I	  do	  it	  will	  ruin	  me	  and	  get	  heavy	  into	  Debt,’	  he	  wrote.	  ‘I	  have	  no	  Flour	  in	  and	  no	  one	  will	  send	  any…	  I	  sent	  a	  sack	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  TNA	  MH'(/**+'	  (,*-./-/,	  William	  Vallance,	  clerk	  to	  Braintree	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  ((	  July	  !"#$;	  reply	  ,	  August	  !"#$.	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Flour	  in	  this	  week	  at	  a	  loss	  of	  +,s.	  that	  will	  ruin	  any	  one	  and	  quickly.’51	  The	  union	  found	  another	  supplier,	  but	  tried	  to	  withhold	  the	  3456	  it	  owed	  Snelling	  for	  the	  goods	  he	  had	  already	  supplied.	  However,	  the	  PLB	  told	  the	  union	  it	  was	  unlawful	  to	  withhold	  the	  sum,	  as	  there	  had	  not	  been	  a	  contract.52	  Snelling	  was	  entitled	  to	  be	  paid	  for	  the	  goods	  he	  had	  delivered.	  Once	  it	  had	  been	  agreed,	  a	  contract	  could	  not	  legally	  be	  altered.	  However,	  the	  central	  authority	  could	  sanction	  the	  guardians	  putting	  an	  end	  to	  it	  prematurely.	  This	  is	  what	  happened	  in	  -./.	  when	  Mr	  Ewing	  of	  High	  Street	  Borough	  agreed	  in	  error	  to	  supply	  the	  St	  Saviour	  guardians	  with	  two	  hundred	  mattresses	  at	  (s	  per	  cwt	  of	  *lock,	  believing	  the	  goods	  to	  be	  of	  the	  same	  quality	  as	  that	  required	  by	  the	  adjoining	  parish	  of	  St	  George	  the	  Martyr.	  The	  new	  beds	  were	  in	  fact	  for	  St	  Saviour’s	  new	  in1irmary	  and	  were	  therefore	  to	  be	  of	  higher	  quality.	  Ewing	  asked	  the	  guardians	  to	  alter	  the	  contract	  by	  giving	  him	  9:s	  !d	  per	  cwt,	  the	  next	  lowest	  price	  tendered	  by	  a	  competitor.	  The	  guardians	  were	  prepared	  to	  do	  so,	  as	  they	  believed	  Ewing	  had	  been	  led	  into	  the	  error	  by	  his	  assistant,	  and	  the	  PLB	  consented	  to	  the	  guardians	  ending	  the	  contract	  and	  entering	  into	  a	  new	  one.53	  The	  PLB	  also	  agreed	  to	  end	  a	  contract	  between	  the	  Whitechapel	  union	  and	  its	  milk	  supplier,	  Messrs	  Freeman,	  Sockett	  &	  Roberts,	  in	  $%&'.54	  In	  this	  case	  the	  problem	  was	  not	  an	  administrative	  error	  but	  the	  poor	  quality	  of	  the	  milk.	  The	  supplier	  had	  entered	  into	  a	  six-­‐month	  contract	  on	  !"	  March,	  but	  the	  guardians	  decided	  to	  end	  it	  as	  early	  as	  ,,	  April.	  A	  supplier’s	  inability	  to	  ful,il	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  contract	  was	  not	  unknown:	  Bedminster’s	  guardians	  asked	  the	  PLB	  to	  end	  its	  contract	  for	  bread	  and	  5lour	  with	  a	  supplier	  who	  was	  about	  to	  be	  declared	  bankrupt	  and	  had	  not	  supplied	  any	  goods	  for	  a	  week.55	  In	  some	  cases	  an	  agreement	  with	  a	  supplier	  could	  be	  ended	  if	  his	  contract	  was	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  salary,	  such	  as	  Narberth’s	  cof6in-­‐maker	  dismissed	  in	  ()*+	  for	  being	  drunk	  while	  conveying	  an	  infant’s	  body	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  TNA	  MH'(/'(*+',	  +-(.*/*/,	  Corner	  to	  PLB,	  (	  November	  '-*/.	  52	  TNA	  MH'(/'(*+',	  +-(.*/*/,	  PLB	  to	  Corner,	  -	  November	  '-*/.	  53	  TNA	  MH'(/'(*++,	  (---./-/,	  Blake	  to	  PLB,	  '9	  June	  '/-/;	  (/'--/-/,	  Blake	  to	  PLB,	  -	  July	  '/-/;	  !"#$$/$",	  PLB	  to	  Blake,	  #1	  July	  #"$".	  54	  TNA	  MH'(/*+',,	  ''''.//+,	  John	  Smith,	  clerk	  to	  Whitechapel	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  ''	  April	  'G/+;	  reply	  '(	  April	  '(+,.	  55	  TNA	  MH'(/!"#!$	  #&&$'/&&,	  Thomas	  Coles,	  clerk	  to	  Bedminster	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  #"	  June	  !"##;	  &'&()/##,	  &(	  June	  !"##;	  reply	  &)	  June	  !"##.	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burial	  ground.56	  Thomas	  Williams	  won	  a	  contract	  to	  supply	  meat	  to	  Stepney	  union	  in	  &'()	  but	  did	  not	  at	  .irst	  realise	  he	  was	  bound	  to	  deliver	  to	  four	  workhouses.	  The	  agreed	  price	  would,	  he	  discovered,	  entail	  a	  loss.	  Williams	  asked	  Thomas	  Fardell,	  another	  butcher,	  to	  take	  the	  contract	  and	  supply	  the	  meat	  on	  his	  own	  account	  at	  the	  same	  price,	  which	  the	  PLB	  sanctioned.57	  St	  Saviour	  union	  allowed	  grocer	  Nicholas	  Yarrow	  to	  amend	  his	  tender	  for	  arrowroot	  from	  )½d	  to	  $d	  per	  lb,	  as	  it	  was	  ‘evidently	  a	  clerical	  error’.58	  The	  PLB	  told	  the	  Bridgewater	  guardians	  in	  -./0	  they	  could	  allow	  a	  further	  7/	  to	  a	  slate	  cistern	  supplier	  who	  had	  misunderstood	  the	  requirements.59	  And	  Hastings	  union	  contracted	  in	  /001	  with	  a	  butcher	  who	  meant	  to	  supply	  meat	  at	  $s	  !"d	  per	  stone	  but	  accidentally	  wrote	  2s	  !"d.	  The	  LGB	  allowed	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  contract	  so	  the	  guardians	  could	  enter	  into	  a	  new	  one.60	  These	  examples	  show	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  central	  authority	  in	  sanctioning	  (or	  otherwise)	  contract	  changes.	  However,	  the	  centre	  did	  not	  have	  a	  direct	  role	  in	  ensuring	  that	  unions	  complied	  with	  the	  regulations,	  because	  it	  did	  not	  exercise	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  surveillance	  over	  supply	  as	  it	  did	  over	  other	  areas.	  For	  something	  like	  the	  types	  of	  relief	  given	  to	  various	  classes	  of	  paupers,	  the	  PLB’s	  or	  LGB’s	  statistical	  department	  might	  notice	  departures	  from	  the	  rules.	  However,	  unions	  were	  not	  required	  to	  submit	  returns	  to	  the	  centre	  regarding	  tendering	  and	  supply.	  It	  was,	  though,	  one	  of	  the	  jobs	  of	  the	  district	  auditor	  to	  check	  that	  a	  union’s	  tendering	  process	  complied	  with	  the	  regulations.	  For	  instance	  in	  )*+,	  the	  auditor	  noticed	  that	  St	  Saviour	  had	  paid	  5)6,	  for	  gas	  !ittings	  and	  *+,-	  for	  stoves	  in	  the	  union’s	  new	  in!irmary	  without	  advertisement	  or	  tender,	  and	  ./01	  for	  bedsteads	  for	  which	  there	  were	  tenders	  but	  no	  advertisements.61	  The	  clerk	  told	  the	  PLB	  that	  the	  guardians	  had	  not	  known	  these	  costs	  would	  exceed	  /01	  as	  the	  works	  were	  done	  under	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  TNA	  MH'(/'**+,	  -.+-./*.,	  John	  Miles,	  clerk	  to	  Narberth	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  ,	  September	  !"#$.	  57	  LMA	  STBG/L/*+,,	  ff.	  0*0-­‐!"#,	  &'	  December	  '()*;	  f.	  )'.,	  0	  January	  '(67.	  58	  LMA	  SOBG/*+,/*-*,	  f.	  123,	  13	  July	  -89-.	  59	  TNA	  MH'(/'*(+,,	  ./+/0/,1,	  Paul	  Reed,	  clerk	  to	  Bridgewater	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  '0	  November	  !"#$;	  reply	  ,	  December	  !"#$.	  60	  TNA	  MH'(/'(*+*	  ',--*,/.(,	  A.R.	  Inskipp,	  clerk	  to	  Hastings	  guardians,	  to	  LGB,	  01	  November	  !""#;	  reply	  !	  December	  !""#.	  61	  TNA	  MH'(/'(*++,	  -.-//0,	  Meymott	  to	  PLB,	  '	  January	  './0.	  
	   !""	  
superintendence	  of	  the	  architects,	  who	  did	  not	  know	  what	  was	  required	  except	  as	  the	  work	  proceeded	  (and	  of	  course	  we	  now	  have	  no	  way	  of	  knowing	  if	  this	  was	  true).62	  The	  PLB	  told	  the	  clerk	  that	  the	  explanation	  was	  satisfactory,	  but	  that	  the	  prior	  sanction	  of	  the	  PLB	  was	  required	  under	  article	  78	  of	  the	  Consolidated	  General	  Order.	  	  District	  auditors	  were	  a	  key	  part	  of	  the	  centre’s	  surveillance	  framework,	  but	  were	  not	  necessarily	  effective	  supervisors	  of	  contracting.	  They	  had	  a	  number	  of	  other	  functions,	  including	  checking	  that	  the	  various	  books	  of	  several	  union	  of#icers	  were	  correctly	  #illed	  up	  and	  that	  ledgers	  and	  accounts	  were	  consistent.	  They	  had	  to	  certify	  that	  the	  rates	  were	  spent	  on	  items	  connected	  with	  poor	  relief	  as	  prescribed	  by	  law.	  But	  they	  had	  no	  power	  to	  ensure	  that,	  for	  instance,	  the	  goods	  delivered	  to	  workhouses	  were	  compared	  with	  the	  samples	  provided	  by	  suppliers	  when	  tendering;	  nor	  could	  they	  require	  boards	  of	  guardians	  to	  justify	  their	  choice	  of	  a	  particular	  supplier.	  Auditors	  might	  be	  strict	  about	  ruling	  certain	  expenditure	  unlawful,	  but	  they	  could	  not	  force	  unions	  to	  pay	  suppliers.	  It	  was	  for	  the	  suppliers	  themselves	  to	  chase	  unions	  for	  payment,	  through	  the	  courts	  if	  they	  had	  to.	  Although	  unions	  were	  supposed	  to	  delay	  payment	  to	  creditors	  for	  no	  longer	  than	  twenty-­‐one	  days	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  quarter,	  payments	  made	  after	  this	  time	  were	  not	  generally	  ruled	  unlawful	  by	  the	  auditors.	  There	  was,	  after	  all,	  no	  fair	  way	  of	  recovering	  money	  from	  suppliers	  once	  they	  had	  been	  paid	  by	  the	  union.	  Furthermore	  delayed	  payments	  were	  such	  a	  common	  practice,	  and	  early	  payments	  were	  so	  inconvenient	  for	  unions,	  that	  it	  was	  dif2icult	  for	  the	  central	  authority	  to	  end	  them.	  	  The	  district	  auditor	  was	  bound	  to	  disallow	  expenditure	  from	  the	  rates	  if	  it	  did	  not	  strictly	  ful-il	  the	  legal	  requirements,	  but	  on	  appeal	  by	  the	  party	  liable	  for	  the	  sum	  the	  central	  authority	  could	  overrule	  the	  disallowance	  or	  remit	  the	  amount	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  fairness.	  The	  Local	  Authorities	  (Expenses)	  Act	  9::;	  enabled	  the	  LGB	  to	  sanction	  unlawful	  expenditure	  before	  the	  district	  auditor	  disallowed	  it	  if	  it	  had	  been	  made	  in	  good	  faith	  or	  inadvertently,	  whereas	  until	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  TNA	  MH'(/'(*++,	  -'.(/-/,	  Blake	  to	  PLB,	  '	  February	  '>-/.	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this	  statute	  sanction	  could	  only	  be	  given	  afterwards.63	  This	  was	  designed	  to	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  appeals,	  according	  to	  the	  LGB,	  though	  a	  Fabian	  critic	  of	  the	  audit	  system	  writing	  in	  0123	  suggested	  that	  district	  auditors	  had	  become	  too	  independent-­‐minded	  for	  the	  department.64	  	  Guardians	  and	  their	  suppliers	  worked	  under	  an	  existing	  body	  of	  contract	  law	  that	  applied	  to	  all	  transactions,	  not	  just	  those	  between	  public	  authorities	  and	  their	  suppliers.	  But	  there	  were	  also	  laws	  predating	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  about	  poor	  law	  administrators	  and	  their	  relationships	  with	  suppliers.	  Guardians	  and	  similar	  managers	  or	  directors	  of	  the	  poor	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  supply	  goods	  for	  the	  poor	  at	  a	  pro*it,	  nor	  to	  be	  business	  partners	  with	  anyone	  else	  who	  did.65	  This	  remained	  in	  force	  under	  the	  new	  system:	  In	  ,-.,,	  the	  Ross	  union	  clerk	  alerted	  the	  PLB	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  farmer	  who	  supplied	  milk	  to	  the	  workhouse	  was	  nominated	  as	  a	  guardian	  and	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  elected.	  There	  had	  been	  no	  other	  tender	  and	  there	  was	  no	  other	  potential	  supplier	  of	  milk	  in	  the	  area.	  The	  PLB	  told	  the	  union	  that	  the	  farmer	  should	  ‘carefully	  abstain	  from	  supplying	  the	  Union	  with	  milk	  so	  long	  as	  he	  continues	  in	  of5ice’.66	  The	  nominated	  guardian	  was	  therefore	  expected	  to	  resign	  once	  elected.	  Any	  guardian	  wishing	  to	  resign	  had	  to	  have	  his	  resignation	  accepted	  by	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board,	  which	  did	  not	  treat	  this	  part	  of	  its	  responsibilities	  simply	  as	  a	  formality.67	  In	  January	  )*+)	  printer	  George	  Cannon	  submitted	  his	  resignation	  as	  a	  guardian	  of	  Wycombe	  union	  to	  the	  PLB	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  prevented	  him	  from	  being	  a	  contractor.68	  The	  PLB	  declined	  the	  resignation,	  but	  the	  Wycombe	  board	  of	  guardians	  contracted	  with	  Cannon	  nonetheless.69	  A	  few	  days	  later,	  in	  telling	  the	  union	  that	  the	  contract	  appeared	  to	  be	  legally	  invalid,	  the	  PLB	  said	  Cannon	  should	  have	  resigned	  in	  advance,	  seemingly	  not	  noticing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  !"	  &	  !%	  Vict.,	  c.	  ,-.	  64	  PP	  #$$$	  XLIX	  #:	  Seventeenth	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board.	  #$$<-­‐!!;	  W.A.	  Robson,	  The	  District	  Auditor:	  An	  old	  menace	  in	  a	  new	  guise,	  Fabian	  Tract	  No.	  /01	  (London:	  The	  Fabian	  Society,	  ./01),	  p.	  5.	  65	  !!	  Geo.	  III	  c.	  )*+.	  Poor	  Relief	  Act	  (+,+-).	  66	  TNA	  MH'(/**+,,	  '*(*.//',	  Thomas	  Edwards,	  clerk	  to	  Ross	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  (F	  March	  ',/';	  reply	  '	  April	  '*+'.	  67	  !	  &	  $	  Vict.	  c.	  !*	  s.	  ,,.	  Poor	  Law	  Continuation	  Act	  ,789.	  68	  TNA	  MH'(/*+(,	  -+(/*',	  G.	  Cannon	  to	  PLB,	  8	  January	  '=*'.	  	  69	  TNA	  MH'(/*+(,	  +-.-/*',	  Saunders	  Nash	  to	  PLB,	  '=	  January	  '.*'.	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that	  he	  had	  tried	  to	  do	  just	  that.70	  The	  union	  clerk’s	  response	  was	  to	  suggest	  a	  circumvention,	  accepted	  by	  the	  PLB,	  by	  which	  Cannon	  would	  be	  obliged	  to	  supply	  the	  union	  at	  a	  discounted	  rate	  and	  thereby	  not	  make	  a	  pro/it.71	  Overseers	  and	  other	  persons	  with	  responsibility	  for	  the	  local	  poor	  were	  prohibited	  from	  providing	  the	  poor	  with	  goods	  ‘for	  pro3it’	  by	  the	  6768	  act,	  but	  judgments	  handed	  down	  in	  two	  subsequent	  cases	  found	  the	  prohibition	  did	  not	  apply	  if	  the	  contractor	  made	  no	  pro1it	  from	  the	  contract.72	  PLB	  assistant	  secretary	  Lumley	  noted	  his	  regret	  that	  the	  resignation	  had	  not	  been	  accepted,	  and	  he	  believed	  ‘there	  was	  some	  misapprehension	  as	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  this	  Bd	  [Board]	  –	  by	  such	  rule	  as	  stated	  the	  Gns	  [Guardians]	  may	  be	  deprived	  of	  the	  best	  tradesman	  in	  the	  district.’	  Indeed,	  later	  that	  month,	  the	  PLB	  accepted	  the	  resignation	  of	  a	  guardian	  of	  the	  Oundle	  union	  on	  the	  same	  grounds	  as	  Cannon	  had	  used.73	  The	  circumvention	  adopted	  at	  Wycombe	  was	  not	  a	  newly	  invented	  trick,	  having	  as	  it	  did	  a	  long-­‐standing	  legal	  basis,	  and	  Wycombe	  was	  not	  the	  only	  union	  to	  use	  this	  case	  law:	  For	  example	  one	  of	  Oxford’s	  guardians,	  who	  was	  also	  editor	  of	  the	  Oxford	  Herald	  newspaper,	  was	  paid	  a	  nominal	  sum	  to	  print	  the	  names	  of	  paupers	  quarterly.74	  	  Guardians	  and	  the	  PLB	  were	  therefore	  both	  constrained	  and	  given	  some	  !lexibility	  by	  the	  statute	  and	  case	  law	  which	  predated	  the	  new	  poor	  law.	  Unions	  were	  obliged	  to	  conduct	  their	  contracting	  in	  speci&ic	  ways	  by	  the	  orders	  of	  the	  post-­‐!"#$	  central	  authorities,	  but	  they	  still	  had	  to	  behave	  within	  general	  contract	  law	  and	  according	  to	  the	  special	  nature	  of	  poor-­‐law	  contracting	  which	  had	  developed	  under	  the	  old	  poor	  law.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  guardians	  were	  given	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  freedom	  by	  a	  body	  of	  law	  and	  systems	  of	  institutional	  behaviour	  that	  evolved	  to	  recognise	  the	  practicalities	  of	  arranging	  the	  supply	  of	  goods	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  poor.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  TNA	  MH'(/*+(,	  -.*+/*',	  J.	  Harman,	  clerk	  to	  Wycombe	  union,	  to	  PLB,	  (C	  January	  'C*';	  reply	  F	  February	  )*+).	  71	  TNA	  MH'(/*+(,	  -**./*',	  Harman	  to	  PLB,	  '8	  February	  '-*'	  and	  PLB	  to	  Harman,	  ('	  February	  !"#!.	  72	  Pope	  v.	  Backhouse,	  0	  Taunt	  456	  SC;	  Skinner	  v.	  Buckee,	  #	  B.	  &	  C.	  (.	  73	  TNA	  MH!"/$$!%,	  !"#$%/'!,	  R.	  Richardson,	  clerk	  to	  Oundle	  union,	  to	  PLB,	  encl.	  resignation	  of	  	  J.	  Everest,	  guardian,	  12	  February	  6786;	  reply	  8	  March	  6786.	  74	  TNA	  MH'(/*+,+,	  ..++,/!",	  H.	  Jacob,	  clerk	  to	  Oxford	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  =	  August	  "=!";	  reply	  "B	  August	  '()'.	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3.3.4 Guardian	  discretion	  and	  its	  limits	  This	  freedom	  had	  a	  number	  of	  aspects.	  First,	  there	  were	  decisions	  guardians	  could	  take	  which	  were	  explicitly	  reserved	  for	  them	  by	  law.	  When	  receiving	  tenders,	  for	  example,	  they	  were	  not	  bound	  to	  accept	  the	  lowest	  bid,	  and	  might	  stipulate	  this	  in	  their	  newspaper	  advertisements	  (e.g.	  Figure	  !.!).	  Thus	  they	  could	  avoid	  being	  obliged	  to	  buy	  poor	  quality	  goods	  or	  to	  contract	  with	  suppliers	  they	  knew	  were	  unreliable	  or	  unsuitable.	  Camberwell’s	  clerk	  told	  the	  Admiralty’s	  Francis	  Rowsell	  that	  decisions	  were	  made	  ‘partly	  by	  prices,	  and	  partly	  by	  the	  repute	  of	  the	  parties	  tendering.	  The	  guardians	  do	  not	  accept	  a	  tender	  solely	  on	  account	  of	  price.’75	  The	  parish	  of	  St	  Luke’s	  Chelsea	  generally	  did	  not	  take	  the	  lowest	  tender	  at	  all,	  and	  in	  +,-+	  their	  ‘oatmeal	  was	  highest	  and	  meat	  second	  highest	  in	  price’	  of	  London	  unions.76	  In	  fact,	  of	  the	  twenty-­‐six	  unions	  who	  answered	  Rowsell’s	  query	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  lowest	  bid	  was	  always	  accepted,	  only	  two	  replied	  yes	  without	  quali!ication,	  the	  other	  twenty-­‐four	  mostly	  saying	  that	  they	  took	  into	  account	  the	  quality	  of	  goods	  previously	  supplied	  and	  the	  character	  of	  the	  supplier.	  	  
	  
Figure 3.6. Advertisement for West Derby union potato contract.  
Source: Liverpool Mercury, 1 January 1867, p. 2.	  
Would-­‐be	  suppliers	  who	  did	  not	  win	  contracts	  despite	  being	  the	  lowest	  bidder	  occasionally	  complained	  to	  the	  central	  authority.	  Builder	  Thomas	  Crook	  did	  so	  in	  $%&'	  when	  St	  George	  in	  the	  East	  union	  declined	  his	  tender	  for	  new	  workhouse	  buildings.	  He	  had	  submitted	  the	  lowest	  bid	  for	  the	  principal	  works	  but	  sealed	  a	  schedule	  of	  prices	  for	  extra	  works	  in	  an	  envelope	  marked	  ‘Not	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  PP	  #$%&	  LI	  !"",	  p.	  %&.	  76	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&.	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be	  opened	  unless	  the	  tender	  is	  accepted’.	  This	  was	  too	  risky	  for	  the	  guardians.	  They	  accepted	  the	  second-­‐lowest	  bid,	  from	  Messrs	  Curtis	  &	  Co,	  telling	  the	  PLB	  that	  the	  winning	  *irm	  were	  ‘well	  known	  as	  most	  respectable	  builders	  having	  been	  engaged	  in	  many	  works	  similar	  to	  those	  tendered	  for	  but…	  Mr	  Crook	  was	  known	  to	  the	  Board	  [of	  Guardians]	  chie5ly	  as	  having	  been	  engaged	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  sewers.’77	  It	  is	  therefore	  clear	  that	  guardians	  tended	  to	  have	  a	  fairly	  strong	  knowledge	  of	  local	  suppliers.	  In	  some	  cases,	  indeed,	  the	  line	  between	  a	  good	  working	  relationship	  and	  friendship	  could	  be	  blurred.	  Although	  guardians	  were	  very	  aware	  of	  their	  duty	  to	  ratepayers	  to	  minimise	  costs,	  they	  did	  not	  want	  to	  ruin	  local	  businesses	  by	  enforcing	  punitive	  terms.	  An	  unexpected	  rise	  in	  duty	  on	  tea	  and	  sugar	  announced	  in	  April	  0122	  was	  met	  with	  alarm	  by	  grocers	  who	  had	  contracted	  with	  unions	  at	  a	  lower	  price	  than	  they	  could	  afford	  after	  the	  increase.	  Brentford’s	  guardians	  asked	  the	  PLB	  to	  allow	  them	  to	  pay	  their	  supplier	  more.78	  William	  Hull	  and	  John	  Craney,	  who	  supplied	  several	  metropolitan	  unions,	  wrote	  directly	  to	  the	  PLB	  asking	  if	  they	  were	  justi;ied	  in	  adding	  the	  new	  duty	  to	  their	  existing	  contracts.79	  The	  answer	  was	  no,	  at	  -irst,	  but	  when	  Parliament	  enacted	  the	  new	  levels	  of	  duty	  a	  few	  months	  later	  a	  section	  was	  inserted	  allowing	  contractors	  to	  do	  just	  that.80	  The	  same	  legal	  provision	  was	  made	  in	  other	  duty	  increases,	  such	  as	  for	  spirits	  in	  5667.81	  In	  another	  case,	  Stepney’s	  guardians	  in	  4567	  found	  that	  their	  milk	  supplier,	  Messrs	  Abbott,	  had	  lost	  cattle	  from	  disease	  and	  therefore	  wanted	  an	  increase	  in	  price	  from	  +¾d	  per	  gallon	  to	  +s.	  Abbotts	  were	  a	  long-­‐standing	  supplier	  to	  the	  union	  and	  the	  guardians	  told	  the	  PLB	  they	  thought	  the	  rise	  justi4ied	  under	  the	  circumstances.	  In	  the	  event,	  the	  PLB’s	  sanction	  was	  unnecessary	  as	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  TNA	  MH'(/*'+,	  '((+-/'./-,	  Thomas	  Stone,	  clerk	  to	  St	  George	  in	  the	  East	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  !"	  April	  ")*+.	  78	  TNA	  MH'(/*+,-	  '*.'(/..,	  William	  Ruston,	  clerk	  to	  Brentford	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  E	  May	  'G...	  79	  MH#$/#$&'(	  $**+'/**,	  William	  Hull	  to	  PLB,	  $#	  June	  #;**;	  MH$*/##	  #'=&*/**,	  J.E	  Craney	  to	  PLB,	  !	  May	  &'((.	  80	  !"	  &	  !%	  Vict.	  c.	  &'	  s.	  );	  TNA	  MH'&/1234	  4)313/55,	  PLB	  to	  Ruston,	  ''	  September	  'D55.	  81	  TNA	  MH'(/*+,*	  +-,.(/-/,	  G.M.	  Howard,	  clerk	  to	  Nottingham	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  ''	  May	  '--/;	  reply	  '	  June	  +,,-;	  /,	  &	  /1	  Vict.,	  c.	  -+.	  Customs	  and	  Inland	  Revenue	  Act	  +,,-.	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guardians	  had	  not	  executed	  a	  contract	  with	  the	  supplier:	  either	  party	  could	  withdraw	  from	  the	  supply	  at	  the	  price	  stipulated	  at	  any	  time.82	  	  Guardians	  and	  other	  of/icers	  clearly	  could	  work	  very	  closely	  with	  suppliers.	  A	  new	  district	  auditor	  discovered	  in	  ,-..	  that	  Uppingham	  union’s	  relieving	  of#icer	  made	  his	  rounds	  with	  the	  baker	  who	  supplied	  bread	  to	  the	  union’s	  outdoor	  paupers,	  on	  the	  baker’s	  horse	  and	  cart.	  The	  auditor	  did	  not	  believe	  the	  practice	  was	  illegal,	  but	  he	  thought	  it	  ‘likely	  to	  subject	  the	  Relieving	  Of4icer	  to	  suspicions	  regarding	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  discharge	  of	  his	  duties,	  and	  to	  produce	  a	  tendency	  to	  destroy	  that	  independence	  of	  Tradesmen	  and	  Contractors	  which	  is	  so	  desirable	  to	  be	  observed	  by	  Union	  of5icers’.83	  Poor	  law	  inspector	  Robert	  Weale	  noted	  that	  he	  knew	  of	  the	  practice	  and	  thought	  it	  did	  no	  harm,	  and	  the	  clerk	  told	  the	  PLB	  that	  it	  gave	  the	  relieving	  of6icer	  an	  opportunity	  to	  observe	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  bread.84	  The	  PLB	  took	  no	  action.	  The	  Lanchester	  guardians	  worked	  so	  closely	  with	  their	  butcher	  in	  1234	  that	  they	  voted	  to	  make	  him	  an	  extra	  payment	  of	  234	  when	  meat	  prices	  rose	  and	  he	  found	  his	  contract	  unsustainable.85	  The	  butcher	  was	  a	  ‘young	  man	  just	  commencing	  business’	  and	  the	  guardians	  thought	  it	  would	  cost	  more	  than	  &'(	  to	  scrap	  the	  agreement	  and	  contract	  with	  another	  supplier.	  The	  auditor	  disallowed	  the	  payment	  but	  the	  PLB	  remitted	  the	  amount	  with	  a	  caution	  against	  repeating	  such	  expenditure.86	  One	  of	  the	  PLB’s	  of.icials	  noted	  wryly	  on	  the	  correspondence:	  ‘If	  the	  price	  had	  fallen,	  and	  the	  Contractor	  had	  made	  an	  unexpected	  pro,it,	  I	  suppose	  he	  would	  not	  have	  made	  the	  Gdns	  a	  present	  of	  !"#.’87	  A	  second	  aspect	  of	  freedom	  for	  guardians	  in	  contracting	  practice	  arose	  because,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  central	  authority	  could	  sanction	  certain	  activities.	  Guardians	  could	  take	  advantage	  of	  this,	  and	  the	  centre	  occasionally	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  TNA	  MH'(/*+,-	  ./*+0//1,	  W.H.	  Swepstone,	  clerk	  to	  Stepney	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  '.	  October	  !"#$;	  reply	  ,-"."A/#$,	  2"	  October	  !"#$.	  83	  TNA	  MH'(/*+',	  '-+.//..,	  John	  Bowring	  to	  PLB,	  (=	  April	  '+...	  84	  TNA	  MH'(/*+',	  '-.(+///,	  W.	  Shield,	  clerk	  to	  Uppingham	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  (	  May	  ,(--.	  85	  TNA	  MH'(/*'+,	  (*-.,/+/,	  J.	  Thompson,	  clerk	  to	  Lanchester	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  G	  June	  'G+/.	  86	  TNA	  MH'(/*'+,	  **+-./+-,	  PLB	  to	  Thompson,	  ((	  October	  '?+-.	  87	  TNA	  MH'(/*'+,	  (,**-/+.,	  Thompson	  to	  PLB,	  '+	  July	  '>+..	  
	   !"#	  
found	  itself	  cornered	  into	  approving	  behaviour	  after	  the	  fact	  to	  which	  it	  would	  not	  have	  given	  prior	  sanction.	  If	  an	  irregular	  item	  of	  expenditure	  was	  large	  enough,	  for	  instance,	  it	  was	  likely	  to	  be	  remitted	  by	  the	  PLB	  after	  its	  disallowance	  by	  the	  auditor	  even	  if	  the	  PLB	  did	  not	  think	  it	  necessarily	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  justice	  and	  fairness.	  In	  1233	  the	  Stepney	  guardians	  had	  a	  contract	  with	  a	  coal	  merchant,	  Irving	  &	  Cooper,	  who	  sent	  the	  workhouse	  12	  or	  so	  tons	  at	  a	  time.	  The	  guardians	  appear	  to	  have	  decided	  that	  it	  would	  be	  cheaper	  to	  buy	  around	  *+,	  tons	  in	  one	  transaction	  but	  Irving	  &	  Cooper	  declined,	  as	  the	  contract	  was	  only	  to	  deliver	  the	  coals	  necessary	  for	  present	  consumption.	  The	  guardians	  then	  bought	  around	  /00	  tons	  at	  once	  from	  Sargeant	  &	  Sons	  without	  ending	  the	  existing	  contract.	  Irving	  &	  Cooper	  complained	  to	  the	  PLB.88	  However,	  by	  the	  time	  the	  PLB	  was	  involved,	  the	  coal	  had	  already	  been	  delivered.	  The	  PLB	  was	  thus	  cornered	  into	  sanctioning	  the	  departure	  from	  the	  regulations	  requiring	  large	  purchases	  to	  be	  made	  through	  competitive	  tender.89	  Guardians	  sometimes	  had	  to	  report	  facts	  in	  a	  certain	  light	  to	  persuade	  the	  central	  authority	  to	  change	  its	  regulations.	  In	  $%&'	  Stepney	  union	  wanted	  to	  dispense	  with	  tendering	  for	  porter	  for	  the	  sick	  as	  there	  was	  a	  2ixed	  price	  charged	  by	  the	  large	  metropolitan	  brewers	  of	  55s	  per	  barrel	  with	  a	  ,ive	  per	  cent	  discount.	  The	  competition	  was	  therefore	  between	  the	  small	  brewers	  whose	  product	  was	  inferior.	  Instead	  of	  accepting	  this	  argument	  immediately,	  the	  PLB	  asked	  the	  union	  how	  much	  porter	  was	  consumed.	  The	  union	  was	  forced	  to	  admit	  that	  -./	  unpaid	  nurses,	  washerwomen,	  tradesmen,	  wardsmen,	  cooks	  and	  others,	  as	  well	  as	  '()	  sick	  paupers,	  were	  allowed	  porter.	  The	  PLB	  reminded	  the	  union	  that	  these	  unpaid	  workers	  needed	  medical	  certi3icates	  before	  they	  could	  be	  allowed	  alcohol.	  The	  guardians	  resolved	  that	  the	  clerk	  should	  ‘confer	  with	  the	  Medical	  Of4icers	  thereon	  and	  obtain	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  TNA	  MH'(/*+',	  -./0///,	  W.H.	  Swepstone,	  clerk	  to	  Stepney	  guardians,	  to	  PLB,	  :	  February	  !"##;	  &'("/##,	  Irving	  &	  Cooper,	  to	  PLB,	  !:	  February	  !"##.	  89	  TNA	  MH'(/*+',	  +-.'A///,	  PLB	  to	  Swepstone,	  ('	  March	  '+//.	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recommendations	  in	  writing’.90	  The	  union	  thereby	  obtained	  the	  PLB’s	  sanction.	  
3.3.5 Impropriety	  and	  fraud	  Guardians	  in	  many	  cases	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  act	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  lawful	  behaviour	  without	  facing	  severe	  consequences.	  Union	  of5icers	  committing	  fraud	  could	  expect,	  if	  discovered,	  to	  be	  prosecuted	  as	  fully	  as	  anyone	  else.	  It	  was	  not	  unknown	  for	  poor-­‐rate	  collectors,	  relieving	  of0icers,	  clerks,	  masters	  and	  other	  such	  of.icials	  to	  be	  charged,	  dismissed	  or	  required	  to	  resign	  because	  of	  some	  form	  of	  defalcation.91	  The	  discovery	  of	  fraud	  by	  guardians	  or	  suppliers	  was	  uncommon,	  though,	  either	  because	  it	  was	  not	  easy	  to	  commit	  or	  because	  it	  was	  not	  easy	  to	  discover.	  However,	  there	  were,	  of	  course,	  many	  activities	  of	  dubious	  propriety	  which	  were	  not	  necessarily	  illegal.	  	  As	  other	  rates	  were	  assimilated	  to	  the	  poor	  rate,	  including	  the	  highway,	  county	  or	  borough,	  police	  and	  hundred	  rates,	  guardians	  and	  parish	  of5icers	  had	  access	  to	  accounts	  that	  were	  not	  overseen	  by	  district	  auditors	  to	  the	  same	  standards	  as	  the	  poor	  rate.	  One	  anonymous	  ratepayer	  complained	  to	  the	  
Nottinghamshire	  Guardian	  in	  $%&'	  that	  this	  gave	  rise	  to	  opportunities	  for	  moving	  expenditure	  between	  ledgers:	  Ever	  since	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Amendment	  Act,	  with	  its	  elaborate	  system	  and	  strict	  surveillance	  of	  accounts,	  came	  into	  force,	  it	  is	  proverbial	  that	  the	  highway	  accounts	  are	  the	  common	  receptacle	  for	  all	  illegal	  and	  irregular	  parish	  payments.	  If	  a	  disallowance	  be	  made	  by	  the	  auditor	  in	  the	  overseer’s	  accounts	  the	  rejected	  item	  is	  almost	  certain	  to	  3ind	  admission	  in	  the	  surveyor’s,	  either	  in	  its	  proper	  form	  or	  converted	  into	  “broken	  stones.”	  How	  many	  guardians	  of	  the	  poor,	  partial	  valuations,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  LMA	  STBG/L/!"#,	  ff.	  ()*-­‐!!",	  %&	  November	  .&/";	  STBG/L/!"#,	  f.(,	  #$	  December	  !"#$;	  ff.	  ))-­‐!",	  %&	  December	  -./0.	  91	  They	  might	  also	  .lee	  to	  avoid	  prosecution,	  as	  did	  William	  Ward,	  master	  of	  Coventry	  workhouse,	  who	  was	  suspected	  of	  embezzlement.	  See	  R.	  Hall,	  ‘The	  vanishing	  unemployed,	  hidden	  disabled,	  and	  embezzling	  master:	  researching	  Coventry	  Workhouse	  registers’,	  Local	  
Historian	  !":$	  ($''"),	  pp.	  ,,,-­‐!".	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&c.,	  are	  paid	  out	  of	  the	  highway	  rates,	  though	  known	  to	  be	  totally	  illegal,	  and	  a	  gross	  imposition	  upon	  the	  ratepayers.92	  
The	  answer	  to	  the	  correspondent’s	  question	  is	  unknowable,	  and	  he	  may	  have	  been	  nursing	  some	  private	  grievance,	  but	  the	  letter	  points	  to	  a	  strong	  contemporary	  impression	  that	  parish	  accounts	  potentially	  hid	  sharp	  practices.	  There	  is	  certainly	  evidence	  for	  conveniently	  poor	  record-­‐keeping	  in	  some	  instances.	  In	  +,-.	  Skipton	  union	  was	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  arguments	  between	  the	  guardians	  over	  whether	  they	  were	  all	  ratepayers	  and	  over	  the	  dismissal	  of	  a	  master	  and	  matron.	  Parliament	  asked	  the	  union	  for	  a	  ‘copy	  of	  all	  contracts…	  which	  have	  been	  entered	  into	  by	  the	  said	  Board	  of	  Guardians	  since	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Union,	  with	  any	  Member,	  or	  with	  any	  one	  in	  Partnership	  with	  any	  Member,	  of	  the	  said	  Board.’93	  Fortunately	  for	  the	  suspected	  guardians	  no	  written	  contracts	  had	  been	  signed	  but,	  the	  clerk	  replied,	  ‘tenders	  were	  accepted	  and	  verbal	  contracts	  made	  with	  some	  members	  of	  the	  Board.’94	  Furthermore	  a	  former	  guardian	  of	  the	  union	  had	  also	  employed	  three	  young	  workhouse	  inmates	  at	  his	  factory	  for	  eleven	  hours	  a	  day,	  paying	  their	  wages	  to	  the	  governor	  of	  the	  workhouse;	  ‘their	  employment	  in	  such	  factory	  was	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  Board	  of	  Guardians,	  but	  very	  much	  complained	  of	  and	  protested	  against	  by	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commissioners,	  and	  their	  Assistant	  Commissioner,	  Mr	  Clements,	  when	  the	  same	  came	  under	  their	  observation.’95	  	  The	  Skipton	  example	  demonstrates	  the	  close	  connections	  between	  guardians	  and	  their	  predecessors,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  ways	  such	  behaviour	  might	  be	  covered	  up.	  Similar	  behaviour	  by	  guardians	  was	  discussed	  in	  789:	  by	  George	  Lansbury,	  himself	  a	  former	  Poplar	  guardian	  who	  had	  by	  then	  become	  chairman	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  Labour	  party.	  In	  his	  memoirs	  he	  described	  how	  he	  found	  the	  Poplar	  board	  when	  he	  was	  2irst	  elected	  to	  it	  in	  5678:	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  ‘Correspondence:	  The	  New	  Highway	  Act’,	  Nottinghamshire	  Guardian,	  #	  November	  +,#-,	  p.	  -.	  93	  PP	  #$%&	  XLV	  *&&:	  Skipton	  Union.	  Return	  of	  the	  names	  of	  persons	  who	  have	  been	  appointed	  governors	  of	  the	  Skipton	  Union	  Workhouse	  during	  the	  last	  two	  years;	  and	  copy	  of	  contracts	  for	  food,	  &c.	  since	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  union.	  94	  Ibid.	  95	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %.	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Most	  guardians	  were	  freemasons,	  and	  so	  were	  many	  of	  the	  of'icials	  and	  all	  the	  contractors.	  I	  do	  not	  think	  there	  was	  any	  real	  corruption	  except	  that	  people	  did	  look	  after	  their	  friends.	  You	  scratch	  my	  back	  and	  I’ll	  scratch	  yours	  was	  the	  kind	  of	  policy	  where	  jobs	  and	  contracts	  were	  concerned.96	  	  
Lansbury	  thus	  gave	  the	  impression	  of	  an	  all-­‐too-­‐comfortable	  local	  élite	  enjoying	  a	  long-­‐standing	  status	  quo	  –	  to	  be	  contrasted,	  of	  course,	  with	  his	  own	  necessarily	  radical	  faction.	  Despite	  the	  clear	  disdain,	  Lansbury	  accused	  his	  former	  colleagues	  more	  of	  cosiness	  than	  of	  wrongdoing.	  Nonetheless,	  he	  found	  that	  other	  union	  of,icials	  were	  indeed	  corrupt:	  We	  visited	  the	  workhouse	  early	  morning	  and	  late	  at	  night,	  discovering	  many	  gross	  irregularities	  such	  as	  calico	  in	  stock	  in	  place	  of	  linen	  the	  Board	  had	  paid	  for.	  Then	  we	  tried	  to	  discover	  where	  all	  the	  stores	  went	  to,	  and	  (inally	  found	  our	  stores	  were	  short	  by	  thousands	  of	  yards.	  After	  weeks	  of	  toil	  we	  impeached	  the	  of1icers	  and	  proved	  gross	  negligence,	  if	  not	  worse,	  and	  applied	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board	  for	  an	  Inquiry.’97	  	  
An	  inquiry	  was	  held	  and	  the	  of3icers	  sacked,	  though	  the	  LGB	  was	  obstructive,	  Lansbury	  went	  on	  to	  complain.	  There	  was	  no	  interest	  from	  the	  LGB	  in	  pursuing	  claims	  of	  corruption,	  and	  ‘as	  to	  3inding	  out	  anything	  corrupt,	  auditors	  appear	  to	  think	  that	  is	  none	  of	  their	  business,	  and	  so	  1ind	  out	  only	  what	  they	  are	  told.’98	  This	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  views	  of	  Fabian	  writer	  W.A.	  Robson	  who	  accused	  auditors	  of	  systematically	  overreaching	  their	  mandates.	  The	  quality	  of	  guardians	  and	  auditors	  alike	  was	  clearly	  a	  subjective	  experience.99	  Lansbury’s	  criticisms	  of	  the	  old	  Poplar	  board	  must	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  allegations	  made	  about	  the	  union	  under	  his	  time	  in	  of2ice	  there.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  guardians	  give	  far	  more	  outdoor	  relief	  than	  the	  LGB	  and	  many	  ratepayers	  would	  have	  liked,	  but	  they	  were	  also	  ‘rumblings’	  of	  corruption	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  G.	  Lansbury,	  My	  Life	  (London:	  Constable,	  0123),	  p.	  078.	  97	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&'.	  98	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&'.	  99	  Robson,	  The	  District	  Auditor.	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their	  own	  contracting	  arrangements.100	  Lansbury’s	  presence	  on	  the	  board	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  practices	  of	  his	  colleagues:	  Beatrice	  Webb	  attended	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  Poplar	  guardians	  in	  3456,	  and	  noted	  in	  her	  diary	  that	  the	  procedure	  for	  allotting	  the	  contracts	  for	  the	  year	  was	  ‘utterly	  reckless’.	  She	  wrote:	  The	  tenders	  were	  opened	  at	  the	  meeting,	  the	  names	  and	  prices	  read	  out	  and	  then	  without	  any	  kind	  of	  report	  of	  a	  Committee	  or	  by	  of1icials	  straight	  away	  voted	  on.	  Usually	  the	  same	  person	  as	  heretofore	  was	  taken,	  nearly	  always	  a	  local	  man	  –	  it	  was	  not	  always	  the	  lowest	  tender	  and	  the	  prices	  were,	  in	  all	  cases,	  full,	  in	  some	  cases	  obviously	  excessive.	  Butter	  at	  !/#	  [!s	  !d]	  a	  lb.	  when	  the	  contracts	  ran	  into	  thousands	  of	  3-­‐worth	  was	  obviously	  ridiculous!…	  	  If	  there	  is	  no	  corruption	  in	  that	  Board	  English	  human	  nature	  must	  be	  more	  naively	  stupid	  than	  any	  other	  race	  would	  credit…	  Even	  Lansbury,	  by	  constitution	  a	  thoroughgoing	  sentimentalist	  and	  with	  no	  other	  experience	  of	  public	  affairs,	  protested,	  and	  was	  clearly	  ashamed	  of	  the	  procedure.101	  
George	  C.T.	  Bartley,	  another	  guardian-­‐turned-­‐M.P.,	  noted	  that	  guardians	  de#ied	  the	  law	  prohibiting	  them	  from	  supplying	  goods	  to	  the	  workhouse	  ‘with	  very	  little	  attempt	  at	  concealment’.102	  On	  one	  occasion,	  he	  recounted	  in	  his	  ‘handy-­‐book’	  for	  new	  guardians,	  his	  union’s	  board	  approved	  a	  large	  purchase	  of	  $irewood	  at	  the	  end	  of	  a	  meeting,	  when	  few	  guardians	  were	  there.	  It	  emerged	  that	  one	  of	  the	  guardians	  was	  to	  cart	  the	  wood	  from	  the	  canal	  to	  the	  workhouse:	  	  On	  drawing	  attention	  the	  Act	  of	  Parliament	  and	  the	  circumstance	  of	  a	  Guardian	  being	  a	  sub-­‐contractor	  to	  cart	  the	  timber,	  which	  he	  openly	  acknowledged	  he	  was,	  the	  Clerk	  of	  the	  Board	  stated,	  as	  reported	  in	  the	  local	  paper,	  that	  “There	  was	  a	  doubt	  about	  the	  matter,	  and	  he	  was	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  say	  what	  construction	  would	  be	  put	  upon	  such	  an	  act	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law.”	  The	  case	  was	  aggravated	  by	  this	  same	  Guardian	  acting	  on	  the	  Finance	  Committee,	  whose	  duty	  it	  was	  to	  see	  to	  the	  payments,	  and	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  K.D.	  Brown,	  ‘John	  Burns	  at	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board:	  a	  reassessment’,	  Journal	  of	  Social	  
Policy	  !:#	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  p.	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  101	  B.	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  G.C.T.	  Bartley,	  A	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  Book	  for	  Guardians	  of	  the	  Poor.	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  a	  Complete	  Manual	  of	  the	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  of	  the	  Of,ice,	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  (London:	  Chapman	  &	  Hall,	  $%&'),	  p.	  +,-.	  
	   !!!	  
also	  on	  the	  House	  Committee,	  whose	  duty	  it	  was	  to	  see	  to	  the	  timber	  being	  measured.103	  
This	  account	  suggests	  that	  the	  collusion	  of	  at	  least	  some	  other	  members	  of	  the	  board	  and	  of	  the	  clerk	  was	  necessary	  to	  engage	  in	  such	  behaviour	  successfully.	  This	  might	  have	  minimised	  the	  possibility	  of	  widespread	  #inancial	  impropriety.	  Nonetheless	  there	  were	  clearly	  opportunities	  to	  hide	  wrongdoing.	  As	  unions	  oversaw	  large	  movements	  of	  money,	  there	  were	  chances	  for	  poor	  law	  of.icers	  to	  commit	  outright	  frauds.	  However,	  evidence	  for	  dishonesty	  by	  suppliers	  themselves	  is	  necessarily	  rare	  in	  the	  records.	  F.W.	  Rowsell	  of	  the	  Admiralty	  had	  ‘sure	  information’	  that	  price	  8ixing,	  or	  ‘combinations’	  of	  suppliers,	  took	  place,	  but	  could	  not	  give	  concrete	  evidence:	  	  There	  is	  a	  regular	  class	  of	  dealers	  who	  lay	  themselves	  out	  for	  workhouse	  and	  other	  large	  contracts,	  and	  it	  is	  as	  easy	  for	  them	  to	  arrange,	  as	  it	  is	  certain	  they	  do	  arrange	  to	  a	  very	  large	  extent,	  in	  whose	  hands	  particular	  contracts	  shall	  be.	  The	  meat	  dealers,	  i.e.,	  the	  vendors	  of	  the	  largest	  item	  of	  consumption	  in	  the	  workhouses,	  are	  intimately	  associated	  for	  this	  purpose,	  and	  guard	  their	  ring	  fence	  with	  very	  strong	  trade	  sanctions.104	  
Unions	  did	  little	  to	  combat	  the	  phenomenon,	  he	  added,	  beyond	  comparing	  prices,	  and	  ‘the	  presence	  on	  the	  board	  of	  persons	  in	  the	  same	  line	  of	  business	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  detect	  such	  combinations;	  certainly	  not	  to	  defeat	  them.’	  	  
3.3.6 Value	  for	  money	  Cartel	  behaviour	  by	  suppliers	  would	  not	  necessarily	  have	  resulted	  in	  unions	  paying	  signi)icantly	  more	  for	  their	  goods	  than	  they	  would	  have	  paid	  in	  a	  free	  market,	  though	  it	  may	  well	  have	  limited	  the	  pool	  of	  suppliers	  from	  whom	  they	  might	  have	  bought.105	  This	  suggests	  that	  however	  much	  discretionary	  power	  poor	  law	  guardians	  could	  exercise,	  they	  had	  only	  a	  limited	  ability	  to	  make	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&'.	  104	  PP	  #$%&	  LI	  !"",	  p.	  %&.	  105	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  cartels	  such	  as	  coal	  merchants	  under	  the	  Limitation	  of	  the	  Vend.	  See	  W.J.	  Hausman,	  ‘Cheap	  Coals	  or	  Limitation	  of	  the	  Vend?	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  London	  Coal	  Trade,	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  Journal	  of	  Economic	  History	  !!:#	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difference	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  goods	  and	  to	  the	  value	  for	  money	  they	  could	  obtain	  for	  ratepayers.	  	  The	  most	  common	  action	  that	  guardians	  took	  in	  promoting	  quality	  was	  complaining	  to	  suppliers	  if	  the	  goods	  were	  below	  standard.	  Bermondsey	  union	  told	  baker	  Matthew	  Gooderson	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  bread	  he	  delivered	  to	  the	  workhouse	  in	  August	  2345.106	  In	  January	  )*+)	  the	  union	  also	  complained	  to	  contracted	  butcher	  Henry	  Lee	  of	  the	  poor	  standard	  of	  his	  meat,	  warning	  him	  that	  if	  it	  did	  not	  improve	  the	  guardians	  would	  4ind	  an	  alternative	  supplier	  and	  charge	  Lee	  the	  difference	  in	  price.107	  The	  Lewisham	  guardians	  demanded	  the	  attendance	  of	  their	  contracted	  butcher	  William	  Waller	  at	  a	  board	  meeting	  to	  confer	  with	  him	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  his	  ‘coarse	  and	  inferior	  quality’	  meat	  in	  November	  2345.108	  In	  June	  &'()	  St	  George	  the	  Martyr’s	  guardians	  told	  their	  contractor	  for	  spirits,	  Job	  Spurgin,	  to	  replace	  the	  bad	  goods	  he	  supplied	  with	  another	  batch	  and	  to	  expect	  to	  be	  charged	  the	  difference	  in	  price	  if	  the	  union	  was	  forced	  to	  1ind	  another	  supplier.109	  	  	  Despite	  this,	  there	  tended	  not	  to	  be	  any	  systematic	  effort	  by	  guardians	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  contracted	  with	  the	  most	  appropriate	  supplier	  in	  the	  3irst	  place.	  As	  shown	  above,	  guardians	  reserved	  the	  right	  not	  to	  accept	  the	  lowest	  bid	  for	  a	  contract;	  however,	  this	  approach	  depended	  on	  the	  guardians	  possessing	  a	  level	  of	  knowledge	  of	  both	  the	  goods	  and	  the	  suppliers	  which	  they	  might	  not	  necessarily	  have	  had.	  Even	  taking	  into	  account	  Francis	  Rowsell’s	  interest	  in	  overstating	  the	  de2iciencies	  of	  union	  procurement	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  Admiralty,	  his	  observations	  are	  useful	  here.	  He	  quoted	  at	  length,	  for	  example,	  an	  anonymous	  guardian	  who	  vividly	  described	  his	  colleagues	  drinking	  several	  glasses	  of	  port	  with	  biscuits	  and	  cheese	  before	  voting	  on	  which	  to	  buy	  for	  the	  year.110	  No	  doubt	  many	  boards	  of	  guardians	  took	  their	  responsibilities	  more	  seriously	  than	  this	  one,	  but	  there	  was	  nothing	  to	  stop	  every	  board	  acting	  like	  this	  if	  they	  wished.	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Nor	  did	  guardians	  necessarily	  have	  the	  means	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  goods	  they	  received	  under	  the	  contract	  were	  of	  the	  right	  standard.	  For	  instance	  coal	  from	  Wallsend	  had	  a	  high	  reputation,	  leading	  to	  many	  boards	  contracting	  for	  it	  by	  name.	  	  As	  Rowsell	  pointed	  out,	  however,	  there	  was	  not	  enough	  Wallsend	  coal	  in	  existence	  to	  ful-il	  all	  these	  contracts:	  ‘The	  result	  is	  “a	  make	  up”	  of	  various	  kinds	  of	  coal,	  which	  the	  trade	  are	  pleased	  to	  describe	  as	  Wallsend,	  with	  some	  qualifying	  pre.ix	  or	  other;	  though	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  to	  quote	  [coal	  expert]	  Mr	  M’Culloch’s	  words,	  “not	  one	  coal	  of	  the	  mixture	  was	  ever	  within	  -.!	  miles	  of	  the	  county	  of	  Durham”.’111	  It	  would	  have	  been	  better,	  he	  suggested,	  simply	  to	  ask	  for	  coal	  for	  household	  or	  steam-­‐engine	  purposes.	  	  Guardians	  also	  had	  the	  incentive	  to	  keep	  to	  minimal	  standards	  of	  workhouse	  food	  entailed	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  less	  eligibility.	  Suppliers	  could	  take	  the	  opportunity	  to	  dispose	  of	  the	  worst	  of	  their	  produce	  or	  to	  adulterate	  their	  goods.	  Rowsell	  believed	  ‘a	  considerable	  proportion’	  of	  workhouse	  butter	  consisted	  of	  horse	  fat,	  known	  in	  the	  trade	  as	  ‘bosh	  butter’.	  ‘On	  the	  whole,	  I	  am	  not	  surprised	  to	  ,ind	  that	  some	  inmates	  of	  workhouses	  prefer	  dripping	  to	  butter	  upon	  their	  bread,’	  he	  reported.112	  Workhouse	  milk,	  furthermore,	  had	  been	  adulterated	  or	  diluted	  so	  much	  that	  it	  was	  ‘utterly	  unreliable	  as	  a	  food	  for	  infants	  and	  aged	  persons.’113	  This	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  problem	  speci3ic	  to	  workhouses,	  though.	  Only	  ten	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  milk	  supplied	  to	  London	  workhouses	  was	  genuine,	  according	  to	  dairy	  chemist	  J.A.	  Wanklyn,	  and	  after	  examining	  a	  thousand	  or	  so	  samples	  of	  milk	  in	  London	  for	  the	  Milk	  Journal	  in	  !"#!-­‐!",	  he	  ‘arrived	  at	  a	  similar	  conclusion	  as	  to	  the	  general	  condition	  of	  the	  milk-­‐trade	  in	  the	  metropolis’.114	  Under	  these	  circumstances,	  guardians	  not	  only	  had	  an	  incentive	  to	  buy	  the	  worst	  produce,	  they	  also	  had	  very	  little	  choice	  in	  the	  matter.	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  Ibid.,	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  112	  Ibid.	  113	  Ibid.	  114	  J.A.	  Wanklyn,	  Milk-­‐Analysis:	  A	  practical	  treatise	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  examination	  of	  milk	  and	  its	  
derivatives,	  cream,	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  and	  cheese	  (London:	  Trübner	  &	  Co,	  0123),	  p.	  37.	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3.4 Conclusion	  As	  representatives	  of	  their	  ratepayer	  electorates,	  guardians	  were	  mindful	  of	  the	  need	  to	  keep	  costs	  down.	  This	  status	  also	  meant	  that	  they	  were	  members	  of	  their	  local	  communities	  0irst,	  and	  government	  administrators	  second.	  They	  would	  have	  known	  their	  local	  suppliers	  fairly	  well,	  especially	  in	  unions	  outside	  the	  densely	  populated	  cities,	  and	  even	  within	  urban	  areas	  they	  would	  have	  had	  long-­‐standing	  working	  relationships	  with	  particular	  union	  suppliers.	  These	  sorts	  of	  relationships	  are	  apparent	  in	  the	  requests	  guardians	  made	  to	  the	  central	  authority	  to	  make	  extra	  payments	  to	  suppliers	  or	  to	  alter	  contracts	  advantageously	  towards	  them.	  Some	  of	  the	  practices	  of	  poor	  law	  unions	  throughout	  the	  period	  evoke	  George	  Lansbury’s	  criticisms	  of	  the	  Poplar	  guardians’	  tendency	  to	  make	  unof3icial	  reciprocal	  arrangements.	  Many	  such	  practices	  were	  not	  criminal,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  good	  chance	  that	  expenditure	  ruled	  unlawful	  by	  the	  district	  auditor	  might	  well	  be	  remitted	  on	  appeal	  by	  the	  central	  authority.	  From	  1223	  guardians	  could	  even	  ask	  for	  sanction	  before	  the	  auditor	  examined	  the	  books.	  	  The	  central	  authority	  was	  concerned	  to	  eliminate	  clear	  abuses	  of	  ratepayer	  funds	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  guardians	  did	  not	  act	  ultra	  vires.	  This	  is	  true	  of	  central	  government	  efforts	  to	  promote	  all	  sorts	  of	  policies,	  such	  as	  the	  ways	  certain	  classes	  of	  pauper	  were	  relieved.	  Such	  policies	  were	  intended	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  ratepayer	  burden	  through	  restricting	  the	  numbers	  of	  paupers	  relieved,	  or	  the	  amounts	  of	  relief	  they	  received.	  This	  chapter	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  same	  forces	  identi/ied	  by	  historians	  as	  relating	  to	  policy	  transactions	  were	  also	  at	  work	  when	  it	  came	  to	  the	  ways	  guardians	  spent	  money	  on	  goods	  and	  services.	  For	  instance,	  Bellamy	  describes	  the	  central	  authority	  as	  working	  to	  ‘minimise	  error	  and	  avoid	  the	  breakdown	  of	  relations’.115	  This	  is	  apparent	  in	  the	  authority’s	  willingness	  to	  sanction	  unlawful	  expenditure	  after	  the	  fact,	  and	  in	  the	  persistence	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  non-­‐standard	  contracts	  between	  unions	  and	  suppliers.	  Such	  contracts	  were	  allowed	  because	  there	  was	  already	  a	  statute	  and	  case	  law	  framework	  for	  contracting.	  Enforcing	  a	  standard	  contract	  would	  have	  had	  an	  impact	  not	  just	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  Bellamy,	  Central-­‐local	  relations,	  p.	  %%&.	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on	  unions,	  whose	  activities	  were	  also	  highly	  regulated,	  but	  also	  on	  ordinary	  tradesmen	  and	  women.	  The	  poor	  law	  in	  this	  respect	  operated	  as	  a	  set	  of	  social	  relationships	  which	  could	  not	  be	  co-­‐opted	  into	  a	  purely	  administrative	  framework,	  even	  though	  these	  relationships	  were	  a	  necessary	  product	  of	  government	  process.	  To	  this	  extent,	  the	  poor	  law’s	  operation	  at	  union	  level	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  expression	  of	  central-­‐local	  tensions,	  but	  instead	  as	  the	  space	  in	  which	  public	  authorities	  and	  private	  enterprise	  (and,	  indeed,	  paupers)	  interacted	  and	  overlapped	  to	  different	  degrees	  at	  different	  scales.	  This	  interaction	  could,	  but	  did	  not	  always,	  generate	  friction.	  	  This	  model	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  yields	  some	  234	  local	  geographies	  of	  institutional	  supply,	  each	  with	  its	  own	  unique	  features	  emerging	  from	  both	  national	  and	  local	  realities.	  These	  included	  operational	  or	  administrative	  aspects	  (tendering	  and	  contracting	  processes,	  supply	  chain	  logistics	  and	  so	  on),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  less	  tangible	  features	  such	  as	  social	  relations	  also	  discussed	  here.	  For	  guardians,	  suppliers,	  paupers	  and	  ratepayers,	  the	  consequences	  were	  felt	  in	  the	  amounts	  spent	  on	  goods	  and	  services.	  These	  patterns	  of	  pricing	  and	  supply	  are	  considered	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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! Price	  and	  policy:	  Geographies	  of	  supply	  	  	  
4.1 Introduction	  The	  importance	  of	  geographical	  scale	  in	  understanding	  poor	  relief	  is	  underscored	  by	  the	  procurement	  practices	  adopted	  by	  boards	  of	  guardians.	  Guardians	  acted	  locally,	  but	  they	  bought	  goods	  and	  services	  that	  were	  subject	  to	  national,	  regional	  and	  local	  markets	  and	  supply	  networks.	  	  For	  some	  goods,	  this	  resulted	  in	  patchworks	  of	  prices	  across	  England	  and	  Wales;	  for	  others	  the	  picture	  was	  more	  uniform.	  These	  local	  variations	  in	  price	  were	  key	  to	  some	  of	  the	  differences	  visible	  in	  relief	  practices,	  not	  simply	  because	  prices	  affected	  relief	  costs	  but	  because	  they	  were	  a	  product	  of	  the	  relationships	  between	  unions	  and	  suppliers	  in	  local	  economies.	  Furthermore,	  because	  the	  main	  costs	  of	  indoor	  relief	  related	  to	  goods	  purchased	  to	  supply	  the	  workhouse,	  as	  this	  form	  of	  expenditure	  became	  more	  signi3icant	  over	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  these	  geographies	  of	  supply	  became	  increasingly	  important	  to	  poor	  law	  guardians.	  Understanding	  geographies	  of	  supply,	  therefore,	  is	  important	  in	  developing	  a	  clearer	  grasp	  of	  the	  factors	  that	  in2luenced	  the	  overall	  costs	  of	  poor	  relief.	  	  	  Of	  these	  goods	  and	  services,	  food	  was	  the	  most	  signi4icant	  item	  of	  expenditure	  for	  workhouses.	  Around	  half	  the	  costs	  of	  running	  a	  London	  workhouse	  in	  6776	  went	  on	  food	  for	  paupers,	  of	  which	  the	  greatest	  single	  item	  of	  expenditure	  –	  nearly	  ()	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  workhouse	  costs	  –	  was	  meat	  (Table	  !.!).1	  Flour	  and	  bread	  made	  up	  just	  under	  ./	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  workhouse	  costs,	  but	  were	  also	  an	  important	  element	  in	  outdoor	  relief	  costs	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  England	  and	  Wales.	  Outdoor	  relief	  given	  in	  kind	  was	  worth	  6!.#	  per	  cent	  of	  all	  outdoor	  relief	  in	  ())(	  (nearly	  -.)/,///),	  but	  was	  as	  much	  as	  :..(	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  Eastern	  division,	  ./.1	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  South-­‐East,	  '(.*	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  Metropolis	  and	  ./.1	  per	  cent	  in	  the	  South	  Midlands.2	  In	  these	  districts,	  in	  particular,	  the	  cost	  of	  bread	  was	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  especially	  important.	  After	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  PP	  #$$%	  XXX	  Pt.	  I.	  &.	  Eleventh	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board.	  6776-­‐!",	  pp.	  Appendix	  D,	  no.	  --.	  Similar	  (igures	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  are	  not	  readily	  available,	  but	  it	  may	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  proportions	  were	  not	  greatly	  dissimilar.	  2	  Ibid.,	  p.	  xiv.	  
	   !!"	  
provisions,	  establishment	  costs	  were	  the	  next	  biggest	  bloc	  of	  workhouse	  expenditure,	  of	  which	  loan	  servicing	  and	  of6icers’	  salaries	  were	  the	  most	  signi%icant	  items,	  together	  representing	  around	  ,-	  per	  cent	  of	  total	  costs.	  Relatively	  small	  sums	  were	  paid	  for	  items	  such	  as	  fuel	  and	  clothing.	  The	  emphasis	  in	  this	  chapter,	  therefore,	  is	  on	  the	  food	  supplied	  to	  poor	  law	  unions,	  though	  other	  goods	  and	  services	  were	  not	  unimportant.	  	  
Expenditure item  Amount (£)  




Provisions    
Meat  91,640  42.6 18.9 
Grocery  42,856  19.9 8.8 
Flour and bread  39,091  18.2 8.1 
Vegetables  13,640  6.3 2.8 
Milk  13,298  6.2 2.7 
Beer  6,221  2.9 1.3 
Other provisions  5,026  2.3 1.0 
Wine and spirits  3,551  1.6 0.7 
Total provisions  215,323  100.0 44.4 
Establishment    
Loan servicing  56,552  29.3 11.7 
Salaries, gratuities, fees  45,566  23.6 9.4 
Furniture and repairs  23,290  12.1 4.8 
Building and repairs  21,478  11.1 4.4 
Rations  20,837  10.8 4.3 
Rent, rates, taxes, tithes, insurance  13,466  7.0 2.8 
Other establishment  4,051  2.1 0.8 
Drugs, medical, surgical appliances  3,945  2.0 0.8 
Funerals  2,579  1.3 0.5 
Uniforms  1,072  0.6 0.2 
Total establishment  192,836  100.0 39.7 
Necessaries    
Warming  21,728  46.5 4.5 
Lighting  10,691  22.9 2.2 
Cleansing  7,644  16.3 1.6 
Water  4,444  9.5 0.9 
Other necessaries  2,261  4.8 0.5 
Total necessaries  46,768  100.0 9.6 
Clothing    
Linen, cotton, woollen, flannel, other  23,622  78.1 4.9 
Boots and shoes  6,621  21.9 1.4 
Total clothing  30,243  100.0 6.2 
Total all  485,170   100.0 
Table 4.1: Expenditure by type of goods and services in thirty-three London workhouses 
operated by thirty unions, year ended Lady-day 1881.  
Source: PP 1882 XXX Pt. I 1. Eleventh Annual Report of the Local Government Board, 1881-
82, Appendix D, no. 66. 
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Food	  was	  not	  only	  a	  sizable	  proportion	  of	  the	  workhouse	  budget,	  it	  was	  also	  one	  of	  the	  few	  areas	  of	  spending	  over	  which,	  as	  shown	  above,	  guardians	  had	  some	  degree	  of	  control.	  This	  was	  by	  design,	  as	  the	  food	  given	  to	  workhouse	  inmates	  was	  key	  to	  upholding	  the	  less-­‐eligibility	  principle.	  In	  a	  circular	  letter	  in	  $%&',	  Edwin	  Chadwick	  ‘offered’	  six	  possible	  dietary	  tables	  to	  boards	  of	  guardians	  so	  they	  could,	  he	  wrote,	  ‘select	  from	  them	  that	  one	  which	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  best	  adapted	  for	  each	  particular	  Union.	  In	  making	  this	  selection,	  especial	  reference	  must	  be	  had	  to	  the	  usual	  mode	  of	  living	  of	  the	  independent	  labourers	  of	  the	  district	  in	  which	  the	  Union	  is	  situated’.3	  Charles	  Mott,	  assistant	  poor	  law	  commissioner	  for	  London	  and	  the	  south-­‐east	  in	  ()*+,	  suggested	  to	  the	  PLC	  that	  ‘uniformity	  of	  diet	  as	  to	  quality	  can	  hardly	  be	  attained,	  nor	  indeed	  is	  it	  absolutely	  necessary.	  Provincial	  habits	  are	  dif6icult	  to	  conquer.’4	  Despite	  the	  PLC	  having	  set	  out	  these	  six	  dietary	  tables	  for	  unions,	  guardians	  tended	  to	  make	  adjustments	  to	  suit	  local	  circumstances	  which	  were	  then	  approved	  by	  the	  central	  authority,	  and	  therefore	  the	  majority	  of	  unions	  were	  subject	  to	  their	  own	  particular	  dietary	  orders.5	  By	  $%&&	  divergent	  practices	  proliferated.	  Edward	  Smith,	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board’s	  medical	  of9icer,	  reported	  that	  year	  that	  ‘of	  +,	  workhouses,	  the	  returns	  of	  the	  dietaries	  of	  which	  have	  been	  forwarded	  to	  me,	  I	  1ind	  that	  there	  are	  3	  different	  arrangements	  of	  the	  breakfast,	  ,,	  of	  the	  dinner,	  and	  12	  of	  the	  supper.’6	  Individual	  unions	  also	  had	  different	  proportions	  of	  the	  various	  classes	  of	  pauper,	  each	  with	  their	  own	  appropriate	  dietary,	  making	  it	  impossible	  for	  the	  central	  authority	  (or,	  indeed,	  historians)	  to	  compare	  quantities	  consumed	  or	  amounts	  spent.	  	  Food	  in	  workhouses	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  administration,	  but	  was	  a	  highly	  contentious	  and	  emotive	  subject.	  Accounts	  of	  workhouse	  life	  by	  former	  indoor	  paupers	  often	  emphasised	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  threat	  of	  starvation	  drove	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  PP	  #$%&	  XXIX	  Pt.I.%,	  Pt.II.%.	  Second	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commissioners	  for	  England	  and	  Wales;	  together	  with	  appendices	  A.	  B.	  C.	  D,	  Appendix	  A,	  no.	  !,	  p.	  &'.	  4	  Ibid.,	  Appendix	  B,	  no.	  -,	  p.	  ./..	  5	  Order	  as	  to	  dietaries	  in	  union	  workhouses,	  W.	  Cunningham	  Glen,	  The	  General	  Consolidated	  
and	  other	  Orders	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commissioners	  and	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board;	  with	  explanatory	  
notes	  elucidating	  the	  orders,	  tables	  of	  statutes,	  cases,	  and	  index	  to	  the	  orders	  and	  notes,	  !th	  ed.	  (London:	  Butterworths,	  1232),	  pp.	  789-­‐!"#.	  6	  PP	  #$%%	  XXXV	  !"#.	  Dietaries	  for	  the	  inmates	  of	  workhouses.	  Report	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  of	  Dr	  Edward	  Smith,	  FRS,	  medical	  of8icer	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board,	  and	  Poor	  Law	  Inspector,	  p.	  0.	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them	  to	  seek	  relief,	  and	  it	  is	  therefore	  unsurprising	  that	  food	  quality	  and	  quantity	  tended	  also	  to	  be	  described	  in	  some	  detail.	  Even	  with	  the	  passage	  of	  some	  decades,	  former	  inmates	  retained	  vivid	  impressions	  of	  mealtimes.	  Charles	  Shaw	  wrote	  in	  /012	  of	  his	  experiences	  as	  a	  child	  in	  Wolstanton	  &	  Burslem	  union’s	  Chell	  workhouse	  in	  1!"#.	  The	  food	  was	  unpleasant,	  but	  nonetheless	  highly	  valued	  by	  his	  fellow	  inmates:	  I	  was	  hungry,	  but	  that	  bread	  !	  that	  greasy	  water	  !	  those	  few	  lumps	  of	  something	  which	  would	  have	  made	  a	  tiger's	  teeth	  ache	  to	  break	  the	  !ibres	  of	  !	  the	  strangeness,	  the	  repulsiveness,	  and	  the	  loneliness,	  made	  my	  heart	  turn	  over,	  and	  I	  turned	  over	  what	  I	  could	  not	  eat	  to	  those	  near	  me,	  who	  devoured	  voraciously	  all	  I	  could	  spare.	  I	  had	  heard	  of	  workhouse	  skilly	  but	  had	  never	  before	  seen	  it…	  By	  what	  rare	  culinary-­‐making	  nausea	  and	  bottomless	  fatuousness	  it	  could	  be	  made	  so	  sickening	  I	  never	  could	  make	  out.7	  
Emaciated	  paupers	  were	  a	  staple	  of	  anti-­‐poor-­‐law	  literature	  (Figure	  !.!).	  The	  
Times,	  a	  staunch	  opponent	  of	  the	  new	  regime,	  published	  twenty-­‐four	  real	  and	  imagined	  accounts	  of	  inadequate	  diets	  in	  the	  workhouse	  between	  5678	  and	  !"#$.8	  Moreover,	  one	  of	  the	  best-­‐publicised	  workhouse	  scandals	  included	  the	  near-­‐starvation	  of	  Andover’s	  indoor	  paupers	  in	  1234-­‐!,	  an	  episode	  which	  contributed	  to	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commission.9	  The	  central	  authority	  was	  therefore	  concerned	  not	  only	  to	  preserve	  less-­‐eligibility	  but	  also	  to	  ensure	  that	  paupers	  received	  adequate	  nutrition.	  Guardians,	  meanwhile,	  did	  not	  want	  to	  starve	  their	  paupers,	  but	  they	  were	  obliged	  to	  keep	  expenses	  as	  low	  as	  possible.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  ‘An	  Old	  Potter’	  [Charles	  Shaw],	  ‘When	  I	  Was	  a	  Child’.	  Online	  at	  http://www.workhouses.org.uk/Shaw.	  Accessed	  May	  3456.	  8	  D.	  Roberts,	  ‘How	  Cruel	  Was	  the	  Victorian	  Poor	  Law?’,	  Historical	  Journal	  !:#	  ("#$%),	  p.	  #+.	  9	  PP	  #$%&	  V	  Part	  &.&,	  Part	  ).&.	  Report	  from	  the	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Andover	  Union;	  together	  with	  the	  minutes	  of	  evidence,	  appendix	  and	  index,	  p.	  vi;	  A.L.	  Brundage,	  The	  English	  poor	  laws,	  
!"##-­‐!"#$	  (Basingstoke:	  Palgrave,	  3443),	  pp.	  89-­‐!".	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Figure 4.1: ‘Phiz’ (H.K. Browne), ‘A Workhouse dinner’, in J. Grant, Sketches in London 
(London: T. Tegg, 1840), p. 225.. Wellcome Library, London. 
As	  shown	  in	  Chapter	  /,	  keeping	  provisioning	  costs	  low	  was	  just	  one	  element	  of	  the	  effective	  management	  of	  a	  poor	  law	  union,	  and	  even	  this	  was	  not	  easily	  achieved	  in	  practice.	  Buying	  low	  quality	  goods	  in	  bulk	  usually	  meant	  that	  unions	  paid	  prices	  at	  the	  bottom	  end	  of	  the	  range.	  However,	  this	  chapter	  shows	  that	  unions’	  buying	  practices	  were	  also	  shaped	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  production	  costs,	  supply	  chains,	  local	  demand	  and	  competition	  –	  all	  of	  which	  varied	  by	  commodity	  and	  by	  location.	  Regions	  of	  low	  prices	  did	  not	  necessarily	  produce	  regions	  of	  low	  relief	  expenditure,	  but	  relief	  practices	  were	  strongly	  in+luenced	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  wider	  markets	  for	  particular	  goods,	  whether	  local,	  regional	  or	  national.	  Workhouse	  supplies	  must	  therefore	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  &ield	  of	  poor	  law	  management	  that	  was	  subject	  not	  just	  to	  administrative	  activity	  but	  also	  to	  market	  forces.	  These	  together	  produced	  the	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geographies	  of	  supply	  which	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  chapter,	  and	  which	  were	  re#lected	  in	  the	  differences	  in	  policy,	  practice	  and	  pauper	  experience	  across	  the	  country.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  price	  geographies	  of	  the	  goods	  considered	  in	  this	  chapter:	  ,lour,	  bread,	  beef,	  butter,	  cheese	  and	  milk.	  	  Records	  of	  the	  prices	  paid	  by	  individual	  unions	  for	  goods	  and	  services	  on	  a	  national	  scale	  are	  not	  readily	  found,	  as	  guardians	  were	  very	  rarely	  required	  to	  make	  returns	  of	  their	  contract	  prices.	  The	  most	  comprehensive	  aggregation	  of	  prices	  at	  union	  level	  was	  published	  in	  an	  3456	  parliamentary	  paper	  and	  gives	  data	  for	  two	  six-­‐month	  periods	  ending	  ./	  March	  34/5	  and	  34/3	  respectively.10	  There	  were	  other	  similar	  reports	  published,	  such	  as	  in	  5678,	  but	  the	  %&'(	  paper	  gives	  costs	  per	  standardised	  quantities	  for	  the	  greatest	  number	  of	  unions.11	  Detailed	  time	  series	  for	  union	  contract	  prices	  are	  lacking,	  though	  some	  exist	  for	  certain	  unions	  at	  certain	  times	  and	  for	  some	  goods.	  The	  *igures	  provided	  in	  the	  ,-.!	  paper	  seemingly	  also	  represent	  the	  most	  detailed	  data	  on	  local	  prices	  of	  any	  sort.	  Other	  contemporary	  contract	  price	  data	  records	  are	  either	  at	  a	  larger	  scale,	  such	  as	  the	  Army’s	  county-­‐level	  %igures,	  or	  for	  individual	  institutions,	  such	  as	  naval	  yards,	  prisons,	  asylums	  and	  hospitals.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  poor	  law	  data	  show	  the	  contract	  prices	  of	  certain	  goods	  at	  union	  level	  across	  England	  and	  Wales.	  This	  chapter	  therefore	  uses	  these	  national	  !igures	  to	  assess	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  markets	  in	  these	  goods.	  The	  ‘snapshot’	  approach	  necessitated	  by	  the	  data	  in	  the	  0123	  paper	  is	  supplemented	  by	  further	  time	  series	  of	  prices	  for	  particular	  goods	  in	  certain	  unions,	  where	  available.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  PP	  #$%&	  XLV	  *:	  Poor	  relief.	  Return	  of	  the	  number	  of	  paupers	  receiving	  in	  and	  out-­‐door	  relief	  in	  $%&	  unions	  and	  single	  parishes	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  during	  the	  half-­‐years	  ended	  at	  Lady-­‐Day	  %&'(	  and	  %&'%	  respectively;	  together	  with	  the	  average	  prices	  of	  provisions	  contracted	  for	  during	  the	  aforesaid	  respective	  periods	  by	  the	  boards	  of	  guardians	  for	  the	  different	  counties.	  	  11	  Sixty-­‐four	  unions	  returned	  no	  data	  at	  all	  on	  prices	  for	  the	  ()*+	  return	  as	  they	  had	  no	  indoor	  poor	  or	  were	  not	  obliged	  to	  under	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Amendment	  Act	  (i.e.	  they	  were	  unions	  or	  parishes	  under	  local	  acts).	  Two	  –	  Garstang	  in	  Lancashire	  and	  Sedbergh	  in	  the	  West	  Riding	  –	  were	  obliged	  to	  return	  the	  data	  but	  did	  not.	  Other	  papers	  include	  PP	  #$%&	  XLV	  #*&:	  Poor	  Law	  unions.	  An	  account	  of	  the	  prices	  of	  articles	  of	  consumption	  at	  the	  Poor	  Law	  unions	  throughout	  England	  and	  Wales,	  in	  June	  ()*+,	  and	  June	  ()*.;	  and,	  for	  a	  much	  smaller	  sample	  of	  unions,	  PP	  !"#$-­‐!"	  LIII	  &"':	  Poor	  Law.	  Return	  of	  the	  comparative	  expenditure	  for	  relief	  of	  the	  poor,	  number	  of	  poor	  relieved,	  average	  prices	  of	  0lour	  and	  potatoes	  per	  stone,	  and	  of	  bread	  per	  quartern	  loaf,	  in	  each	  period	  in	  the	  six	  months	  ending	  Lady-­‐Day	  in	  '()*,	  '(),	  and	  '()(,	  in	  Bradford,	  Bolton,	  &c.	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Contract	  prices	  have	  been	  used	  in	  various	  ways	  to	  explore	  patterns	  of	  expenditure	  and	  prices.12	  Trainor,	  for	  example,	  considers	  local	  food	  prices	  important	  in	  his	  comparison	  of	  the	  expenditure	  of	  three	  unions	  in	  the	  Black	  Country,	  West	  Bromwich,	  Dudley	  and	  Wolverhampton.13	  Economic	  circumstance	  combined	  with	  the	  disposition	  of	  guardians	  to	  produce	  different	  spending	  patterns	  visible	  principally	  in	  outdoor	  relief.14	  	  Other	  historians	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  prices	  paid	  by	  poor	  law	  guardians	  to	  understand	  regional	  variations	  in	  the	  cost	  of	  living.	  Crafts,	  in	  particular,	  has	  explored	  this	  issue	  using	  contract	  prices	  for	  -./0	  to	  examine	  the	  impact	  of	  regional	  price	  variations	  on	  standards	  of	  living.15	  He	  does	  not	  explore	  the	  importance	  of	  prices	  in	  relief	  expenditure	  directly,	  but	  does	  suggest	  that	  bulk	  buying	  by	  unions	  had	  a	  minimal	  effect	  on	  prices,	  if	  any.16	  Crafts’s	  data	  are	  aggregated	  by	  region,	  though,	  whereas	  this	  chapter	  uses	  disaggregated	  union-­‐level	  %igures	  to	  highlight	  the	  local	  importance	  of	  prices	  in	  relief	  spending.	  Furthermore,	  his	  assessment	  of	  the	  regionality	  of	  prices	  in	  2345	  is	  supplemented	  here	  by	  the	  !"#$	  data,	  and	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  dates	  can	  be	  identi&ied	  for	  the	  most	  signi)icant	  items	  of	  expenditure.	  Crafts,	  for	  example,	  !inds	  that	  !lour	  was	  most	  expensive	  in	  London	  and	  the	  Home	  counties,	  whereas	  the	  6789	  :igures	  suggest	  the	  North	  was	  also	  an	  expensive	  region	  (Section	  !.#).	  In	  both	  ()*+	  and	  !"#$	  bread	  was	  most	  expensive	  in	  the	  northern	  industrial	  region,	  while	  meat	  was	  most	  expensive	  in	  the	  northern	  Midlands	  and	  eastern	  England	  (Section	  !.#).	  Butter	  was	  cheap	  in	  the	  south	  of	  England,	  including	  London,	  the	  Home	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  R.	  Edwards	  and	  R.	  Perren,	  ‘A	  note	  on	  regional	  differences	  in	  British	  meat	  prices,	  ;<=<-­‐!"#$’,	  
Economy	  and	  History	  !!:!	  (%&'&),	  pp.	  %!,-­‐!"#;	  P.H.	  Lindert,	  ‘English	  Population,	  Wages,	  and	  Prices:	  )*+)-­‐!"!#’,	  Journal	  of	  Interdisciplinary	  History	  !":$	  (!'("),	  pp.	  $%&-­‐!"#;	  E.H.	  Phelps	  Brown	  and	  S.V.	  Hopkins,	  ‘Seven	  Centuries	  of	  the	  Prices	  of	  Consumables,	  Compared	  with	  Builders’	  Wage-­‐Rates’,	  Economica	  New	  Series,	  *+:-*	  (/-01),	  pp.	  *-1-­‐!"#;	  T.L.	  Richardson,	  ‘The	  Agricultural	  Labourer’s	  Standard	  of	  Living	  in	  Kent,	  !"#$-­‐!"#$’,	  in	  D.J.	  Oddy	  and	  D.S.	  Miller	  (eds),	  
The	  Making	  of	  the	  Modern	  British	  Diet	  (London:	  Croom	  Helm,	  '()*),	  pp.	  './-­‐!!";	  N.J.	  Silberling,	  ‘British	  Prices	  and	  Business	  Cycles,	  4556-­‐!"#$’,	  Review	  of	  Economics	  and	  Statistics	  !:	  Supplement	  *	  (,-*.),	  pp.	  !!"-­‐!"#;	  P.M.	  Solar	  and	  J.T.	  Klovland,	  ‘New	  series	  for	  agricultural	  prices	  in	  London,	  -../-­‐!"!#’,	  Economic	  History	  Review	  !":$	  ('($$),	  pp.	  -'-­‐!".	  For	  a	  contemporary	  analysis	  see	  G.R.	  Porter,	  ‘On	  a	  Comparative	  Statement	  of	  Prices	  and	  Wages	  During	  the	  Years	  from	  &'()	  to	  &'(+’,	  Journal	  of	  the	  Statistical	  Society	  of	  London	  !":"	  (!&'(),	  pp.	  -!(-­‐!"#.	  13	  R.H.	  Trainor,	  Black	  Country	  Élites:	  The	  Exercise	  of	  Authority	  in	  an	  Industrialised	  Area	  ;<=>-­‐
!"##	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon	  Press,	  2334),	  pp.	  839-­‐!.	  14	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&'.	  15	  N.F.R.	  Crafts,	  ‘Regional	  Price	  Variations	  in	  England	  in	  89:;:	  An	  Aspect	  of	  the	  Standard-­‐of-­‐Living	  Debate’,	  Explorations	  in	  Economic	  History	  !":!	  (!"&'),	  pp.	  ,!-­‐!";	  based	  on	  PP	  #$%&	  XLV	  #*&.	  16	  Crafts,	  ‘Regional	  Price	  Variations,’	  pp.	  78-­‐!.	  
	   !"#	  
counties	  and	  the	  wider	  south-­‐east,	  and	  expensive	  in	  the	  North	  and	  Midlands	  (Section	  !.!).	  Cheese	  was	  cheapest	  in	  the	  west	  and	  south-­‐east	  (Section	  !.#).	  Milk	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  price	  records	  for	  either	  year,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  competition	  and	  low	  prices	  had	  a	  detrimental	  effect	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  goods	  and	  therefore	  on	  paupers	  (Section	  !.#).	  High	  prices	  did	  not	  necessarily	  produce	  high	  relief	  costs,	  but	  understanding	  these	  regional	  variations	  and	  how	  they	  changed	  over	  time	  is	  important	  as	  a	  way	  of	  understanding	  better	  the	  relationships	  between	  prices	  and	  decision	  making	  by	  boards	  of	  guardians.	  
4.2 Bread	  and	  flour	  The	  purchasing	  of	  bread	  and	  2lour	  by	  poor	  law	  unions	  clearly	  demonstrates	  the	  signi)icance	  of	  price	  in	  guardians’	  procurement	  decisions.	  Unions	  had	  to	  supply	  bread	  to	  paupers	  and	  could	  choose	  between	  baking	  their	  own	  or	  buying	  from	  an	  external	  supplier	  (or	  a	  combination	  of	  both).	  In	  areas	  where	  high	  bread	  prices	  prevailed,	  unions	  tended	  to	  buy	  5lour	  instead	  and	  bake	  their	  own	  loaves,	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  data	  in	  this	  section.	  Bread	  was	  the	  staple	  food	  of	  the	  general	  population	  and	  of	  paupers	  in	  particular.17	  When	  outdoor	  relief	  was	  given	  in	  kind,	  it	  tended	  to	  be	  wholly	  or	  partly	  in	  bread.	  It	  was	  also	  consumed	  in	  the	  workhouse,	  frequently	  with	  tea	  and	  butter	  for	  breakfast,	  as	  an	  accompaniment	  to	  soup	  or	  broth,	  as	  a	  substitute	  for	  potatoes	  with	  meat,	  or	  with	  cheese	  or	  butter	  for	  supper.18	  Bread	  for	  paupers	  was	  renowned	  for	  its	  poor	  quality,	  leading	  Punch	  to	  parody	  the	  commercial	  prices	  columns	  in	  the	  likes	  of	  the	  Economist	  by	  reporting	  on	  ‘mysterious	  transactions	  in	  sawdust	  by	  the	  baker	  who	  liberally	  deals	  with	  the	  workhouse.’19	  	  	  The	  prices	  paid	  by	  poor	  law	  unions	  for	  bread	  were	  fairly	  uniform	  across	  the	  Midlands	  and	  the	  south	  of	  England,	  with	  some	  higher	  prices	  paid	  in	  the	  north	  and	  London	  (Figure	  !.!).	  No	  particular	  location	  type	  of	  union	  enjoyed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  D.J.	  Oddy,	  ‘Working-­‐Class	  Diets	  in	  Late	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  Britain’,	  Economic	  History	  Review	  New	  Series,	  *+:*	  (./01),	  pp.	  +.5-­‐!"",	  !%&.	  18	  PP	  #$%%	  XXXV	  ()#,	  pp.	  %-­‐!".	  19	  Punch,	  or	  the	  London	  Charivari,	  #:	  %&	  (()&#),	  p.	  (&(.	  
	   !"#	  
especially	  low	  prices	  compared	  to	  others,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  dividing	  unions	  into	  six	  categories:	  rural	  northern	  England,	  rural	  southern	  England,	  urban	  northern	  England,	  urban	  southern	  England	  excluding	  London,	  London	  itself,	  and	  Wales,	  which	  was	  almost	  entirely	  rural	  (Figure	  !.!).20	  London	  unions	  appear	  to	  have	  paid	  prices	  at	  the	  higher	  end	  of	  the	  scale,	  however	  (Table	  !.!).	  The	  bakers	  who	  supplied	  bread	  to	  unions	  used	  price	  points,	  and	  the	  mode	  price	  paid	  by	  unions	  for	  a	  0lb	  loaf	  in	  )*+,	  was	  /d,	  with	  '()	  unions	  out	  of	  )/)	  ("".$	  per	  cent)	  being	  charged	  that	  amount.	  The	  next	  most	  common	  price	  was	  !½d,	  paid	  by	  )*+	  unions	  (++.*	  per	  cent).	  There	  are	  gaps	  in	  the	  bread	  data,	  especially	  in	  parts	  of	  Wales,	  Cumberland,	  Yorkshire,	  Surrey	  and	  Sussex,	  and	  !"#	  unions	  gave	  no	  .igures	  for	  bread	  expenditure	  despite	  returning	  prices	  for	  !lour	  and	  other	  commodities.	  This	  suggests	  that	  these	  unions	  exclusively	  baked	  their	  own	  bread	  in	  the	  workhouse	  for	  consumption	  by	  both	  indoor	  and	  outdoor	  poor.	  This	  is	  con*irmed	  by	  the	  account	  of	  the	  PLB’s	  medical	  of*icer	  Edward	  Smith	  in	  -.//,	  who	  found	  that	  although	  some	  unions	  bought	  bread	  by	  contract,	  generally	  it	  was	  0lour	  that	  was	  bought	  and	  either	  baked	  in	  the	  workhouse	  into	  bread	  or	  made	  into	  dough	  in	  the	  workhouse	  and	  sent	  out	  to	  a	  bakehouse.21	  This	  varied	  geographically	  though:	  Unions	  in	  the	  rural	  south	  of	  England	  overwhelmingly	  tended	  to	  buy	  bread,	  whereas	  Welsh	  unions	  mostly	  made	  their	  own.	  Many	  unions	  bought	  bread	  but	  also	  made	  their	  own,	  some	  buying	  loaves	  for	  pauper	  consumption	  but	  also	  buying	  4ine	  4lour	  to	  make	  puddings	  and	  of,icers’	  bread.	  Greenwood,	  in	  his	  7899	  account	  of	  a	  night	  in	  Lambeth	  workhouse’s	  casual	  ward,	  mentioned	  that	  bread	  was	  brought	  to	  the	  inmates	  by	  ‘a	  baker’s	  man’.22	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Urban	  unions	  are	  de-ined	  as	  those	  with	  more	  than	  one	  person	  per	  acre	  (see	  chapter	  5).	  21	  PP	  #$%%	  XXXV	  ()#,	  p.	  )).	  22	  J.	  Greenwood,	  A	  Night	  in	  a	  Workhouse,	  from	  the	  Pall	  Mall	  Gazette	  (London:	  F.	  Bowering,	  !"##),	  p.	  !).	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Figure 4.2: Prices paid by poor law unions for bread, 1850.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
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Figure 4.3: Prices paid by poor law unions for bread, 1850, by union location types.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
 Mean price, d/lb % returning prices* 
London 1.19 92.6 
Northern Rural 1.15 65.0 
Northern Urban 1.13 66.0 
Southern Rural 1.09 89.7 
Southern Urban 1.06 96.0 
Wales 1.11 59.5 
All 1.11 78.5 
Table 4.2: Mean prices paid for bread by unions, by location type.  
Note: * = percentage of unions excluding those not returning price data for any goods.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
Baking	  was	  a	  common	  form	  of	  employment	  in	  the	  workhouse,	  with	  around	  eighty	  unions	  specifying	  the	  activity	  in	  an	  1234	  parliamentary	  return.23	  (More	  will	  have	  used	  it,	  but	  it	  would	  also	  have	  fallen	  into	  the	  return’s	  category	  of	  general	  household	  work	  in	  many	  cases.)	  Some	  unions	  sold	  the	  bread	  they	  made,	  Ashton-­‐under-­‐Lyne	  making	  a	  pro.it	  of	  123	  45s	  !d	  in	  its	  bakery	  account	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  PP	  #$%&-­‐!"	  LXXXIV	  ()):	  Poor	  Law.	  Abstract	  of	  return,	  from	  each	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  unions	  in	  England,	  Wales,	  and	  Ireland,	  showing,	  what	  kinds	  of	  employment	  are	  carried	  on	  in	  the	  workhouses,	  or	  on	  land	  attached;	  the	  number	  of	  adult	  able-­‐bodied	  persons	  on	  the	  books	  as	  recipients	  of	  relief	  on	  -	  July	  !"#$,	  and	  the	  proportion	  engaged	  in	  handicraft	  and	  agricultural	  industry;	  &c.	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in	  $%%&,	  for	  instance.24	  Many	  workhouses	  also	  required	  paupers	  to	  grind	  corn	  in	  hand-­‐mills,	  either	  for	  the	  bakehouse	  or	  for	  feed	  for	  livestock.25	  Bakehouses	  were	  standard	  elements	  in	  workhouse	  architecture	  under	  the	  new	  poor	  law,	  appearing	  in	  Sampson	  Kempthorne’s	  model	  plans	  published	  in	  the	  PLC’s	  8irst	  annual	  report	  (Figure	  !.!).	  Most	  unions	  which	  bought	  bread	  also	  purchased	  !lour,	  combining	  the	  use	  of	  the	  workhouse	  bakery	  with	  external	  bakers	  to	  feed	  the	  outdoor	  poor.	  However,	  twenty-­‐three	  unions	  had	  workhouses	  without	  bakeries,	  and	  they	  therefore	  relied	  exclusively	  on	  external	  contractors.	  Unions	  without	  workhouses	  also	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  buy	  bread	  externally	  for	  their	  outdoor	  poor.	  
 
	  
Figure 4.4: Kempthorne's 1835 model square-plan workhouse showing bakehouse, flour and 
mill room and bread room (inset).  
Source: PP 1835 XXXV 107. First Annual Report of the Poor Law Commissioners for England 
and Wales, Appendix A, no. 10. Unlike	  the	  purchase	  of	  bread,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  unions	  bought	  5lour.	  Flour	  was	  most	  expensive	  for	  poor	  law	  unions	  in	  the	  north	  of	  England,	  the	  north	  Midlands	  and	  Wales,	  although	  there	  were	  unions	  across	  the	  country	  which	  paid	  high	  prices	  (Figure	  !.!).	  The	  majority	  of	  unions	  bought	  5lour,	  particularly	  those	  in	  the	  south,	  but	  northern	  towns	  had	  a	  slightly	  lower	  proportion	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  A	  Statement	  of	  the	  Accounts	  of	  the	  Ashton-­‐under-­‐Lyne	  Union,	  for	  the	  Half-­‐Year	  ended	  March	  
!"th,	  '(()	  (Ashton-­‐under-­‐Lyne:	  Ashton-­‐under-­‐Lyne	  Poor	  Law	  Union,	  .//0).	  25	  PP	  #$%&-­‐!"	  LXXXIV	  &''.	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!lour-­‐buying	  unions	  among	  them	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  (Table	  !.!).	  	  Flour	  prices	  	  tended	  to	  be	  cheapest	  in	  the	  south	  and	  east,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  London,	  where	  prices	  were	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  (Figure	  !.!).	  This	  may	  account	  for	  the	  higher	  bread	  prices	  in	  London.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  London’s	  prices	  for	  both	  bread	  and	  2lour	  were	  consistently	  higher	  than	  urban	  and	  rural	  unions	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  south	  of	  England,	  possibly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  cartel	  behaviour	  by	  suppliers.	  	  
	  
Figure 4.5: Prices paid by poor law unions for flour, 1850.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
	   !"#	  
	  
Figure 4.6: Prices paid by poor law unions for flour, 1850, by union location type.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
 Mean price, d/lb % returning prices* 
London 1.38 96.3 
Northern Rural 1.36 94.4 
Northern Urban 1.36 90.6 
Southern Rural 1.28 96.2 
Southern Urban 1.26 100.0 
Wales 1.42 94.6 
All 1.32 95.2 
Table 4.3: Mean prices paid for flour by unions, by location type.  
Note: * = percentage of unions excluding those not returning price data for any goods.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
All	  unions	  served	  bread	  to	  their	  paupers,	  but	  guardians	  tended	  not	  to	  buy	  bread	  as	  much	  in	  areas	  where	  bread	  prices	  were	  higher,	  instead	  choosing	  to	  bake	  their	  own.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  unions	  in	  each	  of	  the	  twelve	  poor	  law	  inspectors’	  districts	  which	  bought	  bread	  and	  0lour	  respectively,	  plotted	  against	  the	  prices	  of	  those	  goods	  (Figure	  !.!).26	  Unions	  effectively	  had	  the	  choice	  not	  to	  buy	  bread,	  and	  more	  unions	  exercised	  that	  choice	  in	  districts	  where	  bread	  prices	  were	  high	  (i.e.	  in	  Wales	  and	  the	  north	  of	  England).	  However,	  unions	  could	  do	  little	  in	  response	  to	  high	  8lour	  prices.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  See	  Figure	  (.**	  for	  inspector	  districts.	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Where	  &lour	  prices	  were	  high,	  so	  too	  were	  bread	  prices.	  The	  districts	  with	  fewer	  bread-­‐buyers	  were	  therefore	  those	  districts	  with	  high	  1lour	  prices	  too	  –	  and	  the	  unions	  within	  them	  had	  little	  option	  but	  to	  buy	  2lour.	  Furthermore,	  !lour	  prices	  varied	  much	  more	  within	  districts	  than	  bread	  prices	  did.	  These	  factors	  account	  for	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  2lour	  prices	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  unions	  which	  bought	  0lour.	  
	  
Figure 4.7: Percentage of unions in poor law inspector districts buying bread and flour versus 
price, 1850.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
The	  role	  of	  the	  production	  process	  was	  critical	  in	  generating	  geographical	  variation	  in	  )lour	  prices,	  particularly	  in	  the	  period	  following	  the	  repeal	  of	  the	  Corn	  Laws	  in	  +,-..	  	  Flour	  was	  mostly	  made	  from	  foreign	  wheat,	  especially	  in	  the	  south	  of	  England.27	  It	  did	  not	  take	  long	  after	  repeal	  for	  the	  UK	  to	  become	  part	  of	  an	  integrated	  international	  wheat	  market.	  Imported	  wheat	  overtook	  domestic	  sales	  for	  the	  -irst	  time	  in	  the	  mid	  1234s	  and	  consistently	  outsold	  the	  domestic	  product	  from	  +,-+;	  and	  by	  +344	  the	  UK	  took	  in	  over	  half	  the	  world’s	  wheat	  imports.28	  Historians	  have	  yet	  to	  assess	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  UK’s	  intra-­‐national	  wheat	  market	  integration	  in	  detail,	  but	  Jacks	  suggests	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  A.	  Velkar,	  Markets	  and	  measurements	  in	  nineteenth-­‐century	  Britain	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  -./-),	  p.	  /3/.	  28	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&'.;	  D.S.	  Jacks,	  ‘Intra-­‐	  and	  international	  commodity	  market	  integration	  in	  the	  Atlantic	  economy,	  ./00-­‐!"!#’,	  Explorations	  in	  Economic	  History	  !":$	  ("''(),	  p.	  $-..	  See	  also	  J.T.	  Klovland,	  ‘Commodity	  market	  integration	  4567-­‐!"!#:	  Evidence	  from	  Britain	  and	  Germany’,	  
European	  Review	  of	  Economic	  History	  !	  ($%%&),	  pp.	  +,--­‐!"#;	  M.	  Olson,	  ‘The	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  world	  market	  in	  wheat	  and	  other	  primary	  products,	  5667-­‐!"!#’,	  Explorations	  in	  Economic	  
History	  !!:#	  (!&'(),	  pp.	  -#.-­‐!"";	  K.G.	  Persson,	  ‘Mind	  the	  gap!	  Transport	  costs	  and	  price	  convergence	  in	  the	  mid	  nineteenth	  century	  Atlantic	  economy’,	  European	  Review	  of	  Economic	  
History	  !	  ($%%&),	  pp.	  +$,-­‐!"#.	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emerging	  picture	  is	  one	  of	  a	  ‘highly	  integrated	  economy’	  with	  wheat	  prices	  varying	  little	  across	  the	  UK.	  	  	  Given	  the	  spatial	  consistency	  in	  wheat	  prices	  across	  the	  country,	  the	  variation	  in	  $lour	  prices	  within	  districts	  may	  therefore	  be	  attributed	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  combinations	  of	  types	  of	  wheat	  millers	  used.	  Farmers	  and	  importing	  merchants	  sold	  wheat	  to	  millers	  through	  mealmen	  and	  factors	  who	  conducted	  business	  through	  London’s	  markets.	  The	  millers	  then	  sold	  the	  %lour	  they	  produced	  to	  bakers,	  though	  some	  unions	  purchased	  directly	  from	  the	  mealmen.29	  Millers	  each	  had	  personal	  preferences,	  borne	  of	  experience	  and	  the	  relative	  costs	  of	  available	  wheat,	  for	  making	  up	  grist	  from	  which	  to	  create	  !lour.	  Velkar	  quotes	  a	  number	  of	  millers’	  suggestions	  for	  the	  ‘ideal’	  grist,	  all	  using	  different	  quantities	  of	  various	  sorts	  of	  domestic	  and	  imported	  grain.30	  Furthermore,	  there	  was	  no	  standardised	  product	  for	  a	  given	  name	  of	  6lour.	  Poor	  law	  unions	  frequently	  contracted	  for	  ‘best’	  or	  ‘seconds	  household’	  or	  ‘"ine	  middlings’	  but	  these	  were	  not	  exact	  terms;	  rather,	  they	  were	  comparative	  grades	  for	  the	  produce	  of	  the	  individual	  miller,	  even	  if	  their	  meanings	  were	  broadly	  understood.	  Millers	  tendering	  for	  cheaper	  markets	  were	  also	  prone	  to	  adulterating	  ,lour,	  often	  with	  alum.31	  The	  cost	  of	  producing	  a	  sack	  of	  seconds	  household	  )lour	  would	  therefore	  vary	  from	  miller	  to	  miller,	  and	  it	  is	  thus	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  purchase	  price	  varied	  from	  union	  to	  union.	  Furthermore,	  wheat	  could	  travel	  but	  %lour	  could	  not	  survive	  transportation	  for	  any	  great	  length	  of	  time,	  especially	  given	  its	  combustibility.	  This	  leads	  Perren	  to	  suggest	  that	  around	  *+,-	  there	  was	  not	  a	  national	  market	  for	  6lour	  but	  instead	  ‘a	  series	  of	  interrelated	  local	  ones,	  each	  led	  by	  the	  largest	  -irm	  in	  its	  area’.32	  Even	  large	  urban	  mills	  would	  probably	  not	  have	  found	  customers	  more	  than	  thirty	  miles	  away.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Velkar,	  Markets	  and	  measurements,	  p.	  %&'.	  30	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  $%&-­‐!"".	  31	  E.J.T.	  Collins,	  ‘Food	  adulteration	  and	  food	  safety	  in	  Britain	  in	  the	  9:th	  and	  early	  ;<th	  centuries’,	  Food	  Policy	  !":$	  (!''(),	  p.	  '-.	  32	  R.	  Perren,	  ‘Structural	  change	  and	  market	  growth	  in	  the	  food	  industry:	  Flour	  milling	  in	  Britain,	  Europe,	  and	  America,	  *+,--­‐!"!#’,	  Economic	  History	  Review,	  New	  Series,	  *+:+	  (.//0),	  p.	  !"#.	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Despite	  these	  factors	  in/luencing	  wheat,	  /lour	  and	  bread	  prices	  at	  the	  local	  scale,	  bread	  prices	  were	  clearly	  related	  to	  those	  of	  wheat.	  The	  closeness	  with	  which	  bread	  prices	  followed	  wheat	  prices	  can	  be	  seen	  over	  time	  using	  data	  recorded	  by	  the	  central	  authority	  for	  three	  London	  unions	  and	  eight	  other	  unions	  for	  )*+,	  to	  )**,	  (Figure	  !.!).	  The	  prices	  paid	  by	  unions	  for	  bread	  followed	  national	  wheat	  price	  trends	  fairly	  closely	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  early	  '(()s.	  It	  is	  notable	  that	  the	  three	  London	  unions	  tended	  to	  pay	  less	  on	  average	  than	  the	  selected	  non-­‐London	  unions.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  1234	  data,	  which	  showed	  London	  on	  average	  paying	  more	  overall	  than	  other	  unions.	  Therefore	  either	  the	  unions	  selected	  in	  the	  1222	  return	  were	  unrepresentative	  of	  the	  rest,	  or	  the	  prices	  in	  London	  and	  elsewhere	  had	  reversed	  situations	  in	  the	  intervening	  period.	  
	  
Figure 4.8: Prices of 4-lb loaf paid by selected unions and national wheat prices, 1867-87. 
London unions: St George in the East, Lambeth, St Pancras. Non-London unions: Croydon, 
Wellingborough, West Ham, Newton Abbot, Birmingham, Stamford, Manchester, Auckland. 
‘Gazette’ = London Gazette prices. 
Source: PP 1888 LXXXI 603. Wheat and Bread; Klovland-Solar index (‘K&S’) in Solar and 
Klovland, ‘New Series’.  
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did	  the	  unions.	  This	  would	  ,it	  the	  description	  by	  Andrews	  et	  al.	  of	  Bethlem	  as	  having	  from	  the	  ./01s	  a	  ‘growing	  reputation	  as	  a	  hospital	  for	  the	  middle	  classes’.33	  The	  naval	  hospital	  at	  Greenwich	  may	  also	  have	  been	  keen	  to	  feed	  its	  in-­‐pensioners	  to	  a	  better-­‐than-­‐minimal	  standard.	  It	  is	  also	  likely	  that	  most	  retailed	  bread	  was	  better	  than	  workhouse	  bread,	  in	  conformity	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  less	  eligibility,	  and	  the	  retailers	  cited	  by	  the	  Board	  of	  Trade	  were	  probably	  more	  towards	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  price	  range	  than	  those	  selling	  to	  the	  worst-­‐off	  labourers.	  One	  would	  expect	  retail	  prices	  to	  be	  higher	  than	  institutional	  contract	  prices	  in	  any	  case,	  although	  in	  many	  years	  both	  Bethlem’s	  and	  Greenwich’s	  bread	  seem	  to	  have	  cost	  more	  than	  retail.	  
	  
Figure 4.9: Prices of 4-lb loaf paid by selected London unions, institutions and retail, 1867-87. 
Source: PP 1888 LXXXI 603; PP 1903 LXVIII 1. 
The	  quality	  of	  the	  bread	  distributed	  to	  paupers	  was	  accordingly	  poor.	  Edward	  Smith	  noted:	  There	  is	  a	  tendency…	  in	  the	  contractor	  to	  reduce	  the	  quality	  of	  his	  goods	  below	  that	  of	  the	  samples	  upon	  which	  the	  contract	  was	  made…	  I	  have	  frequently	  detected	  rye-­‐meal	  in	  the	  bread	  and	  oatmeal,	  and	  sharps	  in	  so-­‐called	  seconds	  *lour.	  The	  kind	  of	  *lour	  which	  is	  called	  thirds,	  and	  is	  in	  use	  in	  some	  workhouses,	  consists	  largely	  of	  sharps	  and	  rye-­‐meal,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  in	  nutritive	  value	  and	  digestibility	  very	  inferior	  to	  the	  farina	  of	  wheat.34	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Guardians	  might	  therefore	  have	  chosen	  according	  to	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  food,	  its	  price,	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  supplier	  and	  other	  local	  factors.	  Where	  prices	  were	  low	  and	  reliability	  good,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  quality	  remained	  high.	  
4.3 Beef	  Meat	  prices,	  as	  shown	  above,	  were	  a	  substantial	  element	  in	  workhouse	  costs.	  Prices	  were	  also	  strongly	  regionally	  dependent	  and	  had	  a	  signi3icant	  effect	  on	  guardians’	  spending	  power.	  Large	  quantities	  of	  meat	  were	  consumed	  in	  the	  workhouse,	  and	  it	  was	  served	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  ways.	  Workhouse	  meat	  was	  usually	  beef,	  though	  it	  was	  also	  sometimes	  mutton	  and	  occasionally	  pork.	  A	  meat	  dinner,	  consisting	  of	  between	  four	  and	  six	  ounces	  of	  beef	  plus	  vegetables,	  was	  served	  to	  adults	  two	  or	  three	  times	  a	  week	  in	  most	  workhouses,	  and	  beef	  was	  also	  used	  to	  make	  meat	  hash,	  pudding,	  stew,	  soup	  or	  broth	  served	  at	  other	  meals.35	  Smith	  noted	  that	  the	  quality	  of	  meat	  was	  ‘generally	  good,	  and	  in	  some	  workhouses…	  excellent;	  but	  in	  workhouses,	  as	  in	  all	  public	  institutions,	  meat	  of	  inferior	  quality	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  substituted	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  constant	  watchfulness	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  of0icers’.36	  Meat	  was	  mostly	  delivered	  once	  a	  week,	  sometimes	  twice,	  and	  in	  one	  or	  two	  cases	  three	  or	  more	  times.	  The	  meat	  not	  used	  on	  the	  day	  of	  delivery	  was	  ‘almost	  universally’	  salted	  and	  pickled.37	  In	  the	  '()*s,	  following	  the	  lead	  of	  the	  Admiralty	  and	  with	  the	  sanction	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board,	  some	  poor	  law	  unions	  began	  buying	  tinned	  beef	  produced	  in	  Australia.38	  This	  had	  a	  longer	  shelf-­‐life	  than	  domestic	  beef	  and,	  although	  it	  was	  often	  more	  expensive	  per	  pound,	  there	  was	  less	  wastage	  as	  the	  entire	  contents	  of	  the	  tin	  could	  be	  eaten.39	  Frozen	  meat	  was	  also	  bought	  from	  South	  America,	  among	  other	  places,	  but	  occasionally	  paupers	  suffered	  from	  meat	  which	  arrived	  in	  a	  poor	  condition:	  In	  2345	  the	  medical	  of8icer	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  %,	  &'.	  36	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %%.	  37	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&.	  38	  S.	  Webb	  and	  B.	  Webb,	  English	  Poor	  Law	  Policy	  (London:	  Longmans,	  Green	  &	  Co,	  2324),	  p.	  893.	  39	  For	  example	  in	  -../	  Ashton-­‐under-­‐Lyne	  spent	  ).+,-	  d/lb	  on	  Australian	  tinned	  beef	  and	  9.:	  d/lb	  fresh:	  Accounts	  of	  the	  Ashton-­‐under-­‐Lyne	  Union.	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Sculcoates	  union	  blamed	  frozen	  Argentine	  meat	  for	  thirty-­‐!ive	  cases	  of	  sickness	  in	  the	  workhouse	  including	  six	  deaths.40	  Beef	  was	  most	  expensive	  in	  the	  Midlands,	  with	  unions	  in	  Leicestershire,	  Lincolnshire	  and	  Nottinghamshire	  paying	  especially	  high	  prices	  (Figure	  !.!").	  It	  was	  cheapest	  in	  Wales	  and	  in	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  north	  and	  south-­‐east	  of	  England	  (Figure	  !.!!).	  Almost	  all	  unions	  recorded	  having	  bought	  beef,	  as	  it	  was	  a	  staple	  part	  of	  the	  working	  class	  diet	  (Table	  !.!);	  the	  price	  therefore	  had	  no	  discernable	  impact	  on	  the	  number	  of	  unions	  willing	  to	  buy	  it	  (Figure	  !.!").41	  	  Those	  unions	  who	  bought	  no	  beef	  tended	  to	  buy	  mutton	  instead,	  and	  this	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  the	  Welsh	  uplands	  where	  sheep	  farming	  was	  more	  common	  than	  cattle	  farming.42	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Sydney	  Mail,	  #$	  June	  $%&',	  p.	  +.	  41	  PP	  #$%&	  LX	  !",	  p.	  %&.	  42	  R.J.	  Moore-­‐Colyer,	  ‘Farming	  regions:	  Wales’,	  in	  E.J.T.	  Collins	  (ed),	  The	  Agrarian	  History	  of	  
England	  and	  Wales:	  Volume	  VII:	  1234	  -­‐	  !"!#	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  5666),	  pp.	  !!"-­‐!!".	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Figure 4.10: Prices paid by poor law unions for beef, 1850.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
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Figure 4.11: Prices paid by poor law unions for beef, 1850, by union location type.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7.  
 Mean price, d/lb % returning prices* 
London 4.23 96.3 
Northern Rural 4.54 98.9 
Northern Urban 4.15 100.0 
Southern Rural 4.32 95.4 
Southern Urban 4.27 96.0 
Wales 3.88 94.6 
All 4.34 96.9 
Table 4.4: Mean prices paid for beef by unions by location type.  
Note: * = percentage of unions excluding those not returning price data for any goods.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
	  
Figure 4.12: Percentage of unions in poor law inspector districts buying beef versus price, 
1850.  
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Nonetheless,	  areas	  that	  produced	  cattle	  appear	  to	  have	  had	  lower	  prices	  than	  those	  which	  did	  not.	  Wales,	  where	  unions	  spent	  the	  least	  per	  pound	  of	  beef,	  provided	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  the	  meat	  consumed	  in	  England,	  with	  drovers	  traditionally	  bringing	  cattle	  to	  pasture	  in	  the	  Midlands	  for	  fattening.43	  (Scotland,	  too,	  supplied	  England.)	  The	  cattle	  were	  then	  sold	  in	  local	  fairs	  or	  driven	  on	  to	  London	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  south-­‐east	  which	  had	  the	  demand.44	  South	  of	  London	  and	  parts	  of	  East	  Anglia	  were	  also	  livestock-­‐fattening	  regions.45	  Prices	  in	  the	  Midlands	  may	  have	  been	  relatively	  high	  because	  the	  data	  used	  here	  were	  reported	  for	  the	  winter	  months,	  when	  cattle	  were	  not	  at	  pasture	  in	  the	  region.	  Droving	  seems	  to	  have	  remained	  the	  chief	  method	  of	  transport	  for	  the	  meat	  industry	  until	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  and	  the	  transport	  and	  sale	  of	  dead	  meat	  was	  almost	  entirely	  for	  London,	  according	  to	  Hawke.46	  An	  outbreak	  of	  cattle	  plague	  in	  the	  3456s	  was	  thought	  to	  have	  prompted	  the	  signi%icant	  rise	  of	  rail	  transport	  for	  beef,	  but	  Perren	  has	  argued	  that	  this	  began	  earlier	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century.47	  The	  national	  picture	  for	  beef	  prices	  is	  therefore	  a	  product	  of	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  London	  market.	  Within	  regions,	  larger	  towns	  and	  cities	  such	  as	  Leeds,	  Northampton,	  Norwich,	  Lincoln,	  Derby	  and	  Leicester	  also	  served	  as	  centres	  of	  distribution	  for	  meat	  products.48	  For	  much	  of	  the	  country,	  however,	  the	  supply	  of	  meat	  was	  a	  highly	  localised	  industry.	  Around	  Manchester,	  for	  example,	  many	  farms	  were	  too	  small	  to	  permit	  the	  sort	  of	  cattle-­‐fattening	  that	  only	  larger	  farms	  could	  manage.49	  Accordingly,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  Manchester’s	  beef	  came	  from	  Ireland	  via	  Liverpool,	  or	  from	  Newcastle,	  the	  biggest	  market	  in	  the	  north.50	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  R.	  Colyer,	  ‘Welsh	  cattle	  drovers	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century:	  II’,	  National	  Library	  of	  Wales	  
Journal	  !":$	  (!'()),	  p.	  $./.	  44	  Idem,	  ‘Welsh	  cattle	  drovers	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century:	  I’,	  National	  Library	  of	  Wales	  Journal	  !":$	  (!'"(),	  pp.	  -'.-­‐!"#.	  45	  R.S.	  Metcalfe,	  Meat,	  Commerce	  and	  the	  City:	  The	  London	  food	  market,	  4566-­‐!"##	  (London:	  Pickering	  &	  Chatto,	  1231),	  p.	  37.	  46	  G.R.	  Hawke,	  Railways	  and	  economic	  growth	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  5678-­‐!"#$	  (Oxford:	  Clarendon,	  +,-.),	  pp.	  +23-­‐!"!.	  47	  R.	  Perren,	  ‘The	  meat	  and	  livestock	  trade	  in	  Britain,	  %&'(-­‐!"’,	  Economic	  History	  Review	  New	  Series,	  ():+	  (-./0),	  pp.	  +)0-­‐!""	  48	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&'.	  49	  R.	  Scola,	  Feeding	  the	  Victorian	  city:	  The	  food	  supply	  of	  Manchester,	  9::;-­‐!"#$	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  1223),	  p.	  78.	  50	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  %&-­‐!!.	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These	  local	  geographies	  of	  supply	  for	  beef,	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  food	  in	  workhouse	  operational	  costs,	  meant	  that	  !luctuations	  in	  beef	  prices	  could	  produce	  noticeable	  changes	  in	  the	  costs	  of	  indoor	  relief.	  In	  London,	  as	  shown	  above,	  nearly	  56	  per	  cent	  of	  workhouse	  costs	  went	  on	  meat	  in	  +,,+.	  The	  trend	  in	  expenditure	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  followed	  beef	  prices	  fairly	  closely	  (Figure	  !.!"),	  and	  between	  +,-.	  and	  +,,/,	  beef	  prices	  were	  a	  very	  good	  predictor	  of	  expenditure	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  	  (R!	  =	  #.%&;	  Figure	  !.!").51	  Guardians	  therefore	  acted	  within	  an	  environment	  that	  was	  as	  much	  driven	  by	  the	  market	  as	  by	  policy.	  
	  
Figure 4.13: Spend per indoor pauper and beef prices at 1850 values, England and Wales, 
1849-83.  
Source: PLB/LGB annual reports; Solar and Klovland, ‘Agricultural prices’. 
	  
Figure 4.14: Spend per indoor pauper versus beef prices, England and Wales, 1849-1883. 
Source: PLB/LGB annual reports; Solar and Klovland, ‘Agricultural prices’. 
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4.4 Butter	  In	  the	  workhouse	  butter	  was	  almost	  invariably	  provided	  with	  bread	  (though	  not	  vice-­‐versa),	  with	  or	  without	  cheese.	  An	  idea	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  butter	  can	  be	  gained	  from	  its	  price:	  The	  mean	  in	  4567	  paid	  by	  poor	  law	  unions	  was	  !.!#	  d/lb,	  compared	  to	  the	  01	  d/lb	  contract	  price	  for	  best-­‐quality	  Surrey	  butter	  supplied	  to	  ‘one	  of	  the	  1irst	  hotels	  in	  Brighton	  and	  to	  another	  in	  London,’	  according	  to	  agriculturalist	  and	  writer	  James	  Caird.52	  Butter	  was	  notoriously	  variable	  in	  standard	  anyway,	  with	  poor	  cattle	  feed	  and	  badly	  ventilated	  housing	  giving	  it	  a	  ‘cowhouse	  2lavour’.53	  As	  late	  as	  ()*(,	  a	  government	  investigation	  found	  that	  12	  per	  cent	  of	  samples	  of	  butter	  (in	  the	  general	  markets)	  contained	  colouring.54	  Admiralty	  inspector	  F.W.	  Rowsell	  was	  especially	  damning	  of	  workhouse	  butter	  in	  his	  +,-+	  report	  on	  London	  workhouses	  for	  the	  PLB,	  suggesting	  that	  a	  ‘considerable	  proportion’	  was	  horse	  fat.55	  The	  prices	  paid	  by	  poor	  law	  unions	  for	  butter	  show	  some	  stark	  regional	  differences	  (Figure	  !.!"	  and	  Figure	  !.!").	  Wales,	  for	  example,	  was	  a	  centre	  for	  butter	  production	  and	  unions	  paid	  relatively	  low	  prices	  there	  (though	  many	  Welsh	  unions	  did	  not	  return	  price	  data).	  The	  Midland	  region	  was	  not	  a	  butter-­‐intensive	  region,	  with	  its	  dairies	  instead	  tending	  to	  supply	  liquid	  milk	  to	  local	  towns,	  and	  butter	  was	  therefore	  somewhat	  more	  expensive.56	  In	  the	  south-­‐west,	  meanwhile,	  Caird	  found	  dairy	  farmers	  ‘who	  despair	  of	  producing	  a	  marketable	  article’	  of	  butter	  because	  of	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  cattle	  were	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  J.	  Caird,	  English	  Agriculture	  in	  /012-­‐!",	  !nd	  ed.	  (London:	  Longman,	  Brown,	  Green	  &	  Longmans,	  *+,-),	  p.	  *-!.	  53	  G.E.	  Fussell,	  The	  English	  dairy	  farmer	  1233-­‐!"##	  (London:	  Frank	  Cass	  &	  Co.,	  1233),	  p.	  678.	  54	  Collins,	  ‘Food	  adulteration’,	  p.	  $%.	  55	  PP	  #$%&	  LI	  Workhouses,	  Metropolis	  (supply	  of	  provisions).	  Copy	  of	  report	  of	  Francis	  W.	  Rowsell,	  Esquire,	  superintendent	  of	  contracts,	  Admiralty,	  to	  the	  Right	  Honourable	  James	  Stansfeld,	  M.P.,	  President	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board,	  dated	  the	  67th	  day	  of	  July	  ;<=;,	  relative	  to	  the	  system	  of	  supply	  of	  provisions	  and	  stores	  for	  the	  workhouses	  of	  the	  Metropolis,	  p.	  8.	  56	  J.R.	  Walton,	  ‘Farming	  regions:	  The	  Midlands’,	  in	  E.J.T.	  Collins	  (ed),	  The	  Agrarian	  History	  of	  
England	  and	  Wales:	  Volume	  VII:	  1234	  -­‐	  !"!#	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  5666),	  	  p.	  $%%.	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kept.57	  This	  could	  account	  for	  the	  high	  prices	  in	  that	  region.	  Northern	  unions,	  especially	  in	  predominantly	  rural	  areas,	  spent	  the	  most	  on	  butter.	  	  High	  butter	  prices	  had	  the	  same	  effect	  on	  guardians’	  willingness	  to	  buy	  the	  product	  as	  had	  high	  bread	  prices.	  There	  is	  a	  noticeable	  trend	  for	  districts	  where	  butter	  prices	  were	  higher	  to	  contain	  fewer	  unions	  who	  bought	  the	  commodity	  (Figure	  !.!").	  It	  was	  unions	  in	  these	  high-­‐cost	  areas	  that	  were	  least	  likely	  to	  buy	  butter	  at	  all	  (Table	  !.!).	  The	  higher	  prices	  in	  the	  north	  might	  re#lect	  the	  fact	  that	  butter	  was	  somewhat	  less	  common	  in	  the	  diets	  of	  the	  poor	  (and	  hence	  in	  the	  workhouse	  dietaries)	  in	  that	  part	  of	  the	  country.	  However,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  northern	  unions	  bought	  less	  butter	  because	  it	  was	  more	  expensive	  there.	  In	  contrast	  southern	  urban	  unions	  including	  London,	  where	  prices	  were	  lower,	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  buy	  the	  product.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Caird,	  English	  Agriculture	  in	  /012-­‐!",	  p.	  %&'.	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Figure 4.15: Prices paid by poor law unions for butter, 1850.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
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Figure 4.16: Prices paid by poor law unions for butter, 1850, by union location types.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
 Mean price, d/lb % returning prices* 
London 6.23 96.3 
Northern Rural 11.00 83.1 
Northern Urban 9.12 83.0 
Southern Rural 8.01 96.2 
Southern Urban 7.34 100.0 
Wales 8.51 91.9 
All 8.85 90.9 
Table 4.5: Mean prices paid for butter by unions by location type.  
Note: * = percentage of unions excluding those not returning price data for any goods.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
	  
Figure 4.17: Percentage of unions in poor law inspector districts buying butter versus price, 
1850.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
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The	  south-­‐east	  of	  England	  was	  not	  an	  area	  especially	  renowned	  for	  butter	  manufacturing,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  it	  bene4itted	  from	  the	  relatively	  easy	  transport	  of	  butter	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  to	  London,	  and	  from	  cheap	  imports	  of	  the	  commodity	  from	  Europe	  as	  well.	  As	  Peet	  argues,	  urban	  growth	  and	  tariff	  changes	  in	  the	  UK	  during	  the	  period	  combined	  with	  improvements	  in	  transport	  technology	  to	  fuel	  changes	  in	  European	  agricultural	  exports	  of	  various	  sorts.58	  French	  and	  Dutch	  producers	  of	  semi-­‐perishables	  such	  as	  butter,	  cheese	  or	  eggs	  increasingly	  found	  the	  London	  market	  accessible	  via	  steamer	  and	  railway,	  with	  Danish	  butter	  making	  gains	  from	  the	  789:s.59	  London	  provisions	  dealer	  George	  Penson,	  who	  supplied	  many	  of	  London’s	  unions	  –	  !"	  in	  !&'(–	  sourced	  much	  of	  his	  butter	  from	  Normandy,	  in	  particular	  from	  the	  Lepelletier	  buttery	  (see	  Chapter	  )).60	  By	  the	  '()*s	  steamers	  were	  carrying	  butter	  and	  cheese	  over	  the	  Channel,	  having	  begun	  taking	  post	  and	  passengers	  in	  the	  ,-./s.61	  One	  food	  supply	  expert,	  commenting	  in	  the	  6778s,	  noted	  that	  ‘French	  butter	  can	  be	  sent	  here	  in	  twenty-­‐four	  hours,	  and	  very	  frequently	  Normandy	  butter	  made	  on	  a	  Monday	  morning	  is	  sent	  into	  consumption	  in	  London	  on	  the	  Wednesday	  following.’62	  By	  $%%%	  Lepelletier	  and	  another	  company,	  Bretel	  Frères,	  had	  ‘almost	  monopolised	  the	  trade,	  each	  !irm	  sending	  to	  the	  English	  markets	  from	  eighty	  to	  one	  hundred	  tons	  a	  week,’	  he	  claimed.63	  It	  is	  very	  possible	  that	  some	  of	  this	  butter	  found	  its	  way	  to	  the	  workhouses	  of	  the	  south-­‐east	  of	  England.	  Even	  if	  Penson	  did	  not	  directly	  supply	  poor	  law	  unions	  all	  across	  the	  south-­‐east	  of	  England	  and	  beyond,	  he	  was	  certainly	  supplying	  retailers	  across	  a	  wide	  region	  who	  themselves	  could	  have	  supplied	  unions.	  Among	  his	  company’s	  debtors	  listed	  in	  legal	  papers	  in	  the	  %&'(s	  were	  grocers	  in	  places	  such	  as	  Diss,	  Norfolk	  (Aldrich	  &	  Bryant),	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  R.	  Peet,	  ‘In+luences	  of	  the	  British	  market	  on	  agriculture	  and	  related	  economic	  development	  in	  Europe	  before	  ,-./’,	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Institute	  of	  British	  Geographers	  !"	  (%&'(),	  	  pp.	  $-­‐!".	  59	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  %&-­‐!!;	  I.	  Henriksen,	  M.	  Lampe	  and	  P.	  Sharp,	  ‘The	  strange	  birth	  of	  liberal	  Denmark:	  Danish	  trade	  protection	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  dairy	  industry	  since	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century’,	  Economic	  History	  Review	  !":$	  ($'($),	  p.	  --'.	  60	  TNA	  C&'/))*/P,-.	  Penson	  &	  Company	  Ltd	  v.	  Penson,	  &)=,.	  61	  J.H.	  Clapham,	  The	  economic	  development	  of	  France	  and	  Germany,	  +,+--­‐!"!#	  !rd	  ed.	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  5678),	  pp.	  55<-­‐!!!.	  62	  R.	  Bannister,	  ‘Our	  milk,	  butter	  and	  cheese	  supply’,	  Journal	  of	  the	  Society	  of	  Arts	  !":$%"&	  	  ("#	  August	  "***),	  p.	  //".	  63	  Ibid.	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Hythe,	  Kent	  (Ashford	  &	  Tite),	  and	  West	  Bromwich	  (William	  Cooksey).64	  Penson	  also	  did	  business	  with	  the	  Great	  Eastern	  Railway,	  which	  served	  Essex,	  Cambridgeshire	  and	  East	  Anglia,	  and	  the	  London	  &	  South	  Western	  Railway,	  which	  reached	  Plymouth.	  Butter	  from	  France	  was	  signi2icantly	  cheaper	  than	  the	  UK’s	  domestic	  produce	  until	  the	  %&'(s,	  and	  it	  continued	  to	  be	  competitively	  priced	  even	  after	  the	  markets	  converged	  (Figure	  !.!").	  French	  butter	  imports	  grew	  from	  virtually	  nil	  in	  the	  ()*+s	  to	  half	  a	  million	  hundredweight	  in	  the	  1234s.65	  From	  &'((	  to	  !"#$	  the	  estimated	  average	  value	  of	  imported	  French	  butter	  was	  ;	  d/lb	  cheaper	  than	  the	  averages	  of	  Wales,	  Dorset	  and	  Ireland	  butter.66	  It	  is	  also	  notable	  that	  the	  prices	  paid	  by	  three	  unions	  for	  which	  data	  are	  available	  were	  in	  some	  cases	  well	  below	  reported	  wholesale	  prices	  (Figure	  !.!").	  It	  may	  be	  that	  unions	  such	  as	  Lambeth	  bought	  butter	  from	  sources	  other	  than	  those	  reported;	  or	  that	  their	  suppliers	  adulterated	  the	  product,	  as	  suspected	  by	  Rowsell.	  
	  
Figure 4.18: Wholesale market prices for butter, 1855-1870. ‘Dorset/Leadenhall’ is assumed 
to be Dorset butter sold at Leadenhall Market, London. 
Source: Afton and Turner, ‘Prices’; PPs for annual statements of trade and navigation;  
PP 1881 XCII 521.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	  TNA	  C&'/))*/P,-;	  London	  Gazette,	  #	  December	  ()*),	  p.	  *,./.;	  Dudley	  Archives	  DSCAM/'/(/(),	  articles	  of	  co-­‐partnership,	  William	  Cooksey	  &	  Son,	  5	  January	  8595.	  65	  Fussell,	  English	  dairy	  farmer,	  p.	  %&'.	  66	  Prices	  derived	  from	  B.	  Afton	  and	  M.	  Turner,	  ‘Prices’,	  in	  E.J.T.	  Collins	  (ed),	  The	  agrarian	  history	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Figure 4.19: Prices paid for butter by three unions, 1855-1869.  
Source: PLB annual reports and Returns 'C'. 
4.5 Cheese	  Cheese	  was	  a	  common	  accompaniment	  to	  workhouse	  bread,	  usually	  provided	  for	  one	  or	  two	  days’	  dinner	  or	  supper	  each	  week.67	  In	  their	  tender	  advertisements	  guardians	  frequently	  requested	  Gouda	  or	  Edam,	  both	  plain	  and	  cheap	  cheeses	  imported	  from	  Holland.68	  These	  names	  might	  also	  have	  represented	  generic	  types	  produced	  domestically.	  Mostly,	  though,	  unions	  did	  not	  specify	  named	  cheeses,	  instead	  relying	  on	  potential	  contractors	  simply	  to	  provide	  the	  cheapest	  possible.	  In	  many	  cases	  this	  was	  imported	  cheese,	  but	  unions	  in	  some	  dairying	  regions	  could	  bene1it	  from	  locally	  produced	  goods.	  	  There	  were	  fairly	  strong	  regional	  patterns	  to	  prices	  paid	  by	  unions	  for	  cheese	  (Figure	  !.!").	  Unions	  in	  the	  Midlands,	  and	  especially	  the	  East	  Midlands,	  appear	  to	  have	  paid	  the	  most	  on	  the	  whole.	  However,	  there	  were	  many	  more	  individual	  unions	  across	  the	  country	  that	  were	  also	  at	  the	  higher	  end	  of	  the	  scale,	  especially	  in	  rural	  areas	  (Figure	  !.!").	  The	  south-­‐east,	  especially	  London,	  enjoyed	  relatively	  low	  prices,	  but	  the	  unions	  paying	  the	  least	  were	  in	  Somerset,	  Dorset	  and	  much	  of	  Wales.	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Figure 4.20: Prices paid by poor law unions for cheese, 1850.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7.	  
	   !"#	  
	  
Figure 4.21: Prices paid by poor law unions for cheese, 1850, by union location type.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
Cheese	  was	  not	  standard	  in	  every	  workhouse,	  though,	  with	  only	  56	  per	  cent	  of	  unions	  (i.e.	  of	  those	  who	  returned	  prices	  for	  any	  goods	  in	  the	  5678	  parliamentary	  return)	  giving	  a	  price	  (Table	  !.!).	  Northern	  unions,	  where	  cheese	  was	  most	  expensive,	  were	  least	  likely	  to	  buy	  the	  product.	  As	  with	  butter,	  the	  higher	  prices	  might	  re"lect	  the	  fact	  that	  cheese	  was	  not	  a	  prominent	  part	  of	  the	  diet	  of	  the	  poor;	  or	  unions	  might	  have	  declined	  to	  buy	  cheese	  because	  it	  was	  relatively	  expensive.	  Neither	  butter	  nor	  cheese	  were	  essential	  parts	  of	  the	  pauper	  dietary,	  unlike	  bread	  or	  beef,	  and	  could	  therefore	  be	  dispensed	  with	  if	  guardians	  decided	  they	  were	  either	  too	  dear	  or	  too	  unusual	  for	  the	  locality.	  Higher	  prices	  are	  associated	  with	  districts	  in	  which	  fewer	  unions	  bought	  cheese,	  and	  there	  were	  also	  some	  districts	  –	  such	  as	  in	  the	  north	  of	  England	  –	  where	  prices	  were	  not	  especially	  high	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  but	  where	  cheese	  was	  not	  regarded	  as	  a	  staple	  (Figure	  !.!").	  This	  was	  the	  case,	  for	  instance,	  in	  Yorkshire,	  where	  according	  to	  Edward	  Smith	  cheese	  was	  not	  usually	  consumed	  in	  labourers’	  families.69	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  PP	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 Mean price, d/lb % returning prices* 
London 4.09 92.6 
Northern Rural 5.00 70.6 
Northern Urban 5.44 77.4 
Southern Rural 4.07 95.8 
Southern Urban 4.13 92.0 
Wales 3.54 86.5 
All 4.39 85.5 
Table 4.6: Mean prices paid for cheese by unions by location type, 1850. 
Note: * = percentage of unions excluding those not returning price data for any goods.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
	  
Figure 4.22: Percentage of unions in poor law inspector districts buying cheese versus price, 
1850.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7. 
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most	  likely	  have	  been	  cheaper.	  The	  %irst	  phase	  of	  large-­‐scale	  cheese-­‐factory	  creation	  was	  in	  the	  #$%&s	  but	  even	  by	  #$.&,	  Holderness	  estimates,	  factory	  output	  was	  no	  more	  than	  .,011	  cwt	  out	  of	  over	  half	  a	  million	  cwt	  made	  in	  England	  in	  total.72	  There	  was	  no	  national	  market	  in	  English	  cheese,	  only	  in	  foreign	  imports:	  the	  Economist’s	  ‘Commercial	  Times’	  column	  did	  not	  consistently	  give	  prices	  for	  domestically	  produced	  cheese	  until	  5678,	  when	  it	  added	  ‘Derby	  Gouda’	  to	  its	  list	  of	  Dutch,	  Canadian,	  American	  and	  New	  Zealand	  prices.73	  Suppliers	  to	  poor	  law	  unions	  had	  limited	  opportunities	  to	  buy	  in	  bulk,	  therefore,	  and	  would	  have	  been	  reliant	  either	  on	  a	  number	  of	  local	  producers	  or	  on	  goods	  transported	  some	  distance.	  
4.6 Milk	  Most	  of	  the	  milk	  consumed	  in	  workhouses	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  given	  to	  infants	  and	  the	  elderly	  and	  in.irm,	  though	  gruel	  and	  other	  dishes	  for	  the	  able-­‐bodied	  were	  also	  made	  from	  milk.74	  Price	  data	  are	  not	  readily	  available	  for	  milk	  but	  there	  is	  nonetheless	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  useful	  evidence	  relating	  to	  its	  supply	  –	  mostly	  for	  London,	  but	  in	  some	  cases	  for	  elsewhere.	  The	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  the	  highly	  competitive	  market	  for	  milk	  in	  London	  led	  to	  paupers	  being	  supplied	  with	  a	  poor	  and	  adulterated	  product.	  Cows	  were	  kept	  for	  local	  milk	  supply	  in	  some	  urban	  centres,	  such	  as	  London	  and	  Liverpool,	  much	  more	  than	  in	  others	  such	  as	  Manchester	  (Figure	  !.!").75	  Despite	  London’s	  signi.icant	  dairy	  cow	  population,	  at	  least	  until	  the	  rinderpest	  outbreak	  in	  5678,	  it	  relied	  heavily	  on	  milk	  brought	  in	  from	  outside.76	  Those	  places	  without	  a	  tradition	  of	  ‘town	  milk’	  relied	  entirely	  on	  the	  surrounding	  countryside.	  Manchester	  was	  supplied	  by	  milk	  transported	  by	  canal.77	  Bedford,	  a	  town	  of	  -.,///	  people	  in	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  B.A.	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  ‘Farming	  systems:	  Dairying’,	  in	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  Collins	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  The	  Agrarian	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  of	  
England	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  University	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  Victorian	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  E.H.	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  ‘The	  London	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  trade,	  6789-­‐!"##’,	  Economic	  History	  Review,	  New	  Series,	  !":$	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  D.	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  ‘London’s	  milk	  supply,	  :";#-­‐!"##:	  A	  reinterpretation’,	  Agricultural	  
History	  !":$	  ($'($),	  pp.	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  Fussell,	  The	  English	  dairy	  farmer	  1233-­‐!"##,	  p.	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  77	  Scola,	  Feeding	  the	  Victorian	  city,	  p.	  %&.	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!"#$,	  was	  home	  to	  a	  hundred	  cows	  but	  the	  produce	  of	  around	  7ifty	  more	  –	  some	  !"#	  gallons	  –	  was	  brought	  in	  daily	  by	  rail.78	  	  
	  
Figure 4.23: G.J. Scharf, ‘Cow Keeper’s Shop’, London (1825). Wellcome Library, London. 
The	  further	  the	  distance	  travelled,	  particularly	  by	  rail,	  the	  worse	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  product	  on	  arrival,	  and	  this	  fact	  shaped	  the	  retail	  market	  for	  milk.	  However,	  for	  poor	  law	  unions	  it	  was	  usually	  the	  price	  that	  was	  paramount.	  This	  led	  not	  only	  to	  spoiled	  milk	  being	  given	  to	  paupers	  but	  also	  adulterated	  milk.	  A	  former	  chairman	  of	  Bermondsey	  union	  told	  a	  Parliamentary	  select	  committee	  on	  food	  adulteration	  in	  /012	  that	  the	  guardians	  had	  accepted	  a	  tender	  from	  a	  milk	  supplier	  for	  1½d	  per	  gallon,	  when	  the	  next	  lowest	  was	  8s	  per	  gallon:	  ‘All	  the	  milk	  was	  adulterated;	  it	  turned	  sour,	  and	  was	  altogether	  bad	  milk…	  It	  was	  found	  that	  there	  was	  a	  great	  sediment.’79	  It	  had	  taken	  the	  master	  a	  month	  to	  report	  the	  problem,	  whereupon	  the	  supply	  was	  discontinued.	  Adulteration	  –	  either	  by	  watering	  down	  or	  through	  the	  addition	  of	  foreign	  minerals	  –	  was	  something	  of	  an	  open	  secret	  in	  the	  industry.	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Agricultural	  writer	  John	  Chalmers	  Morton	  reported	  the	  account	  of	  a	  correspondent	  ‘recently	  in	  the	  trade’	  regarding	  workhouse	  supply:	  [I]f	  you	  go	  below	  the	  labouring	  class	  to	  paupers:	  they	  are	  treated	  worst	  of	  all.	  We	  have	  tendered	  for	  /ive	  or	  six	  workhouses	  at	  a	  price	  which	  would	  have	  given	  us	  a	  pro1it	  of	  less	  than	  one	  farthing	  a	  quart,	  and	  yet	  we	  have	  not	  been	  accepted.	  Tenders	  of	  3s	  4d	  a	  barn	  gallon	  (8	  quarts)	  have	  been	  accepted,	  or	  /d	  a	  barn	  gallon	  less	  than	  our	  milk	  now	  costs	  us	  at	  our	  shop;	  and	  we	  are	  only	  paying	  the	  market	  value	  of	  pure	  milk	  in	  large	  quantities.	  We	  have	  had	  men	  in	  attendance	  at	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  tenders,	  and	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  it	  was	  all	  settled	  beforehand	  who	  was	  to	  have	  the	  contracts,	  as	  the	  outsiders	  knew	  well	  before	  it	  was	  announced.	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  dealer	  offered	  to	  buy	  a	  large	  quantity	  of	  our	  ‘skim,’	  avowedly	  to	  supply	  a	  workhouse	  contract	  for	  ‘new,’	  shows	  what	  the	  paupers	  really	  get.80	  
Guardians	  were,	  if	  not	  complicit,	  at	  least	  fostering	  the	  conditions	  for	  watered-­‐down	  milk	  by	  accepting	  the	  lowest	  tenders	  regardless	  of	  quality,	  some	  alleged.	  The	  milk	  sub-­‐committee	  of	  the	  food	  committee	  of	  the	  Society	  of	  Arts	  met	  on	  12	  March	  '()*	  and	  heard	  from	  W.	  Hope,	  a	  partner	  in	  the	  Dairy	  Reform	  Company	  whose	  stated	  aim	  was	  to	  sell	  unadulterated	  milk	  in	  London.	  He	  told	  the	  meeting	  about	  the	  attempted	  bribery	  and	  intimidation	  his	  competitors	  had	  employed	  to	  try	  to	  close	  the	  business:	  One	  of	  the	  principal	  –	  he	  believed	  the	  largest	  milk	  dealer	  at	  the	  West-­‐end,	  came	  to	  the	  company	  in	  a	  very	  friendly	  spirit,	  and,	  with	  many	  professions	  of	  desire	  to	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  the	  “tricks	  of	  the	  trade,”	  made	  various	  offers	  to	  buy	  milk…	  Among	  other	  offers	  was	  one	  to	  take	  78	  to	  79	  barn	  gallons	  of	  skim	  milk	  per	  day,	  stating	  that	  he	  had	  a	  contract	  to	  supply	  a	  workhouse	  with	  that	  quantity	  of	  new	  milk,	  and	  that	  the	  price	  at	  which	  the	  contracts	  for	  these	  establishments	  were	  let	  precluded	  the	  possibility	  of	  new	  milk	  being	  supplied	  unless	  it	  was	  well	  watered.	  The	  company	  had	  been	  applied	  to	  for	  tenders	  for	  various	  places,	  but	  on	  ascertaining	  the	  prices	  usually	  paid	  they	  refused,	  as	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  supply	  pure	  milk	  on	  such	  terms.	  The	  prices	  varied	  from	  7s	  8d	  to	  7s	  9d	  and	  %s	  'd	  per	  “barn”	  gallon	  delivered…	  [A	  dealer	  in	  the	  East	  End]	  stated	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he	  had	  a	  contract	  for	  a	  workhouse	  at	  0s	  1d	  per	  gallon,	  or	  6d	  less	  than	  he	  paid	  for	  it.81	  
The	  adulteration	  of	  milk	  was	  a	  signi4icant	  problem	  across	  the	  country	  until	  government	  efforts	  to	  improve	  its	  quality	  began	  to	  take	  effect	  in	  the	  !"#$s	  and	  ’"#s.	  Even	  then,	  London’s	  milk	  was	  worse	  for	  longer	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  England	  and	  Wales:	  The	  average	  percentage	  of	  water	  added	  to	  milk	  fell	  to	  the	  low	  teens	  by	  +,,-	  outside	  London,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  achieve	  this	  level	  in	  London	  until	  after	  +,-!.82	  Milk	  destined	  for	  workhouses	  probably	  did	  not	  improve	  faster	  than	  the	  milk	  supplied	  to	  anyone	  else.	  	  Even	  milk	  which	  reached	  the	  workhouse	  uncontaminated	  might	  not	  always	  have	  been	  given	  to	  the	  paupers	  in	  its	  optimal	  state,	  either	  because	  it	  was	  left	  too	  long	  or	  because	  of	  interference	  from	  union	  staff.	  An	  anonymous	  correspondent	  told	  readers	  of	  the	  British	  Medical	  Journal	  in	  $%&':	  For	  many	  years,	  nothing	  but	  skimmed	  milk	  has	  been	  supplied	  to	  the	  inmates	  of	  our	  workhouse	  in0irmary.	  The	  cream	  is	  taken	  off	  and	  used	  by	  the	  of'icers	  of	  the	  house,	  either	  as	  cream	  or	  after	  being	  converted	  into	  butter.	  As	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Board,	  I	  am	  anxious	  to	  have	  this	  state	  of	  things	  altered,	  but	  I	  am	  at	  once	  told	  that	  skimmed	  milk	  furnishes	  all	  the	  nutriment	  required.	  Further,	  I	  may	  say	  that	  the	  milk	  is	  sometimes	  twenty-­‐four	  hours	  old	  when	  used	  in	  the	  in/irmary	  and	  is	  at	  times	  sour,	  but	  the	  inmates	  must	  either	  consume	  it	  or	  have	  nothing.83	  
Workhouse	  milk	  seems,	  therefore,	  to	  have	  been	  generally	  worse	  than	  the	  already	  poor	  product	  usually	  retailed,	  especially	  in	  London.	  This	  was	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  the	  drive	  for	  low	  prices	  by	  guardians	  and	  the	  highly	  competitive	  market.	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4.7 Conclusion	  The	  evidence	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter	  shows	  that	  food	  prices	  affected	  the	  purchasing	  behaviour	  of	  poor	  law	  guardians,	  though	  the	  relationship	  between	  price	  and	  purchasing	  was	  complex.	  Expensive	  commodities	  did	  not	  simply	  increase	  relief	  expenditure:	  Rather,	  	  high	  prices	  meant	  that	  to	  some	  extent	  guardians	  would	  be	  less	  disposed	  to	  buy	  the	  foodstuff	  in	  question	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  cost.	  However,	  it	  could	  also	  indicate	  that	  the	  foodstuff	  was	  not	  as	  common	  in	  the	  region	  as	  it	  was	  elsewhere.	  The	  less	  common	  the	  food,	  the	  less	  likely	  guardians	  would	  be	  to	  provide	  it	  to	  paupers.	  Variations	  in	  prices	  arose	  from	  local	  differences	  in	  the	  costs	  of	  goods	  to	  suppliers	  which	  were	  passed	  on	  to	  poor	  law	  union	  customers,	  but	  must	  also	  be	  understood	  as	  products	  of	  the	  social	  relationships	  between	  supplier	  and	  customer	  within	  the	  wider	  economy.	  	  The	  data	  for	  +,-.	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  markets	  in	  the	  goods	  bought	  by	  poor	  law	  unions.	  Bread	  and	  5lour	  prices	  were	  closely	  linked,	  as	  one	  might	  expect,	  but	  bread	  prices	  were	  much	  more	  uniform	  across	  England	  and	  Wales	  than	  *lour	  prices.	  This	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  a	  result	  of	  variations	  in	  local	  production	  methods	  and	  marketing	  arrangements.	  Butter	  prices	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  were	  seemingly	  dependent	  on	  import	  prices,	  in	  particular	  French	  and	  Irish,	  and	  on	  the	  domestic	  supply	  chain,	  especially	  in	  the	  south-­‐east.	  Meanwhile	  there	  was	  a	  national	  market	  in	  foreign	  cheese	  imports,	  but	  not	  in	  the	  domestic	  product	  until	  perhaps	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  geography	  of	  beef	  prices	  was	  heavily	  in-luenced	  by	  the	  London	  market,	  which	  drew	  in	  large	  quantities	  of	  live	  cattle	  and	  dead	  meat	  from	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  other	  regional	  centres.	  Although	  we	  do	  not	  have	  good	  price	  data	  for	  milk	  purchases	  by	  poor	  law	  unions,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  ease	  of	  adulteration	  forced	  both	  prices	  and	  quality	  down,	  especially	  in	  London	  and	  perhaps	  other	  urban	  settings.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  quali0ication	  to	  Perren’s	  !indings	  that	  ‘prices	  in	  London	  and	  the	  conurbations	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  rather	  higher	  than	  in	  other	  areas	  which	  may	  have	  been	  a	  re2lection	  of	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higher	  income	  levels’.84	  London	  was	  indeed	  a	  distinct	  market	  in	  many	  respects,	  but	  it	  was	  a	  low-­‐price	  zone	  for	  butter,	  cheese	  and,	  perhaps,	  milk.	  Milk	  was	  especially	  likely	  to	  spoil	  quickly,	  but	  paupers	  were	  given	  the	  worst	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  product	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  routine.	  The	  nature	  of	  institutional	  contracting	  also	  meant	  that	  boards	  of	  guardians	  could	  obtain	  false	  economies	  by	  buying	  cheap	  but	  unsuitable	  goods.	  Butchers,	  for	  instance,	  made	  up	  the	  required	  weight	  of	  meat	  by	  supplementing	  beef	  with	  bones.	  As	  Edward	  Smith	  pointed	  out,	  the	  butcher	  ‘naturally	  prefers	  to	  send	  those	  parts	  which	  contain	  the	  most	  bone,	  and	  even,	  as	  I	  have	  seen,	  to	  add	  additional	  bones’.85	  Suppliers	  may,	  in	  fact,	  have	  found	  poor	  law	  unions	  to	  be	  ready	  customers	  for	  products	  which	  might	  otherwise	  not	  have	  easily	  sold.	  Poor	  law	  unions	  were	  thus	  integral	  parts	  of	  their	  local	  economies	  through	  their	  relationships	  with	  suppliers,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  supply	  for	  particular	  goods	  had	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  ways	  poor	  relief	  was	  delivered.	  Local	  prices	  had	  a	  greater	  impact	  on	  relief	  expenditure	  for	  some	  goods	  and	  some	  unions	  than	  for	  others,	  with	  beef	  prices	  contributing	  most	  to	  workhouse	  costs,	  and	  bread	  prices	  were	  also	  important,	  especially	  for	  outdoor	  relief	  costs.	  The	  effects	  of	  price	  variations	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  decisions	  guardians	  made,	  such	  as	  choosing	  whether	  to	  buy	  bread	  or	  2lour,	  or	  whether	  to	  buy	  cheese	  at	  all.	  In	  turn,	  unions	  bought	  in	  signi-icant	  quantities,	  thereby	  distributing	  the	  rates	  to	  local	  businesses	  on	  a	  large	  scale.	  There	  were	  few	  institutions	  buying	  in	  such	  magnitude,	  especially	  outside	  towns,	  and	  suppliers	  would	  have	  regarded	  poor	  law	  contracts	  as	  important	  sources	  of	  income.	  The	  following	  chapter	  therefore	  examines	  the	  geographies	  of	  contractual	  relationships	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  rural	  and	  urban	  poor	  law	  unions.	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! Local	  geographies	  of	  supply	  in	  rural	  and	  	  
urban	  contexts	  	  	  
5.1 	  Introduction	  The	  preceding	  chapters	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  geography	  of	  the	  supply	  of	  goods	  to	  poor	  law	  unions	  was	  of	  fundamental	  importance	  to	  boards	  of	  guardians,	  to	  paupers	  and	  to	  the	  suppliers	  themselves.	  For	  guardians,	  knowledge	  of	  potential	  contracting	  partners	  was	  essential	  for	  achieving	  a	  suitable	  balance	  of	  cost	  and	  quality	  for	  ratepayers	  and	  paupers,	  and	  for	  maintaining	  good	  terms	  with	  those	  ratepayers	  who	  sold	  to	  unions.	  For	  suppliers,	  institutions	  such	  as	  workhouses,	  schools,	  in2irmaries	  and	  asylums	  could	  be	  vital	  sources	  of	  income,	  and	  it	  was	  in	  suppliers’	  interests	  to	  form	  connections	  with	  the	  of,icials	  responsible	  for	  allocating	  contracts.	  Poor	  law	  supply	  was	  therefore	  constituted	  socially,	  in	  the	  relationships	  between	  guardians	  and	  local	  business.	  	  These	  relationships	  potentially	  diminished	  with	  distance,	  however.1	  Guardians	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  know	  businesses	  well	  if	  they	  were	  in	  their	  own	  unions	  –	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  same	  town	  –	  compared	  to	  those	  further	  away.	  Small	  traders	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  supply	  only	  the	  unions	  in	  which	  they	  were	  located,	  *irst	  because	  the	  ability	  to	  send	  goods	  cheaply	  over	  any	  greater	  distance	  was	  a	  function	  of	  scale,	  and	  second	  because	  the	  opportunities	  to	  form	  essential	  selling	  relationships	  were	  more	  present	  locally.	  Larger	  enterprises	  were	  therefore	  better	  able	  to	  supply	  distant	  unions.	  	  This	  chapter	  shows	  how,	  over	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  these	  larger	  businesses	  took	  on	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  poor	  law	  supply.	  By	  examining	  the	  locations	  of	  suppliers	  in	  /012	  and	  #$$%	  for	  a	  selection	  of	  unions	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  England	  and	  Wales,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  business	  was	  increasingly	  given	  to	  suppliers	  further	  from	  the	  workhouse	  –	  including	  some	  based	  in	  London	  –	  and	  that	  more	  partnerships	  and	  limited	  companies	  gained	  custom	  from	  unions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  As	  per	  the	  ‘*irst	  law	  of	  geography’	  articulated	  by	  Waldo	  Tobler:	  ‘Everything	  is	  related	  to	  everything	  else,	  but	  near	  things	  are	  more	  related	  than	  distant	  things’.	  W.R.	  Tobler,	  ‘A	  computer	  movie	  simulating	  urban	  growth	  in	  the	  Detroit	  region’,	  Economic	  Geography	  !":$	  ('()*),	  p.	  $/".	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over	  time.	  In	  c.-../	  unions	  bought	  more	  from	  larger	  businesses	  which	  supplied	  a	  wider	  variety	  of	  goods,	  compared	  to	  c.6789	  when	  smaller	  local	  specialised	  traders	  had	  more	  poor	  law	  business.	  Nonetheless	  there	  were	  still,	  in	  $%%&,	  opportunities	  for	  the	  smaller	  traders	  to	  supply	  unions,	  and	  the	  poor	  law	  remained	  a	  key	  source	  of	  revenue	  for	  these	  small	  businesses.	  It	  is	  also	  apparent	  that	  poor	  law	  unions	  could	  represent	  very	  stable	  and	  long-­‐lasting	  sources	  of	  business	  for	  local	  suppliers	  who	  were	  capable	  of	  meeting	  their	  requirements.	  (The	  high	  density	  of	  suppliers	  and	  customers	  in	  London	  made	  the	  capital	  something	  of	  a	  special	  case,	  and	  its	  features	  are	  examined	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  Chapter	  -.)	  This	  broad	  trend	  is	  clear,	  but	  in	  individual	  locations	  the	  details	  varied	  by	  unions’	  demographies,	  sizes,	  infrastructure	  and	  industrial	  pro$iles.	  Poor	  law	  supply	  can	  be	  seen,	  therefore,	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  continuing	  embeddedness	  of	  social	  relations	  in	  local	  economies	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  in	  different	  places	  and	  at	  different	  scales,	  pace	  Polanyi’s	  suggestion	  that	  the	  market	  became	  disembedded	  from	  social	  relationships	  following	  the	  reforms	  of	  ()*+.2	  The	  evidence	  considered	  in	  this	  chapter	  also	  contributes	  to	  the	  history	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  goods	  which,	  over	  the	  last	  (ifty	  or	  so	  years,	  has	  largely	  focused	  on	  retailing.	  This	  is	  especially	  true	  in	  the	  case	  of	  food,	  tending	  to	  take	  as	  a	  starting	  point	  Jefferys’s	  argument	  that	  food	  distribution	  in	  Britain	  did	  not	  develop	  from	  its	  pre-­‐industrial	  form	  until	  late	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century.3	  More	  recent	  work	  has	  argued	  that	  changes	  occurred	  much	  earlier	  than	  this,	  using	  the	  evidence	  of	  growing	  shop	  numbers	  and	  of	  structural	  changes	  in	  consumer	  demand.4	  The	  shops	  which	  have	  garnered	  most	  attention	  from	  historians	  have	  been	  grocers	  and,	  in	  parallel,	  the	  consumers	  that	  have	  been	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  K.	  Polanyi,	  The	  Great	  Transformation:	  The	  Political	  and	  Economic	  Origins	  of	  our	  Time,	  #nd	  pbk	  ed.	  (Boston	  MA:	  Beacon	  Press,	  1223),	  pp.	  72,	  89.	  3	  J.B.	  Jefferys,	  Retail	  trading	  in	  Britain	  -./0-­‐!"#$:	  A	  study	  of	  trends	  in	  retailing	  with	  special	  
reference	  to	  the	  development	  of	  Co-­‐operative,	  multiple	  shop	  and	  department	  store	  methods	  of	  
trading	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  5678).	  4	  J.	  Blackman,	  ‘The	  development	  of	  the	  retail	  grocery	  trade	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century’,	  Business	  
History	  !:#	  (&!'(),	  pp.	  &&--­‐!!";	  D.G.	  Alexander,	  Retailing	  in	  England	  during	  the	  Industrial	  
Revolution	  (London:	  Athlone	  Press,	  1234);	  G.	  Shaw,	  ‘Changes	  in	  consumer	  demand	  and	  food	  supply	  in	  nineteenth-­‐century	  British	  cities’,	  Journal	  of	  Historical	  Geography	  !!:#	  (!&'(),	  pp.	  -'.-­‐!"#.	  See	  N.	  Alexander	  and	  G.	  Akehurst,	  ‘Introduction:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Modern	  Retailing,	  !"#$-­‐!"#$’,	  Business	  History	  !":!	  (&''(),	  pp.	  &-­‐!!	  for	  a	  survey	  of	  the	  historiography.	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discussed	  have	  mostly	  been	  individuals	  and	  families.	  Those	  larger	  businesses	  which	  have	  been	  considered	  by	  historians	  have	  been	  either	  industrial	  producers	  or	  multiple	  retailers	  and	  department	  stores.5	  	  The	  wholesalers	  who	  themselves	  supplied	  the	  retailers	  have	  been	  somewhat	  neglected,	  despite	  a	  plea	  by	  Shaw	  for	  the	  whole	  distribution	  chain	  to	  be	  scrutinised.6	  This	  is	  an	  important	  gap	  in	  the	  historiography	  because,	  as	  this	  chapter	  argues,	  the	  distinction	  between	  wholesalers	  and	  retailers	  was	  an	  unclear	  one,	  not	  least	  when	  it	  came	  to	  institutional	  provision.	  In	  the	  5678s	  and	  !"#$s,	  some	  small	  local	  retailers	  could	  get	  a	  signi5icant	  amount	  of	  trade	  from	  institutional	  provision,	  as	  exempli1ied	  by	  the	  workhouse.	  In	  the	  following	  decades,	  these	  institutions	  continued	  to	  give	  their	  custom	  to	  such	  retailers,	  but	  increasingly	  the	  larger	  traders	  won	  contracts	  for	  supply.	  These	  traders	  could	  be	  both	  large-­‐scale	  retailers	  and	  wholesalers	  to	  smaller	  shops,	  and	  they	  supplied	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  goods	  than	  the	  smaller	  retailers	  could.	  They	  were	  also,	  in	  some	  cases,	  further	  from	  their	  customers	  than	  their	  earlier	  counterparts.	  Nonetheless,	  smaller	  traders	  were	  not	  entirely	  eclipsed.	  Retailers	  have	  been	  understood	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  poor	  law	  as	  being	  either	  ratepayers,	  guardians	  or	  opponents	  of	  the	  new	  system.7	  They	  are	  thus	  seen	  as	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  keeping	  rates	  down,	  as	  electing	  from	  among	  their	  ranks,	  and	  as	  promoters	  and	  bene/iciaries	  of	  ticket	  systems	  of	  outdoor	  relief,	  stemming	  from	  their	  drive	  for	  ‘economy	  and	  self-­‐interest’.8	  But	  this	  chapter	  shows	  that	  many	  were	  bene.iciaries	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  system	  because	  unions	  were	  among	  their	  customers;	  and	  small	  traders	  in	  particular	  might	  have	  been	  dependent	  on	  union	  custom	  where	  there	  were	  few	  other	  buyers	  on	  the	  same	  scale.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For	  example	  Jefferys,	  Retail	  trading	  in	  Britain;	  G.	  Shaw	  et	  al.,	  ‘Structural	  and	  spatial	  trends	  in	  British	  retailing:	  the	  importance	  of	  3irm-­‐level	  studies’,	  Business	  History	  !":!	  (&''(),	  pp.	  -'-­‐!".	  6	  Shaw,	  ‘Food	  supply,’	  p.	  ()*.	  7	  M.	  Winstanley,	  The	  shopkeeper’s	  world,	  /012-­‐!"!#	  (Manchester:	  Manchester	  University	  Press,	  !"#$),	  pp.	  *+,	  !",	  !"#,	  !"#.	  8	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&.	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5.2 Case	  study	  unions	  Given	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  social	  economy	  in	  patterns	  of	  poor	  law	  supply,	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  spatial	  relations	  between	  unions	  and	  suppliers	  is	  vital.	  	  The	  records	  of	  the	  guardians	  of	  six	  case-­‐study	  unions	  were	  used	  alongside	  street	  directories	  to	  determine	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  therefore,	  where	  their	  suppliers	  were	  located.	  The	  six	  unions	  are	  Southwell	  (Nottinghamshire),	  Llanfyllin	  (Montgomeryshire),	  St	  Saviour	  Southwark	  (Surrey),	  Chester	  le	  Street,	  Houghton	  le	  Spring	  and	  Durham	  (County	  Durham).9	  These	  represent	  a	  range	  of	  union	  types	  with	  varying	  workhouse	  use	  in	  different	  parts	  of	  England	  and	  Wales.	  To	  assess	  the	  changes	  in	  poor	  law	  supply	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  records	  for	  two	  periods	  were	  used:	  c.4567-­‐!"	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  Llanfyllin,	  for	  which	  c.4567-­‐!!	  was	  used	  owing	  to	  gaps	  in	  the	  records)	  and	  c.,-./-­‐!".	  This	  is	  supplemented	  by	  full	  series	  for	  Llanfyllin	  and	  St	  Saviour	  for	  the	  whole	  period.	  All	  the	  suppliers	  noted	  in	  the	  unions’	  records	  for	  these	  periods	  formed	  a	  preliminary	  database	  which	  was	  then	  compared	  with	  address	  data	  in	  street	  directories	  and	  newspapers.	  The	  analysis	  at	  the	  core	  of	  this	  chapter	  uses	  only	  those	  suppliers	  whose	  locations	  could	  be	  determined	  with	  some	  degree	  of	  accuracy.	  Owing	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  records	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Sources	  for	  suppliers	  are	  guardians’	  minutes	  and	  general	  ledgers:	  Durham	  County	  Record	  Of#ice:	  U/CS	  -;	  U/CS	  &';	  U/DU	  *;	  U/DU	  +;	  U/DU	  ,;	  U/HO	  *;	  U/HO	  ,.	  Powys	  County	  Archives	  Of#ice:	  M/G/B/-/.,	  M/G/B/-/.0;	  Nottinghamshire	  Archives:	  PU	  S	  ././-;	  PU	  S	  ././A.	  London	  Metropolitan	  Archives:	  SOBG/789/779	  to	  78:.	  Southwell	  data	  also	  from	  Nottinghamshire	  
Guardian.	  Addresses	  and	  other	  data	  from	  Pigot	  &	  Co’s	  Royal	  National	  and	  Commercial	  Directory	  
and	  Topography	  of	  the	  counties	  of	  Berkshire,	  Buckinghamshire,	  Cornwall,	  Devonshire,	  
Dorsetshire,	  Gloucestershire,	  Hampshire,	  Herefordshire,	  Monmouthshire,	  Oxfordshire,	  
Somersetshire,	  Wiltshire,	  and	  North	  and	  South	  Wales	  (London	  &	  Manchester:	  Isaac	  Slater,	  5677);	  
The	  Small	  Edition	  of	  the	  Post	  Of3ice	  London	  Directory,	  :;<=.	  Comprising,	  amongst	  other	  
information,	  of+icial	  directory;	  commercial	  directory;	  court	  directory;	  parliamentary	  directory;	  
postal	  directory;	  banking	  directory;	  &c.	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co,	  /012);	  The	  Durham	  Directory	  and	  
Almanack	  (Durham:	  George	  Walker,	  2345);	  Post	  Of(ice	  Directory	  of	  Derbyshire	  and	  
Nottinghamshire	  with	  maps	  engraved	  expressly	  for	  the	  work	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co,	  *+,,);	  Royal	  
National	  Commercial	  Directory	  of	  the	  Northern	  Counties,	  vol.	  I,	  comprises	  the	  counties	  of	  
Durham,	  Northumberland	  and	  Yorkshire	  (Manchester:	  Isaac	  Slater,	  1233);	  Post	  Of(ice	  Directory	  
of	  Essex,	  Herts,	  Kent,	  Middlesex,	  Surrey	  and	  Sussex.	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co,	  /011);	  Post	  Of(ice	  
Directory	  of	  Nottinghamshire	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co,	  /012);	  Post	  Of(ice	  Directory	  of	  Durham	  and	  
Northumberland	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co.,	  0123);	  Royal	  National	  Commercial	  Directory	  of	  North	  and	  
South	  Wales	  (Manchester:	  Isaac	  Slater,	  -../);	  The	  Durham	  Directory	  and	  Almanack	  (Durham:	  George	  Walker,	  ,--.);	  Kelly’s	  Directory	  of	  Nottinghamshire	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co,	  /00/);	  The	  Post	  
Of#ice	  London	  Directory	  for	  0112,	  Comprising,	  amongst	  other	  information,	  of#icial,	  street,	  
commercial,	  trades,	  law,	  court,	  Parliamentary,	  postal,	  city	  &	  clerical	  conveyance	  &	  banking	  
directories	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co,	  /001);	  History,	  gazetteer	  and	  directory	  of	  Nottinghamshire	  (Shef&ield:	  William	  White,	  1223-­‐!).	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it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  guarantee	  that	  the	  correct	  individual	  has	  been	  identi3ied	  in	  every	  case,	  but	  all	  those	  presenting	  signi4icant	  doubt	  have	  been	  excluded.	  Traders	  at	  the	  smaller	  end	  of	  the	  scale	  are	  slightly	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  than	  larger,	  as	  they	  were	  less	  easy	  to	  trace.	  However,	  the	  locations	  of	  smaller	  traders	  frequently	  appear	  in	  guardians’	  minutes	  alongside	  those	  of	  larger	  traders.	  	  	  Some	  indication	  of	  the	  shifting	  environment	  in	  which	  these	  unions	  and	  their	  suppliers	  operated	  can	  be	  gained	  from	  the	  changes	  in	  their	  populations,	  pauper	  numbers	  and	  spend	  per	  pauper	  (Table	  !.!;	  Figure	  !.!).	  	  Southwell	  was	  a	  predominantly	  rural	  union	  named	  for	  the	  town	  of	  Southwell,	  which	  was	  connected	  by	  rail	  to	  nearby	  Nottingham	  and	  Mans4ield.	  It	  was	  the	  only	  union	  of	  the	  six	  case	  studies	  whose	  population	  declined	  over	  the	  period,	  and	  its	  pauperism	  rate	  was	  in	  &''(	  fairly	  close	  to	  what	  it	  had	  been	  in	  &'5(.	  The	  other	  unions	  showed	  a	  tendency	  for	  decreased	  pauperism	  over	  the	  period.	  Southwell	  also	  saw	  its	  cost	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  rise	  more	  than	  the	  other	  case	  studies.	  Llanfyllin	  was	  a	  large	  and	  mountainous	  union	  with	  a	  fairly	  small	  population,	  with	  Llanfyllin	  town	  connected	  by	  road	  and	  a	  branch	  rail	  line	  to	  the	  market	  towns	  of	  Oswestry	  and	  Shrewsbury.	  These	  two	  unions	  were	  selected	  for	  their	  potential	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  distribution	  of	  goods	  to	  towns	  at	  some	  distance	  from	  ‘hub’	  cities.	  St	  Saviour	  Southwark,	  in	  contrast,	  was	  a	  densely	  populated	  union	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  London.	  Three	  parishes	  were	  added	  to	  its	  original	  two	  in	  $%&',	  accounting	  for	  its	  high	  rate	  of	  population	  change.	  The	  three	  unions	  in	  County	  Durham,	  meanwhile,	  were	  neighbours	  in	  a	  region	  experiencing	  urbanisation	  and	  industrial	  growth	  focused	  on	  coal	  mining.	  The	  populations	  of	  all	  three	  grew	  rapidly	  between	  4564	  and	  4554,	  with	  Chester	  le	  Street	  more	  than	  doubling	  to	  over	  23,555	  over	  the	  period.	  Durham	  was	  already	  a	  sizeable	  city	  and	  regional	  administrative	  centre.	  These	  three	  County	  Durham	  case	  studies	  can	  provide	  insight	  as	  to	  the	  range	  of	  approaches	  to	  procurement	  adopted	  by	  neighbouring	  unions	  in	  fairly	  similar	  circumstances.	  Houghton	  le	  Spring	  is	  notable	  for	  having	  increased	  its	  use	  of	  the	  workhouse	  drastically,	  from	  fewer	  than	  twenty	  indoor	  paupers	  in	  /012	  to	  well	  over	  /22	  by	  the	  '(()s.	  Its	  total	  expenditure	  on	  the	  poor	  rose	  with	  this	  increase	  in	  
	   !"!	  
indoor	  poor,	  but	  its	  spend	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  remained	  stable	  (adjusted	  for	  in#lation).	  There	  was	  a	  wide	  variation	  in	  rates	  of	  spend	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  between	  the	  unions	  in	  both	  periods	  –	  far	  more	  than	  the	  variation	  in	  spend	  per	  outdoor	  pauper.	  In	  -./0	  spend	  per	  indoor	  and	  per	  outdoor	  pauper	  by	  all	  the	  case	  study	  unions	  was	  below	  the	  national	  mean.	  In	  3445	  only	  Southwell	  was	  above	  the	  national	  mean	  for	  spend	  per	  indoor	  pauper,	  and	  only	  Chester	  le	  Street	  and	  Durham	  were	  below	  the	  national	  mean	  for	  spend	  per	  outdoor	  pauper.	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5.3 Local	  suppliers	  Outside	  London,	  unions	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  buy	  from	  suppliers	  within	  their	  boundaries,	  though	  by	  the	  1223s	  an	  increasing	  amount	  of	  business	  tended	  to	  be	  given	  to	  suppliers	  from	  outside	  the	  union	  (Table	  !.!).	  Furthermore,	  three	  of	  the	  %ive	  case	  study	  unions	  outside	  London	  bought	  ledgers	  and	  forms	  from	  London	  printers	  in	  ,--..	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  the	  external	  suppliers	  were	  fairly	  close	  to	  their	  poor	  law	  customers	  and,	  aside	  from	  the	  London	  printers,	  were	  rarely	  more	  than	  one	  union	  away.	  The	  exception	  was	  St	  Saviour	  Southwark,	  which	  bought	  from	  businesses	  across	  London	  and,	  from	  the	  late	  6789s,	  from	  a	  milk	  seller	  in	  Essex.	  Food	  in	  particular	  tended	  to	  be	  bought	  from	  local	  suppliers	  except	  when	  the	  union	  was	  remote	  (e.g.	  Llanfyllin)	  or	  in	  decline	  (e.g.	  Southwell),	  as	  in	  these	  cases	  there	  were	  fewer	  such	  local	  suppliers.	  Urbanisation	  boosted	  the	  provisions	  sectors	  in	  the	  growing	  case	  study	  unions,	  but	  it	  also	  enabled	  the	  development	  of	  inter-­‐urban	  networks	  of	  supply	  which	  saw	  non-­‐food	  suppliers	  (e.g.	  furniture,	  ironmongery)	  sell	  to	  neighbouring	  unions.	  Not	  only	  could	  Houghton	  le	  Spring’s	  local	  businesses	  increase	  their	  ability	  to	  supply	  the	  Houghton	  union	  over	  time,	  therefore,	  but	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  union	  as	  a	  potential	  customer	  (by	  virtue	  of	  its	  new	  workhouse	  built	  in	  !"#$)	  made	  it	  interesting	  to	  businesses	  in	  Newcastle,	  Gateshead,	  Sunderland	  and	  Durham.	  Such	  businesses	  already	  supplied	  the	  Chester	  le	  Street	  union	  in	  !"#$,	  which	  was	  similar	  in	  population	  and	  growth	  to	  Houghton,	  but	  whose	  workhouse	  was	  bigger.	  As	  Chester	  le	  Street	  grew	  in	  population,	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  its	  workhouse	  supplies	  came	  from	  businesses	  inside	  the	  union,	  but	  it	  continued	  to	  buy	  from	  traders	  further	  a2ield.	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  Suppliers 
identified 
Suppliers in union <10 miles from WH Furthest 




Chester le Street 38 26 68.4 36 94.7 10.4 
Durham 33 33 100.0 33 100.0 1.3 
Houghton le Spring 21 20 95.2 21 100.0 4.9 
Llanfyllin 53 32 60.4 33 62.3 159.3 
Southwell 37 31 83.8 32 86.5 13.5 
St Saviour Southwark 87 42 48.3 87 100.0 3.7 




Chester le Street 43 35 81.4 42 97.7 22.6 
Durham 67 58 86.6 59 88.1 233.7 
Houghton le Spring 35 26 74.3 30 85.7 237.2 
Llanfyllin 34 23 67.6 24 70.6 159.3 
Southwell 73 61 83.6 64 87.7 16.3 
St Saviour Southwark 27 11 40.7 26 96.3 18.7 
Table 5.2: Distances between workhouses and their suppliers, 1850 and 1880. N.B. Suppliers 
are only those with identifiable addresses.  
Source: Guardians' minutes and general ledgers; commercial directories. 
5.3.1 Chester	  le	  Street	  The	  locations	  and	  types	  of	  suppliers	  re3lected	  the	  varied	  economic	  contexts	  of	  the	  case	  study	  unions.	  Chester	  le	  Street’s	  suppliers	  in	  5678	  were	  mostly	  in	  the	  town	  itself,	  with	  a	  few	  from	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  union	  including	  the	  Birtley	  Iron	  Company,	  a	  signi-icant	  ironworks	  and	  colliery	  owner	  with	  an	  output	  of	  over	  !,###	  tons	  of	  iron	  per	  year	  in	  0!1!	  (Figure	  !.!).10	  This	  was	  the	  only	  supplier	  which	  was	  not	  named	  as	  an	  individual	  in	  the	  guardians’	  minutes.	  Those	  from	  outside	  the	  union	  were	  a	  grocer,	  an	  ironmonger	  and	  a	  dressmaker	  from	  Newcastle;	  a	  baker	  from	  Sunderland;	  a	  stationer	  and	  a	  draper	  from	  Gateshead;	  and	  a	  stationer	  and	  a	  salt	  merchant	  from	  South	  Shields.	  In	  4556	  fewer	  businesses	  outside	  Chester	  le	  Street	  union	  supplied	  its	  workhouse,	  but	  those	  that	  did	  tended	  to	  be	  large	  wholesalers	  or	  specialist	  suppliers,	  named	  usually	  as	  non-­‐family	  partnerships	  or	  companies,	  including	  municipal	  utilities.	  Examples	  of	  these	  larger	  suppliers	  are	  Gateshead	  mealman	  Robert	  Dowson,	  Durham	  stationers	  Proctor	  &	  Son,	  Middleton	  quarry	  owners	  Ord	  &	  Maddison,	  London	  stationers	  Knight	  &	  Co	  and	  Shaw	  &	  Sons,	  and	  four	  Sunderland	  concerns:	  brewers	  Fenwick	  &	  Co,	  the	  Sunderland	  Gas	  Company,	  Sunderland	  Eye	  In'irmary	  and	  aggregates	  'irm	  J.T.	  French	  &	  Co.	  This	  change	  in	  types	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  PP	  #$%&	  XXII	  )&*.	  Report	  of	  the	  commissioner	  appointed,	  under	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  act	  2	  &	  !	  Vict.,	  c.	  )),	  to	  inquire	  into	  the	  operation	  of	  that	  act,	  and	  into	  the	  state	  of	  the	  population	  of	  the	  mining	  districts,	  p.	  ./.	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external	  suppliers	  re-lects	  an	  increasing	  number	  of	  businesses	  within	  Chester	  le	  Street	  which	  were	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  union	  with	  high	  volumes	  of	  goods,	  though	  there	  were	  still	  some	  gaps	  in	  provision	  which	  needed	  to	  be	  5illed	  by	  companies	  from	  further	  a0ield.	  In	  particular,	  mealman	  Robert	  Dowson	  was	  able	  to	  take	  the	  place	  of	  the	  several	  suppliers	  who	  had	  previously	  sold	  the	  union	  groceries	  and	  -lour.	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5.3.2 Houghton	  le	  Spring	  In	  $%&'	  all	  but	  one	  of	  Houghton	  le	  Spring’s	  suppliers	  were	  located	  inside	  the	  union,	  the	  exception	  being	  a	  butcher	  in	  Sherburn	  village,	  in	  neighbouring	  Durham	  union	  (Figure	  !.!).	  All	  were	  named	  as	  individuals	  rather	  than	  partnerships	  or	  companies.	  At	  this	  time,	  though,	  the	  union	  did	  not	  need	  a	  large	  number	  of	  suppliers	  as	  it	  did	  not	  favour	  indoor	  relief:	  only	  45	  of	  its	  556	  paupers	  were	  relieved	  indoors	  on	  /	  January	  /234	  (Table	  !.!),	  and	  it	  had	  capacity	  for	  no	  more	  than	  /0.11	  It	  is	  remarkable	  that	  it	  required	  more	  suppliers	  than	  it	  had	  indoor	  paupers.	  The	  town	  was	  growing	  in	  importance,	  though,	  and	  it	  was	  one	  of	  several	  mining	  communities	  emerging	  as	  ‘local	  centres	  of	  shopping	  and	  services,	  catering	  for	  their	  own	  little	  planetary	  systems	  of	  smaller	  pit	  villages’.12	  The	  workhouse	  was	  enlarged	  in	  1234,	  so	  by	  !""#	  a	  much	  higher	  proportion	  of	  paupers	  were	  indoor.13	  As	  the	  workhouse	  consumed	  more,	  more	  of	  its	  goods	  were	  bought	  from	  outside	  the	  union.	  All	  its	  food	  continued	  to	  come	  from	  businesses	  inside	  the	  union,	  but	  hardware	  and	  other	  material	  came	  from	  Sunderland	  (for	  iron	  work,	  plumbing	  and	  glasses),	  Gateshead	  (glasses),	  Newcastle	  (furniture),	  Durham	  (printing	  by	  George	  Proctor	  &	  Son,	  who	  also	  supplied	  Durham	  and	  Chester	  le	  Street),	  and	  London	  (three	  stationers:	  Knight	  &	  Co,	  Shaw	  &	  Sons	  and	  Haddon	  Best	  &	  Co).	  Suppliers	  now	  included	  four	  non-­‐family	  partnerships	  and	  another	  four	  incorporated	  !irms,	  most	  of	  which	  were	  outside	  the	  union.	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  PP	  #$%&-­‐!!	  XLVI	  !".	  Population	  &c.	  Returns	  of	  the	  population	  of	  every	  union,	  and	  of	  every	  parish	  not	  in	  a	  union,	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  showing	  the	  amount	  of	  workhouse	  accommodation	  in	  each,	  for	  the	  year	  ending	  12st	  December	  2678;	  similar	  return	  for	  every	  parish	  in	  Scotland,	  for	  the	  same	  period;	  and	  similar	  return	  for	  every	  union	  in	  Ireland,	  for	  the	  same	  period,	  p.	  -.	  12	  N.	  McCord,	  ‘Some	  aspects	  of	  change	  in	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  North	  East’,	  Northern	  History	  !"	  ("%%&),	  p.	  +,".	  13	  PP	  #$%&-­‐!"	  LXI	  !"!.	  Poor	  law	  (workhouse	  inspection).	  Return	  to	  an	  order	  of	  the	  Honourable	  the	  House	  of	  Commons,	  dated	  -	  December	  2345	  for,	  a	  return	  of	  copies	  of	  a	  letter	  dated	  the	  24th	  day	  of	  October	  -.//,	  and	  addressed	  by	  direction	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  to	  Mr.	  Gulson,	  Mr.	  Hawley,	  Mr.	  Weale,	  Sir	  John	  Walsham,	  Mr.	  Graves,	  Mr.	  Doyle,	  Mr.	  Farnall,	  Mr.	  Hurst,	  Mr.	  Cane,	  and	  Dr.	  Edward	  Smith,	  poor	  law	  inspectors,	  instructing	  them	  to	  report	  specially	  on	  the	  workhouses	  in	  their	  respective	  districts;	  of	  the	  reports	  made	  by	  the	  said	  Poor	  Law	  inspectors	  in	  pursuance	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  instructions;	  and,	  of	  any	  statements	  of	  Poor	  Law	  inspectors	  formerly	  in	  charge	  of	  unions	  reported	  upon	  in	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  reports,	  p.	  !"!.	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5.3.3 Durham	  All	  of	  Durham’s	  workhouse	  provisions	  in	  *+,-	  came	  from	  businesses	  within	  the	  union	  but	  by	  +,,-	  the	  guardians	  bought	  from	  a	  few	  suppliers	  from	  elsewhere	  (Figure	  !.!).	  Rope	  was	  sourced	  from	  South	  Shields;	  furniture	  or	  school	  books	  from	  the	  North	  of	  England	  School	  Furnishing	  Company	  in	  Darlington;	  water	  from	  Weardale	  and	  Shildon	  District	  Water	  Works	  Company’s	  reservoir	  in	  Wolsingham;	  and	  stationery	  from	  the	  three	  London	  !irms	  which	  also	  supplied	  Houghton.	  All	  the	  suppliers	  to	  Durham	  in	  5678	  were	  named	  as	  individuals	  except	  Seawin	  &	  Monks	  (seed	  merchants)	  and	  Elvet	  Colliery.	  In	  ,--.	  there	  were	  many	  more	  partnerships.	  Some	  were	  between	  family	  members,	  such	  as	  W.H.	  &	  J.	  Ferens	  (drapers);	  G.	  &	  A.	  Cooke	  (drapers);	  George	  Procter	  &	  Son	  (printers);	  George	  Gradon	  &	  Son	  (builders);	  Hauxwell	  &	  Son	  (ironfounders);	  and	  Heron	  Brothers	  (plumbers).	  Non-­‐family	  partnerships	  and	  companies	  included	  Johnston	  &	  Coxon	  (drapers);	  Scawin	  &	  Burn	  (chemist);	  and	  several	  coal,	  gas,	  iron	  and	  water	  companies	  in	  and	  around	  the	  county.14	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  These	  included	  Framwellgate	  Coal	  Company,	  Durham	  Water	  Company,	  Durham	  Gas	  Company,	  Weardale	  Iron	  &	  Coal	  Company,	  Consett	  Water	  Works	  Company	  and	  Weardale	  &	  Shildon	  District	  Water	  Company.	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5.3.4 Southwell	  All	  but	  a	  handful	  of	  Southwell’s	  suppliers	  in	  ./01	  were	  inside	  the	  union,	  mostly	  in	  Southwell	  town	  itself,	  and	  they	  were	  all	  recorded	  as	  individuals	  (Figure	  !.!).	  Those	  outside	  the	  union	  included	  a	  grocer	  in	  Mans/ield,	  another	  in	  Nottingham,	  a	  shoemaker	  also	  in	  Nottingham,	  a	  draper	  in	  Sneinton	  and	  a	  farmer	  near	  Balderton	  who	  supplied	  milk.	  In	  6778,	  the	  locations	  of	  suppliers	  to	  Southwell	  reveal	  the	  relative	  rise	  in	  importance	  of	  Newark	  and	  Mans#ield	  as	  centres	  of	  distribution.	  Ten	  of	  Southwell’s	  suppliers	  came	  from	  these	  towns,	  !ive	  from	  each.	  As	  these	  towns	  grew,	  therefore,	  their	  local	  businesses	  began	  to	  look	  further	  a,ield	  to	  ,ind	  customers.	  The	  Mans,ield	  businesses	  were	  all	  food	  suppliers:	  two	  butchers,	  a	  farmer,	  a	  publican	  and	  a	  potato	  dealer.	  Those	  in	  Newark	  were	  a	  (lour	  factor,	  butcher,	  ironmonger,	  currier	  and	  chimney	  sweep.	  There	  were	  a	  further	  two	  from	  Nottingham	  (both	  drapers)	  and	  two	  from	  Retford	  (one	  brewer	  and	  one	  draper).	  Suppliers	  in	  %&&'	  included	  nine	  family	  partnerships,	  one	  non-­‐family	  partnership	  –	  Bates	  &	  Co,	  grocers	  and	  mealmen	  –	  and	  Southwell	  Gas	  Company.	  It	  also	  included	  one	  John	  Garratt,	  the	  district	  surveyor	  of	  highways	  and	  union	  sanitary	  inspector,	  from	  whom	  the	  union	  bought	  stone.	  It	  seems	  likely	  that	  he	  was	  selling	  stone	  from	  highway	  maintenance	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  county.	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5.3.5 Llanfyllin	  A	  smaller	  proportion	  (but	  still	  the	  majority)	  of	  Llanfyllin	  workhouse’s	  suppliers	  in	  the	  %&'(s	  were	  inside	  the	  union,	  compared	  to	  other	  unions	  (Figure	  !.!).	  However,	  several	  suppliers	  from	  outside	  the	  town	  itself	  provided	  goods	  such	  as	  straw,	  shoes,	  dairy	  produce,	  brushes	  and	  some	  groceries.	  The	  workhouse	  was	  supplied	  by	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  businesses	  from	  outside	  the	  union,	  including	  grocers,	  chandlers	  and	  potato	  merchants	  in	  Oswestry,	  stationers	  and	  shoemakers	  in	  Shrewsbury,	  and	  two	  dairy	  farmers	  in	  Llandidloes.	  Some	  goods	  had	  to	  bought	  from	  suppliers	  at	  a	  greater	  distance:	  glass	  from	  Birmingham,	  drapery	  from	  Manchester,	  stationery	  from	  London	  and	  slate	  from	  Pontrhydyfen,	  near	  Port	  Talbot.	  Five	  of	  the	  union’s	  9ifty-­‐three	  suppliers	  in	  *+!!	  were	  partnerships	  and	  one	  was	  a	  company,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  outside	  the	  union.	  Paradoxically,	  therefore,	  it	  appears	  that	  a	  more	  remote	  and	  less	  populated	  union	  like	  Llanfyllin	  was	  obliged	  to	  source	  provisions	  from	  suppliers	  outside	  the	  union	  at	  an	  earlier	  period	  than	  those	  with	  better	  communications:	  Llanfyllin’s	  traders	  did	  not	  have	  access	  to	  goods	  on	  the	  scale	  that	  the	  workhouse	  required,	  whereas	  those	  in	  Oswestry	  and	  Shrewsbury	  did.	  By	  /001	  there	  was	  a	  similar	  number	  and	  variety	  of	  suppliers	  from	  within	  the	  union	  as	  in	  /0!!,	  but	  patterns	  of	  distribution	  from	  outside	  the	  union	  had	  changed	  somewhat.	  Five	  companies	  supplied	  the	  union	  in	  5667,	  four	  of	  which	  were	  outside	  the	  union,	  the	  other	  being	  the	  Llanfyllin	  Coal	  Company.	  As	  well	  as	  a	  few	  specialist	  suppliers	  (such	  as	  a	  shoemaker	  and	  cheesemonger	  in	  Shrewsbury,	  and	  a	  clock	  repairer	  in	  Corwen),	  there	  were	  now	  some	  larger	  enterprises	  supplying	  a	  greater	  range	  of	  goods.	  Joseph	  Evans	  of	  Oswestry,	  for	  instance,	  sold	  the	  union	  oatmeal,	  split	  peas,	  coffee,	  sugar,	  candles,	  soap	  and	  soda.	  This	  business	  was	  therefore	  performing	  the	  functions	  which	  thirty	  years	  earlier	  may	  well	  have	  been	  carried	  out	  by	  individual	  mealmen,	  grocers,	  chandlers	  and	  oilmen.	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5.3.6 St	  Saviour	  Southwark	  St	  Saviour	  Southwark’s	  suppliers	  re2lected	  a	  broader	  London	  picture	  in	  which	  businesses	  from	  all	  over	  the	  capital	  –	  though	  concentrated	  in	  the	  centre	  –	  sold	  to	  many	  poor	  law	  unions	  at	  one	  time	  (see	  Chapter	  3).	  Nonetheless,	  London	  unions	  were	  keen	  to	  buy	  from	  suppliers	  within	  their	  boundaries,	  and	  St	  Saviour	  was	  fortunate	  in	  having	  in	  it	  a	  number	  of	  large	  suppliers	  capable	  of	  meeting	  the	  demand	  generated	  by	  many	  unions.	  The	  comparative	  geographies	  of	  St	  Saviour’s	  suppliers	  in	  1234	  and	  1224	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  !.!	  and	  further	  consideration	  is	  given	  to	  the	  London	  context	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  St	  Saviour	  continued	  to	  buy	  from	  London-­‐wide	  big	  suppliers	  between	  /012	  and	  !"!",	  supplemented	  by	  smaller	  local	  businesses,	  but	  the	  number	  of	  local	  businesses	  winning	  contracts	  was	  somewhat	  diminished	  by	  3445	  as	  much	  of	  London’s	  institutional	  provisioning	  became	  consolidated	  among	  a	  few	  large	  enterprises.	  	  
5.3.7 Summary	  In	  all	  the	  case	  studies,	  supplier	  types	  and	  locations	  depended	  on	  the	  changing	  circumstances	  of	  the	  unions.	  Within	  Chester	  le	  Street,	  where	  the	  population	  was	  growing,	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  businesses	  were	  able	  to	  supply	  the	  required	  volumes	  of	  goods,	  though	  the	  union	  still	  needed	  to	  contract	  with	  suppliers	  from	  further	  a/ield.	  In	  neighbouring	  Houghton	  le	  Spring,	  where	  the	  workhouse	  was	  enlarged,	  there	  were	  enough	  food	  suppliers	  but	  more	  goods	  of	  other	  sorts	  needed	  to	  be	  brought	  from	  outside	  the	  union.	  Durham’s	  connections	  to	  other	  nearby	  towns	  enabled	  it	  to	  expand	  its	  geographical	  importance	  by	  becoming	  a	  potential	  customer	  to	  more	  distant	  businesses	  over	  time.	  In	  declining	  Southwell,	  the	  union	  was	  less	  and	  less	  able	  to	  rely	  on	  local	  traders,	  and	  its	  suppliers’	  locations	  reveal	  the	  increasing	  importance	  of	  neighbouring	  Nottingham,	  Newark	  and	  Mans5ield.	  Remote	  Llanfyllin	  continued	  to	  rely	  on	  external	  suppliers,	  whereas	  St	  Saviour	  Southwark	  bene$itted	  from	  a	  dense	  concentration	  of	  local	  businesses	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  high	  number	  of	  institutional	  customers	  in	  London.	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5.4 Business	  organisation	  The	  types	  of	  organisations	  supplying	  unions	  also	  changed	  over	  time,	  re5lecting	  to	  some	  extent	  larger	  amounts	  of	  capital	  in	  the	  businesses.	  In	  all	  the	  non-­‐London	  unions,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  suppliers	  in	  6789	  were	  named	  as	  individuals	  in	  the	  records	  (Figure	  !.!).	  A	  third	  of	  St	  Saviour’s	  suppliers	  were	  partnerships,	  however.	  Over	  time,	  the	  nature	  of	  suppliers	  outside	  London	  increasingly	  resembled	  their	  metropolitan	  counterparts	  as	  there	  was	  a	  shift	  from	  named	  individual	  suppliers	  to	  a	  higher	  proportion	  of	  partnerships.	  Many	  of	  these	  partnerships	  were	  between	  people	  with	  the	  same	  surname	  (assumed	  here	  to	  be	  family	  members)	  or	  described	  as	  ‘and	  Son(s)’,	  ‘Brothers’	  etc.	  This	  was	  not	  universal,	  though,	  with	  Houghton	  having	  just	  two	  and	  Llanfyllin	  only	  one	  such	  partnership	  listed	  (Table	  !.!).	  Less	  common	  than	  family	  partnerships	  in	  +,,-,	  but	  more	  so	  than	  in	  +,3!,	  were	  partnerships	  between	  people	  with	  different	  surnames.	  This	  ‘non-­‐family	  partnership’	  category	  excludes	  incorporations	  of	  various	  sorts,	  which	  fall	  into	  the	  ‘company’	  category.	  This	  latter	  group	  expanded	  greatly	  between	  789:	  and	  788:.	  Companies	  here	  include	  businesses	  described	  not	  merely	  as	  ‘and	  Company’,	  which	  could	  have	  been	  used	  as	  a	  shorthand	  for	  a	  partnership,	  but	  those	  also	  with	  some	  indication	  of	  their	  incorporated	  status.	  Examples	  include	  industrial	  enterprises	  or	  local	  utility	  /irms	  formed	  by	  act	  of	  Parliament	  (such	  as	  Southwell	  Gas	  Company	  or	  Consett	  Water	  Works	  Company)	  and	  those	  registered	  at	  Companies	  House	  (such	  as	  Fields	  Mercantile	  Company	  or	  Hadden,	  Best	  &	  Co	  Ltd).	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Figure 5.8: Business type of suppliers to case-study unions, c.1850 and c.1880.  
Source: Guardians’ minutes and general ledgers; commercial directories.  
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One	  reason	  for	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  partnerships	  as	  workhouse	  suppliers	  was	  the	  change	  in	  the	  way	  that	  individuals	  could	  combine	  their	  interests	  in	  a	  business.	  From	  the	  mid	  %&'(s,	  Parliament	  enacted	  a	  series	  of	  measures	  that	  enabled	  groups	  of	  seven	  or	  more	  people	  to	  pool	  their	  capital	  by	  signing	  memoranda	  of	  association,	  and	  thereby	  those	  individuals	  were	  not	  liable	  for	  the	  company’s	  debts	  beyond	  the	  value	  of	  their	  shares.15	  As	  Poovey	  puts	  it,	  limited	  liability	  ‘severed	  the	  link	  between	  business	  failure	  and	  personal	  ruin.’16	  It	  therefore	  in	  theory	  opened	  the	  commercial	  landscape	  to	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  entrepreneurs.	  But	  even	  by	  5667	  no	  more	  than	  around	  ten	  per	  cent	  of	  ‘important’	  businesses	  were	  limited	  companies.17	  Instead,	  personal	  partnerships	  remained	  a	  key	  organisational	  form	  well	  into	  the	  4556s	  at	  least.18	  Family	  partnerships	  were	  especially	  suited	  to	  this	  form,	  as	  unlimited	  liability	  required	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  trust.	  This	  restricted	  the	  size	  of	  businesses,	  though,	  as	  family	  )irms	  did	  not	  like	  to	  expand	  their	  operations	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that	  the	  individuals	  responsible	  could	  no	  longer	  personally	  control	  them.19	  This	  is	  borne	  out	  by	  the	  types	  of	  suppliers	  to	  the	  case	  study	  unions	  in	  %&&':	  There	  were	  among	  them	  many	  more	  family	  partnerships	  and	  companies	  than	  there	  were	  non-­‐family	  partnerships	  (Table	  !.!).	  	  A	  potential	  limitation	  to	  this	  typology	  is	  that	  the	  poor	  law	  records	  cannot	  be	  relied	  upon	  to	  differentiate	  between	  suppliers	  along	  these	  lines	  in	  every	  case.	  There	  were	  very	  probably	  several	  instances	  of	  partnerships	  being	  listed	  under	  one	  partner’s	  name,	  or	  incorporations	  described	  as	  partnerships,	  for	  example.	  There	  may	  well	  also	  have	  been	  partnerships	  between	  people	  with	  different	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  !"	  &	  !%	  Vict.,	  c.	  !,,.	  Limited	  Liability	  Act	  (!"77);	  !%	  &	  :;	  Vict.,	  c.<=.	  Joint	  Stock	  Companies	  Act	  ("#$%);	  )$	  &	  )%	  Vict.,	  c.	  #1.	  Companies	  Act	  ("#%));	  D.	  Loftus,	  ‘Capital	  and	  Community:	  Limited	  Liability	  and	  Attempts	  to	  Democratize	  the	  Market	  in	  Mid-­‐Nineteenth-­‐Century	  England’,	  
Victorian	  Studies	  !":$	  ('(('),	  p.	  -..	  16	  M.	  Poovey,	  Making	  a	  social	  body:	  British	  cultural	  formation,	  89:;-­‐!"#$	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  .//0),	  p.	  !".	  17	  P.L.	  Payne,	  ‘The	  Emergence	  of	  the	  Large-­‐scale	  Company	  in	  Great	  Britain,	  =>?@-­‐=A=B’,	  Economic	  
History	  Review	  New	  series,	  )*:,	  (./01),	  p.	  5)*.	  18	  M.B.	  Rose,	  ‘The	  family	  3irm	  in	  British	  business’,	  in	  M.W.	  Kirby	  and	  M.B.	  Rose	  (eds),	  Business	  
Enterprise	  in	  Modern	  Britain	  from	  the	  Eighteenth	  to	  the	  Twentieth	  Century	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  Routledge,	  /001),	  p.	  56.	  19	  M.	  Winstanley,	  ‘Concentration	  and	  competition	  in	  the	  retail	  sector,	  c.7899-­‐!""#’,	  in	  M.W.	  Kirby	  and	  M.B.	  Rose	  (eds),	  Business	  enterprise	  in	  modern	  Britain	  (London:	  Routledge,	  /001),	  	  p.	  $%&.	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surnames	  who	  were	  in	  fact	  family	  members	  by	  marriage.	  Nonetheless,	  there	  was	  a	  noticeable	  trend	  for	  more	  suppliers	  to	  be	  partnerships	  or	  companies	  of	  any	  sort	  in	  *++,	  than	  there	  had	  been	  in	  *+1,,	  and	  as	  such	  the	  changes	  that	  took	  place	  were	  likely	  to	  have	  re0lected	  a	  real	  shift	  in	  the	  scale	  of	  suppliers.	  A	  second	  limitation	  of	  the	  typology	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  comprehensively	  describe	  business	  sizes.	  Businesses	  did	  not	  have	  to	  be	  partnerships	  or	  companies	  in	  !""#	  to	  be	  signi-icant	  traders,	  although	  clearly	  partnerships	  had	  greater	  growth	  potential	  than	  businesses	  that	  relied	  on	  an	  individual	  for	  their	  capital	  requirements.	  Judging	  business	  size	  is	  itself	  problematic,	  however,	  especially	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  full	  sets	  of	  accounts.	  Insurance	  records	  are	  of	  limited	  use	  even	  where	  they	  exist	  because,	  as	  Hosgood	  points	  out,	  trades	  in	  perishable	  goods	  had	  a	  much	  quicker	  turnover	  of	  stock	  than	  other	  forms	  of	  retailing,	  leading	  to	  relatively	  small	  insured	  values.20	  Moreover,	  many	  ,irms	  in	  all	  sorts	  of	  sectors	  organised	  the	  distribution	  of	  goods	  without	  ever	  having	  the	  stock	  on	  their	  premises.21	  There	  are,	  however,	  some	  ways	  of	  illustrating	  the	  ranges	  of	  sizes	  of	  businesses	  which	  supplied	  poor	  law	  unions.	  Thomas	  Raine,	  a	  linen	  and	  woollen	  draper,	  supplied	  Durham	  union	  in	  0123.	  He	  advertised	  in	  0189	  for	  ‘two	  active	  assistants	  and	  two	  apprentices’,	  suggesting	  that	  trade	  was	  successful	  enough	  to	  employ	  at	  least	  that	  many.22	  Liverpool	  poor	  law	  parish	  employed	  tailors	  from	  within	  the	  workhouse	  to	  make	  clothes	  from	  raw	  materials	  bought	  in,	  but	  when	  there	  were	  not	  enough	  skilled	  indoor	  paupers	  to	  meet	  supply,	  as	  in	  October	  )*+,	  and	  September	  )**3,	  the	  parish	  had	  to	  buy	  suits	  urgently	  from	  Messrs	  Coop	  of	  Wigan.	  Coop	  was	  a	  signi1icant	  business,	  employing	  some	  :;;	  people	  in	  its	  factory.23	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  C.P.	  Hosgood,	  ‘A	  ‘Brave	  and	  Daring	  Folk’?	  Shopkeepers	  and	  Trade	  Associational	  Life	  in	  Victorian	  and	  Edwardian	  England’,	  Journal	  of	  Social	  History	  !":!	  (&''!),	  pp.	  !,--­‐!"#.	  21	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&'.	  22	  Newcastle	  Courant,	  !	  March	  ()*!,	  p.	  (.	  23	  A.	  Brogden,	  ‘Clothing	  provision	  by	  the	  Liverpool	  workhouse’,	  Costume	  !"	  (%&&%),	  p.	  +!.	  Coop	  &	  Marsden	  was	  ‘established	  to	  employ	  girls	  redundant	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Cotton	  Famine	  of	  the	  !"#$s’:	  English	  Heritage,	  Coops	  Factory	  list	  entry.	  Online	  at	  http://list.english-­‐heritage.org.uk/resultsingle.aspx?uid=5678898.	  Accessed	  May	  +,-..	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Ad	  hoc	  purchasing,	  especially	  through	  workhouse	  of5icials,	  could	  be	  made	  from	  suppliers	  of	  all	  sizes,	  but	  this	  form	  of	  buying	  could	  represent	  a	  valuable	  opportunity	  for	  smaller	  local	  businesses.	  Durham’s	  guardians’	  minutes	  record	  frequent	  small	  payments	  to	  the	  workhouse	  master	  and	  matron	  for	  funerals,	  carting,	  butter,	  wine	  and	  so	  on.	  Such	  purchases	  would	  probably	  have	  been	  from	  small	  high-­‐street	  retailers,	  as	  payments	  to	  the	  0irms	  who	  were	  contracted	  with	  for	  the	  quarter	  would	  not	  have	  been	  recorded	  in	  this	  way.	  Traders	  who	  gained	  custom	  from	  poor	  law	  unions	  would	  therefore	  have	  been	  spread	  across	  the	  spectrum	  of	  business	  sizes.	  
5.5 Transporting	  goods	  The	  distances	  between	  workhouses	  and	  their	  suppliers,	  and	  the	  types	  of	  suppliers,	  therefore	  show	  some	  relationship	  to	  unions’	  changing	  circumstances.	  For	  both	  Durham	  and	  Houghton	  le	  Spring,	  more	  suppliers	  were	  located	  outside	  the	  unions	  in	  .//0	  than	  in	  ./1!.	  Durham	  was	  historically	  a	  signi%icant	  hub	  city,	  self-­‐suf$icient	  in	  terms	  of	  local	  suppliers	  in	  1234.	  As	  communications	  improved,	  the	  workhouse	  was	  supplied	  by	  businesses	  at	  greater	  distances.	  Houghton	  was	  increasing	  in	  importance	  locally	  and	  was	  also	  better	  connected	  to	  surrounding	  towns:	  The	  workhouse	  was	  supplied	  with	  food	  by	  businesses	  inside	  the	  union	  which	  had	  access	  to	  these	  nearby	  markets,	  and	  with	  more	  specialist	  goods	  from	  further	  a4ield.	  Meanwhile,	  both	  Chester	  le	  Street	  and	  Llanfyllin	  had	  fewer	  suppliers	  from	  outside	  the	  union	  in	  0112	  than	  they	  had	  in	  *+,-.	  As	  Chester	  grew	  in	  importance,	  more	  suppliers	  were	  themselves	  better	  connected	  to	  external	  markets.	  Llanfyllin	  had	  fewer	  suppliers	  in	  total,	  and	  much	  of	  its	  provisions	  came	  from	  a	  single,	  out-­‐of-­‐union	  supplier.	  Southwell	  showed	  little	  change	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  external	  to	  internal	  suppliers,	  but	  their	  changing	  locations	  reveal	  the	  relative	  rise	  of	  neighbouring	  towns.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  differences	  between	  2345	  and	  2335	  was	  communications	  infrastructure,	  especially	  in	  the	  growth	  and	  consolidation	  of	  railway	  networks	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through	  the	  )*+,s,	  ’0,s	  and	  ’4,s.24	  New	  rail	  links	  enabled	  industrial	  suppliers	  to	  gain	  access	  to	  more	  distant	  markets,	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  poor	  law	  unions	  bene$itted	  from	  this.	  Chester	  le	  Street,	  for	  example,	  gained	  a	  railway	  connection	  in	  ()*),	  perhaps	  explaining	  the	  increase	  in	  bulky	  goods	  brought	  in	  from	  further	  a+ield	  by	  bigger	  businesses	  in	  4556	  compared	  with	  45:6.25	  This	  may	  be	  an	  example	  of	  the	  dual	  phenomenon	  suggested	  by	  Jefferys,	  of	  there	  having	  been	  two	  opposing	  trends	  in	  distribution	  in	  the	  period	  between	  2345	  and	  %&%':	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  were	  improvements	  in	  transport	  systems	  which	  enabled	  producers	  to	  reach	  their	  customers	  directly	  and	  bypass	  wholesalers	  altogether.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  ‘the	  concentration	  of	  production	  in	  factories,	  the	  growth	  of	  towns	  and	  the	  switch	  to	  imported	  foodstuffs…	  tended	  to	  increase	  the	  part	  played	  by	  intermediaries.’26	  	  It	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  question	  of	  connection,	  however.	  Some	  places	  already	  had	  a	  rail	  link	  before	  ,-./,	  some	  had	  no	  link	  by	  ,--/,	  and	  some	  were	  served	  by	  other	  means.	  Of	  more	  signi%icance	  was	  the	  ability	  of	  rail	  –	  or	  any	  other	  transport	  technology	  –	  to	  bring	  down	  the	  costs	  of	  reaching	  customers,	  whether	  those	  customers	  were	  the	  unions	  themselves	  or	  their	  suppliers.27	  Southwell,	  for	  instance,	  was	  on	  a	  branch	  of	  the	  Midland	  railway	  from	  789:.	  Durham	  had	  a	  railway	  connection	  from	  3456.	  Meanwhile	  there	  was	  no	  passenger	  or	  general	  freight	  rail	  at	  Houghton	  le	  Spring	  at	  all,	  though	  there	  were	  several	  colliery	  lines.	  Perhaps	  of	  more	  importance	  were	  the	  road	  and	  waterway	  connections:	  Houghton	  was	  on	  a	  main	  road	  linking	  Durham	  and	  Sunderland;	  and	  the	  river	  Wear	  was	  navigable	  from	  Durham	  through	  Chester	  le	  Street	  to	  Sunderland.28	  	  Llanfyllin	  is	  especially	  interesting	  in	  this	  regard,	  as	  its	  workhouse	  was	  already	  a	  substantial	  consumer	  of	  goods	  from	  outside	  the	  union	  in	  3456,	  despite	  not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  R.	  Schwartz,	  I.N.	  Gregory	  and	  T.	  Thévenin,	  ‘Spatial	  History:	  Railways,	  Uneven	  Development,	  and	  Population	  Change	  in	  France	  and	  Great	  Britain,	  6789–!"!#’,	  Journal	  of	  Interdisciplinary	  
History	  !":$	  ("'$$),	  p.	  ,-.	  25	  C.J.	  Allen,	  The	  North	  Eastern	  Railway	  (London:	  I.	  Allen,	  ,-./),	  p.	  ,23.	  26	  Jefferys,	  Retail	  trading	  in	  Britain,	  pp.	  %&-­‐!!.	  27	  Alexander,	  Retailing,	  p.	  %&.	  28	  E.	  Paget-­‐Tomlinson,	  Illustrated	  history	  of	  canal	  and	  river	  navigations	  (Shef&ield:	  Shef&ield	  Academic	  Press,	  -../),	  map	  2.	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getting	  a	  rail	  link	  until	  ,-./.	  In	  this	  respect,	  Llanfyllin	  resembled	  other	  Welsh	  unions	  that	  were	  hampered	  by	  poor	  communications.	  Merthyr	  Tyd6il,	  for	  example,	  imported	  .lour	  from	  Ireland	  to	  avoid	  high	  internal	  transport	  costs.29	  Furthermore,	  mid	  and	  north	  Wales	  did	  not	  have	  an	  effective	  internal	  market,	  and	  farmers	  tended	  to	  export	  to	  the	  Midlands	  and	  northern	  counties	  of	  England	  rather	  than	  ,inding	  buyers	  closer	  to	  home.30	  This	  trade,	  and	  presumably	  the	  trade	  that	  brought	  goods	  into	  Llanfyllin,	  was	  frequently	  conducted	  on	  waterways.31	  Nearby	  Newtown	  and	  Welshpool	  were	  on	  a	  branch	  of	  the	  Ellesmere	  canal	  which	  linked	  to	  the	  navigable	  Severn	  at	  Llanymynech,	  not	  far	  from	  Oswestry.32	  Both	  the	  Severn	  and	  the	  Montgomeryshire	  Canal	  were	  used	  for	  freight	  transport.33	  Those	  businesses	  which	  supplied	  Llanfyllin	  with	  goods	  from	  further	  a2ield	  would	  have	  used	  waterways	  such	  as	  these.	  	  Long	  distance	  trade	  was	  far	  from	  unusual	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  at	  this	  time.	  Commercial	  travelling	  was	  a	  very	  well-­‐established	  mode	  of	  marketing	  by	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  with	  salesmen	  making	  journeys	  of	  some	  hundreds	  of	  miles	  to	  visit	  prospective	  customers.34	  The	  itineraries	  of	  commercial	  travellers	  demonstrate	  the	  distances	  that	  suppliers	  could	  reach.	  In	  3456,	  for	  example,	  the	  representative	  of	  an	  Oxfordshire	  worsted	  manufacturer	  visited	  drapers	  in	  twenty-­‐six	  towns	  and	  cities	  in	  northern	  and	  eastern	  England,	  including	  York,	  Hull	  and	  Leeds.35	  A	  Somerset	  rug	  and	  woollens	  1irm	  supplied	  customers	  ‘as	  far	  a"ield	  as	  the	  Home	  Counties,	  East	  Midlands,	  South	  Wales,	  Lancashire	  and	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  in	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Ireland,’	  according	  to	  Sutton.36	  Usually	  long-­‐distance	  selling	  required	  intermediaries	  such	  as	  brokers,	  merchants	  or	  agents.37	  However,	  the	  most	  distant	  suppliers	  to	  provincial	  poor	  law	  unions	  tended	  to	  be	  stationery	  3irms	  based	  in	  London.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  following	  chapter,	  these	  were	  )irms	  which	  between	  them	  had	  control	  of	  a	  virtually	  closed	  market	  and	  exclusive	  access	  to	  the	  poor	  law	  central	  authority,	  enabling	  them	  to	  produce	  the	  books	  and	  forms	  all	  unions	  required.	  The	  products	  were	  easily	  transported	  to	  the	  unions	  by	  post.	  Aside	  from	  these	  goods	  London	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  very	  important	  to	  the	  case	  study	  unions,	  especially	  as	  they	  were	  better	  connected	  to	  centres	  of	  enterprise	  in	  the	  north.38	  
5.6 Marketing	  and	  wholesaling	  Changing	  transport	  networks	  altered	  the	  business	  environment	  whether	  or	  not	  individual	  poor	  law	  unions	  were	  connected	  to	  particular	  1irms.	  Improvements	  in	  transport	  and	  manufacturing	  fragmented	  the	  distribution	  system	  into	  ‘distinct	  producers,	  wholesalers	  and	  retailers’,	  according	  to	  Shaw	  and	  Bucklin.39	  Specialist	  wholesalers	  grew	  in	  number	  and	  scope,	  alongside	  a	  reduction	  in	  businesses	  combining	  retail	  with	  wholesale	  or	  ‘pre-­‐distributive	  processes’.40	  In	  the	  meat	  trade,	  for	  instance,	  the	  1irst	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  saw	  the	  dominance	  of	  butchers	  who	  dealt	  cattle,	  slaughtered,	  retailed	  and	  wholesaled	  to	  smaller	  retailers.41	  Later	  in	  the	  century,	  specialist	  wholesalers	  emerged	  and	  a	  similar	  pattern	  is	  discernable	  for	  the	  grocery	  trade.42	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Poor	  law	  unions	  bought	  from	  suppliers	  who	  described	  themselves	  –	  or	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  –	  retailers,	  wholesalers,	  factors,	  dealers,	  merchants	  or	  producers.	  This	  suggests	  that	  distribution	  and	  marketing	  networks	  operated	  !lexibly,	  responding	  to	  demand	  from	  institutions	  like	  poor	  law	  unions,	  which	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  buy	  at	  the	  appropriate	  scale.	  Institutional	  customers	  like	  poor	  law	  unions	  were	  bigger	  consumers	  than	  provincial	  high-­‐street	  retailers	  in	  many	  cases.	  As	  Winstanley	  notes,	  small	  retailers	  relied	  ‘on	  the	  dealers	  to	  be	  found	  in	  nearby	  town	  centres	  who	  doubled	  as	  wholesalers	  and	  retailers’	  well	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century.43	  Only	  in	  cities	  were	  there	  enough	  small	  retailers	  to	  make	  wholesale-­‐only	  business	  worthwhile.44	  	  The	  grocery/provisions	  trade	  in	  particular	  appears	  to	  have	  undergone	  the	  greatest	  alteration	  between	  *+,-	  and	  *++-,	  judging	  by	  the	  changing	  suppliers	  to	  the	  poor	  law	  union	  case	  studies.	  Across	  the	  unions	  can	  be	  seen	  examples	  of	  specialised	  dealers	  in	  particular	  grocery	  products	  giving	  way	  to	  businesses	  trading	  in	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  goods,	  though	  the	  unions	  did	  continue	  to	  buy	  some	  goods	  from	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  high-­‐street	  grocers.	  Chester	  le	  Street,	  for	  instance,	  bought	  from	  separate	  grocers	  and	  bakers	  in	  5678.	  In	  5668,	  it	  bought	  from	  two	  suppliers	  of	  both	  grocery	  and	  6lour,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  a	  mealman.	  Llanfyllin	  bought	  /lour,	  rice,	  tea,	  treacle	  and	  potatoes	  from	  Edward	  Lewis	  of	  Llanfyllin	  High	  Street,	  and	  oatmeal,	  split	  peas,	  coffee,	  sugar,	  candles,	  soap	  and	  soda	  from	  Joseph	  Evans	  of	  Oswestry.	  In	  Durham	  in	  9:;:-­‐!"	  a	  grocer,	  George	  Greenwell,	  won	  tenders	  to	  supply	  ‘certain	  provisions	  and	  necessaries’	  to	  the	  workhouse,	  and	  as	  no	  specialist	  3lour	  or	  bread	  supplier	  was	  contracted	  with,	  it	  seems	  those	  goods	  were	  included	  in	  Greenwell’s	  contracts.	  Buying	  from	  a	  single	  supplier	  for	  many	  goods	  was	  very	  convenient	  for	  the	  customer,	  though	  unions	  might	  have	  to	  be	  wary	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  goods	  in	  some	  cases.	  Durham’s	  guardians,	  for	  example,	  resolved	  to	  accept	  the	  tender	  of	  Messrs	  Chapman	  &	  Son	  for	  ‘certain	  provisions	  and	  necessaries’	  from	  3	  October	  to	  36	  December	  !""#	  ‘upon	  condition	  that	  Messrs.	  Chapman	  and	  Son	  supply	  Sugar	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  Master	  of	  the	  Workhouse	  at	  the	  price	  named	  in	  their	  tender	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  Winstanley,	  Shopkeeper’s	  world,	  p.	  %%.	  44	  Ibid.,	  p.	  %&.	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and	  that	  if	  they	  decline	  to	  do	  this	  the	  tender	  of	  Mr.	  George	  Greenwell	  to	  supply	  all	  the	  provisions	  and	  necessaries	  be	  accepted.’45	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  other	  case	  study	  unions,	  Southwell	  continued	  to	  buy	  its	  5lour	  from	  a	  'irm	  of	  millers,	  F.	  &	  E.	  Caudwell,	  whose	  premises	  were	  the	  local	  water	  mill,	  and	  from	  a	  baker,	  William	  Marriott	  of	  Newark-­‐upon-­‐Trent.	  Alongside	  these	  was	  one	  Thomas	  Bates	  of	  Southwell	  who	  sold	  groceries	  and	  oatmeal.	  Rather	  than	  clear	  instances	  of	  large	  consolidated	  traders	  supplying	  Southwell	  union,	  therefore,	  there	  can	  be	  seen	  many	  specialist	  small	  traders.	  The	  union	  had	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  suppliers	  in	  total	  (seventy-­‐three	  whose	  identities	  could	  be	  ascertained,	  and	  another	  eleven	  who	  could	  not),	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  which	  do	  not	  appear	  from	  the	  records	  to	  have	  sold	  more	  than	  one	  type	  of	  goods.	  Exceptions	  include	  one	  Walter	  Chadburn	  who	  sold	  the	  workhouse	  wine	  and	  drapery;	  and	  farmer	  Joseph	  Templeman	  who	  sold	  straw	  and	  wood	  and	  kids	  for	  the	  workhouse	  garden.	  The	  garden	  farm	  itself	  supplied	  the	  workhouse	  with	  bacon	  and	  vegetables.	  
5.7 Supplier	  networks	  Businesses	  did	  not	  simply	  interact	  with	  their	  customers:	  they	  also	  existed	  in	  relation	  to	  their	  competitors	  and	  colleagues	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  wider	  society.	  These	  relations	  constituted,	  and	  were	  a	  product	  of,	  the	  business	  environment.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  contractual	  arrangements	  made	  by	  poor	  law	  unions	  were	  characterised	  by	  a	  reliance	  on	  reputation	  and	  reliability,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  price.	  Rose	  points	  to	  the	  ‘informal	  networks	  of	  mutual	  trust	  and	  interest’	  in	  local	  business	  communities:	  ‘Shared	  values	  and	  attitudes	  were	  reinforced	  by	  an	  impressive	  array	  of	  institutions	  as	  well	  as	  more	  informal	  arrangements.	  This	  meant	  that	  transaction	  costs	  were	  usually	  comparatively	  low.’46	  This	  is	  borne	  out	  by	  poor	  law	  contracting,	  which	  was	  indeed	  a	  combination	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  networks	  and	  arrangements,	  enabling	  well-­‐placed	  small	  local	  businesses	  to	  participate.	  There	  were	  low	  barriers	  to	  entry	  for	  traders,	  as	  seen	  by	  the	  numbers	  of	  suppliers	  to	  the	  unions,	  but	  the	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ability	  to	  supply	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  was	  still	  restricted	  to	  those	  who	  had	  the	  required	  capital.	  This	  is	  applicable	  to	  the	  evidence	  of	  the	  3456s	  and	  yet	  more	  so	  in	  the	  )**+s.	  Furthermore,	  large	  businesses	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  dominate	  the	  market	  in	  more	  than	  one	  way.	  Westall	  notes	  the	  ‘three	  usual	  strategic	  options’	  faced	  by	  entrepreneurs	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century:	  ‘competition,	  collusion	  or	  integration.’47	  Collusion	  is	  not	  easily	  visible	  in	  the	  records,	  though	  it	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  in	  small	  markets,	  especially	  outside	  London,	  according	  to	  Westall.48	  Customers	  relied	  on	  experience	  for	  knowledge	  about	  reliability,	  but	  this	  was	  imperfect	  information,	  and	  they	  were	  therefore	  at	  a	  disadvantage.	  The	  case	  study	  unions	  tended	  to	  record	  only	  the	  winners	  of	  contracts,	  and	  not	  the	  losing	  bidders,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  construct	  models	  of	  competition.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  integration	  was	  constrained	  by	  limits	  on	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  !irm.49	  Large	  businesses	  would	  thus	  be	  expected	  to	  squeeze	  smaller	  competitors	  out	  of	  business,	  especially	  where	  economies	  of	  scale	  were	  important	  –	  such	  as	  in	  the	  +lour,	  meal	  and	  grocery	  trades,	  as	  evident	  from	  the	  case	  study	  examples.	  This	  was	  a	  slow	  process,	  though,	  and	  was	  dependent	  on	  local	  and	  regional	  conditions.	  Areas	  with	  strong	  rail	  connections	  and	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  urbanisation	  would	  be	  1irst	  to	  see	  these	  features.50	  These	  factors	  could	  explain	  the	  persistence	  of	  higher	  numbers	  of	  individual	  producers	  in	  Llanfyllin	  and	  Southwell	  in	  1223	  than	  in	  the	  north-­‐eastern	  unions.	  Meanwhile	  in	  the	  well-­‐networked	  north-­‐east,	  businesses	  could	  take	  advantage	  of	  their	  connections	  more	  readily.	  In	  $%&%	  Chester	  le	  Street’s	  grocery	  supplier,	  George	  Simpson	  of	  Birtley,	  had	  as	  sureties	  for	  the	  performance	  of	  his	  contract	  Robert	  Johnson,	  a	  wholesale	  grocer,	  and	  John	  Temperley,	  a	  wholesale	  provision	  merchant,	  both	  of	  Newcastle	  upon	  Tyne.51	  Temperley	  was	  one	  of	  around	  a	  dozen	  Newcastle	  .irms	  which	  are	  known	  to	  have	  supplied	  co-­‐operative	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retailers	  with	  dairy	  and	  pork.52	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  what	  McCord	  identi,ies	  as	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  ‘purely	  local’	  and	  its	  displacement	  by	  ‘patterns	  of	  “distant”	  rather	  than	  intimate	  local	  inter-­‐dependence’.53	  Comprehensive	  data	  on	  the	  sureties	  and	  other	  facets	  of	  business	  community	  networks	  are	  lacking,	  however,	  making	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  geographies	  of	  these	  networks	  over	  time	  unviable.	  
5.8 Duration	  of	  supply	  Gaining	  a	  contract	  to	  supply	  a	  poor	  law	  union	  could	  be	  highly	  lucrative	  over	  the	  long	  term,	  though	  it	  was	  not	  easy	  to	  maintain	  a	  working	  relationship	  over	  many	  years	  when	  contracts	  were	  re-­‐advertised	  every	  three	  or	  six	  months.	  This	  is	  clear	  from	  examining	  the	  longevity	  of	  supply	  relationships	  over	  the	  period	  ()*+	  to	  ())+	  for	  two	  of	  the	  case-­‐study	  unions,	  Llanfyllin	  and	  St	  Saviour.	  According	  to	  the	  guardians’	  minutes,	  Llanfyllin	  bought	  from	  89	  individually	  named	  suppliers	  in	  that	  period,	  12	  of	  whom	  only	  held	  a	  contract	  for	  a	  single	  quarter.	  St	  Saviour	  had	  /01	  suppliers	  and	  usually	  contracted	  in	  six-­‐month	  slots;	  '(	  of	  its	  suppliers	  only	  ever	  held	  one	  such	  contract.	  But	  the	  remaining	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  suppliers	  did	  gain	  subsequent	  business,	  a	  fact	  suggesting	  that	  boards	  of	  guardians	  took	  notice	  of	  those	  proving	  their	  ability	  to	  deliver	  consistently	  and	  at	  the	  right	  price.	  A	  relationship,	  once	  formed,	  could	  be	  fruitful	  for	  many	  years,	  again	  underscoring	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  processes	  in	  the	  market	  economy.	  Many	  suppliers	  won	  poor-­‐law	  business	  frequently,	  if	  not	  continuously,	  and	  a	  few	  suppliers	  held	  contracts	  for	  very	  long	  periods:	  In	  Llanfyllin,	  James	  Fox	  supplied	  milk	  and	  butter,	  and	  occasionally	  shoes,	  for	  nearly	  the	  full	  ,-	  years	  (00-	  quarters).	  Charles	  Jones	  supplied	  the	  workhouse	  with	  shoes	  for	  +,	  quarters.	  The	  longest-­‐lasting	  suppliers	  in	  St	  Saviour	  were	  butchers	  John	  and	  James	  Beale	  (34	  quarters),	  cof9in-­‐makers	  James	  and	  Susannah	  Darby	  (-.	  quarters),	  mealmen	  Edwards	  Brothers	  (-;	  quarters)	  and	  oilman	  James	  Percival	  (%&	  quarters).	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In	  Figure	  !.!	  (Llanfyllin)	  and	  Figure	  !.!"	  (St	  Saviour),	  each	  supplier	  is	  represented	  by	  a	  single	  row,	  with	  a	  contract	  lasting	  one	  quarter	  being	  represented	  by	  a	  block	  along	  the	  row.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  pattern	  is	  one	  of	  regular	  new	  entrants	  to	  workhouse	  supply,	  some	  of	  whom	  secured	  continued	  business.	  In	  Llanfyllin,	  the	  ()*+s	  and	  ()/+s	  saw	  relative	  stability,	  with	  fewer	  new	  suppliers	  than	  there	  had	  been	  in	  the	  0123s,	  but	  with	  a	  group	  of	  8irst-­‐time	  suppliers	  appearing	  in	  the	  late	  ./01s.	  In	  St	  Saviour,	  there	  was	  a	  somewhat	  higher	  turnover	  of	  suppliers	  in	  the	  0123s	  and	  $%&'s,	  though	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  was	  fairly	  stable	  until	  /012.	  In	  that	  year	  the	  parishes	  of	  St	  George	  the	  Martyr,	  St	  Mary	  Newington	  and	  Southwark	  were	  joined	  to	  St	  Saviour	  union.	  This	  brought	  new	  competition	  which	  disrupted	  the	  existing	  supplier	  stability.	  The	  new	  parishes	  had	  their	  own	  institutions	  and	  the	  organisation	  of	  the	  union	  was	  changed,	  with	  the	  St	  Saviour	  workhouse	  in	  Marlborough	  Street	  used	  for	  the	  in#irm,	  Southwark	  workhouse	  used	  for	  the	  male	  able-­‐bodied,	  and	  Newington	  for	  female	  able-­‐bodied.	  The	  existing	  suppliers	  to	  those	  workhouses	  now	  competed	  for	  bigger	  contracts	  covering	  more	  than	  one	  institution	  at	  a	  time.	  Several	  of	  the	  long-­‐standing	  suppliers	  to	  the	  old	  St	  Saviour	  workhouse	  lost	  their	  contracts,	  and	  the	  new	  suppliers	  visible	  in	  Figure	  !.!"	  in	  $%&'	  were	  largely	  the	  existing	  trusted	  suppliers	  to	  the	  newly	  added	  parishes.	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Figure 5.9: Longevity of Llanfyllin union suppliers, 1852-1880. Each row represents one 
supplier, with horizontal blocks indicating lengths of contracts. See Appendix A for names of 
suppliers and goods supplied.  
Source: Minutes of board of guardians. 
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Figure 5.10: Longevity of St Saviour Southwark union suppliers, 1852-1880. Each row 
represents one supplier, with horizontal blocks indicating lengths of contracts. See Appendix A 
for names of suppliers and goods supplied.  
Source: Minutes of board of guardians. 
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In	  both	  Llanfyllin	  and	  St	  Saviour,	  but	  especially	  so	  in	  Llanfyllin,	  businesses	  attempting	  to	  gain	  the	  custom	  of	  the	  guardians	  may	  well	  have	  found	  it	  very	  hard	  to	  gain	  a	  contract	  in	  the	  -irst	  place,	  but	  easier	  to	  maintain	  it	  once	  won.	  In	  Llanfyllin,	  there	  were	  six	  periods	  of	  more	  than	  a	  year	  when	  no	  new	  suppliers	  were	  given	  any	  business	  (Figure	  !.!!).	  In	  any	  given	  quarter	  from	  the	  4567s	  to	  the	  late	  &'()s,	  suppliers	  on	  average	  had	  held	  contracts	  in	  six	  or	  more	  of	  the	  preceding	  eight	  quarters	  (Figure	  !.!").	  In	  St	  Saviour,	  there	  was	  only	  one	  period	  of	  over	  a	  year	  with	  no	  new	  suppliers,	  but	  six	  periods	  of	  three	  consecutive	  quarters	  (Figure	  !.!").	  The	  average	  number	  of	  preceding	  quarters	  in	  which	  St	  Saviour’s	  suppliers	  had	  had	  contracts	  dropped	  sharply	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  parishes	  in	  ./01,	  interrupting	  some	  .6	  years	  of	  relative	  stability	  (Figure	  !.!")	  Furthermore,	  Llanfyllin’s	  guardians	  tended	  to	  award	  only	  one	  new	  supplier	  with	  a	  contract	  in	  any	  given	  period.	  St	  Saviour’s	  guardians	  were	  a	  little	  less	  risk-­‐averse,	  and	  two	  or	  three	  new	  suppliers	  at	  a	  time	  might	  win	  contracts	  in	  those	  periods	  when	  new	  contracts	  were	  awarded,	  especially	  after	  the	  union	  merger	  when	  there	  was	  more	  than	  one	  institution	  to	  supply.	  St	  Saviour	  also	  bought	  from	  more	  suppliers	  in	  total	  compared	  to	  Llanfyllin,	  averaging	  )*.,	  suppliers	  per	  quarter	  to	  Llanfyllin’s	  8.9.	  This	  re<lects	  both	  the	  relative	  sizes	  of	  the	  unions	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  competition	  in	  London.	  	  A	  highly	  competitive	  market	  was	  only	  to	  be	  expected,	  given	  the	  dense	  concentration	  of	  businesses	  in	  the	  centre	  of	  London	  and	  the	  lucrative	  nature	  of	  poor	  law	  contracts	  over	  the	  medium	  to	  long	  term.	  The	  advantages	  to	  suppliers	  were	  clear:	  Income	  was	  not	  just	  relatively	  secure	  over	  the	  course	  of	  one	  contract	  but	  also	  very	  likely	  to	  be	  repeated	  in	  future	  contracts.	  This	  was	  dependent	  on	  the	  supplier	  proving	  his	  or	  her	  reliability	  by	  meeting	  the	  expectations	  of	  the	  union.	  Winning	  the	  initial	  contract	  was	  the	  more	  dif7icult	  task,	  therefore,	  as	  the	  competition	  was	  between	  the	  known	  suppliers	  who	  potentially	  dominated	  the	  tendering	  process	  and	  the	  newcomers	  who	  relied	  on	  reputations	  built	  elsewhere	  and	  on	  lower	  bids.	  Guardians	  were	  wary	  of	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  low-­‐bidding	  newcomer	  to	  deliver	  reliably,	  yet	  they	  could	  not	  afford	  to	  ignore	  low	  bidders	  because	  of	  their	  responsibility	  to	  their	  ratepayer	  electorates.	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Figure 5.11: Number of new and not new suppliers to Llanfyllin union, 1854-80.  
Source: Minutes of board of guardians. 
	  
Figure 5.12: Mean number of quarters in previous two years in which suppliers held contracts 
with Llanfyllin union, 1854-80.  
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Figure 5.13: Number of new and not new suppliers to St Saviour Southwark union, 1854-80.  
Source: Minutes of board of guardians. 
	  
Figure 5.14: Mean number of quarters in previous two years in which suppliers held contracts 
with St Saviour Southwark union, 1854-80.  
Source: Minutes of board of guardians. 
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considered	  in	  this	  chapter,	  but	  can	  be	  seen	  operating	  in	  different	  ways	  as	  bigger	  'irms	  with	  a	  longer	  reach	  entered	  the	  market	  between	  c.5678	  and	  c.#$$%.	  Boards	  of	  guardians	  formed	  business	  relationships	  with	  these	  bigger	  and	  more	  distant	  suppliers,	  but	  continued	  to	  work	  with	  smaller	  local	  suppliers	  too.	  For	  example,	  London’s	  specialist	  local-­‐government	  printing	  ,irms	  increasingly	  supplied	  very	  distant	  unions.	  Remote	  unions	  generally	  had	  to	  buy	  from	  further	  a+ield	  than	  less	  remote	  unions:	  their	  local	  businesses	  were	  comparatively	  poorly	  connected	  to	  wider	  markets,	  so	  they	  were	  obliged	  to	  buy	  from	  more	  distant	  -irms	  higher	  up	  the	  supply	  chain.	  Unions	  frequently	  bought	  from	  bigger	  suppliers	  in	  /001,	  external	  to	  the	  union	  if	  need	  be,	  but	  internal	  if	  available,	  and	  unions	  encompassing	  smaller	  centres	  of	  population	  often	  bought	  from	  nearby	  towns.	  	  Business	  organisation	  types	  also	  changed	  to	  re&lect	  greater	  capital	  invested	  in	  suppliers.	  In	  %&&',	  compared	  to	  %&2',	  there	  were	  more	  partnerships,	  both	  between	  family	  members	  and	  others,	  and	  there	  were	  more	  companies,	  both	  municipal	  and	  commercial.	  Non-­‐family	  partnerships	  also	  increased,	  but	  not	  as	  much	  as	  family	  partnerships	  or	  companies.	  Across	  the	  union	  case	  studies,	  the	  !"#$s	  were	  characterised	  by	  individual	  suppliers	  selling	  speci8ic	  goods,	  but	  in	  contrast,	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  grocery	  trade	  into	  bigger	  3irms	  covering	  wider	  ranges	  of	  products	  is	  visible	  in	  the	  5667s.	  This	  :its	  with	  the	  more	  recent	  historiography	  of	  business	  organisation	  fairly	  well.	  However,	  specialised	  grocers	  continued	  to	  exist	  on	  high	  streets	  at	  this	  time	  and	  they	  continued	  to	  number	  poor	  law	  unions	  among	  their	  customers.	  	  Comparing	  the	  poor	  law	  unions	  sheds	  some	  light	  on	  Scola’s	  question	  of	  how	  far	  retail	  developments	  at	  this	  time	  were	  ‘distinctively	  urban’.54	  Fixed	  retailing,	  in	  his	  analysis,	  had	  been	  a	  rural	  as	  well	  as	  urban	  feature	  for	  many	  centuries	  after	  all.	  The	  evidence	  of	  the	  case	  studies	  suggests	  that	  scale	  was	  a	  highly	  signi)icant	  factor	  here.	  Local	  retailers	  in	  small	  towns	  had	  multiple	  roles:	  they	  were	  also	  wholesalers,	  and	  could	  also	  be	  distributors	  to	  local	  customers	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  in	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of	  goods	  at	  larger	  scales	  without	  themselves	  holding	  the	  stock.	  There	  were	  plenty	  of	  opportunities	  for	  small	  local	  1irms	  to	  gain	  at	  least	  some	  business	  from	  the	  poor	  law.	  It	  is	  unlikely	  that	  many	  could	  have	  been	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  poor	  law	  business,	  though.	  	  Suppliers	  to	  workhouses	  thus	  rarely	  appear	  to	  be	  ‘penny	  capitalists’	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  those	  living	  precariously	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  ‘economy	  of	  makeshifts’.55	  Contractors	  were	  ratepayers	  wherever	  possible,	  and	  guardians	  relied	  on	  continuity	  and	  reliability.	  Suppliers	  therefore	  ranged	  from	  individual	  shopkeepers	  and	  dealers	  to	  large	  industrial	  enterprises.	  However,	  ad	  hoc	  purchases	  may	  have	  been	  made	  in	  small	  quantities	  from	  local	  traders	  who	  were	  not	  ratepayers	  and	  who	  might	  have	  had	  incomes	  at	  the	  smaller	  end	  of	  the	  scale.	  It	  seems	  that	  unions	  bought	  from	  these	  ‘smaller’	  traders	  far	  less	  in	  the	  %&&'s	  than	  they	  had	  in	  the	  %&.'s,	  and	  that	  much	  more	  business	  was	  done	  with	  bigger	  industrial	  enterprises	  in	  the	  later	  period.	  Not	  all	  of	  that	  business	  was	  on	  a	  large	  scale,	  though:	  unions	  bought	  3irewood	  from	  gas	  companies,	  for	  instance,	  *irewood	  being	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  the	  industrial	  process.	  In	  this	  sense	  the	  workhouse	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  peer	  of	  the	  municipal	  institution	  within	  the	  industrial	  landscape.	  The	  changes	  between	  the	  -./0s	  and	  -..0s	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  Railway	  communications	  were	  important	  in	  reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  transporting	  goods,	  though	  existing	  infrastructure	  such	  as	  waterways	  were	  vital	  for	  relatively	  remote	  places	  earlier	  in	  the	  period.	  On	  a	  wider	  scale,	  developments	  such	  as	  telegraphy	  and	  cheaper	  steel	  allowed	  information	  and	  goods	  to	  be	  distributed	  in	  greater	  quantities	  and	  at	  longer	  distances.56	  Direct	  evidence	  for	  these	  changes	  is	  not	  obvious	  from	  the	  poor	  law	  data,	  but	  the	  changes	  in	  business	  typologies	  which	  resulted	  from	  these	  factors	  can	  be	  seen	  readily.	  These	  organisational	  changes	  followed	  from	  alterations	  in	  the	  laws	  concerning	  limited	  liability	  in	  the	  1234s	  and	  %&'(s.	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The	  unions	  considered	  in	  this	  chapter	  tended	  to	  buy	  from	  local	  businesses,	  whether	  inside	  their	  boundaries	  or	  in	  neighbouring	  unions.	  By	  3445	  some	  bought	  from	  London,	  but	  these	  suppliers	  were	  speci6ically	  stationers	  who	  could	  send	  pro	  forma	  ledgers	  readily	  by	  post.	  Poor	  law	  supply	  was	  therefore,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  characterised	  by	  local	  knowledge	  networks	  and	  relationships,	  and	  this	  persisted	  even	  with	  the	  gradual	  introduction	  of	  bigger	  enterprises	  capable	  of	  supplying	  on	  a	  greater	  scale.	  However,	  the	  example	  of	  St	  Saviour	  Southwark	  shows	  that	  the	  geography	  of	  poor	  law	  supply	  was	  very	  different	  in	  the	  capital.	  There	  were	  more	  potential	  suppliers	  within	  reach,	  owing	  to	  London’s	  density	  and	  transport	  infrastructure,	  and	  suppliers	  could	  take	  advantage	  of	  a	  high	  concentration	  of	  potential	  customers.	  Many	  London	  suppliers	  sold	  to	  numerous	  poor	  law	  unions	  at	  a	  time,	  and	  this	  may	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  case	  of	  Durham,	  Houghton	  le	  Spring	  and	  Chester	  le	  Street:	  They	  were	  each	  supplied	  by	  Durham	  printers	  George	  Proctor	  &	  Son,	  but	  this	  was	  the	  only	  business	  to	  sell	  to	  more	  than	  one	  union	  despite	  Durham’s	  status	  as	  a	  distribution	  hub	  and	  the	  proximity	  of	  the	  three	  unions.	  The	  next	  chapter	  therefore	  shows	  how	  London’s	  unique	  market	  for	  institutional	  provision	  affected	  the	  running	  of	  the	  metropolitan	  poor	  law.	  Rather	  than	  removing	  the	  social	  context	  of	  poor	  law	  supply,	  London’s	  concentration	  of	  suppliers	  and	  customers	  meant	  that	  local	  knowledge	  was	  just	  as	  important,	  if	  not	  more	  so,	  compared	  to	  unions	  elsewhere	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	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! Poor	  law	  supply	  in	  London	  	  	  
6.1 Introduction	  	  London	  had	  a	  very	  dense	  concentration	  of	  workhouses	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  England	  and	  Wales,	  some	  of	  which	  were	  exceptionally	  large,	  and	  their	  capacities	  increased	  dramatically	  over	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  On	  average,	  London	  unions	  in	  4567	  maintained	  9.:	  times	  as	  many	  indoor	  paupers	  as	  non-­‐London	  unions	  maintained,	  rising	  to	  0.2	  times	  by	  !"#!.1	  This	  network	  of	  institutions	  across	  the	  capital	  provided	  a	  ready	  opportunity	  for	  potential	  suppliers.	  Take,	  for	  example,	  Wandsworth	  &	  Clapham	  union’s	  workhouse,	  which	  accommodated	  around	  678	  people:	  it	  held	  in	  its	  store	  on	  ))	  March	  ./0.	  some	  223	  lb	  of	  cheese,	  %&'	  lb	  of	  oatmeal,	  /01	  pints	  of	  porter,	  ,-.	  pints	  of	  ale,	  12	  tons	  of	  coal,	  .,452	  lb	  of	  potatoes	  and	  over	  a	  mile	  of	  cloth	  (see	  Appendix	  B).2	  The	  amount	  of	  beef	  used	  by	  the	  union,	  which	  was	  not	  kept	  in	  the	  store	  and	  presumably	  therefore	  delivered	  daily,	  can	  only	  be	  guessed	  at.	  	  The	  scale	  of	  goods	  consumed	  by	  workhouses	  raises	  a	  series	  of	  important	  questions	  which	  this	  chapter	  addresses.	  It	  examines	  how	  large	  suppliers	  of	  poor	  law	  unions	  had	  to	  be	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  the	  required	  goods,	  and	  shows	  that	  several	  large	  suppliers	  dominated	  the	  markets	  for	  certain	  goods,	  in	  particular	  those	  required	  in	  bulk.	  These	  large	  businesses	  were	  themselves	  supplied	  by	  local	  and	  national	  producers,	  and	  they	  were	  suppliers	  not	  only	  to	  poor	  law	  unions	  but	  to	  other	  large	  institutions	  such	  as	  hospitals,	  barracks	  and	  prisons.	  However,	  unions	  also	  bought	  where	  possible	  from	  smaller	  local	  suppliers,	  including	  minor	  producers	  and	  high-­‐street	  retailers.	  This	  is	  supported	  by	  the	  evidence	  of	  provision	  for	  a	  central	  metropolitan	  union	  (St	  Saviour	  Southwark)	  and	  a	  peripheral	  one	  (St	  John	  Hampstead).	  It	  was	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  guardians	  not	  only	  to	  keep	  rates	  low	  by	  buying	  from	  large	  dealers,	  but	  also	  to	  keep	  the	  poor	  rates	  circulating	  within	  the	  union	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Indoor	  pauper	  means:	  London:	  /	  January	  /234:	  356;	  /	  January	  /28/:	  /,::3.	  Rest	  of	  England	  and	  Wales:	  (	  January	  (./0:	  (12;	  (	  January	  (.1(:	  (4..	  Source:	  PLB	  and	  LGB	  annual	  reports.	  2	  LMA	  WABG/)*),	  ,,	  March	  *12*.	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economy.	  In	  looking	  at	  the	  different	  prices	  unions	  paid	  for	  their	  goods,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  that	  there	  were	  not	  signi-icant	  geographical	  differences	  in	  pricing	  across	  London,	  but	  that	  the	  same	  suppliers	  charged	  different	  amounts	  to	  different	  unions	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  Potential	  reasons	  for	  these	  disparities	  include	  transport	  costs,	  sizes	  of	  orders	  and,	  potentially,	  collaboration	  between	  suppliers.	  Together,	  the	  evidence	  presented	  here	  helps	  us	  to	  understand	  better	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  supply	  of	  goods	  was	  organised	  within	  the	  metropolitan	  poor	  law	  system.	  
6.2 Competition	  in	  markets	  for	  poor-­‐law	  supply	  A	  striking	  feature	  of	  many	  of	  the	  businesses	  which	  supplied	  workhouses	  is	  their	  size.	  Some	  trades	  were	  dominated	  by	  large	  businesses	  more	  than	  others,	  though	  in	  every	  trade	  there	  were	  very	  many	  smaller	  businesses,	  or	  suppliers	  who	  held	  contracts	  with	  only	  one	  union	  at	  a	  time.	  Some	  of	  these	  structural	  differences	  between	  various	  trades	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  comparing	  the	  numbers	  of	  unions	  on	  the	  books	  of	  the	  three	  suppliers	  for	  each	  trade	  who	  supplied	  the	  most	  London	  unions	  in	  +,-.-­‐!"	  (Figure	  !.!)	  and	  the	  numbers	  of	  businesses	  who	  supplied	  different	  numbers	  of	  unions	  for	  each	  trade	  (Table	  !.!).	  For	  example,	  meat	  and	  groceries	  were	  often	  provided	  by	  large	  suppliers	  with	  contracts	  with	  several	  unions,	  whereas	  items	  such	  as	  ironmongery	  or	  wine	  and	  spirits	  –	  purchased	  in	  much	  smaller	  quantities	  –	  were	  usually	  provided	  by	  smaller	  businesses	  with	  contracts	  with	  only	  one	  union.	  Twenty-­‐six	  unions	  have	  surviving	  records	  of	  their	  suppliers.3	  Many	  unions	  bought	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  goods	  from	  more	  than	  one	  supplier	  over	  the	  period.	  Some	  were	  consecutive	  contracts,	  but	  in	  almost	  every	  case	  unions	  bought	  a	  certain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Given	  mostly	  in	  minutes	  of	  boards	  of	  guardians:	  Camden	  Local	  Studies	  and	  Archive	  Centre	  (CLS):	  St	  Pancras:	  UTAH	  //0	  (micro5ilm).	  London	  Metropolitan	  Archives	  (LMA):	  Camberwell:	  CAGB/&&',	  CABG/&&*;	  City	  of	  London:	  CBG/&56;	  East	  London:	  CBG/&&:;	  Fulham:	  FBG/""#,	  !!";	  Greenwich:	  GBG/!01,	  GBG/!03;	  Kensington:	  KBG/!01,	  KBG/!03;	  Lambeth:	  LABG/!!>;	  Lewisham:	  LEBG///0;	  Paddington:	  PABG///9;	  Poplar:	  X/0////>	  (microAilm);	  St	  Luke	  Chelsea:	  CHBG/&&';	  St	  Mary	  Bermondsey:	  BBG/&&7;	  Stepney:	  STBG/L/&;<,	  STBG/L/&;>,	  STBG/L/"#$;	  St	  George	  the	  Martyr:	  SOBG/122;	  St	  John	  Hampstead:	  HPBG/11<;	  St	  Martin	  in	  the	  Fields:	  WEBG/SM/()*,	  WEBG/SM/()-;	  St	  Olave:	  BBG/(67,	  (68	  ;	  Strand:	  WEBG/ST/()),	  WEBG/ST/()6,	  WEBG/ST/()*;	  St	  Saviour	  Southwark:	  SOBG/(*9/()(;	  Wandsworth	  and	  Clapham:	  WABG/(!",	  WABG/&'';	  West	  London:	  CBG/&'3;	  Whitechapel:	  STBG/WH/&''.	  City	  of	  Westminster	  Archives	  (CWA):	  St	  George	  Hanover	  Square:	  MF	  234,	  MF	  236;	  St	  James	  Piccadilly:	  MF	  644A,	  MF	  644B;	  St	  Margaret	  &	  St	  John	  Westminster:	  MF	  4567.	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amount	  from	  their	  contractor	  and	  additionally	  bought	  from	  other	  suppliers;	  for	  example	  a	  union	  might	  have	  had	  a	  contract	  for	  vegetables	  with	  one	  supplier	  but	  would	  also	  buy	  smaller	  quantities	  from	  a	  local	  farmer.	  These	  data	  encompass	  all	  the	  traders	  listed	  as	  having	  supplied	  a	  union	  either	  by	  5ixed-­‐term	  contract	  or	  by	  ad	  hoc	  arrangement,	  or	  who	  bid	  for	  a	  contract	  but	  were	  not	  necessarily	  successful.	  This	  re2lects	  the	  relative	  ability	  of	  traders	  to	  supply	  unions,	  i.e.	  the	  number	  of	  unions	  a	  given	  trader	  was	  prepared	  to	  supply	  simultaneously.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  traders	  did	  in	  fact	  supply	  that	  number	  of	  unions,	  though.	  	  	  
	   	  
Figure 6.1. London unions supplied by top three suppliers by type, 1849-51.  
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 Number of business supplying: 
Occupation/goods 5+ unions 2-4 unions 1 union 
Bedding 0 8 8 
Bread/flour 7 17 116 
Beer 4 15 38 
Brushes/turnery 1 7 20 
Clothing 5 10 90 
Coal 2 18 70 
Earthenware 0 5 26 
Funerals/coffins 2 11 59 
Grocery, meal, oilman’s goods, cheese 18 23 129 
Ironmongery, tinware etc. 5 17 133 
Meat 11 8 46 
Milk 3 17 63 
Potatoes and other vegetables 1 16 63 
Printing/stationery 3 19 88 
Shoes/leather 7 9 38 
Stone 1 3 14 
Wine/spirits 0 5 66 
Wood 1 5 42 
Table 6.1. Suppliers of multiple unions.  
Source: Minutes of boards of guardians. 
Certain	  types	  of	  supply	  were	  dominated	  by	  a	  small	  number	  of	  large	  businesses.	  In	  the	  clothing	  trade	  (excluding	  shoemakers),	  from	  :;<=	  to	  :;>:	  twenty-­‐three	  unions	  had	  contracts	  with	  William	  Smith	  &	  Son	  of	  Pimlico.	  Thirteen	  contracted	  with	  Charles	  Roope	  of	  Sloane	  Street,	  Chelsea,	  and	  nine	  with	  William	  Lunn	  of	  St	  Mary	  at	  Hill,	  City	  of	  London.	  Twelve	  traders	  supplied	  between	  two	  and	  *ive	  unions,	  and	  another	  eighty-­‐nine	  traders	  supplied	  only	  one	  union	  during	  the	  period.	  Among	  grocers	  and	  general	  provision	  merchants,	  three	  businesses	  each	  had	  sixteen	  unions	  on	  their	  books:	  Ambridge	  &	  Andrews	  and	  George	  Penson	  (both	  with	  of4ices	  in	  the	  City	  of	  London)	  and	  Pinchin	  &	  Johnson	  (based	  in	  New	  Road,	  St	  George	  in	  the	  East).	  James	  Percival	  of	  Blackfriars	  supplied	  0ifteen	  unions	  and	  another	  six	  traders	  supplied	  between	  ten	  and	  twelve.	  A	  further	  thirty	  supplied	  between	  two	  and	  nine	  unions,	  and	  another	  ./0	  just	  one	  union.	  The	  large-­‐scale	  provision	  of	  potatoes	  and	  other	  vegetables	  was	  almost	  entirely	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Charles	  Evans	  of	  Hampstead	  Road,	  who	  had	  seventeen	  London	  unions	  among	  his	  customers	  during	  the	  period.	  The	  two	  next	  biggest	  suppliers	  had	  just	  four	  unions	  apiece.	  Fourteen	  supplied	  two	  or	  three	  unions,	  and	  sixty-­‐two	  supplied	  one.	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These	  trades	  have	  in	  common	  the	  sheer	  bulk	  of	  goods	  to	  be	  supplied	  by	  individual	  contractors.	  It	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  suppliers	  comprised	  the	  markets	  for	  goods	  which	  were	  capital-­‐	  and	  labour-­‐intensive,	  requiring	  large	  warehouse	  facilities,	  complex	  transport	  arrangements	  and	  extensive	  networks	  of	  supply.	  Drapers	  like	  William	  Smith	  &	  Son	  had	  the	  resources	  to	  supply	  unions	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  London	  (Figure	  !.!).	  They	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  passed	  parts	  of	  their	  contracts	  with	  poor	  law	  unions	  to	  subcontractors	  who	  in	  turn	  divided	  up	  the	  work	  among	  members	  of	  London’s	  enormous	  pool	  of	  outworkers.	  Given	  the	  necessity	  for	  low	  prices	  demanded	  by	  the	  guardians,	  it	  is	  also	  likely	  that	  these	  workers	  were	  paid	  very	  little	  and	  performed	  what	  could	  be	  described	  as	  ‘sweated’	  labour.4	  Henry	  Mayhew	  described	  –	  somewhat	  sensationally	  –	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  such	  labourers	  worked	  in	  his	  reports	  for	  the	  Morning	  Chronicle	  in	  $%&'-­‐!".5	  He	  did	  not	  speci,ically	  discuss	  the	  manufacture	  of	  workhouse	  uniforms,	  but	  did	  examine	  the	  pay	  and	  conditions	  of	  those	  making	  clothes	  for	  the	  ‘army,	  navy,	  police,	  railway,	  customs	  and	  post-­‐of#ice	  servants,	  convicts,	  and	  other	  such	  articles	  of	  wearing	  apparel	  as	  are	  made	  either	  by	  contract	  or	  in	  large	  quantities’.6	  The	  people	  responsible	  for	  purchasing	  clothes	  for	  the	  army	  were	  keen	  to	  keep	  workers’	  conditions	  humane,	  Mayhew	  reported,	  and	  pointed	  out	  that	  army	  clothier	  William	  Shaw	  in	  $%&'	  told	  his	  contractors	  to	  pay	  their	  workers	  a	  living	  wage.	  Shaw	  wrote	  to	  the	  Committee	  on	  Army,	  Navy	  and	  Ordnance	  Estimates	  in	  6787	  urging	  the	  abandonment	  of	  the	  contract	  system	  of	  supply	  as	  it	  stood	  ‘as	  being	  one	  of	  false	  economy,	  as	  a	  system	  most	  oppressive	  to	  the	  poor,	  and	  being	  most	  injurious,	  in	  every	  way,	  to	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  country’.7	  Nonetheless,	  neither	  the	  army	  nor	  any	  other	  of	  the	  institutions	  examined	  by	  the	  Morning	  Chronicle	  bought	  their	  clothing	  in	  a	  way	  that	  appropriately	  paid	  the	  piece-­‐workers	  who	  made	  the	  goods,	  Mayhew	  reported.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  For	  subcontracting	  in	  sweated	  industries,	  see	  J.A.	  Schmeichen,	  Sweated	  industries	  and	  
sweated	  labor:	  The	  London	  clothing	  trades	  4567-­‐!"!#	  (Urbana,	  Illinois:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  '()*),	  chapter	  1.	  	  5	  Collected	  in	  H.	  Mayhew,	  The	  Morning	  Chronicle	  survey	  of	  labour	  and	  the	  poor:	  the	  
metropolitan	  districts	  (Firle:	  Caliban	  Books,	  2345-­‐!"#$),	  in	  particular	  volumes	  !	  and	  $.	  6	  Mayhew,	  Letter	  VII,	  Morning	  Chronicle	  !	  November	  *+,!.	  7	  Ibid.	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Figure 6.2. London unions supplied by William Smith & Son, drapers, 1849-51.  
Source: Minutes of boards of guardians. 
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describing	  himself	  as	  a	  ‘general	  provision	  merchant’.8	  	  Like	  Smith	  &	  Son,	  Penson	  supplied	  unions	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  London	  (Figure	  !.!).	  He	  was	  also	  wholesale	  dealer	  to	  grocers	  across	  the	  south-­‐east	  of	  England.9	  He	  was	  so	  successful	  in	  business	  that	  he	  was	  able	  to	  invest	  heavily	  in	  property	  in	  Kensington	  in	  the	  +,-.s.10	  In	  $%!!	  he	  incorporated	  his	  business	  as	  Penson	  &	  Company	  with	  share	  capital	  of	  3456,666,	  one	  of	  the	  shareholders	  being	  a	  ;lour	  dealer	  named	  Robert	  Salter	  Thornhill,	  who	  supplied	  the	  St	  George	  in	  the	  East	  workhouse.11	  On	  Penson’s	  death,	  his	  estate	  was	  valued	  at	  3!"#,###.12	  
	  
Figure 6.3. London unions supplied by George Penson, provisions merchant, 1849-51.  
Source: Minutes of boards of guardians. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Penson’s	  evidence	  to	  Old	  Bailey,	  34	  June	  7837,	  case	  ref.	  t"#$"%&$%-­‐!"#.	  Online	  at	  http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id=t45647867-­‐!"#&div=t!*+!,#+,-­‐!"#.	  Accessed	  September	  )*+).	  9	  The	  National	  Archives	  (TNA)	  C45/778/P:;.	  10	  The	  Small	  Edition	  of	  the	  Post	  Of3ice	  London	  Directory,	  :;<=.	  Comprising,	  amongst	  other	  
information,	  of+icial	  directory;	  commercial	  directory;	  court	  directory;	  parliamentary	  directory;	  
postal	  directory;	  banking	  directory;	  &c.	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co,	  /012),	  p.	  622.;	  ‘The	  Ladbroke	  estate:	  The	  )*+,s	  onwards',	  in	  F.H.W.	  Sheppard	  (ed.),	  Survey	  of	  London:	  volume	  01:	  Northern	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Printing	  and	  stationery	  was	  another	  trade	  dominated	  by	  a	  few	  large	  enterprises,	  but	  this	  was	  something	  of	  a	  special	  case.	  From	  its	  earliest	  years,	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commission	  insisted	  on	  unions’	  books	  being	  kept	  in	  a	  uniform	  manner,	  with	  information	  recorded	  and	  presented	  in	  the	  same	  way	  by	  all	  local	  authorities.13	  The	  majority	  of	  unions	  bought	  books	  and	  forms	  from	  Charles	  Knight	  &	  Co	  of	  Ludgate	  Street,	  who	  from	  September	  89:;	  were	  publisher	  ‘by	  authority’	  to	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commission	  (Figure	  !.!).14	  John	  Shaw	  &	  Sons	  of	  Fetter	  Lane	  and	  James	  Truscott	  of	  Blackfriars	  Road	  also	  specialised	  in	  government	  printing,	  pro-­‐formas	  and	  ledgers.	  No	  other	  printers	  supplied	  nearly	  as	  many	  unions:	  nineteen	  served	  between	  two	  and	  four	  unions,	  and	  eighty-­‐seven	  had	  only	  single	  customers.	  Knight’s	  of4icial	  status	  was	  a	  point	  of	  contention:	  the	  central	  authority	  had	  not	  granted	  Knight	  a	  monopoly,	  and	  told	  unions	  in	  '()*	  that	  they	  were	  welcome	  to	  buy	  their	  books	  and	  forms	  from	  any	  supplier	  who	  could	  match	  Knight’s	  price.	  Nonetheless	  Shaw	  &	  Sons	  complained	  to	  the	  Home	  Of1ice	  in	  2345	  about	  the	  PLC’s	  imprimatur,	  and	  although	  Knight	  maintained	  he	  derived	  no	  particular	  3inancial	  bene3it	  from	  it,	  he	  complained	  in	  turn	  that	  Shaw	  faithfully	  copied	  his	  publications	  and	  prices.	  Knight	  had	  prepared	  his	  forms	  and	  account	  books	  in	  collaboration	  with	  PLC	  of#icials	  but	  Shaw,	  he	  alleged,	  ‘copied	  [them]	  in	  every	  particular...	  but	  of	  course	  without	  incurring	  any	  of	  the	  labour	  necessary	  to	  carry	  through	  such	  a	  large	  operation	  in	  its	  +irst	  steps	  of	  economical	  combinations’.15	  In	  $%&'	  Knight	  had	  predicted	  gross	  margins	  of	  0.2	  per	  cent	  on	  union	  books	  and	  forms,	  and	  although	  in	  +,-.	  he	  told	  the	  PLC	  that	  this	  prediction	  had	  been	  over-­‐optimistic,	  we	  cannot	  be	  too	  sure,	  as	  he	  also	  published	  the	  monthly	  PLC	  of-icial	  circulars	  on	  which	  he	  made	  ,-	  per	  cent	  margin.	  All	  the	  unions	  in	  London	  were	  supplied	  with	  their	  forms	  and	  books	  either	  by	  Knight,	  Shaw	  or	  Truscott,	  but	  the	  unions	  also	  had	  many	  small	  printing	  and	  stationery	  requirements,	  such	  as	  notepaper,	  letter-­‐heads,	  cheque	  books,	  bills	  and	  notices	  and	  so	  on.	  For	  these,	  they	  could	  use	  London’s	  many	  small	  printing	  businesses.	  There	  were	  89:	  printing	  of<ices	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  The	  PLC’s	  *irst	  annual	  report	  contained	  an	  order	  for	  keeping	  accounts	  with	  pro	  formas:	  	  PP	  #$%&	  XXXV	  !"#.	  First	  annual	  report	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commissioners	  for	  England	  and	  Wales,	  Appendix	  A,	  no.	  ,,.	  14	  TNA	  HO'(/*+',.	  15	  Ibid.	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of	  various	  sizes	  according	  to	  the	  London	  Society	  of	  Compositors’	  9:;;	  guide,	  many	  of	  which	  occupied	  very	  small	  premises	  such	  as	  sheds	  and	  backyards.16	  
	  
Figure 6.4. Publisher Charles Knight, n.d. (?1865).  
Source: A.A. Clowes, Charles Knight: A Sketch (London: Richard Bentley & Son, 1892). 
Other	  trades	  characterised	  by	  a	  large	  number	  of	  small	  businesses	  were	  those	  in	  wine	  and	  spirits,	  earthenware	  and	  turnery.	  Unions	  did	  not	  need	  very	  large	  quantities	  of	  these	  goods,	  but	  all	  unions	  required	  some.	  Forti6ied	  wine	  and	  gin	  or	  brandy	  were	  usually	  provided	  to	  sick	  paupers,	  but	  not	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  course	  to	  the	  elderly	  or	  in,irm,	  who	  would	  generally	  be	  given	  half-­‐pints	  of	  porter.	  These	  sorts	  of	  quantities	  in	  many	  cases	  could	  be	  provided	  by	  local	  public	  houses.	  The	  brushes,	  baskets	  and	  other	  such	  materials	  used	  by	  paupers	  to	  clean	  the	  workhouse	  could	  easily	  be	  bought	  by	  the	  dozen	  from	  local	  small	  businesses.	  Earthenware	  was	  used	  in	  larger	  quantities	  by	  workhouses,	  which	  needed	  stock	  of	  several	  hundred	  plates	  for	  meals,	  but	  unions	  tended	  to	  buy	  from	  London’s	  earthenware	  dealers	  who	  themselves	  bought	  from	  the	  manufacturers	  elsewhere,	  especially	  in	  the	  Midlands.17	  Unions	  could	  therefore	  easily	  obtain	  the	  goods	  from	  a	  local	  supplier	  who	  would	  not	  have	  to	  keep	  the	  stock	  in	  a	  warehouse	  but	  simply	  arrange	  for	  its	  delivery.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  P.G.	  Hall,	  The	  industries	  of	  London	  since	  0120	  (London:	  Hutchinson	  University	  Library,	  789:),	  p.	  $%&.	  17	  There	  were	  relatively	  few	  manufacturers	  of	  earthenware	  in	  London:	  J.P.	  Cushion,	  Handbook	  
of	  pottery	  and	  porcelain	  marks	  (London:	  Faber,	  ./01),	  pp.	  .10-­‐!!".	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By	  the	  '()*s	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  milk	  was	  brought	  to	  London	  by	  rail,	  and	  many	  unions	  bought	  milk	  that	  had	  been	  produced	  outside	  the	  capital.18	  Collinson	  Hall	  of	  Bowers	  Farm,	  Havering,	  Essex,	  supplied	  four	  unions	  in	  89:;-­‐!"	  and	  had	  premises	  in	  Finsbury,	  the	  City	  and	  Shoreditch	  (Figure	  !.!).	  He	  also	  supplied	  the	  Foundling	  Hospital	  in	  Bloomsbury	  with	  milk	  in	  89:;	  and	  was	  credited	  by	  contemporaries	  as	  ‘the	  2irst	  to	  introduce	  the	  supply	  of	  country	  milk	  to	  London’.19	  William	  Jones,	  who	  sold	  to	  1ive	  unions	  at	  the	  time,	  was	  described	  as	  a	  ‘cowkeeper	  and	  grazier’	  of	  Ham	  Park,	  Upton,	  Essex,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  ‘dairyman,	  and	  dealer	  in	  eggs	  and	  bread’	  from	  his	  premises	  at	  6	  New	  Road,	  Whitechapel.20	  Richard	  Sockett	  and	  John	  Roberts,	  who	  in	  partnership	  ran	  Cranbrook	  Farm,	  Dagenham,	  Essex,	  supplied	  twelve	  unions	  with	  milk.	  They	  had	  premises	  at	  ,	  Mitre	  Square,	  Aldgate.	  James	  Tilling	  had	  a	  farm	  in	  Hendon,	  Middlesex	  and	  premises	  at	  /0	  Earl	  Street,	  Lisson	  Grove,	  from	  which	  he	  supplied	  Strand	  union	  and	  the	  parish	  of	  St	  James	  Westminster.	  	  
	  
Figure 6.5. Dairy farmer Collinson Hall.  
Source: Illustrated Dramatic and Sporting News, 9 July 1881, p. 400. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  There	  is	  not	  consensus	  over	  the	  quantities	  and	  timing	  of	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  railway	  milk	  trade:	  See	  P.J.	  Atkins,	  ‘London’s	  Intra-­‐Urban	  Milk	  Supply,	  circa	  1234-­‐!"!#’,	  Transactions	  of	  the	  
Institute	  of	  British	  Geographers	  !:#	  (&'((),	  pp.	  #-#-­‐!"";	  D.	  Taylor,	  ‘London’s	  milk	  supply,	  9:;<-­‐!"##:	  A	  reinterpretation’,	  Agricultural	  History	  !":$	  ($'($),	  pp.	  ---­‐!".	  	  19	  Essex	  Record	  Of-ice,	  D/DQ	  34/55;	  ‘Mr.	  Collinson	  Hall’,	  Hampshire	  Telegraph	  and	  Sussex	  
Chronicle,	  #$	  March	  $**+,	  p.	  #.	  20	  ‘Bankruptcies’,	  Edinburgh	  Gazette,	  #	  February	  +,-.,	  p.	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The	  direct	  sale	  to	  unions	  by	  dairy	  farmers	  somewhat	  quali5ies	  historians’	  common	  conception	  of	  milk	  distribution.	  Fussell	  suggests	  that	  dairy	  farmers	  outside	  London	  consigned	  their	  milk	  to	  wholesalers	  in	  the	  capital:	  The	  business	  was	  completely	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  wholesalers.	  There	  was	  no	  competition	  between	  them…	  Each	  salesman	  had	  his	  regular	  customers	  every	  day.	  There	  were	  about	  ten	  dealers,	  and	  on	  arrival	  about	  thirty	  or	  forty	  retailer’s	  carts	  were	  waiting	  to	  take	  the	  milk	  away.21	  That	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  unions	  exclusively	  bought	  directly	  from	  farmers,	  and	  there	  is	  in	  fact	  some	  evidence	  of	  metropolitan	  unions	  being	  supplied	  by	  these	  milk	  wholesalers.	  James	  Allen,	  junior,	  of	  56	  Paradise	  Street,	  Lambeth,	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  associated	  with	  a	  particular	  farm	  and	  it	  may	  be	  that	  he	  bought	  from	  farmers	  whose	  milk	  arrived	  in	  London	  at	  nearby	  Spa	  Road	  railway	  station.	  James	  Allen,	  senior,	  supplied	  two	  unions;	  he	  had	  premises	  in	  Paris	  Street,	  Lambeth,	  very	  near	  Waterloo	  station.	  Three	  unions	  bought	  milk	  from	  Edward	  Jutsum,	  listed	  in	  the	  Post	  Of5ice	  directory	  only	  as	  a	  ‘carcase	  butcher’.22	  His	  premises	  at	  +,	  Aldgate	  High	  Street	  were	  close	  to	  Fenchurch	  Street	  station.	  However,	  many	  unions	  –	  especially	  those	  on	  the	  fringes	  of	  the	  metropolis	  –	  also	  bought	  directly	  from	  local	  farms,	  with	  no	  need	  for	  rail	  transport.	  St	  John	  Hampstead	  bought	  milk	  from	  nearby	  farmer	  William	  Collins,	  for	  example,	  and	  Kensington	  was	  supplied	  by	  Henry	  Holmden	  of	  Turnham	  Green.	  The	  concentration	  of	  poor	  law	  business	  among	  small	  numbers	  of	  suppliers	  changed	  somewhat	  for	  different	  trades	  between	  2345	  and	  2365,	  judging	  by	  the	  numbers	  of	  contracts	  held	  by	  certain	  suppliers	  in	  4567	  (Table	  !.!).	  These	  data	  show	  only	  the	  contracts	  between	  unions	  and	  suppliers,	  and	  not	  other	  types	  of	  provision	  (e.g.	  ad	  hoc	  small	  purchases).	  In	  0123	  there	  were	  several	  butchers	  supplying	  a	  large	  number	  of	  unions	  but	  by	  2345	  the	  trade	  appears	  to	  have	  become	  more	  competitive,	  with	  many	  unions	  buying	  from	  suppliers	  who	  had	  only	  one	  or	  two	  other	  contracts	  and	  none	  with	  more	  than	  three.	  For	  the	  supply	  of	  $lour,	  most	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  contracts	  were	  held	  by	  Messrs	  Kingsford	  or	  by	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  G.E.	  Fussell,	  The	  English	  dairy	  farmer	  1233-­‐!"##	  (London:	  Frank	  Cass	  &	  Co.,	  &'((),	  p.	  +&&.	  22	  Kelly’s	  London	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John	  Gillett	  &	  Sons	  (described	  as	  an	  ‘army	  contractor’	  in	  the	  Post	  Of)ice	  directory,	  and	  supplying	  both	  4lour	  and	  meat),	  continuing	  the	  dominance	  of	  a	  few	  large	  suppliers.23	  Grocery	  and	  meal	  are	  divided	  in	  these	  data,	  as	  the	  supply	  of	  meal	  was	  increasingly	  controlled	  by	  Neill	  &	  Waugh	  and	  was	  less	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  general	  provision	  merchants	  as	  it	  had	  been	  in	  the	  2345s.	  Several	  of	  the	  traders	  who	  supplied	  poor	  law	  unions	  in	  1234-­‐!"	  were	  still	  doing	  business	  with	  them	  in	  ,-./.	  These	  long-­‐standing	  suppliers	  include	  John	  Gillett,	  the	  Kingsford	  family,	  grocer	  John	  Eddison	  Craney,	  butchers	  Henry	  Lee	  and	  William	  Masters,	  mealmen	  Edwards	  Brothers	  and	  butcher	  Charles	  Baker	  and	  his	  son	  Benjamin	  Bloom-ield	  Baker.	  	  
Meat Contracts held Flour Contracts held 
Morris & Oakes 3 Messrs Kingsford 9 
James Blofeld 3 John Gillett 6 
Henry Lee 3 S. Kidd & Co 3 
John Gillett 2 Henry Ward 2 
George Barth 2 Thomas Hadden 2 
Joseph Cockrill 2 4 others 1  
B.B. Baker 2   
11 others 1  Meal  
  Neill & Waugh 12 
Grocery  Edwards Brothers 3 
George T. Cox 6 S. Hebberdine 2 
William Topley  2 13 others 1  
16 others 1    
Table 6.2. Poor-law contracts held by suppliers, six months to Michaelmas 1870.  
Source: PP 1870 LVIII 563: Metropolitan Boards of Guardians (contracts). Return of the 
contracts made by the Metropolitan Boards of Guardians for the supply of certain articles for 
the six months ending Michaelmas 1870. 
Meat,	  clothing	  and	  groceries	  tended	  therefore	  to	  be	  provided	  by	  large	  suppliers	  with	  contracts	  with	  several	  unions,	  as	  bulky	  goods	  required	  greater	  capital	  and	  labour.	  Local	  purchases,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  could	  be	  made	  when	  goods	  were	  less	  bulky	  or	  came	  in	  smaller	  quantities,	  or	  when	  they	  were	  required	  less	  frequently,	  as	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  turnery	  or	  wine	  and	  spirits.	  Changes	  are	  apparent	  in	  the	  organisation	  of	  some	  markets	  over	  time,	  and	  meat	  supply	  became	  more	  competitive	  whereas	  larger	  suppliers	  increasingly	  dominated	  the	  +lour	  market.	  By	  the	  3456s,	  meal	  supplies	  emerged	  as	  distinct	  from	  grocery.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  nature	  and	  meaning	  of	  grocery	  developed	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over	  the	  period	  to	  emphasise	  retail,	  and	  that	  mealmen	  came	  to	  represent	  the	  wholesale	  part	  of	  the	  market	  by	  this	  point.	  The	  retail	  market	  was	  increasingly	  dominated	  by	  multiples	  such	  as	  Lipton’s,	  squeezing	  out	  more	  modest	  high-­‐street	  traders	  even	  in	  relatively	  small	  towns.24	  These	  single	  high-­‐street	  traders	  may	  in	  earlier	  decades	  have	  been	  capable	  of	  supplying	  goods	  to	  workhouses,	  distributing	  from	  their	  own	  wholesalers,	  but	  the	  multiples	  who	  replaced	  them	  were	  organised	  differently	  and	  focused	  on	  retail.	  
6.3 The	  importance	  of	  poor	  law	  unions	  as	  local	  customers	  The	  great	  quantities	  of	  goods	  supplied	  to	  poor	  law	  unions,	  the	  large	  sums	  spent	  on	  buying	  them	  and	  the	  longevity	  of	  some	  of	  the	  suppliers	  suggest	  that	  workhouse	  provisioning	  could	  be	  a	  lucrative	  type	  of	  commerce.	  However,	  the	  number	  of	  suppliers	  in	  the	  various	  trades	  for	  different	  unions	  indicates	  that	  poor	  law	  work	  did	  not	  necessarily	  bring	  large	  revenues	  for	  individual	  businesses.	  In	  other	  words,	  some	  unions	  spread	  their	  spending	  on	  certain	  items	  more	  thinly	  than	  others	  (Table	  !.!).	  The	  table	  explores	  this	  geographical	  diversity	  for	  the	  period	  ./01-­‐!"	  by	  listing	  the	  number	  of	  contractors	  supplying	  each	  union.	  Six	  unions,	  for	  instance,	  bought	  their	  bread	  and	  5lour	  from	  just	  one	  supplier	  each	  –	  in	  most	  cases	  a	  supplier	  who	  also	  contracted	  with	  many	  other	  unions.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  most	  unions	  bought	  bread	  and	  !lour	  from	  a	  few	  more	  suppliers,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  from	  very	  many	  –	  such	  as	  the	  unusually	  high	  number	  (12)	  who	  did	  business	  with	  St	  Pancras.	  It	  is	  unclear	  from	  the	  records,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  St	  Pancras,	  at	  that	  time	  a	  parish	  under	  a	  local	  act,	  ran	  a	  ticket	  system	  of	  relief	  by	  which	  outdoor	  paupers	  could	  buy	  bread	  from	  any	  local	  baker,	  and	  the	  bakers	  would	  then	  present	  their	  invoices	  to	  the	  guardians.	  Meanwhile	  some	  unions	  were	  well-­‐placed	  to	  choose	  between	  large	  numbers	  of	  suppliers	  for	  certain	  goods,	  such	  as	  St	  Olave’s	  nineteen	  coal	  suppliers	  between	  &'()	  and	  &',&.	  The	  multitude	  of	  coal	  wharves	  on	  the	  south	  bank	  of	  the	  Thames	  enabled	  the	  union	  to	  buy	  small	  quantities	  directly	  from	  the	  wholesalers	  more	  readily	  than	  other	  unions	  could.	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  F.G.	  Pennance	  and	  B.S.	  Yamey,	  ‘Competition	  in	  the	  Retail	  Grocery	  Trade	  <=>?-­‐!"#"’,	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Bermondsey 3 4 6 19 3 2 3 4 4 1 
Bethnal Green 3 4 2 9 3 2 2 8 1 1 
Camberwell 1 1 4 4 3 1 2 1 3 0 
City of London 12 5 15 15 8 6 2 7 3 0 
East London 6 5 1 10 5 6 5 9 5 0 
Fulham 2 8 5 11 8 2 2 3 2 4 
Greenwich 14 8 5 19 16 4 11 9 11 12 
Hackney 8 6 8 10 2 2 3 3 1 1 
Kensington 13 7 3 16 6 8 7 8 9 4 
Lambeth 2 4 2 10 1 4 6 6 2 3 
Lewisham 1 2 2 5 2 2 2 2 3 2 
Paddington 1 2 1 8 4 5 1 4 2 3 
Poplar 5 6 3 7 5 4 5 6 6 3 
St George Hanover Sq 1 5 0 9 3 2 2 0 0 2 
St George in the East 19 12 9 21 12 13 9 15 12 10 
St George the Martyr 1 5 2 9 2 2 5 7 4 2 
St James Westminster 4 3 0 11 3 6 2 3 1 0 
St John Hampstead 3 7 4 6 6 3 3 3 2 2 
St Luke's Chelsea 5 5 5 20 10 6 3 8 3 4 
St Margaret & St John  7 2 5 22 8 5 5 7 5 3 
St Martin in the Fields 1 4 1 8 3 4 2 5 0 3 
St Olave 7 11 19 21 8 8 6 2 9 3 
St Pancras 53 11 10 24 9 9 6 9 6 4 
St Saviour Southwark 3 11 5 14 3 3 3 9 6 2 
Stepney 8 6 2 10 4 4 5 10 6 7 
Strand 8 11 2 11 6 4 4 4 3 2 
Wandsworth & Clapham 7 2 2 8 3 3 8 7 2 2 
West London 3 7 3 7 1 3 1 13 3 4 
Whitechapel 10 8 8 17 8 10 4 11 9 1 
Mean 7.3 5.9 4.6 12.4 5.3 4.6 4.1 6.3 4.2 2.9 
Trimmed mean* 5.8 5.9 4.3 12.3 5.1 4.4 4.0 6.2 4.1 2.7 
Median 5 5 3 10 4 4 3 7 3 2 
* Trimmed mean excludes greatest and smallest value. 
Table 6.3. Number of suppliers per union by trade-type, 1849-51.  
Source: Minutes of boards of guardians. 
By	  examining	  the	  locations	  of	  suppliers	  to	  a	  single	  union	  in	  London,	  St	  Saviour	  Southwark,	  we	  can	  not	  only	  gain	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  poor	  law	  custom	  to	  local	  economies,	  but	  also	  see	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  concentration	  of	  certain	  markets	  among	  a	  small	  number	  of	  big	  suppliers.	  In	  the	  year	  to	  78	  March	  '()*	  St	  Saviour	  spent	  56,899	  on	  workhouse	  supplies	  of	  various	  sorts,	  including	  bread	  and	  -lour,	  meat,	  groceries,	  soap,	  candles,	  cloth	  and	  clothing,	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coal,	  milk,	  beer,	  vegetables,	  ironmongery,	  stationery,	  cleaning	  chemicals,	  cof$ins	  and	  other	  items	  (out	  of	  a	  total	  spend	  that	  year	  of	  123,565).	  Seventy-­‐three	  suppliers	  are	  listed	  in	  the	  guardians’	  minutes	  as	  having	  received	  cheques	  for	  these	  goods.25	  Of	  those,	  forty-­‐seven	  –	  some	  sixty-­‐four	  percent	  –	  had	  premises	  within	  the	  union,	  with	  the	  other	  twenty-­‐six	  almost	  entirely	  within	  a	  couple	  of	  miles	  of	  the	  union’s	  boundaries	  (Figure	  !.!).	  St	  Saviour	  spent	  '(,*+,	  on	  goods	  from	  businesses	  based	  in	  the	  union,	  though	  ',,89:	  of	  this	  was	  paid	  to	  a	  single	  supplier,	  baker	  Thomas	  Field	  of	  Blackfriars	  Road.	  Field	  ran	  a	  very	  large	  enterprise,	  holding	  contracts	  with	  six	  other	  London	  unions	  or	  parishes	  at	  the	  time:	  City	  of	  London,	  Fulham,	  Hackney,	  St	  James	  Westminster,	  St	  Margaret	  &	  St	  John	  Westminster	  and	  St	  Olave.	  The	  number	  and	  geographical	  spread	  of	  these	  unions	  indicates	  that	  he	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  small-­‐scale	  local	  baker,	  and	  it	  therefore	  seems	  likely	  that	  he	  was	  selected	  by	  St	  Saviour	  not	  just	  because	  he	  was	  based	  in	  the	  union	  but	  rather	  because	  he	  was	  capable	  of	  ful+illing	  the	  contract.	  	  
	  
Figure 6.6. Suppliers to St Saviour Southwark, 1849-51.  
Source: Minutes of board of guardians, LMA SOBG/039/009; Kelly’s London 1852; Post 
Office Directory of Essex, Herts, Kent, Middlesex, Surrey and Sussex. (London: Kelly & Co, 
1855). 	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Did	  the	  union	  prefer	  to	  do	  business	  with	  local	  traders?	  It	  was	  indeed	  prepared	  to	  contract	  with	  large	  bakers	  outside	  the	  union:	  in	  March	  5678	  Joseph	  Goldsworthy	  of	  St	  Luke’s	  Middlesex	  won	  the	  tender,	  though	  he	  did	  not	  execute	  the	  contract;	  instead	  the	  bread	  contract	  was	  awarded	  to	  Thomas	  Hunt	  (either	  of	  Cheapside	  or	  of	  Bermondsey,	  but	  in	  either	  case	  outside	  the	  union)	  and	  the	  !lour	  contract	  given	  to	  Thomas	  Bowditch	  of	  Deptford.	  The	  following	  September	  James	  Murray	  of	  Fleet	  Street	  took	  over	  the	  supply	  of	  both	  bread	  and	  %lour.	  For	  '()*-­‐!"	  there	  were	  ten	  bakers	  capable	  of	  holding	  contracts	  with	  three	  or	  more	  London	  unions	  at	  a	  time	  (i.e.	  who	  held	  or	  bid	  for	  contracts).	  This	  may	  have	  been	  a	  large	  enough	  number	  of	  suppliers	  to	  represent	  a	  competitive	  market,	  though,	  and	  furthermore	  St	  Saviour	  was	  relatively	  fortunate	  in	  having	  two	  of	  these	  ten	  with	  premises	  within	  its	  boundaries.26	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  choice	  of	  Thomas	  Field	  was	  incidental	  to	  his	  being	  within	  the	  union.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  business	  could	  be	  large	  without	  having	  many	  poor	  law	  unions	  among	  its	  customers.	  St	  Saviour,	  for	  example,	  bought	  goods	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  from	  other	  suppliers	  who	  did	  not	  have	  contracts	  with	  other	  unions.	  For	  meat,	  groceries	  and	  oilman’s	  goods	  (i.e.	  soap,	  candles	  and	  so	  on),	  St	  Saviour	  spent	  large	  amounts	  on	  suppliers	  from	  within	  the	  union,	  despite	  much	  bigger	  businesses	  dominating	  these	  markets	  (Figure	  !.!).	  Of	  the	  top	  ten	  suppliers	  to	  St	  Saviour,	  only	  half	  were	  based	  in	  the	  union,	  though	  the	  guardians	  did	  buy	  from	  competing	  suppliers,	  such	  as	  groceries	  from	  both	  John	  Parr	  and	  Nicholas	  Yarrow,	  and	  meat	  from	  both	  John	  Beale	  and	  Henry	  Att3ield	  (Table	  !.!).	  Thus	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  St	  Saviour	  guardians	  were	  willing	  to	  buy	  from	  large	  suppliers	  outside	  the	  union,	  but	  not	  without	  also	  giving	  some	  business	  to	  local	  suppliers	  too.	  The	  guardians’	  minutes	  for	  56	  July	  569:	  record	  that	  	  The	  attention	  of	  the	  Board	  having	  been	  called	  to	  several	  Tradesmen	  having	  had	  the	  orders	  from	  the	  Union	  continuously	  for	  a	  long	  period,	  It	  was	  Resolved,	  That	  in	  future	  where	  this	  has	  been	  the	  case	  the	  orders	  be	  periodically	  given	  to	  other	  Tradesmen	  residing	  in	  the	  Union.27	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  The	  other	  was	  Thomas	  Hadden	  who	  had	  premises	  at	  12	  High	  Street,	  Poplar,	  and	  89	  Bridge	  Street,	  Southwark.	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This	  resolution	  had	  no	  effect	  in	  practical	  terms,	  however:	  within	  two	  months	  the	  bread	  contract	  was	  awarded	  to	  James	  Murray	  of	  Fleet	  Street;	  clothing	  to	  William	  Smith	  &	  Sons	  of	  Pimlico	  and	  Charles	  Roope	  of	  Chelsea;	  meat	  to	  John	  Williams	  of	  Walworth	  Road;	  leather	  to	  Alfred	  Rymer	  of	  Soho;	  and	  milk	  to	  James	  Allen	  Jr.	  of	  Lambeth.	  	  
Supplier Goods Amount (£) 




Thomas Field Bread and flour 1,509 Yes 7 
John Beale Meat 721 Yes 1 
John Parr Groceries 301 Yes 1 
George Penson Butter 282 No 16 
Henry Attfield Meat 234 No 13 
W.W. & R. Brook Soap, candles etc. 174 Yes 1 
William Smith & Son Clothing 169 No 23 
Rusby, Brown & Co. Granite 157 Yes 1 
Charles Roope Blankets etc. 102 No 13 
Nicholas Yarrow Groceries 97 No 11 
Other suppliers  1,220   
Table 6.4. St Saviour Southwark union's biggest suppliers, 1849-51.  
Source: Minutes of board of guardians, LMA SOBG/039/009. 
For	  large	  items,	  therefore,	  guardians	  were	  to	  some	  degree	  restricted	  in	  choice	  to	  a	  few	  major	  enterprises	  who	  had	  the	  resources	  to	  ful2il	  big	  contracts.	  This	  was	  not	  true	  of	  the	  smaller	  businesses,	  who	  in	  many	  cases	  did	  not	  win	  tenders	  for	  contracts	  but	  nonetheless	  had	  opportunities	  to	  supply	  workhouses.	  Only	  purchases	  of	  over	  -./	  were	  required	  by	  law	  to	  be	  put	  out	  to	  tender	  and	  advertised	  widely	  (see	  Chapter	  1).	  We	  have	  seen	  that	  around	  half	  of	  St	  Saviour’s	  large-­‐scale	  suppliers	  were	  from	  within	  the	  union,	  but	  a	  much	  higher	  proportion	  of	  the	  smaller	  suppliers	  came	  from	  inside	  the	  union.	  Of	  the	  4ifty-­‐four	  suppliers	  who	  received	  less	  than	  &'(-­‐worth	  of	  business	  from	  St	  Saviour	  in	  !"#$-­‐!",	  thirty-­‐seven	  (i.e.	  sixty-­‐nine	  per	  cent)	  were	  local.	  These	  sub-­‐!"#	  deals	  amounted	  to	  *+,-,	  of	  which	  *-,4	  (i.e.	  sixty-­‐seven	  per	  cent)	  was	  spent	  on	  local	  businesses.	  There	  were	  a	  number	  of	  advantages	  to	  any	  union	  in	  buying	  from	  local	  businesses,	  and	  St	  Saviour	  was	  not	  the	  only	  authority	  which	  explicitly	  preferred	  them:	  St	  James	  Westminster,	  a	  parish	  under	  a	  local	  act,	  asked	  for	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tenders	  from	  ‘Rated	  Inhabitants’	  in	  April	  6!"#.28	  This	  stipulation	  would	  have	  been	  unlawful	  for	  a	  union	  or	  parish	  under	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Amendment	  Act.	  Many	  types	  of	  small,	  cheap	  items	  could	  quickly	  and	  easily	  be	  found	  locally,	  with	  messengers	  having	  to	  travel	  only	  a	  short	  distance	  to	  order	  them.	  Local	  supply	  was	  very	  practical,	  as	  most	  goods	  were	  delivered	  to	  workhouses	  by	  horse-­‐drawn	  carts.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  preceding	  chapters,	  union	  of&icials	  were	  likely	  to	  know	  local	  suppliers	  well,	  and	  could	  judge	  their	  reputations	  for	  quality	  and	  reliability.	  Guardians	  were	  also	  keen	  to	  keep	  the	  rates	  circulating	  within	  the	  union,	  to	  a	  large	  part	  because	  such	  a	  policy	  would	  help	  their	  re-­‐election.	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  LGB,	  two	  guardians	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  union	  pointed	  out	  that	  when	  it	  came	  to	  contracting,	  boards	  often	  had	  ‘strong	  local	  interests	  to	  serve’.29	  As	  Snell	  argues,	  there	  was	  also	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  local	  attachment	  to	  parish,	  even	  to	  some	  degree	  in	  dense	  urban	  areas	  of	  central	  London	  –	  and	  by	  extension,	  perhaps,	  to	  unions,	  especially	  in	  those	  like	  St	  Saviour	  composed	  of	  just	  two	  parishes.30	  	  St	  Saviour	  therefore	  bought	  in	  bulk	  from	  large	  suppliers	  from	  across	  London,	  and	  in	  smaller	  quantities	  from	  local	  suppliers;	  but	  it	  also	  bought	  in	  small	  quantities	  from	  some	  businesses	  outside	  the	  union.	  These	  purchases	  tended	  to	  be	  for	  specialised	  items,	  from	  traders	  with	  good	  reputations	  and	  where	  there	  was	  no	  local	  alternative.	  For	  instance	  on	  01	  March	  4561	  the	  guardians	  spent	  !"	  $"s	  on	  hammers	  for	  use	  by	  casual	  paupers	  breaking	  stone.31	  They	  were	  bought	  from	  Richard	  Levett	  of	  '(	  Museum	  Street,	  Bloomsbury,	  whose	  entry	  in	  the	  %&'(	  Post	  Of.ice	  directory	  described	  him	  as	  ‘stone	  hammer	  maker	  to	  the	  Metropolitan	  unions,	  &	  general	  smith.’32	  Levett	  supplied	  seven	  unions	  in	  London	  from	  )*+,	  to	  )*.),	  and	  this	  reference	  was	  clearly	  meant	  to	  advertise	  to	  other	  potential	  customers	  the	  !itness	  of	  his	  tools	  for	  constant	  heavy	  use.	  There	  were	  few	  other	  products	  which	  could	  be	  sold	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  their	  suitability	  for	  paupers.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  CWA	  D"#$%,	  micro-ilm	  "##/,	  p.	  $2.	  29	  TNA	  MH'(/',	  +,-.//,+,	  City	  of	  London	  poor	  law	  union	  to	  LGB,	  'A	  May	  'B,!.	  30	  K.D.M.	  Snell,	  Parish	  and	  belonging:	  Community,	  identity	  and	  welfare	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  
!"##-­‐!"#$	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  5667),	  pp.	  ;<,	  =>.	  	  31	  LMA	  SOBG/*+,/**,,	  f.	  012.	  32	  Kelly’s	  London	  ,-./,	  p.	  %&'.	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It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  St	  Saviour	  was	  an	  unusual	  union	  in	  respect	  of	  its	  suppliers,	  as	  it	  was	  centrally	  located	  with	  excellent	  communications.	  Goods	  could	  cross	  the	  river	  via	  Blackfriars	  road	  and	  rail	  bridges	  and	  Southwark	  bridge;	  Blackfriars	  Road	  was	  a	  major	  thoroughfare	  housing	  several	  large	  enterprises;	  and	  the	  south	  bank	  of	  the	  Thames,	  which	  formed	  the	  union’s	  northern	  border,	  was	  lined	  with	  busy	  wharves.	  It	  is	  therefore	  worth	  comparing	  St	  Saviour’s	  suppliers	  with	  those	  of	  a	  less	  central	  poor	  law	  authority,	  such	  as	  the	  parish	  of	  St	  John	  Hampstead.	  At	  8,898	  acres,	  the	  parish	  was	  nearly	  ten	  times	  the	  area	  of	  St	  Saviour,	  which	  covered	  !"#	  acres;	  however,	  it	  had	  less	  than	  a	  third	  of	  the	  population	  (11,345	  for	  St	  John	  Hampstead,	  :;,:<1	  for	  St	  Saviour	  in	  ,-.,).	  Most	  of	  its	  inhabitants	  lived	  in	  Hampstead	  village.	  A	  goods	  railway	  ran	  nearby	  and	  a	  major	  road	  connected	  it	  to	  London,	  but	  despite	  being	  a	  ‘metropolitan’	  union	  it	  was	  separated	  from	  the	  new	  housing	  developments	  of	  north-­‐central	  London	  by	  a	  belt	  of	  /ields.	  The	  parish’s	  guardians’	  minutes	  for	  0123-­‐!"	  list	  seventy-­‐one	  traders	  who	  supplied	  the	  workhouse	  or	  outdoor	  poor,	  the	  addresses	  of	  forty-­‐nine	  of	  which	  can	  be	  readily	  ascertained.33	  Of	  these	  forty-­‐nine,	  twenty-­‐six	  had	  premises	  in	  Hampstead	  and	  twenty-­‐three	  did	  not	  (Figure	  !.!).	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Figure 6.7. Suppliers to St John Hampstead, 1849-51.  
Source: Minutes of Board of Guardians, LMA HPBG/002; Kelly’s London 1852; Kelly’s Essex 
1855. 
Like	  St	  Saviour’s	  suppliers,	  those	  who	  were	  outside	  St	  John’s	  parish	  fell	  into	  two	  categories.	  First,	  the	  sellers	  of	  specialist	  goods	  such	  as	  tool-­‐maker	  Richard	  Levett	  of	  Bloomsbury,	  mangle-­‐manufacturers	  Baker	  &	  Co	  of	  the	  City,	  engraver	  W.V.	  Wingrove	  of	  Smith$ield	  and	  scale-­‐makers	  T.	  Burch.ield	  &	  Son,	  also	  of	  Smith&ield.	  Second,	  the	  large	  enterprises	  capable	  of	  supplying	  in	  bulk	  who	  supplied	  unions	  across	  London,	  such	  as	  draper	  William	  Lunn	  of	  the	  City,	  butcher	  Henry	  Rogers	  of	  Islington,	  potato-­‐dealer	  Charles	  Evans	  of	  Camden,	  !lour-­‐factor/baker	  John	  Gillett	  of	  Bloomsbury,	  and	  coal-­‐merchant	  Coles	  Child	  &	  Co	  and	  brewers	  Goding	  &	  Co,	  both	  of	  Lambeth.	  St	  John	  Hampstead,	  like	  St	  Saviour,	  occasionally	  also	  bought	  the	  sorts	  of	  goods	  sold	  by	  these	  large	  suppliers	  from	  smaller	  local	  traders,	  like	  brewer	  Thomas	  Buckland,	  draper	  William	  Brett	  and	  baker	  Ebenezer	  Jobbins.	  As	  it	  was	  surrounded	  by	  farmland,	  Hampstead	  could	  also	  bene0it	  from	  local	  milk,	  buying	  only	  from	  farmers	  and	  dairy-­‐keepers	  John	  Culverhouse,	  William	  Collins	  and	  Lucy	  Roach,	  all	  of	  whom	  lived	  in	  the	  parish.	  There	  was	  one	  important	  difference	  between	  St	  Saviour	  and	  St	  John	  Hampstead,	  however:	  Because	  of	  its	  location,	  St	  Saviour	  had	  the	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advantage	  of	  a	  higher	  number	  of	  potential	  suppliers	  than	  St	  John	  for	  more	  types	  of	  goods.	  St	  Saviour	  had	  an	  above-­‐average	  number	  of	  suppliers	  for	  1ive	  out	  of	  the	  ten	  goods	  shown	  in	  Table	  !.!:	  clothing,	  coal,	  grocery,	  printing	  and	  shoes/leather.	  St	  John	  Hampstead,	  in	  contrast,	  had	  an	  above-­‐average	  number	  of	  suppliers	  only	  for	  clothing	  and	  meat.	  But	  of	  the	  thirty-­‐six	  suppliers	  within	  the	  parish	  of	  St	  John	  Hampstead,	  only	  one	  supplied	  any	  other	  workhouses	  at	  all.	  Nonetheless,	  most	  of	  the	  same	  characteristics	  of	  supply	  are	  apparent	  for	  both	  St	  Saviour	  and	  St	  John	  Hampstead.	  For	  the	  goods	  they	  required	  in	  bulk,	  metropolitan	  unions	  had	  a	  choice	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	  large	  businesses	  based	  across	  the	  capital.	  These	  large	  businesses	  were	  not	  to	  be	  found	  in	  every	  union,	  limiting	  the	  ability	  of	  guardians	  to	  spend	  the	  poor	  rates	  only	  on	  local	  traders.	  Where	  possible,	  guardians	  took	  the	  opportunity	  to	  spend	  locally	  when	  smaller	  quantities	  of	  goods	  were	  required	  or	  if	  there	  were	  no	  suitable	  large	  supplier,	  but	  when	  unions	  needed	  certain	  specialist	  goods,	  they	  had	  a	  much	  more	  restricted	  choice.	  
6.4 Supplying	  other	  institutions	  Some	  of	  the	  traders	  who	  supplied	  multiple	  poor	  law	  unions	  were	  also	  in	  a	  position	  to	  contract	  with	  other	  large	  institutions,	  suggesting	  that	  institutional	  provision	  was	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  their	  main	  source	  of	  business.	  William	  Smith	  &	  Son,	  the	  Pimlico	  linen-­‐drapers	  who	  supplied	  or	  bid	  for	  contracts	  with	  twenty-­‐three	  metropolitan	  unions	  in	  /012,	  also	  had	  a	  contract	  to	  supply	  shirts	  for	  the	  Royal	  Marines	  quartered	  at	  Deptford.34	  When	  troops	  were	  encamped	  at	  Chobham	  Common,	  near	  Chertsey,	  in	  0123	  before	  their	  departure	  for	  the	  Crimea,	  the	  contract	  to	  supply	  bread	  and	  56	  sacks	  of	  9lour	  a	  day	  was	  won	  by	  John	  Gillett	  of	  Silver	  Street	  Bloomsbury,	  who	  had	  contracted	  with	  thirteen	  poor	  law	  unions	  in	  ,-./.35	  He	  also	  provided	  -..	  sacks	  of	  corn,	  eighty	  loads	  of	  hay	  and	  sixty	  loads	  of	  straw	  for	  the	  cavalry	  horses.	  The	  contract	  to	  provide	  the	  camp	  with	  *,,,,	  lb	  of	  fresh	  meat	  per	  day	  was	  won	  by	  Charles	  Baker	  &	  Son	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  TNA	  J&&'/)*,	  contract	  bond	  *4	  April	  &849.	  35	  ‘The	  military	  camp	  at	  Chobham’,	  Morning	  Post,	  #$	  May	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  p.	  -.	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Newgate	  market,	  who	  also	  supplied	  seven	  unions	  in	  ,-./.	  Commissary-­‐General	  Sir	  Randolph	  Routh,	  according	  to	  the	  Morning	  Post,	  #irst	  offered	  the	  contracts	  to	  local	  tradesmen	  but	  they	  had	  not	  generally	  taken	  up	  the	  proposal.	  	  Poor	  law	  suppliers	  who	  also	  won	  contracts	  with	  the	  army	  included	  William	  Jackson	  &	  Co	  and	  William	  Lunn,	  who	  both	  supplied	  clothing	  to	  troops	  going	  to	  Crimea	  in	  )*+,.36	  St	  Saviour	  union	  bought	  buttons	  from	  Philip	  Firmin	  &	  Sons,	  described	  as	  ‘[wholesale]	  army	  &	  navy	  button,	  military	  &	  naval	  ornament	  manufacturers	  &	  sword	  cutlers	  to	  the	  Queen	  &	  royal	  family,	  678	  Strand,	  &	  !"	  Conduit	  Street	  Bond	  Street‘,	  although	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  the	  buttons	  bought	  by	  St	  Saviour	  were	  for	  the	  uniform	  of	  an	  of(icial	  such	  as	  the	  master,	  rather	  than	  for	  paupers.37	  Irrespective	  of	  this,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  many	  large	  workhouse	  suppliers	  relied	  on	  institutional	  business	  for	  their	  1inancial	  survival.	  Insane	  asylums	  had	  much	  in	  common	  with	  workhouses	  in	  terms	  of	  size	  and	  contracting	  arrangements,	  and	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  they	  shared	  suppliers.	  Chelsea	  linendrapers	  Charles	  Roope	  &	  Son,	  for	  example,	  frequently	  advertised	  in	  the	  Asylum	  Journal,	  offering	  to	  tender	  for	  contracts	  ‘from	  a	  single	  item	  to	  the	  furnishing	  of	  an	  Establishment	  throughout’,	  and	  claiming	  to	  have	  supplied	  the	  Hanwell	  and	  Colney	  Hatch	  asylums	  since	  they	  were	  founded	  (Figure	  !.!).	  
	  
Figure 6.8. Charles Roope & Son, advertisement, Asylum Journal, 15 May 1855, p. 208.	  
Prisons	  were	  also	  a	  good	  source	  of	  business	  for	  workhouse	  suppliers.	  A	  sample	  of	  contracts	  entered	  into	  by	  Middlesex	  prisons	  in	  4567	  were	  won	  by	  workhouse	  suppliers	  James	  Percival	  of	  Blackfriars	  for	  oilman’s	  goods,	  Mary	  Evans	  of	  Bloomsbury	  for	  potatoes,	  Thomas	  Warne	  of	  Covent	  Garden	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  PP	  #$%&-­‐!!	  XXXII	  %&':	  Army	  clothing	  (Crimea).	  Return	  showing	  the	  number	  and	  description	  of	  articles	  of	  clothing	  supplied	  from	  this	  country	  by	  the	  government	  since	  the	  4st	  day	  of	  October	  )*+,,	  for	  the	  troops	  serving	  in	  the	  Crimea;	  &c.	  37	  Kelly’s	  London	  ,-./,	  p.	  %&'.	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leather,	  Benjamin	  Bloom/ield	  Baker	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  for	  meat	  and	  Neill	  &	  Waugh	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  for	  oatmeal,	  barley	  and	  split	  peas.38	  Benjamin	  Bloom%ield	  Baker	  told	  the	  Old	  Bailey	  in	  2345	  that	  he	  and	  his	  father	  Charles	  supplied	  the	  ‘Model	  Prison’	  (i.e.	  Pentonville)	  with	  788	  to	  9,888	  stone	  of	  meat	  a	  day.39	  Nine	  years	  later	  he	  was	  running	  the	  business	  and,	  as	  his	  agent	  James	  Green	  told	  the	  same	  court,	  was	  also	  a	  contractor	  for	  the	  troops	  at	  Woolwich.40	  These	  arrangements	  often	  ran	  in	  parallel	  with	  workhouse	  contracts,	  which	  serves	  to	  emphasise	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  some	  poor	  law	  contractors	  operated	  very	  large	  businesses	  that	  supplied	  a	  range	  of	  bulk	  purchasers.	  Their	  business	  practices,	  therefore,	  were	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  adapted	  to	  serving	  a	  demand	  for	  considerable	  volumes	  of	  goods	  –	  a	  trait	  that	  was	  a	  vital	  for	  succeeding	  in	  a	  marketplace	  full	  of	  large	  institutional	  customers.	  	  	  
6.5 Prices	  Given	  that	  unions	  throughout	  London	  often	  bought	  their	  goods	  from	  the	  same	  suppliers,	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  there	  were	  no	  signi+icant	  geographical	  differences	  in	  prices	  across	  the	  city	  for	  most	  goods.	  Central	  unions	  paid	  neither	  more	  nor	  less	  than	  peripheral	  unions,	  and	  nor	  were	  there	  north-­‐south	  or	  east-­‐west	  divisions,	  with	  the	  single	  exception	  of	  beef	  (Figure	  !.!).	  In	  &'()-­‐!"	  beef	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  consistently	  cheaper	  south	  of	  the	  river	  than	  north,	  but	  the	  differences	  in	  price	  were	  of	  the	  order	  of	  a	  halfpenny	  or	  so	  per	  pound	  and	  this	  pattern	  should	  be	  treated	  with	  caution.	  	  However,	  suppliers	  often	  contracted	  with	  different	  unions	  at	  different	  prices	  for	  the	  same	  goods	  and	  this	  introduced	  some	  spatial	  variation	  in	  costs.	  This	  can	  be	  seen,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  prices	  paid	  by	  London	  unions	  in	  the	  six	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Percival:	  LMA	  MA/DG/123/45,	  51	  June	  4:35;	  Evans:	  MA/D/G/123/43,	  51	  June	  4:35;	  Warne:	  MA/D/G/&'(/)*,	  )-	  December	  '()*;	  Baker:	  MA/D/G/56)/7',	  '*	  December	  '()*;	  Neill	  &	  Waugh:	  MA/D/G/&'(/(,	  +&	  June	  01(+.	  39	  Benjamin	  Bloom+ield	  Baker’s	  evidence	  in	  prosecution	  of	  William	  Wildgoose,	  :;	  September	  !"#$.	  Online	  at	  http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?path=sessionsPapers%(F*+,-.-*/.xml.	  Accessed	  September	  )*+).	  40	  James	  Green’s	  evidence	  in	  prosecution	  of	  Thomas	  Forsdick,	  99	  November	  <=>=.	  Online	  at	  http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/browse.jsp?id=t789877::-­‐!"&div=t)*"*))++-­‐!".	  Accessed	  September	  )*+).	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months	  to	  Michaelmas	  ./01	  (Table	  !.!).41	  Messrs	  Kingsford	  contracted	  with	  nine	  London	  unions	  for	  !lour	  in	  this	  period.	  Their	  prices	  per	  234-­‐lb	  sack	  of	  best	  seconds	  wheaten	  -lour	  ranged	  from	  45s	  !d	  (St	  Pancras)	  to	  $$s	  !d	  (Strand),	  and	  only	  two	  unions	  even	  paid	  the	  same	  price	  (St	  Marylebone	  and	  St	  Giles	  &	  St	  George	  both	  paid	  23s	  !d).	  Gillett	  &	  Sons	  contracted	  with	  seven	  unions	  for	  )lour	  for	  the	  same	  period.	  Each	  paid	  a	  slightly	  different	  price,	  ranging	  from	  *+s	  !d	  (St	  Olave)	  to	  ,-s	  (Fulham).	  S.	  Kidd	  &	  Co	  supplied	  three	  unions	  with	  *lour,	  two	  of	  which	  (City	  of	  London	  and	  St	  Leonard’s	  Shoreditch)	  paid	  &'s	  and	  one	  of	  which	  paid	  -.s	  (Mile	  End	  Old	  Town).	  A	  similar	  disparity	  is	  evident	  for	  meat.	  Morris	  &	  Oakes	  and	  Henry	  Lee	  each	  supplied	  three	  unions	  with	  meat	  in	  the	  six	  months	  to	  Michaelmas	  4567,	  and	  each	  union	  paid	  a	  different	  amount.	  The	  prices	  paid	  by	  Morris	  &	  Oakes’s	  customers	  were	  a	  little	  lower	  than	  Lee’s:	  the	  highest	  from	  Morris	  &	  Oakes	  was	  lower	  than	  the	  lowest	  from	  Lee,	  and	  the	  mean	  price	  per	  pound	  of	  beef	  from	  Morris	  &	  Oakes	  was	  -./d	  and	  from	  Lee	  was	  -./d.	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  Price per 280lb of best seconds  
wheaten flour (shillings) from: 
Union Flour supplier Gillett Kingsford Other 
Bethnal Green Henry Ward   29.25 
Camberwell Gillett & Sons 30.00   
St Luke Chelsea Gillett & Sons 30.83   
Fulham Gillett & Sons 32.00   
St George's Middlesex Kingsford  30.50  
St George in the East Henry Ward   29.25 
St Giles & St George Kingsford  32.50  
Greenwich Kingsford  29.83  
Hackney Kingsford  30.00  
St John Hampstead Gillett & Sons 30.63   
Holborn Kingsford  30.75  
St Mary Islington Gillett & Sons 30.50   
Kensington Kingsford  31.00  
St Mary Lambeth Simmonds & Morten   31.50 
Lewisham James Roffey   30.42 
City of London S. Kidd & Co.   30.00 
St Marylebone Kingsford  30.50  
Mile End Old Town S. Kidd & Co.   32.00 
St Olave Gillett & Sons 29.75   
Paddington Gillett & Sons 31.00   
St Pancras Kingsford  27.50  
Poplar Thomas Hadden   33.50 
St Saviour Donald Scott   32.00 
St Leonard Shoreditch S. Kidd & Co.   30.00 
Stepney W.E. Westrup   27.00 
Strand Kingsford  33.50  
Wandsworth & Clapham Not named   32.00 
Westminster Kingsford  31.75  
Whitechapel Thomas Hadden   30.00 
Mean  30.67 30.78 30.63 
Table 6.5. Prices charged to London unions by flour suppliers, 1870. Prices are given in 
decimal fractions as a result of calculation to standardise price per quantity, as not all unions 
bought flour in 280lb sacks. 
Source: PP 1870 LVIII 563.  
There	  was	  less	  variation	  in	  the	  contract	  prices	  paid	  by	  customers	  of	  Neill	  &	  Waugh	  for	  oatmeal,	  but	  there	  was	  by	  no	  means	  a	  4ixed	  price.	  The	  partnership	  supplied	  twelve	  unions	  in	  the	  same	  period,	  3ive	  of	  which	  paid	  67s	  !d	  for	  a	  hundredweight	  of	  best	  Scotch	  oatmeal.	  Four	  unions	  paid	  89s,	  two	  paid	  *+s	  !d	  and	  one	  paid	  )*s.	  Meanwhile	  Edwards	  Brothers	  contracted	  with	  four	  unions	  for	  oatmeal,	  all	  at	  different	  prices,	  the	  lowest	  being	  56s	  !d	  and	  the	  highest	  +,s	  !d.	  These	  inconsistencies	  in	  price	  suggest	  that	  the	  largest	  suppliers	  did	  not	  necessarily	  charge	  lower	  prices	  than	  the	  smaller.	  The	  cheapest	  4lour	  bought	  by	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a	  union	  for	  the	  half-­‐year	  came	  from	  W.E.	  Westrup,	  who	  supplied	  only	  Stepney	  during	  the	  period.	  The	  sixteen	  unions	  who	  bought	  their	  .lour	  from	  either	  Gillett	  or	  Kingsford	  paid	  on	  average	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  a	  penny	  more	  per	  sack	  than	  the	  customers	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  suppliers.	  This	  is	  only	  a	  small	  difference,	  which	  would	  have	  had	  very	  little	  impact	  on	  a	  union’s	  total	  relief	  costs,	  but	  one	  which	  shows	  that	  large	  businesses	  did	  not	  automatically	  supply	  at	  lower	  prices.	  As	  shown	  in	  chapter	  .,	  unions	  were	  prepared	  to	  buy	  from	  a	  supplier	  who	  was	  not	  the	  lowest	  bidder	  where	  they	  had,	  for	  instance,	  a	  reputation	  for	  a	  reliable	  standard	  of	  goods	  or	  for	  punctual	  deliveries.	  The	  larger	  suppliers	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  achieve	  these	  more	  effectively	  than	  smaller	  traders.	  Larger	  businesses	  may	  also	  have	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  absorb	  the	  costs	  associated	  with	  late	  payments,	  for	  which	  poor	  law	  unions	  were	  notorious.	  Why	  might	  prices	  be	  different	  for	  different	  unions?	  One	  reason	  might	  have	  been	  the	  expected	  quantities	  to	  be	  bought.	  A	  supplier	  would	  be	  contracted	  with	  for	  a	  price	  per	  item	  or	  weight,	  but	  the	  quantity	  actually	  needed	  by	  the	  union	  would	  not	  be	  speci/ied:	  it	  would	  simply	  order	  as	  required,	  and	  the	  supplier	  would	  send	  in	  the	  goods	  and	  invoice	  the	  union	  for	  the	  contracted	  price	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period	  of	  the	  contract.	  A	  0lour	  dealer	  might	  be	  more	  willing	  to	  tender	  at	  a	  lower	  price	  for	  a	  contract	  with	  a	  workhouse	  he	  expected	  to	  supply	  with	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  3lour,	  than	  with	  another	  whose	  orders	  tended	  to	  be	  smaller.	  This	  would	  have	  been	  a	  judgment	  made	  by	  the	  dealer	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  see	  this	  from	  the	  available	  evidence.	  In	  !"#$,	  for	  example,	  there	  was	  a	  very	  weak	  positive	  relationship	  between	  London	  unions’	  pauper	  numbers	  and	  0lour	  costs,	  i.e.	  unions	  in	  London	  with	  higher	  pauper	  numbers	  tended	  to	  pay	  slightly	  more	  than	  those	  with	  fewer	  paupers.	  In	  +,-.	  this	  pattern	  was	  reversed,	  though	  again	  it	  was	  a	  very	  weak	  relationship	  (Figure	  !.!").	  Quantities	  purchased	  alone,	  therefore,	  were	  no	  guarantee	  of	  lower	  prices.	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Figure 6.10. Flour prices and pauper numbers, 1850 and 1871.  
Source: PP 1852 XLV 7: Poor relief. Return of the number of paupers receiving in and out-door 
relief in 607 unions and single parishes in England and Wales, during the half-years ended at 
Lady-Day 1850 and 1851 respectively; together with the average prices of provisions 
contracted for during the aforesaid respective periods by the boards of guardians for the 
different counties; PP 1870 LVIII 563. 
Another	  possible	  explanation	  is	  that	  a	  supplier	  might	  have	  bid	  at	  relatively	  high	  prices	  where	  he	  believed	  a	  union	  was	  likely	  to	  change	  its	  contractor	  at	  regular	  intervals	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  policy.	  He	  might	  also	  have	  offered	  prices	  depending	  on	  how	  likely	  he	  felt	  the	  unions	  were	  to	  accept:	  the	  knowledge	  that	  he	  had	  few	  competitors	  might	  prompt	  him	  to	  bid	  at	  a	  slightly	  higher	  level,	  for	  instance.	  This,	  too,	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  discern	  in	  the	  data,	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  dealers	  colluded	  with	  each	  other	  to	  organise	  price	  levels	  –	  an	  illegal	  practice	  which	  would	  be	  highly	  unlikely	  to	  leave	  evidence.	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  the	  larger	  enterprises	  ran	  some	  contracts	  at	  a	  small	  loss	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  orders	  from	  poor	  law	  customers	  and	  push	  other	  potential	  suppliers	  out	  of	  consideration.	  Aside	  from	  the	  subtle	  judgments	  suppliers	  might	  have	  to	  make	  about	  their	  customers	  and	  competitors,	  dealers	  of	  course	  also	  had	  to	  adjust	  their	  prices	  to	  accommodate	  transport	  costs.	  Some	  unions	  were	  easier	  to	  reach	  than	  others	  but	  all	  would	  have	  had	  deliveries	  by	  horse-­‐drawn	  carts.	  Some	  were	  near	  railways,	  wharves	  and	  canals.	  A	  coal-­‐merchant	  whose	  goods	  never	  needed	  to	  come	  off	  the	  canal	  to	  reach	  a	  workhouse	  might	  therefore	  be	  expected	  to	  charge	  less	  than	  he	  would	  for	  a	  workhouse	  at	  the	  top	  of	  a	  hill	  which	  could	  only	  be	  reached	  by	  road.	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6.6 Conclusion	  The	  poor	  law	  offered	  signi1icant	  opportunities	  in	  London	  both	  for	  large	  contractors	  and	  for	  local	  suppliers.	  London’s	  workhouses	  were	  unusual	  in	  being	  amid	  commercial,	  industrial	  and	  residential	  activity,	  unlike	  in	  many	  rural	  and	  other	  urban	  or	  semi-­‐urban	  unions	  where	  the	  institutions	  tended	  to	  be	  located	  away	  from	  built-­‐up	  areas.	  The	  spatial	  proximity	  of	  workhouses	  therefore	  engendered	  close	  working	  relationships	  between	  buyers	  and	  sellers.	  It	  also	  meant	  that	  some	  contractors	  could	  bene0it	  from	  economies	  of	  scale,	  and	  they	  could	  also	  supply	  other	  large	  institutional	  purchasers	  such	  as	  the	  army.	  The	  concentration	  of	  such	  institutional	  markets	  no	  doubt	  helped	  some	  contractors	  expand	  their	  businesses	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  have	  been	  more	  dif$icult	  to	  achieve	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  country.	  However,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  local	  basis	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  meant	  that	  guardians	  had	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  keeping	  rates	  circulating	  within	  their	  union,	  and	  this	  also	  presented	  opportunities	  for	  local	  businesses	  to	  take	  on	  the	  job	  of	  supplying	  the	  workhouse.	  	  The	  balance	  of	  supplier	  sizes	  depended,	  in	  part,	  on	  the	  kinds	  of	  goods	  that	  were	  supplied.	  Trades	  such	  as	  clothing,	  grocery,	  shoes	  and	  meat	  were	  dominated	  by	  a	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  very	  large	  enterprises	  who	  had	  the	  resources	  to	  supply	  workhouses,	  hospitals,	  prisons	  and	  barracks.	  The	  goods	  they	  supplied	  were	  required	  in	  bulk	  by	  workhouse	  and	  other	  institutions,	  and	  smaller	  traders	  could	  not	  readily	  procure	  and	  provide	  the	  quantities	  needed.	  Although	  for	  most	  of	  these	  trades	  there	  were	  several	  big	  suppliers,	  guardians	  had	  a	  fairly	  limited	  choice	  in	  practice.	  Unions	  were	  also	  important	  customers	  to	  businesses	  in	  their	  localities.	  It	  was	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  guardians	  to	  keep	  expenditure	  of	  the	  poor	  rate	  within	  the	  union	  as	  far	  as	  possible:	  This	  was	  good	  for	  their	  relations	  with	  the	  ratepayers	  whom	  they	  represented,	  and	  was	  facilitated	  by	  their	  knowledge	  of	  local	  businesses.	  Moreover	  giving	  work	  to	  local	  traders	  ultimately	  kept	  people	  in	  employment	  and	  off	  the	  relief	  lists.	  Guardians	  bought	  not	  only	  from	  large	  suppliers	  of	  bulk	  goods	  and	  small-­‐scale	  local	  businesses,	  but	  also	  from	  traders	  who	  could	  provide	  specialist	  goods.	  Makers	  of	  scales,	  cooking	  apparatus	  and	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the	  like	  were	  not	  to	  be	  found	  in	  every	  union,	  and	  for	  these	  specialist	  suppliers	  poor	  law	  unions	  were	  no	  doubt	  an	  important	  source	  of	  business.	  The	  prices	  paid	  by	  unions	  for	  their	  supplies	  differed	  across	  London,	  but	  in	  most	  cases	  without	  a	  discernable	  geographical	  pattern.	  Prices	  also	  often	  differed	  between	  unions	  who	  had	  the	  same	  supplier.	  The	  causes	  for	  this	  are	  not	  easy	  to	  judge	  from	  the	  available	  evidence,	  but	  might	  well	  include	  transport	  costs	  and	  the	  gamesmanship	  involved	  in	  the	  submission	  of	  sealed	  bids.	  	  Poor-­‐law	  contracting	  is	  therefore	  again	  shown	  to	  have	  been	  a	  social	  practice	  –	  a	  matter	  not	  concerned	  only	  with	  the	  lowest	  tender	  but	  rather	  with	  the	  most	  appropriate.	  Judging	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  bidders	  was	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  few	  guardians,	  based	  on	  personal	  knowledge	  and	  taking	  into	  consideration	  social	  relationships	  between	  them.	  London	  differed	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  in	  this	  respect,	  because	  of	  the	  denser	  concentration	  of	  both	  suppliers	  and	  customers.	  The	  urbanising	  parts	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  began,	  over	  time,	  to	  take	  on	  London’s	  characteristics	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  increasing	  distances	  travelled	  by	  goods	  and	  the	  consolidation	  of	  certain	  markets.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  underlying	  requirements	  for	  reliable	  and	  fairly	  cheap	  supply	  were	  constant	  over	  space	  and	  time	  and	  these	  factors,	  perhaps	  more	  than	  mere	  cost,	  helped	  shape	  the	  geography	  of	  poor	  law	  provision.	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! Conclusion:	  Redrawing	  poor	  law	  geographies	  This	  thesis	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  administration	  of	  relief	  under	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  can	  and	  should	  be	  understood	  afresh	  through	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  its	  supply-­‐side	  geographies.	  While	  demand-­‐side	  approaches	  have	  done	  much	  to	  illustrate	  from	  the	  pauper’s	  perspective	  how	  the	  poor	  law	  operated	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis,	  there	  has	  been	  very	  little	  research	  hitherto	  on	  the	  decisions	  that	  had	  to	  be	  made	  by	  guardians	  about	  the	  supply	  of	  relief,	  particularly	  inside	  the	  workhouse.	  This	  research	  has	  therefore	  focused	  on	  an	  area	  of	  work	  about	  which	  we	  know	  relatively	  little	  and	  has	  sought	  to	  locate	  this	  in	  the	  wider	  historiography	  of	  the	  poor	  law.	  	  Existing	  scholarship	  has	  variously	  explored	  national,	  regional	  and	  local	  expressions	  of	  policy	  and	  pauper	  experience	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  integrated	  these	  scales	  of	  analysis.	  This	  thesis	  overlays	  on	  these	  approaches	  three	  further	  interlinked	  geographical	  themes	  of	  signi3icance:	  The	  importance	  of	  types	  of	  place	  in	  understanding	  relief	  practices;	  a	  more	  nuanced	  assessment	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  central	  and	  the	  local;	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  a	  supply-­‐side	  approach	  for	  helping	  to	  understand	  the	  costs	  of	  relief.	  Taken	  together,	  these	  themes	  show	  that	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  poor	  laws	  was	  socially	  embedded	  even	  where	  the	  social	  might	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  most	  thoroughly	  embedded	  in	  the	  economic:	  in	  the	  purchase	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  
7.1 Types	  of	  place	  Variation	  in	  relief	  practices	  can	  be	  seen	  both	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  expenditure	  poor	  law	  unions	  were	  willing	  to	  make,	  and	  in	  the	  policies	  they	  adopted	  concerning	  the	  treatment	  of	  particular	  classes	  of	  paupers.	  Some	  unions	  gave	  large	  outdoor	  relief	  allowances,	  but	  granted	  that	  relief	  to	  relatively	  few	  paupers.	  Others	  with	  longer	  relief	  lists,	  composed	  of	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  paupers,	  gave	  smaller	  amounts.	  There	  were	  unions	  keen	  to	  enforce	  the	  workhouse	  test	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  pauper	  numbers,	  but	  which	  borrowed	  heavily	  to	  build	  their	  workhouses	  and	  burdened	  their	  ratepayers	  accordingly.	  Such	  variation	  has	  long	  been	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  locations	  of	  the	  unions	  or	  parishes	  in	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question,	  and	  patterns	  in	  these	  practices	  can	  be	  seen	  at	  different	  scales	  and	  for	  different	  phenomena.	  For	  instance,	  this	  thesis	  has	  shown	  that	  historians	  have	  been	  right	  to	  suspect	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  north-­‐south	  divide	  in	  expenditure	  per	  head	  of	  population,	  with	  a	  sharp	  contour	  delineating	  a	  northern	  zone	  of	  relatively	  low	  spending	  and	  a	  concomitantly	  high-­‐spending	  southern	  zone.	  However,	  this	  north-­‐south	  divide	  in	  expenditure	  per	  head	  was	  not	  re1lected	  in	  outdoor	  relief	  allowances.	  Instead	  there	  were	  certain	  regions	  displaying	  a	  degree	  of	  uniformity	  in	  their	  average	  outdoor	  doles,	  but	  also	  large	  sections	  of	  the	  country	  where	  neighbouring	  unions	  operated	  very	  differently	  from	  each	  other.	  At	  a	  regional	  scale	  this	  diversity	  is	  masked,	  and	  it	  is	  only	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  union	  that	  the	  variations	  can	  be	  truly	  appreciated.	  	  Nor	  does	  the	  regional	  approach	  to	  poor	  law	  history,	  while	  important	  for	  assessing	  large-­‐scale	  patterns,	  re,lect	  the	  smaller	  scale	  at	  which	  individuals	  understood	  their	  local	  corner	  of	  the	  system.	  For	  paupers,	  the	  region	  or	  even	  the	  county	  was	  too	  large	  a	  unit	  to	  be	  helpful.	  People	  may	  have	  been	  increasingly	  mobile	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  but	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  London	  they	  were	  rarely	  long-­‐distance	  migrants	  and	  the	  rapid	  urbanisation	  which	  characterised	  the	  period	  was	  largely	  a	  product	  of	  people	  moving	  from	  rural	  areas	  to	  their	  nearest	  large	  towns.	  Local	  information	  networks	  among	  paupers	  were	  strong,	  and	  the	  knowledge	  of	  poor	  relief	  practices	  which	  passed	  between	  paupers	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  in(luenced	  their	  destinations	  and	  negotiating	  strategies.	  The	  rural	  or	  urban	  nature	  of	  unions	  was	  just	  as	  important	  a	  factor	  as	  regional	  location	  for	  indoor	  relief	  policies,	  if	  not	  more	  so.	  There	  was	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  variation	  within	  regions,	  but	  far	  less	  between	  types	  of	  places.	  Rural	  unions	  not	  only	  tended	  to	  give	  more	  outdoor	  relief,	  but	  they	  also	  allowed	  greater	  sums	  per	  outdoor	  pauper	  than	  did	  urban	  unions.	  Conversely,	  the	  cost	  per	  indoor	  pauper	  to	  urban	  unions	  was	  greater	  than	  for	  rural	  unions.	  Board	  of	  guardians	  in	  particular	  types	  of	  places,	  however,	  operated	  within	  broad	  regional	  contexts,	  and	  this	  can	  be	  seen	  especially	  when	  considering	  changes	  over	  time.	  This	  is	  to	  be	  expected,	  given	  that	  knowledge	  of	  poor	  law	  practice	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  shared	  between	  guardians	  who	  belonged	  to	  the	  same	  social	  strata	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in	  particular	  regions.	  Shared	  geographies	  of	  poor	  law	  practice	  were	  also	  likely	  to	  arise	  as	  a	  response	  to	  a	  set	  of	  shared	  circumstances.	  Northern	  urban	  unions,	  for	  example,	  increased	  their	  proportions	  of	  paupers	  relieved	  indoors	  between	  !"#$	  and	  !")$	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  brought	  them	  in	  line	  with	  London’s	  unions.	  These	  northern	  towns,	  which	  in	  ./01	  had	  relatively	  low	  indoor	  pauperism	  rates,	  therefore	  had	  more	  in	  common	  with	  southern	  urban	  unions	  by	  4567	  than	  they	  did	  with	  their	  northern	  agricultural	  counterparts.	  In	  that	  sense,	  at	  least,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  talk	  of	  greater	  spatial	  uniformity	  in	  relief	  practices	  as	  the	  century	  progressed	  –	  a	  trend	  driven	  largely	  by	  the	  spread	  and	  growth	  of	  urbanisation.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  century,	  therefore,	  it	  was	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  place	  rather	  than	  its	  location	  in	  the	  country	  that	  arguably	  de3ined	  the	  kinds	  of	  relief	  practices	  that	  prevailed.	  
7.2 Central	  and	  local	  perspectives	  If	  the	  new	  poor	  law	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  London	  solution	  to	  a	  problem	  inherent	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  of	  south-­‐eastern	  England,	  it	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  unions	  further	  from	  the	  capital	  were	  less	  likely,	  at	  least	  initially,	  to	  use	  the	  workhouse.	  Culturally	  entrenched	  resistance	  to	  central	  government	  might	  also	  have	  played	  a	  part	  in	  some	  regions,	  such	  as	  Wales,	  Lancashire	  and	  Yorkshire,	  where	  distance	  from	  London	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  3igurative	  as	  well	  as	  literal	  consideration.	  Cultural	  geographies	  of	  poor	  law	  policy,	  therefore,	  also	  had	  a	  role	  in	  helping	  to	  explain	  local	  patterns	  of	  relief.	  In	  the	  normal	  course	  of	  business,	  however,	  the	  central	  authority	  and	  unions	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  responsive	  to	  each	  other’s	  views,	  and	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  policy	  was	  a	  product	  of	  negotiation	  between	  guardians,	  poor	  law	  inspectors	  and	  the	  central	  commissioners,	  rather	  than	  unilaterally	  imposed	  from	  London.	  Having	  said	  that,	  the	  geographies	  of	  poor	  law	  administration	  as	  understood	  by	  the	  PLC	  and	  its	  successors	  indicate	  a	  signi.icant	  emphasis	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  capital.	  This	  emphasis	  was	  expressed,	  for	  example,	  through	  the	  numbering	  system	  for	  unions	  used	  by	  the	  PLB,	  which	  started	  with	  metropolitan	  authorities	  and	  increased	  with	  distance,	  and	  through	  the	  divisions	  and	  districts	  into	  which	  England	  and	  Wales	  was	  separated.	  The	  central	  authority	  thus	  inscribed	  for	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itself	  a	  strongly	  regional	  and	  London-­‐centric	  view	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  landscape.	  From	  such	  a	  perspective,	  the	  districts	  that	  objected	  most	  strongly	  to	  curtailing	  outdoor	  relief	  seemed	  to	  the	  assistant	  commissioners	  peripheral	  by	  virtue	  of	  both	  their	  location	  and	  their	  resistance.	  	  	  Despite	  the	  relatively	  high	  degree	  of	  surveillance	  over	  unions	  from	  the	  central	  authority	  in	  the	  matter	  of	  relief	  policy,	  boards	  of	  guardians	  enjoyed	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  discretionary	  power	  over	  relationships	  within	  their	  immediate	  localities.	  Indeed,	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  tensions	  between	  unions	  and	  the	  centre	  was	  the	  very	  local	  nature	  of	  the	  union.	  Guardians	  were	  elected	  representatives	  of	  the	  ratepayers,	  in	  of/ice	  to	  defend	  their	  interests,	  and	  with	  the	  role	  came	  a	  form	  of	  patronage	  through	  which	  contracts	  to	  supply	  the	  union	  were	  awarded.	  This	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  functions	  of	  the	  board	  of	  guardians,	  yet	  one	  which	  was	  given	  only	  the	  lightest	  of	  regulatory	  treatment.	  The	  ability	  which	  guardians	  had	  to	  control	  their	  costs	  was	  in	  large	  part	  dependent	  on	  the	  competitiveness	  and	  openness	  of	  the	  tendering	  process	  and	  as	  long	  as	  they	  followed	  this	  basic	  approach,	  the	  centre	  did	  little	  to	  interfere.	  As	  indoor	  relief	  became	  an	  increasingly	  important	  feature	  of	  the	  poor	  law	  landscape,	  this	  factor	  took	  on	  ever-­‐greater	  signi*icance.	  
7.3 Local	  geographies	  of	  supply	  The	  relative	  independence	  of	  guardians	  in	  their	  contracting	  practices	  means	  that	  the	  local	  geography	  of	  supply	  must	  be	  a	  vital	  consideration	  for	  poor	  law	  historians,	  just	  as	  it	  was	  for	  union	  boards.	  Unions	  did	  not	  have	  to	  form	  contracts	  based	  on	  the	  lowest	  tender,	  and	  a	  supplier	  could	  be	  chosen	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  reputation	  for	  reliability,	  a	  personal	  relationship,	  or	  even	  a	  bribe.	  Poor	  law	  economies	  were	  thus	  emphatically	  embedded	  in	  social	  structures	  rather	  than	  adhering	  rigidly	  to	  the	  dictates	  of	  market	  prices.	  	  Boards	  of	  guardians	  had	  two	  potentially	  competing	  priorities:	  one,	  to	  keep	  the	  burden	  on	  the	  rates	  as	  low	  as	  possible;	  and	  the	  other,	  to	  keep	  the	  money	  spent	  by	  the	  union	  circulating	  within	  it.	  In	  places	  such	  as	  London,	  where	  large	  numbers	  of	  businesses	  from	  outside	  a	  given	  union	  could	  compete	  for	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contracts,	  the	  temptation	  for	  guardians	  to	  spend	  money	  on	  low-­‐bidding	  ‘strangers’	  was	  great.	  For	  the	  0irst	  few	  years	  of	  the	  new	  poor	  law’s	  operation,	  it	  was	  only	  in	  London	  that	  external	  1irms	  could	  compete	  in	  this	  way.	  In	  the	  later	  years	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  as	  supply	  chains	  improved	  and	  markets	  in	  some	  goods	  became	  consolidated,	  urban	  centres	  outside	  London	  also	  exhibited	  this	  feature.	  Larger	  1irms	  came	  to	  dominate	  the	  supply	  of	  certain	  goods	  to	  unions,	  in	  particular	  foodstuffs	  such	  as	  meal	  and	  milk	  which	  were	  easily	  transported	  by	  rail.	  Large	  2irms	  were	  certainly	  present	  in	  the	  !irst	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  but	  in	  less	  densely	  populated	  unions	  –	  where	  guardians	  contracted	  more	  with	  local	  businesses	  –	  these	  !irms	  were	  further	  up	  the	  distribution	  chain.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  were	  wholesalers	  to	  the	  union	  contractors.	  Over	  time,	  these	  wholesalers	  increasingly	  came	  to	  supply	  unions	  directly.	  	  The	  poor	  law	  offered	  signi1icant	  opportunities	  to	  local	  1irms	  and	  entrepreneurs,	  though	  the	  scale	  of	  opportunity	  differed	  between	  places.	  London	  offered	  a	  dense	  concentration	  of	  customers,	  but	  outside	  the	  capital	  suppliers	  faced	  greater	  dif/iculty	  in	  reaching	  more	  than	  one	  union.	  London’s	  unions	  and	  parishes	  were	  administrative	  divisions	  of	  a	  continuous	  conurbation;	  however,	  in	  the	  north	  of	  England,	  even	  the	  rapidly	  growing	  towns	  and	  cities	  were	  still	  surrounded	  by	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  agricultural	  land.	  The	  densely	  populated	  unions	  in	  Lancashire,	  for	  example,	  were	  still	  composed	  of	  towns	  with	  largely	  rural	  hinterlands.	  In	  the	  north-­‐east,	  the	  population	  of	  Chester	  le	  Street	  union,	  County	  Durham,	  for	  example,	  grew	  by	  two-­‐thirds	  from	  !"#!	  to	  !"'!	  but	  its	  overall	  population	  density	  remained	  below	  one	  person	  per	  acre.	  There	  were	  few	  continuous	  built-­‐up	  areas	  outside	  London	  which	  were	  divided	  into	  more	  than	  one	  union	  and	  for	  that	  reason,	  beyond	  the	  capital	  the	  spatial	  reach	  of	  suppliers	  was	  more	  restricted.	  	  The	  openings	  for	  small	  businesses	  to	  supply	  poor	  law	  unions	  therefore	  took	  different	  forms	  in	  London	  and	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  England	  and	  Wales.	  London’s	  unions	  appear	  to	  have	  given	  much	  of	  their	  business	  to	  the	  large	  contractors	  who	  were	  capable	  of	  reliably	  delivering	  the	  requisite	  quantities	  of	  goods,	  and	  this	  element	  of	  reliability	  had	  to	  be	  prioritised	  over	  the	  supplier	  being	  local	  to	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the	  union.	  Nonetheless,	  London’s	  unions	  bought	  the	  same	  goods	  from	  smaller	  businesses	  within	  their	  boundaries	  in	  lesser	  quantities	  on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis	  alongside	  purchases	  of	  certain	  items	  from	  specialist	  suppliers.	  In	  the	  provincial	  case	  studies	  analysed	  here,	  there	  were	  more	  opportunities	  for	  businesses	  whose	  only	  poor-­‐law	  customer	  was	  the	  local	  workhouse.	  Regional	  and	  local	  differences	  in	  relief	  practices	  cannot	  be	  explained	  directly	  by	  price	  differences,	  but	  rather	  re0lect	  social	  geographies	  of	  supply	  –	  a	  fact	  especially	  visible	  in	  the	  differences	  between	  urban	  and	  rural	  unions.	  Over	  the	  thirty	  years	  from	  /012,	  the	  poor	  law	  supply	  market	  displayed	  many	  signs	  of	  the	  development	  of	  economies	  of	  scale,	  both	  internally	  and	  externally.1	  Individual	  *irms	  specialised	  and	  grew,	  becoming	  increasingly	  dominant	  in	  the	  supply	  of	  goods	  such	  as	  fabric,	  shoes,	  meal,	  milk	  or	  butter	  and	  cheese.	  Poor	  law	  supply	  in	  London	  was	  also	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  institutional	  provision	  sector,	  with	  many	  union	  contractors	  also	  winning	  tenders	  with	  the	  likes	  of	  hospitals,	  prisons,	  schools,	  asylums	  and	  the	  military.	  These	  opportunities	  were	  far	  more	  prevalent	  in	  London,	  enabling	  a	  market	  characterised	  by	  very	  large	  0irms	  to	  develop	  to	  a	  much	  greater	  extent	  than	  elsewhere.	  	  	  Evidence	  for	  anti-­‐competitive	  practices	  is	  thin,	  though	  there	  are	  occasional	  intimations	  in	  the	  records	  of	  price	  manipulation,	  adulteration	  of	  goods	  and	  cosy	  relationships	  between	  contractors	  and	  poor	  law	  of3icials.	  There	  are,	  for	  example,	  hints	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  cartels	  in	  meat	  wholesaling	  and	  of	  milk	  contamination,	  and	  questions	  are	  raised	  by	  the	  predominance	  of	  single	  suppliers	  for	  goods	  such	  as	  potatoes	  in	  London.	  The	  only	  type	  of	  goods	  for	  which	  the	  central	  authority	  can	  be	  said	  to	  have	  intervened,	  though,	  was	  printing	  and	  stationery.	  Although	  unions	  were	  not	  bound	  by	  the	  poor	  law	  regulations	  to	  buy	  from	  speci3ic	  suppliers,	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  3irms	  produced	  the	  ledgers	  and	  forms	  which	  the	  central	  authority	  required	  unions	  to	  use.	  One	  such	  &irm,	  Charles	  Knight	  &	  Co,	  worked	  closely	  with	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Commission	  in	  drafting	  the	  forms	  in	  the	  /irst	  place	  and	  advertised	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  semi-­‐of#icial	  status.	  In	  all	  other	  respects,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  that	  anti-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A.	  Marshall,	  Principles	  of	  Economics	  (London:	  Macmillan	  &	  Co,	  1234).	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competitive	  pricing	  practices	  characterised	  the	  supply	  of	  workhouses.	  Indeed,	  although	  relationships	  between	  particular	  suppliers	  and	  unions	  could	  become	  entrenched	  over	  time,	  the	  merging	  of	  unions	  brought	  disruptive	  new	  competition	  between	  the	  long-­‐term	  suppliers	  of	  the	  amalgamated	  bodies.	  Therefore,	  suppliers	  could	  and	  did	  change	  for	  several	  reasons,	  and	  this	  alone	  would	  have	  militated	  against	  the	  development	  of	  anti-­‐competitive	  practices.	  The	  local	  and	  national	  elements	  which	  went	  towards	  local	  prices	  of	  goods	  were	  highly	  signi,icant	  for	  the	  poor	  law	  unions	  buying	  them.	  Local	  variations	  in	  prices	  in	  certain	  cases	  go	  some	  way	  towards	  explaining	  differences	  in	  indoor	  relief	  expenditure	  and,	  indeed,	  the	  readiness	  of	  unions	  to	  use	  the	  workhouse.	  Prices	  did	  not	  usually	  have	  a	  linear	  relationship	  with	  relief	  expenditure,	  but	  could	  affect	  purchasing	  decisions	  and	  therefore	  the	  experiences	  of	  paupers.	  Large	  'luctuations	  in	  prices	  made	  'inancial	  management	  dif'icult,	  but	  the	  central	  authority	  was	  more	  concerned	  with	  !luctuations	  in	  pauper	  numbers	  than	  with	  the	  costs	  of	  goods	  and	  services.	  District	  auditors,	  for	  example,	  were	  charged	  only	  with	  seeking	  out	  unlawful	  expenditure,	  whereas	  it	  was	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  ratepayers	  to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  guardians	  had	  struck	  a	  good	  deal	  on	  their	  behalf.	  	  The	  historiographical	  conception	  of	  local	  poor	  law	  economies	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  composed	  of	  boards	  of	  guardians,	  ratepayers,	  paupers	  and	  the	  central	  authority.	  Variations	  in	  policy	  and	  in	  expenditure,	  over	  time	  and	  over	  space,	  have	  largely	  been	  explained	  in	  terms	  of	  these	  elements.	  This	  thesis	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  suppliers	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  to	  poor	  law	  unions	  must	  also	  form	  part	  of	  our	  understanding	  of	  poor	  law	  practice	  and	  expenditure.	  Poor	  law	  unions	  were	  important	  within	  their	  local	  and	  wider	  economies	  for	  their	  roles	  as	  consumers	  of	  goods	  and	  as	  sources	  of	  revenue	  for	  businesses	  of	  all	  sizes,	  and	  not	  only	  as	  the	  agencies	  through	  which	  the	  poor	  were	  relieved.	  By	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  supply	  side,	  the	  geographies	  of	  poor	  relief	  policy	  and	  practice	  can	  be	  drawn	  more	  effectively.	  Different	  types	  of	  place	  exhibited	  distinct	  characteristics,	  with	  the	  dense	  concentrations	  of	  paupers,	  unions	  and	  suppliers	  found	  in	  urban	  areas	  con-iguring	  themselves	  in	  different	  ways	  to	  
	  	   !"#	  
rural	  economies.	  Regions,	  similarly,	  can	  be	  understood	  not	  just	  as	  generalised	  zones	  of	  similar	  relief	  approaches,	  but	  also	  as	  functional	  spaces	  of	  economic	  activity,	  delineated	  by	  price	  contours	  or	  the	  reach	  of	  a	  supplier.	  At	  different	  scales,	  therefore,	  poor	  law	  geographies	  can	  look	  quite	  contradictory:	  What	  can	  appear	  to	  be	  areas	  of	  similar	  practice	  can	  be,	  in	  fact,	  the	  products	  of	  dissimilar	  processes.	  The	  +lows	  of	  money,	  goods,	  information	  and	  indeed	  people,	  which	  are	  visible	  at	  these	  different	  scales,	  suggest	  that	  the	  poor	  law	  must	  therefore	  be	  understood	  not	  as	  a	  ‘system’	  but	  rather	  as	  an	  interweaving	  set	  of	  local	  and	  national	  social	  economies.	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Appendix	  B.	  Stock	  in	  Wandsworth	  &	  Clapham	  
workhouse,	  ++	  March	  /01/	  	  
Provision store  
Bread 191 loaves 
Flour 215 lbs 
Cheese 443 lbs 
Peas 64 qts 
Oatmeal 280 lbs 
Butter 170 lbs 
Rice 21 lbs 
Tea 77 lbs 
Sugar 280 lbs 
Officer’s cheese 16 lbs 
Coffee 1 lbs 
Candles 35 lbs 
Salt 56 lbs 
Soda 728 lbs 
Scotch Barley 70 lbs 
  
Cellar  
Porter 956 pints 
Ale 351 pints 
Wine 236 oz 
Brandy 163 oz 
Gin 130 oz 
Treacle 28 lbs 
Pork 170 lbs 
Coals 1400 cwt 
Chaplain’s Wine 4 pints 
Potatoes 1680 lbs 
Marsala 308 oz 
  
Tailor’s Shop  
Grey Army Cloth 123 ¼ yds 
Cotton Cord 86 yds 
Jean 64 yds 
Grey Calico 54 yds 
  
Shoemaker’s Shop  
Crop Butts 108 lbs 
Tanner’s Bellies 91 lbs 
Wax Kip 89 lbs 
Grain Shoulders 30 lbs 
Welt Shoulders 21 lbs 
Calf Rounding 29 ½ lbs 
  




Shoes (Men’s) Leather  67 
Shoes (Men’s) Webb 40 
Stockings 251 
Caps 15 
Shoes (Women’s) 58 	  	  
Women’s Store  
Gowns 54 
Under Petticoats 112 
Upper Petticoats 92 
Shifts 190 
Aprons 199 
Handkerchiefs (Men’s) 79 













Bolster Cases 8 
Towels 44 
  
Clothing Materials  
Forfar Sheeting 828 ½ yds 
Irish Linen 9 ¼ yds 
Huckaback 134 ½ yds 
Union Check 206 ½ yds 
Grey Calico 136 yds 
Wigan Calico 5 ½ yds 
Flannel 128 ½ yds 
Petworth Stripe 281 ½ yds 
Jacconet Muslin 14 ¾ yds 
Blue Stripe for Gowns 150 yds 
Bed Tick 111 yds 
Forfar Canvass 135 ½ yds 
¼ inch Stripe Cotton 255 ½ yds 
  
In the Mill  
Wheat 18 quarters 
Flour 13 sacks 2 bush. 
Fine Middlings 8 bushels 
Sharps Fine Pollard, Cs 
Pollard and Bran 
104 bushels 
  
In the Bakehouse  
Flour 85 sacks 3 pecks 
Coals 15 cwt 
Salt 1 cwt 
Potatoes 3 cwt 
  
Excludes goods in mill sent in by parties to 
be ground. 
Source: LMA WABG/010, 22 March 1851. 
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  Respectively;	  Together	  With	  the	  Cost	  Per	  Head	  on	  the	  Population	  in	  Fifty	  Unions	  and	  Parishes,	  Having	  the	  Largest	  Population,	  in	  England	  and	  Wales.	  !"#$	  VIII	  $.	  Report	  From	  the	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Adulteration	  of	  Food,	  &c.,	  Together	  With	  the	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Committee,	  Minutes	  of	  Evidence,	  Appendix	  and	  Index.	  !"#$	  Session	  ,	  XXXII	  pt.	  I	  Supplement	  56.	  Poor	  Rates	  and	  Pauperism.	  Return	  (B.)	  Paupers	  Relieved	  on	  $st	  January	  $,-,.	  !"#$-­‐!"	  XLIX	  part	  +	  ,-..	  Workhouses.	  Return	  of	  the	  Cost	  of	  Building	  of	  Workhouses	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  Erected	  Since	  4567;	  Stating	  Number	  of	  Inmates	  Intended	  for	  Originally,	  and	  Average	  Annual	  Expense	  of	  Food	  and	  Clothing,	  for	  the	  Years	  $%&'	  to	  $%&%,	  of	  the	  Said	  Workhouses.	  !"#$	  XVII	  !.	  Report	  From	  the	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Irremovable	  Poor;	  Together	  With	  the	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Committee,	  Minutes	  of	  Evidence,	  Appendix,	  and	  Index.	  !"##	  XXXV	  '(!.	  Dietaries	  for	  the	  Inmates	  of	  Workhouses.	  Report	  to	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  of	  Dr	  Edward	  Smith,	  FRS,	  Medical	  Of#icer	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board,	  and	  Poor	  Law	  Inspector.	  !"#$	  LX	  ($.	  Workhouse	  Dietaries.	  !"#$-­‐!"	  LXI	  '('.	  Poor	  law	  (workhouse	  inspection).	  Return	  to	  an	  order	  of	  the	  Honourable	  the	  House	  of	  Commons,	  dated	  /	  December	  4567	  for,	  a	  return	  of	  copies	  of	  a	  letter	  dated	  the	  /0th	  day	  of	  October	  /400,	  and	  addressed	  by	  direction	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  to	  Mr.	  Gulson,	  Mr.	  Hawley,	  Mr.	  Weale,	  Sir	  John	  Walsham,	  Mr.	  Graves,	  Mr.	  Doyle,	  Mr.	  Farnall,	  Mr.	  Hurst,	  Mr.	  Cane,	  and	  Dr.	  Edward	  Smith,	  poor	  law	  inspectors,	  instructing	  them	  to	  report	  specially	  on	  the	  workhouses	  in	  their	  respective	  districts;	  of	  the	  reports	  made	  by	  the	  said	  Poor	  Law	  inspectors	  in	  pursuance	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  instructions;	  and,	  of	  
	  	   !"#	  
any	  statements	  of	  Poor	  Law	  inspectors	  formerly	  in	  charge	  of	  unions	  reported	  upon	  in	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  reports.	  !"#$	  LVIII	  )*+.	  Metropolitan	  Boards	  of	  Guardians	  (Contracts).	  Return	  of	  the	  Contracts	  Made	  By	  the	  Metropolitan	  Boards	  of	  Guardians	  for	  the	  Supply	  of	  Certain	  Articles	  for	  the	  Six	  Months	  Ending	  Michaelmas	  789:.	  !"#$	  LIX	  !.	  Poor	  Rates,	  &c.	  Return	  Relating	  to	  Local	  Taxation,	  &c.	  !"#$	  XXXV	  !.	  Twenty-­‐Second	  Annual	  Report	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board.	  789:-­‐!".	  !"#!	  XXVII	  !.	  Twenty-­‐Third	  Annual	  Report	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board.	  !"#$	  LI	  ()).	  Workhouses,	  Metropolis	  (Supply	  of	  Provisions).	  Copy	  of	  Report	  of	  Francis	  W.	  Rowsell,	  Esquire,	  Superintendent	  of	  Contracts,	  Admiralty,	  to	  the	  Right	  Honourable	  James	  Stansfeld,	  M.P.,	  President	  of	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board,	  Dated	  the	  )*th	  Day	  of	  July	  1231,	  Relative	  to	  the	  System	  of	  Supply	  of	  Provisions	  and	  Stores	  for	  the	  Workhouses	  of	  the	  Metropolis.	  !"#$	  LXIII	  !.	  Paupers.	  Return	  for	  the	  Years	  !"89,	  !"$9,	  !"#9,	  and	  !"#<,	  of	  the	  Number	  of	  Paupers	  in	  Receipt	  of	  Relief	  in	  Each	  Union	  in	  England	  on	  ,	  January	  of	  Each	  Year	  Respectively,	  Together	  With	  the	  Cost	  of	  Total	  Relief	  to	  the	  Poor;	  Also,	  a	  General	  Summary	  of	  the	  Same	  Particulars	  for	  the	  Whole	  of	  England	  in	  Each	  of	  the	  Speci2ied	  Years.	  !""!	  XCII	  '(!.	  Trade	  (United	  Kingdom	  and	  France).	  Return	  Showing	  the	  Trade	  Between	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  France,	  in	  Each	  of	  the	  Years	  From	  !"#!	  to	  !"'(,	  Inclusive,	  According	  to	  the	  Respective	  Of<icial	  Statistics	  of	  the	  Two	  Countries,	  With	  an	  Explanatory	  Memorandum	  Thereon.	  !""#	  XXX	  Pt.	  I	  !.	  Eleventh	  Annual	  Report	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board.	  	  !""!-­‐!".	  !"""	  XLIX	  !.	  Seventeenth	  Annual	  Report	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Board.	  	  !""#-­‐!!.	  !"!#	  LIII	  !.	  Royal	  Commission	  on	  the	  Poor	  Laws	  and	  Relief	  of	  Distress.	  Appendix	  Volume	  XXV.	  Statistics	  Relating	  to	  England	  and	  Wales.	  
	  	   !"!	  
The	  National	  Archives	  
Board	  of	  Trade	  BT#$/$&'(.	  Files	  of	  dissolved	  companies.	  Penson	  &	  Company	  Ltd.	  
Chancery	  C"#/%%&/P().	  Penson	  &	  Company	  Ltd	  v.	  Penson	  ("%:().	  
Home	  Of(ice	  HO#$/&'&&.	  Correspondence	  with	  Poor	  Law	  Commission	  (&<#').	  HO#$/!"#$.	  Correspondence	  with	  Shaw	  &	  Sons,	  Printers	  (:;#<).	  
Records	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Judicature	  and	  related	  courts	  J""#/%&.	  Queen's	  Remembrancer:	  Bonds	  and	  Recognizances.	  Contract	  Bonds.	  William	  Smith,	  the	  elder,	  and	  William	  Smith,	  the	  younger,	  linen	  drapers	  at	  Pimlico,	  to	  supply	  shirts	  to	  Deptford	  for	  the	  Royal	  Marines	  (4567).	  
Ministry	  of	  Health,	  Local	  Government	  Board,	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  and	  Poor	  Law	  
Commission	  MH#$/#&.	  Circular	  letters	  from	  the	  Poor	  Law	  Board	  (#=>$).	  MH#$.	  Local	  Government	  Board	  and	  predecessors:	  Correspondence	  with	  poor	  law	  unions	  and	  other	  local	  authorities.	  !"#.	  Wycombe	  (./!0-­‐!").	  !"#$.	  Truro	  (!,-.-­‐!").	  !"#$.	  Lanchester	  ("1#2-­‐!!).	  !!"#.	  Braintree	  (#".!-­‐!").	  !!"#.	  Ross	  (*#+*-­‐!").	  !"#$.	  Brentford	  (0120-­‐!!).	  !"#$.	  St	  George	  in	  the	  East	  ("#$%-­‐!").	  
	  	   !"#	  
!"#".	  St	  Pancras	  (/0"1).	  !"#$-­‐!".	  Stepney	  (!,-.-­‐!!).	  !"#$.	  Whitechapel	  (#12!-­‐!").	  !"##.	  Great	  Yarmouth	  (1!23-­‐!").	  !!"#.	  Oundle	  ("!-"-­‐!").	  !"#!.	  Nottingham	  (0122).	  !"#".	  Oxford	  (-./0-­‐!").	  !"#$.	  Uppingham	  ($"01-­‐!").	  !"#!$.	  Bedminster	  (!122).	  !"#$%.	  Bridgewater	  (-./0-­‐!").	  !!""".	  Southampton	  (!/01-­‐!!).	  !"#$%.	  Lambeth	  (!011).	  !"#$!-­‐!.	  St	  Olave	  (,-.,-­‐!").	  	  !"#$$.	  St	  Saviour	  Southwark	  (!343-­‐!").	  !"#$#.	  Hastings	  (!//").	  !""#$.	  Narberth	  (!$"/-­‐!!).	  MH#$/#.	  Correspondence	  with	  Admiralty	  (#;<;-­‐!").	  MH#$/&&.	  Miscellaneous	  correspondence	  and	  papers	  (0122).	  MH#$.	  Correspondence	  with	  Assistant	  Commissioners	  and	  Poor	  Law	  Inspectors.	  	   !".	  William	  Day	  (!-./-­‐!").	  	   !".	  William	  H.	  Toovey	  Hawley	  ("2!3-­‐!").	  
	  	   !"#	  
Local	  archives	  (Records	  of	  boards	  of	  guardians/directors	  unless	  otherwise	  stated.)	  
Camden	  Local	  Studies	  and	  Archive	  Centre	  UTAH	  &&'	  (micro.ilm).	  St	  Pancras	  (89:;-­‐!").	  
City	  of	  Westminster	  Archives	  MF	  $%&-­‐!"#	  (micro+ilm).	  St	  George,	  Hanover	  Square	  (;<=>-­‐!").	  MF	  $%%&-­‐!""#	  (micro+ilm).	  St	  James	  Piccadilly	  ("#89-­‐!").	  MF	  $%&!	  (micro)ilm).	  St	  Margaret	  &	  St	  John	  Westminster	  (9:;!-­‐!").	  
Dudley	  Archives	  DSCAM/'/(/().	  Articles	  of	  co-­‐partnership,	  William	  Cooksey	  &	  Son	  (6787).	  
Durham	  County	  Record	  Of3ice	  	  U/CS	  &.	  Chester	  le	  Street	  (/012).	  U/CS	  &.	  Chester	  le	  Street	  (/0&1-­‐!").	  U/CS	  &'.	  Chester	  le	  Street	  Treasurer	  (./01-­‐!").	  	  U/DU	  %.	  Durham	  (-./0-­‐!").	  	  U/DU	  %-­‐!.	  Durham	  (+,-!-­‐!").	  	  U/HO	  &;	  U/HO	  (-­‐!.	  Houghton	  le	  Spring	  (234!-­‐!").	  	  
Essex	  Record	  Of-ice	  D/DQ	  %&/''.	  Letter	  from	  Collinson	  Hall	  of	  Bowers	  Farm,	  Havering,	  to	  Mr.	  Brownlow,	  Foundling	  Hospital,	  Middlesex	  (October	  5678).	  
London	  Metropolitan	  Archives	  BBG/$$%.	  St	  Mary	  Bermondsey	  (567$-­‐!").	  	  BBG/$%&,	  $%).	  St	  Olave	  (3&4)-­‐!").	  
	  	   !""	  
CAGB/&&'-­‐!!".	  Camberwell	  (."/0-­‐!").	  CBG/%%&.	  East	  London	  (2345-­‐!").	  	  CBG/%&'.	  City	  of	  London	  (&345-­‐!!)	  CBG/%&'.	  West	  London	  (()*+-­‐!").	  CHBG/&&'.	  St	  Luke	  Chelsea	  (5'67-­‐!").	  FBG/%%&-­‐!!".	  Fulham	  (,-./-­‐!").	  GBG/$%&-­‐!"#.	  Greenwich	  ("/01-­‐!").	  HPBG/&&'.	  St	  John	  Hampstead	  (7898-­‐!"#$).	  KBG/%&'-­‐!"#.	  Kensington	  ("/0/-­‐!"#$).	  LABG/&&'.	  Lambeth	  (1234-­‐!").	  LEBG/&&'.	  Lewisham	  (234'-­‐!").	  	  MA/DG/&'(.	  Middlesex	  prison	  contracts	  (9:(;).	  PABG/&&'.	  Paddington	  (2345-­‐!").	  SOBG/&''.	  St	  George	  the	  Martyr	  ('456-­‐!").	  SOBG/&'(/&)&-­‐!"#.	  St	  Saviour	  Southwark	  (23#!-­‐!""!).	  STBG/L/'()-­‐!"#.	  Stepney	  ("-./-­‐!").	  STBG/WH/()).	  Whitechapel	  ()*+,-­‐!").	  WABG/&'&-­‐!"".	  Wandsworth	  and	  Clapham	  ("456-­‐!").	  WEBG/SM/()*-­‐!"#.	  St	  Martin	  in	  the	  Fields	  ("456-­‐!").	  	  WEBG/ST/())-­‐!"#.	  Strand	  ("-./-­‐!").	  X"#"/""%	  (micro-ilm).	  Poplar	  (4567-­‐!"#$).	  
	  
	  	   !"#	  
Nottinghamshire	  Archives	  	  PU	  S	  %/%/'-­‐!.	  Southwell	  (-./!-­‐!").	  	  
Powys	  County	  Archives	  Of4ice	  	  M/G/B/%/&.	  Llanfyllin	  (&%1&-­‐!").	  M/G/B/%/&'.	  Llanfyllin	  (&%2%-­‐!").	  	  
Newspapers	  and	  periodicals	  
Asylum	  Journal	  
Bradford	  Observer	  
British	  Medical	  Journal	  






Hampshire	  Telegraph	  and	  Sussex	  Chronicle	  
Illustrated	  Dramatic	  and	  Sporting	  News	  











Pall	  Mall	  Gazette	  




History,	  Gazetteer	  and	  Directory	  of	  Nottinghamshire	  (Shef&ield:	  William	  White,	  !""#-­‐!).	  
Kelly’s	  Directory	  of	  Nottinghamshire	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co,	  %&&%).	  
Pigot	  &	  Co’s	  Royal	  National	  and	  Commercial	  Directory	  and	  Topography	  of	  the	  
Counties	  of	  Berkshire,	  Buckinghamshire,	  Cornwall,	  Devonshire,	  
Dorsetshire,	  Gloucestershire,	  Hampshire,	  Herefordshire,	  Monmouthshire,	  
Oxfordshire,	  Somersetshire,	  Wiltshire,	  and	  North	  and	  South	  Wales	  (London	  &	  Manchester:	  Isaac	  Slater,	  5677).	  
Post	  Of(ice	  Directory	  of	  Derbyshire	  and	  Nottinghamshire	  With	  Maps	  Engraved	  
Expressly	  for	  the	  Work	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co,	  /011).	  
Post	  Of(ice	  Directory	  of	  Durham	  and	  Northumberland	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co.,	  !"#$).	  
Post	  Of(ice	  Directory	  of	  Essex,	  Herts,	  Kent,	  Middlesex,	  Surrey	  and	  Sussex.	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co,	  /011).	  
Post	  Of(ice	  Directory	  of	  Nottinghamshire	  (London:	  Kelly	  &	  Co,	  /012).	  
	  	   !"#	  
Royal	  National	  Commercial	  Directory	  of	  North	  and	  South	  Wales	  (Manchester:	  Isaac	  Slater,	  ,--.).	  
Royal	  National	  Commercial	  Directory	  of	  the	  Northern	  Counties,	  Vol.	  I,	  Comprises	  
the	  Counties	  of	  Durham,	  Northumberland	  and	  Yorkshire	  (Manchester:	  Isaac	  Slater,	  ,-..).	  
The	  Durham	  Directory	  and	  Almanack	  (Durham:	  George	  Walker,	  !"#$).	  
The	  Durham	  Directory	  and	  Almanack	  (Durham:	  George	  Walker,	  2334).	  
The	  Post	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